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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of this dissertation is to examine
the influence of the philosophy of personalistic ideal-
ism upon the theology of Augustus Hopkins Strong (1836-
1921).
1. The Nature of the Problem
More specifically, the study will inquire into the
factors which encouraged Dr. Strong T s appropriation of
philosophical premises issuing from personalistic ideal-
ists; will seek to fix the precise extent to which he
modified his earlier theology in view of such influences;
and will evaluate the satisfactoriness of the theological
position at which he finally arrived.
2. The Importance of the Study
The appropriateness of such an inquiry is evident
from several factors. The Baptists are, numerically, the
strongest non-Catholic religious body in the United States
and, among Northern Baptists, no theological treatise has
been more influential than Strong f s Systematic Theology .-*-
1. Strong has been ranked with William Newton Clarke,
Alvah Hovey and George W. Northrop as one of the
four most influential Baptist theological teachers
of his period (Malone Led.], DOAB, XVIII, 142).
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But denominational considerations aside, there is the
still broader question whether personalistic idealism,
in the specific turn which Strong gave to it, furnishes
a satisfactory metaphysics for the Christian interpreta-
tion of reality.^" "Ethical monism"—as Strong preferred
to designate his view—will be seen to involve the whole
gamut of theological structure, from the initial problem
of religious knowledge, to the setting forth of the inner
content of the successive doctrines of Christian faith.
The principles here involved bring to the forefront the
question of the ultimate relationship of philosophy and
theology.
The proposed study, therefore, concerns much more
than the self-consistency of the theological system of a
prominent American theologian. It inquires be}rond this
into a framework which that theologian viewed as the reso
lution of the doctrinal tensions within contemporary Pro-
testantism, and which he felt to enrich the cardinal con-
victions of the historic Christian faith. In the person-
alistic view, as formulated by Strong, he detected
a mighty movement of the Spirit of God*..
preparing the way for the reconciliation of
1. Knudson has pointed out that statements of the Chris-
tian view have been attempted within the general frame
work of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Hegelianism, and
now Personalistic Idealism (POP, 254). Strong’s view
is, of course, but one possible formulation of person-
alistic metaphysics, but it is with this specific
statement that this dissertation is concerned.
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diverse creeds and parties by disclosing
their hidden ground of unity.
^
He expressed the conviction that ethical monism is Bib-
lically supported, 2 and speculated that its late acknowl-
edgment is to be accounted for because, in the divine in-
struction of the race, preparatory doctrines needed first
to be taught as a safeguard against misinterpretation of
the monistic view upon its appearance.
^
Did ethical monism prove, in fact, to placate both
the evangelical and liberal camps within Protestantism,
and if not, why not? Did it, in fact, make good its
promise of an enrichment of the Christian view? Did it
afford a coherent framework for the doctrinal structure
of the Biblical outlook? Such are the important issues
which overarch the research effort confronting us.
These questions look beyond a subject which itself holds
1. CCEM, 22 (all references in this dissertation are to
the writings of Augustus Hopkins Strong, unless other-
wise indicated). The complete statement is: "This
universal tendency toward monism, is it a wave of un-
belief set agoing by an evil intelligence in order to
overwhelm and swamp the religion of Christ? Or is it
a mighty movement of the Spirit of God, giving to
thoughtful men, all unconsciously to themselves,
a deeper understanding of truth and preparing the way
for the reconciliation of diverse creeds and parties
by disclosing their hidden ground of unity? I con-
fess that I have come to believe the latter alterna-
tive to be possibly, and even probably, the correct
one, and I am inclined to welcome the new philosophy
as a most valuable helper in interpreting the word
and the works of God."
2. CCEM, 47. 3. CCEM, 50.
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4no little historical interest—the influence of a contem-
porary philosophical view upon a Biblical theologian of
prominence—to the deeper concern of an adequate Chris-
tian metaphysics.^
3. The Sources Aiding Research
A preliminary explanation concerning the implication
of the title of the dissertation may clarify the research
limitation imposed by it. The designation of "personalis-
tic idealism” is applied with some reserve, but, it will
appear, nonetheless justifiably. The reserve grows out of
the circumstance that at the specific time of Strong 1 s
idealistic affinities, personalism or personalistic ideal-
ism was not a common designation, and Strong himself as-
signed the phrase "ethical monism" to his view. But in
our day the words "personalistic idealism" serve to iden-
tify one’s position almost at once as involving a spirit-
ual view of reality, whereby all existence is regarded as
of the nature of conscious experience, and an insistence
that individual selves are not parts of God, as attested
by man’s freedom and his moral failure. Since this combi-
nation of "metaphysical monism" and "psychological dual-
ism"—to use Strong's characterization—is represented to-
day by the personalistic idealists, and since it was es-
1. CCEM, 22: "Monism is, without much doubt, the philoso-
phy of the future, and the only question would seem to
be whether it shall be an ethical and Christian, or a
non-ethical and anti-Christian monism Let us ten-
tatively accept the monistic principle and give to it
a Christian interpretation. Let us not be found fight-
ing against God."
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poused influentially in Strong 1 s day by Borden P. Bowne,
who applied the term "personalism” to his system in 1905,^
the designation "personalistic idealism" is employed in
the interest of clarity from a contemporary perspective.
The writer has found no earlier effort to trace the
change in Strong’s theology which followed upon his ac-
ceptance of "the combination of psychological dualism and
metaphysical monism," nor to evaluate the self-consistency
of the final theology to which it led the Baptist theolo-
gian.
Nevertheless, there exist aids to research which have
eliminated many of the difficulties which night ordinarily
confront an inquiry of this nature.
The paucity of secondary sources has its compensation
in the fact that Strong was himself a rather prolific wri-
ter. This, indeed, might prove a barrier to effective
study, were the material such that it indicated a constant
modification of viewpoint, with no relief for theological
fluidity. But the fact is that Strong’s writings appeared
1. McConnell, BPB, 131. McConnell considers the reasons
for the slow acceptance of the term "personalism"
(BPB, 133).
2. CCEM, 36. By "metaphysical monism" Strong asserted,
as we shall see, that all reality is the externaliza-
tion of the divine thought by an act of will, and is
spiritual; by "psychological dualism" he affirmed that
human persons are not parts of God, but are possessed
of a relative independence, although divinely created.
Whether the two positions were satisfactorily and con-
sistently maintained remains for later consideration.
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6at such intervals, 1 that the materials for our study have
been given us in a rather useful form, whatever effort
may be required for adequate interpretation and synthesis.
Strong T s initial Lectures on Theology , which appeared
in I676 and constituted his first systematic effort,
reflect the early theology, essentially fundamentalist in
its insistences, to which he adhered at that time. During
the ten years of its class use, students employed inter-
leaved copies, in which lecture comments not contained in
the printed type were inserted. At the termination of
that decade Strong ’s Systematic Theology appeared in 1336,
with revisions in 1339, 1390, 1392 and 1396. Then came
the essays on ethical monism, appearing first in theolo-
gical journals in 1394 and later included, in 1399, in
Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism
,
which most nearly
approximated a well-rounded statement of the newer view.
On top of this came, in 1907, the final revision of
Systematic Theology ,-^ in the light of the per sonalisti
c
approach, which revision afforded at the same time the
more or less standard conservative textbook in theology
among Northern Baptists. If not on every page, at least
1. See bibliography under A. H. Strong.
2. Even a special typography to distinguish the main
points of Strong’s view, the comments, the illustrations
and proof texts are used in several works.
3. Referred to hereafter as ST(1907), to distinguish it
from prior editions. This revision was published in
one and three volume editions. The third volume, how-
ever, did not appear until 1909. By 194$, 20,000
copies of the one-volume, and 3,000 copies of the three-
volume edition had been printed.
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in the treatment of almost every major doctrine, Strong
disclosed in this work the implications of his ethical
monism. The essentials of that position he emphasized
again in his valedictory primer, What Shall I Believe? ,
which appeared in 1922, the year after his death.
The writer has had a long-standing familiarity with
some of these sources, especially with Strong’s theologi-
cal magnum opus , by virtue of former service as professor
of systematic theology in Northern Baptist Theological
Seminary, where that work has been for many years, as in
some other conservative Baptist seminaries, the standard
theology text. This has afforded an opportunity to
evaluate Strong’s final systematization in a careful
manner on numerous occasions, so that the convictions
recorded here have impressed themselves in some degree
across the years.
Leaving aside the primary sources for this study, it
may be remarked that while no lengthy and thorough study
of the influence of personalistic idealism on Strong’s
theology is - availabl e, secondary sources of some impor-
tance do exist. Such materials are t o be found in the
theological jourmls, where in the reviews of Strong’s
books and in the replies to his essays, contemporary
1. In the administrative files at Northern Baptist Theo-
logical Seminary the author also located the manuscript
of the 1921 Wilkinson Lectures delivered there. This
was one of the last lecture series given by Strong pre-
vious to his death on November 29 of that year.
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thinkers in the areas of theology and philosophy of reli-
gion voiced their sentiments pro and con. These reviews
have been examined, and references to them will be made
in appropriate places in the text.
The shelves and files of libraries crucial for this
particular project have been examined also, especially that
at Colgate Rochester Divinity School, the parent institution
which Strong served from 1872 to 1912 as president and pro-
fessor of theology. Further research was pursued at Widener
Library of Harvard University, at Andover-Harvard Library
of Harvard Divinity School, at Union Theological Seminary
in New York City, and at Hoose Library of Philosophy of
University of Southern California. The old files of
The Examiner and The Watchman were perused in the New
York City offices of the national Northern Baptist maga-
zine, The Watc hma n-Exam iner .
In addition, the writer has corresponded periodically
with Dr. John Henry Strong, a son of the theologian upon
wham the study focuses and a retired Baptist pastor now
residing in LaCanada, California. This correspondence
yielded both suggestion and counsel, and was followed by
personal interview.
Thus the difficulties which confront a comprehensive
research project of this nature were mitigated to some ex-
tent by the availability of peculiarly helpful research
aids. But the task of unravelling complex philosophical
influences has remained. Ideological changes frequently
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accrue as a result of interacting and parallel motiva-
tions, and here the personal unavailability of the theo-
logian whom we study precludes a direct interrogation*
But substantial inferences can be made, and sometimes
indubitable guides have been found. One example concerns
the relationship of Strong 1 s acceptance of theistic
evolution to his espousal of ethical monian. The sources
leave no doubt that evolutionism preceded monism in
Strorg ’ s convictions, and he later affirmed that the
acceptance of ethical monism was encouraged by considera-
tions other ”than for the sake of its Christian explana-
tion of evolution.”'1' The factors contributory to theo-
logical change are not always as few nor as unrelated as
men are tempted to portray them. But the difficult task
of discerning the ologi cal elements which owe their encour-
agement to personalist ic idealism, frcm the non-per sonalis-
tic motivations in the theological world of Strong T s day,
gains assistance from the fact that Strong was a prolific
writer, that he constantly revised these writings in a form
which reflects the changes, and that his lata? writings con-
tain full quotations from Lotze, Ladd, Bowne and others2 at
1. CCEM, 73.
2. Doubtless a partial motivation for this was the desire
to reply effectively to critics of a monistic position.
Strong wrote: "From much recent writing it might be in-
ferred that the combination of psychological dualism and
metaphysical monism is a novel ana absurd speculation.
Those who occupy themselves in this criticism vould do
well to study Lotze and Ladd and Upton. Ladd at New
Haven. ..and Upton at Manchester .. .are both following the
German Lotze, the leader of the higher thought of our
time” (CCEM, 56) n
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points of ideological affinity and disagreement, that his
studies of the theology of the great poets interact es-
pecially with the problem of pantheism and its avoidance,
and that Strong has left us, in the course of his writings,
a considerable heritage of autobiographical materials. 1
4. The Method of the Project
Fortunately, a chronological approach to Strong 1 s con-
victions affords an ideal opportunity for ideological con-
trasts also. There is, as we shall see, the earliest
period, which reflects beliefs uncompromisingly fundamen-
talist; there is a middle period, when under the pressure
of the modern philosophy of science he supported an evolu-
tionary view, coupling this with theism in its traditional
form; there is the later period, when the affirmation of
an intensified divine immanence issued in his ethical monism.
The method of this study, then, will be at once chron-
ological and ideological. We shall inquire first into
Strong's early, middle, and late conviction, seeking to in-
dicate the basic reasons for modification, with a view to
establishing in clear manner the precise influence of per-
sonalistic idealism upon his theology, and also of weigh-
ing the satisfactoriness of the outlook for which Strong
finally declared.
1. OHCT is prefaced by two autobiographical addresses de-
livered in 1913, when Strong had completed his fortieth
year as president and professor of systematic theology
at Rochester Theological Seminary.
v/crinl'ii i8 IjoOi J&bl lo fcjnicxj
.re
. }.
.
.
• ' 1 0 :
; L't* . f t ' -i
,
c t
L ‘
'
-
•
• t
'S'ISC
'
<
J . . •- ,
’
•
.
~ *; 0 . , t
.
-
< t
l
'
. o J
,
•
•
'
-
i.
r
. -3
- l
t
T c - . r -v : - -
'
’
‘
^
i o'i
'
; o ' r ; . "ic * • tv'' 2 •! • • w ,t £
.
;
ba'isvil
-
.
CHAPTER II
THE EARLIER THEOLOGY OF AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG
By the earlier theology of Augustus Hopkins Strong,
into which this chapter will inquire, we intend the period
prior to 1S94 when Strong first espoused ethical monism.
It is the ideological rather than the chronological factor,
therefore, which affords the principle of division, setting
in clearer relief the two periods in which Strong 1 s writings
reflect first the traditional stress on divine immanence as
found in evangelical theology (IS76-IS94 ) > and then the
greater stress on divine immanence which characterizes
idealistic thought (1&94-1922).
This early period, prior to the clear impact of per-
sonalistic idealism upon his theology, may be considered
conveniently by attention to Strong 1 s theological heritage
as a youth, his early conversion experience, his divinity
studies preparatory to the ministry, and then his initial
years as a teacher of theology. The purpose of this study
requires not so much an abundance of detail, as an alert-
ness to such influences which will anticipate the modifica-
tion of Strong* s views, for subsequent comparison and con-
trast with the specific tenets of personalistic idealism.
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1. The Heritage of a Christian Home
In his autobiographical addresses, Strong relates for
us the circumstances of his birth (August 3, 1836) and up-
bringing in a Christian home.^ His father had been con-
verted during the great Rochester campaigns of the evange-
2list Charles G. Finney. The oldest religious experience
in Strong’s memory was the occasion when, at the tender
age of six, he knelt with his mother in a dimly lighted
closet as she tried to teach him to pray.^ Again, he
never quite forgot a snow-storm experience at the age of
ten, when his father led him through the deep snow-drifts
and impressed him, on a Sunday when very few worshippers
managed to get to church, with the importance of faithful
attendance.^ At twelve years, on New Year’s eve, he ex-
perienced intense sense of guilt and fear of judgment,
and resolved to begin a Christian life, but the festivi-
ties of the following day, he writes, ’’banished the reso-
lutions from my mind, and I had no conviction of sin for
quite a number of years afterward. ”5 His intellectual
awakening he records as having occurred at fourteen, when
Latin classics began to intrigue him, and then other
literary masterpieces. But apparently no significant
1. OHCT, 5. 2. OHCT, 12. 3. OHCT, 5.
4. OHCT, 5, 6: ”We had a prayer meeting, quorum magnaque
pars fui
,
and never since that time have I been able
to be quite comfortable away from church on a Sunday
morning.
”
5. OHCT, 6.
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spiritual crises followed upon his college days at Yale,
where in 1657 he was to receive the A. B.. degree as a
Phi Beta Kappa graduate.
2. The Conversion and Accompanying Struggle
The early college days were, on Strong 1 s own estimate,
neither academically nor spiritually promising.^ To what
extent the collegiate studies permanently shaped his meta-
physical outlook can hardly be determined from materials
available to us, although it is known, of course, that in
those days Dr. Noah Porter, who defended conservative Chris-
tianity and realism, was Clark Professor of Metaphysics and
2Moral Philosophy in Yale College.
1. OHCT, 10: "Concluding that devotion to scholarship was
not the thing for me, I fell into irregular habits and
associations; and, if I had religious thoughts and ideas
at all at the beginning of my college course, I lost
them very speedily after that course began. In my un-
godly and half-dissipated course I was a model of merely
selfish and worldly ambition. I was never intoxicated
in my life, but I was on the verge of evil; I knew that
if I went very much farther I would be damned; and yet,
until just before the spring vacation in my junior year,
no single man in my class and no single man in college
ever said one word to me about the subject of religion.”
2. One of Dr. Strong 1 s two sons, Dr. John Henry Strong,
comments: "That Father, brought up at Yale on Porter 1 s
The Human Intellect » was deeply influenced by Lotze and
Bowne, I well remember; but he gave us in class the re-
sults rather than his mental processes” (Letter to the
writer, June 19, 1946). Porter T s well-known volume
first appeared in 1666, but he had doubtless emphasized
its essential content for many years, having held the
Clark professorship from 1646. Regarding Porter, we
learn that "he had little aptitude for teaching, though
some of his later graduate students professed much in-
debtedness to him. The undergraduates respected and
liked him, but he awakened in them little interest in
his subject” (Malone Ted.], DOAB, XV, 93).
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But in Strong’s junior year, one March afternoon in
front of the chapel just as the college bell rang for
evening prayer, Wilder Smith, a student who for two-and-
a-half years had sat next to Strong in recitation room,
placed a hand upon his shoulder and said intently:
”0 Strong, I wish you were a Christian. Strong could
not escape those words. During the spring vacation his
young lady cousin, then visiting at the home of his par-
ents, invited him to hear Finney, under whom his father
had been converted, and whom he had himself heard once in
Oberlin. That night, in response to the pulpit invita-
tion, Strong determined upon a Christian life.^ But he
remained spiritually restless, despite Bible-reading, per-
sonal prayer, and prayer-meeting attendance, all of which
failed to yield the peace of soul for which he yearned.
1. OHCT, 11. Strong narrates that years later, when he
spoke to Smith about the incident, the latter could
not recall it. ’’But that one word never left me until
I gave my heart to God.”
2. OHCT, 12: ”1 do not remember what the sermon was,
but I do remember that great, stalwart man standing up
at the close of the service, with his eyes fixed ap-
parently upon me, and saying: ’If there is anyone in
this congregation who thinks he ought to begin to serve
God, let him rise out of his place and go down the
aisle into the basement. There will be some ministers
there who will talk with him on the subject of religion.
It was like a thunderbolt to me. I did not expect any-
thing like that. But I somehow felt that my hour had
come." Downstairs, Strong told the pastor of the church
that he would "now begin to serve God. . .looking to God
for light" (OHCT, 13).
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Three weeks of spiritual struggle ensued. Though he
consecrated his life by prayer, gave up wrong associa-
tions and habits, read his Bible, and even witnessed to
and prayed with unconverted students, he lacked assurance
to such an extent that, attending a college prayer meeting,
he stated publicly: "My friends, I am not a Christian;
I do not pretend anything of the sort, but I want to be;
can you do anything to help me?"^ But, while some of the
students rallied to encourage him, it was not until Strong
read by lamplight the words, "Wherefore come ye out from
among them, and be ye separate, and touch not the unclean
thing, and I will be a Father to you, and ye shall be my
sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty," that he
felt a real tie between him and God. Strong appears to re-
gard this as his conversion night.
3
3. The Formal Theological Studies
Before proceeding to subsequent spiritual experiences
which Strong recounts and interprets for us, it may be well
to remember that these come to us not from any diary of
those early years, but rather as the recollections of a ma-
ture theologian. ^ It is impossible to be certain, there-
fore, of the various factors at work in the selection and
1. OHCT, 16. 2. 2 Cor. 6:17. 3. OHCT, 17.
4. The two introductory autobiographical essays in OHCT
were delivered in 1913, when Strong had completed
forty years as President and Professor of Biblical Theo-
logy at Rochester Theological Seminary.

rejection of particular experiences. Yet the narration
of these inner experiences, in the absence of a diary, can
hardly be better authenticated than by the subject’s auto-
biographical memoirs of a later date.
In relating his earlier religious activities, Strong
affirmed that from those experiences he derived certain
’’lessons in theology” and that the experiences themselves
are related for the specific purpose of showing ”how my
views of evangelical doctrine have been necessarily deter-
mined by the circumstances of my individual history.
Thus, we are told that the weeks of disturbing spirit-
ual struggle which elapsed between his attendance at the
Finney meeting and the final assurance of conversion,
taught him his initial lesson in theology, that of the
2depth and enormity of sin .
i. The Arminian Antecedents
The recurrence of old habits, and his inability to
cope with them in his own strength, declared Strong, led
him on to a second theological lesson, man’s need of God’s
regenerating grace .
Thus far he had come, he remarked, prior to the com-
mencement of formal divinity training, and, he added,
1. OHCT, 4.
2. OHCT, 14-15: "It was my first lesson in theology, and
it prepared me to accept from my own experience, as I
afterward did, Doctor Shedd’s statement that ’sin is a
nature and that nature is guilt’.” The importance of
this deep conviction of the seriousness of sin will be
seen in Strong’s subsequent protest against pantheism
as precluding such an insistence.
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please notice that ray experience was thus
far a purely Arminian experience. I had
yet to learn the truth in Calvinism. In
ray conversion, so far as I can remember,
I had no thought of the Holy Spirit or of
Christ. I had no idea that God was work-
ing in me to will and to do
;
I was only
bent on working out ray own salvation.
There was no reliance on Christ’s atone-
ment; I was trusting in ray own power to
begin and to continue the service of God
...As he had taught me the greatness of my
sin, so he next, taught me that salvation
is of the Lord . 1
The pre-seminary spiritual experiences, then, took
place in a predominantly Arminian context; the stirring
ministry and mood of Charles G. Finney stood in the back-
ground of Strong’s Christian heritage, both through his
father’s conversion and his own. But, having yielded his
life for Christian service, graduation from Yale in 1357
meant the beginning of divinity studies at Rochester Theo-
logical Seminary, where he was to graduate two years later. 2
1. OHCT, 13-19. Strong did not here intend to suggest that
’’thought of the Holy Spirit or of Christ” are exclusively
Calvinistic possessions but that, so far, his thoughts
centered in the human rather than divine elements m his
conversion. At the end of his life Strong recalled:
”If ever there was a purely Arminian or Pelavian conver-
sion, mine was such an one... Except for the fact that I
had a sort of traditional and theoretical belief... in
the background of ray consciousness, my conversion might
have been a purely Unitarian or agnostic reliance upon
the love and truth of God. This fact makes me tolerant
of Unitarian Christianity, although I now recognize it as
an infantile faith” (WSIB, 36, 33).
2. ”1 knew, from the very moment of my conversion, that I
must serve God in the ministry. So I went to Rochester”
(OHCT, 19). Elsewhere he stated that the magnificent
pulpit ability, exact statement and love of truth of
Rochester’s president, Dr. Ezekiel G. Robinson, drew him
there for study (Art. [1396}
,
163). With an experien-
tial reference, Strong also added that he ”had another
source of instruction. . .in a little mission congregation
in the neighborhood of Rochester” (OHCT, 19).

ii. The Calvinistic Formulation
The experientially-grounded lessons in theology,
which Strong later recounted in their chronological un-
folding in his long life, came now to interact with divini-
ty studies. In those days, Ezekiel G. Robinson, whose main
emphasis was Calvinistic, was professor of Biblical theo-
logy and there is every indication that the transition from
Arminianism to Calvinism in Strong’s thinking came about,
or at least was well underway, in seminary days.
Strong's third lesson in theology he dated to his sem-
inary years, when he led a young woman to Christ after speak-
ing at the little mission church which he pastored, on the
fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. She found such assurance,
upon trust in the substitutionary death of Christ, that
Strong learned from the experience, he reported, a third
lesson in Christian doctrine: that only the objective
atonement of Jesus Christ, only Christ’s sufferings upon
the cross, can furnish the ground of our acceptance with
God .1
When Strong completed his seminary course in 1859, he
intended to go abroad as a foreign missionary, but a hem-
orrhage of the lungs prompted physicians to press him to
spend two years in the open air and travel. So Strong made
an extended tour of Europe and Palestine, visited in Ger-
many and studied the language, and gathered a library
1. OHCT, 21.
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of German books. ^ Falling in with the current of pleasure-
2
lovers, he almost lost the desire for Christian service*
But behind him, as a living memory, were his theological
studies at Rochester, and behind that the conversion ex-
perience which steadied him.
iii. The Theology of Strong T s Teacher
E. G. Robinson served Rochester Theological Seminary
as professor of Biblical theology from 1853 to 1872, and
as president from i860 to 18?2. When Strong sat in Robin-
sons classes in 1858 and 1859, it is hardly likely that
anyone imagined that the young scholar would, in 1872,
when Robinson was to become president of Brown University,
succeed his teacher in both positions, becoming from 1872
to 1912 president and professor of Biblical theology at
Rochester *
It was from Robinson that Strong first learned theo-
logy as a discipline* Yet in his autobiographical notes,
1* Nothing indicates that Strong pursued formal studies in
Germany, but his frequent quotation from German scholars
disclosed a familiarity with their writings. His
letters appeared in the Rochester Democrat published by
his father. They commented on the university lectures
in Berlin as about to begin, 347 courses of them* on the
drunkenness and profanity of German students, ana on the
spectacles they wore; and on the ability of Tholuck,
Julius Mflller and Roediger at Halle— ”the three of them
alone would make a great Faculty.” He mentioned also
the unconvincingness of German preaching: ”The last
generation that numbered a Schleiermacher
,
a Neander,
and an Olshausen.
. .began a great progress in German
religious thinking, but even this progress will be obli-
terated unless there is a higher power to carry it for-
ward* Tholuck says that there are no young men to fill
the place of the orthodox theologians who are just gone.”
2. OHCT, 22*
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Strong made hardly a mention of his studies with Robin-
son.
1
That those essays have a strong theological con-
cern does not minimize the circumstance* But several
disclosures bearing on Strong’s major theological rela-
tions to Robinson are afforded in an appreciative chapter
titled "Dr. Robinson as a Theologian" which Strong con-
tributed to the memorial volume Ezekiel Gilman Robinson :
An Autobiography, With a Supplement by H. L. Wayland and
Critical Estimates shortly after Robinson’s death in 1894*
There Strong recorded that it was i n Robinson’s class-
room, under his searching questions and discussions, that
he experienced his "intellectual awakening*"^ More than
this, he declared that "to my teacher and predecessor I
owe more than I owe to any one else outside of my own
family circle. "3 Yet he noted that
of dogmatic instruction in theology in 1857-
59 there was little. His brief dictations
constituted not so much a system as a series
of suggestions to stimulate inquiry. Our
teacher appeared to be feeling his way along,
and his great anxiety seemed to be that each
of his pupils should feel his own way. No-
thing vexed him more than a lazy repetition
of traditional formulas.
. .He dictated. .. cau-
tious statements of the dominant orthodoxy,
with its more mechanical features greatly
softened down, and with the accompanying sug-
gestion of new points of view which logically
imply another and a better faith.
4
1. "A certain sternness and a rigorous attitude in the
matter of discipline is said to have cost Robinson the
affection of students, who though him lacking in
patience and tact and brusque in manner (Malone fed.3
,
DOAB, XVI, 43).
2. Art. (1896), 163. 3. Art. (1896), 163
.
4. Art. (1896), 164-165.
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Robinson 1 s lack of finality1 and of system, then, was
one factor. 2 But there was another, which will take on
special significance when, at a later point, Strong *s
early teaching is appraised theologically. For Strong
explained that, in order not to stifle the creative urge
on his own part, he did not lean heavily upon Robinson 1 s
writings and, in fact, avoided them, when he was called
as Robinson* s successor in 1872. These circumstances
might indicate that Robinson was not tremendously influ-
ential in shaping Strong* s theological outlook*
And yet, Strong himself precluded a hasty dismissal
of Robinson *s influence upon him. For when, a few months
before Robinson *s death in 1894 > Strong first carefully
scrutinized Robinson* s Christian Theology
,
his impression,
1. Strong elucidated that Robinson represented the tenden-
cies of Brown and Newton, rather than of Hamilton, from
which Robinson *s predecessor Dr. Maginnis (who took the
viewpoint of the Princeton school) had come. None of
Robinson* s teachers had been strongly conservative, but
neither Andover nor New Haven had won him for the new
theology. Yet Robinson resisted both what seemed to
him to be the arbitrariness and extemalism of the
Princeton theology of the covenants and the subjectiv-
ism of the non-conservative views.
2. Robinson was beginning his fifth year as professor of
Biblical theology at Rochester when Strong entered in
1857« From i860 to 1872 Robinson served also as presi-
dent, and then Brown called him to its presidency.
Strong remarked that Robinson had neither time nor
strength, under such circumstances, to mature with and
to publish his theological system. TTHe was not a ready
writer, and systematizing, with him, was a slow work...
But before his teaching at Rochester ended, his views
had to a considerable extent crystallized, and he had
proceeded a long way in the elaboration of his * Chris-
tian Theology » *» (Art. [1896] , 167).
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he tells us, was two -fold: first, the general weight and
correctness of Robinson’s theological teaching; seocnd,
the realization of the extent of his personal debt, of
which he was quite unaware, to Robinson’s instruction.
Strong acknowledged:
I am humbled to find how much of my own think-
ing that I thought original has been an uncon-
scious reproduction of his own... And the
ruling idea of his system—that stands out as
the ruling idea of mine; I did not realize un-
til now that I owed it almost wholly to him,-*-
Under those circumstances it seems obligatory to work
through Robinson’s Christian Theology for elements of sig
nificant similarity and difference, aware that Robinson’s
earlier teaching was less systematic, and that fifteen
years intervened between Strong’s studies and the public
appearance of Christian Theology
,
the bulk of which was
revised and printed during Robinson’s last year of
instruction at Rochester. ^ In the various editions of
his later writings, Strong quoted liberally from Robin-
son’s volume.
1. Art. (1896), 168.
2. The preface of the 1694 edition of CT (as Robinson’s
book which be referred to hereafter), which comprised
considerably less than four hundred copies, notes
that Ttwith the exception of pages 61-96, pp. 161-176
and pp. 305-320 which are reprinted almost without
change, the first 320 pages are the identical sheets
which were printed in 1672,” In 1672, Strong recalled
320 pages of the work were printed, but Robinson
stopped with the subject of regeneration, and his new
duties at Brown never permitted him to finish the
desired revisions, although the additional notes were
later included (Art. [1696]
,
167).
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Robinson 1 s theology was quite substantially on the
evangelical side, and it will be necessary, for purposes
of this study, only to indicate those high points which
afford interesting comparison and contrast with Strong’s
position. It does not follow, of course, that in cases
of agreement between the two theologians, Robinson must
always be made the occasion, as Strong 1 s teacher, of the
latter ! s beliefs, although the circumstances in that
case surely afforded Strong encouragement, as he himself
acknowledged, in the views which he held.
Robinson’s very inaugural address, titled "Experi-
mental Theology,"^- was studded with an emphasis on the
significance of Christian experience as well as of doc-
trine which is often reflected in Strong’s outlook. Not
only with regard to Robinson’s traditional doctrinal
affirmations, and in modifications of these, but also in
the final appeal to ethical monism, Strong contended that
he had found anticipations in his teacher’s theological
views.
IT CT, 355-367. Robinson stressed in this address the need
"of earnest regard to that experimental knowledge of the
doctrines of Christianity, which, if Christianity is to
be of any practical avail to us, must always be found in
the heart of the believer" (CT, 356). Christian doc-
trine was not reasoned out, but was divinely revealed;
yet the prophets and apostles felt out (i.e.
,
made their
own by experience) the revealed truth (CT, 357). "A man’s
real creed will always be just what he has experienced,
and no more" (CT, 353)® Yet Robinson added carefully
that experience has no authority of its own; the Bible
does, whereas the authority of experience is derivative
(CT, 360).
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(1). Theology
Robinson defined theology as "the science which
treats of God.”^ But Christianity is "distinctively a
Revealed Religion," and "its one direct and controlling
source, to which the decisive appeal must always be made,
2is the Sacred Scriptures," Yet "the Church and the Scrip-
tures are authorities which can never be justly or safely
divided, "3 contrary to both Romanists and ultra-Protestants,
His theory of inspiration was broad The inspiration
1. Robinson, CT, 1 (this volume will be referred to subse-
quently in this section simply as CT, in order to avoid
unnecessary repetition). "The Christian theologian...
is strictly concerned with the principles and doctrines
of the Christian religion alone, or with the convictions
embosomed in the Christian consciousness, resolved into
formulas in the creeds of the church, and referable to a
formal Revelation, which has been authenticated as
authoritative and divine" (CT, 2).
2. CT, 3* Robinson affirmed that theology—not revelation—is
progressive, contrary to the rationalists (CT, 4, foot-
note ) •
3. CT, 6: "Without the Scriptures. . .the Church has no ac-
credited or infallible guide for herself, or authority
for her teachings; and without the Church, the Scrip-
tures have no visible, trustworthy expounder of their
meaning • ”
4* It is noteworthy that Robinson wrfcte of defects, not
errors, and then proceeds to justify these. But Strong
later pointed out that while higher criticism was not
rife in Robinson’s day, "the principle and spirit of
it, so far as it is theistic and reverent, are
Dr. Robinson’s own, and his whole conception of inspi-
ration is surprisingly like that which has of late
become so current" (Art. [l$96J, 171). Robinson, he
added, discarded all theories of the method of inspira-
tion, holding that the whole church was inspired, not
the writers alone. As against the prevailing proof-
text theology, Robinson found inspiration in the Bible
as a whole, rather than in its separate parts; the
organic unity with its analogy of faith was important,
and hence errors in historical and scientific detail
were not viewed as destructive (Art. Cl^96j[
,
172 )«
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of the Scriptures is not invalidated by "any of the liter-
ary, logical, scientific or historical defects which
modern criticism have made apparent.""^ The claim that the
Bible has errors in cosmogony and cosmology is "founded in
an attempt to interpret the orientalisms of Genesis accord-
ing to the exact and scientific rules of the occidental
mind" and the contention that there are statistical errors
forgets that "in rude ages and among semi-civilized peoples,
like those of the early periods of the Jewish history, exag-
gerations and employment of round numbers always prevail.
The imprecatory psalms are not to be judged in the light of
fuller Christian revelation, but were the necessary vehicle
in those times for the divine ideas.
^
Mankind possesses a natural knowledge of God and of
his will which "so far as it is positive and indubitable,
cannot but be authoritative."^ Natural theology, however,
should not serve as the basis of revealed theology; nor,
on the other hand, should it be disregarded. 5 These are
two sources of truth, but the Bible interprets, supple-
ments and completes the prior revelation of nature.^*
The Bible is viewed as a corrective for both philo-
sophy and science. We must guard "lest our Theology should
anywhere substitute the suggestions of our Philosophy for
the plain declarations of Scripture. "7 True theology and
I- CT, 42. 2. CT, 44. 3. CT, 45. 4. CT, 3.
5. CT, a. 6. CT, 9. 7. CT, 14.
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true science must harmonize, but before accommodating
Scripture to the demands of science T?we must first justly
demand that the claims of the science be established be-
yond dispute*”^
The Scriptures disclose modes of existence and per-
sonal relations TTfor the judging of which finite minds
have no experiential criteria, and for even the under-
standing of which they have no correlative knowledge
whence the omniscient Spirit in his revelation could draw
2
metaphorical or typical forms of thought” —as, for ex-
ample, the doctrines of the Trinity and of the two natures
of Christ. Yet the Scriptures are often silent, due per-
haps to our incapacity to understand. Yet "there are cer-
tain questions about which we are instinctively disposed
to be inquisitive, and to which, so far as we know, the
3
answer might have been intelligible.” As specific ex-
amples, Robinson cited the questions of God T s relation to
the material universe, the origin of sin, and the relation
of departed and living spirits.^"
1. CT, 15. Note, however, the following: ”But a help
which so far proves a master as to compel the discontin-
uance of interpretations that have existed for centuries
and to put meanings into the words of the Bible not be-
fore thought of, must be regarded, however ancillary its
position, as having some kind of authority and some kind
of right to speak in its own name” (CT, 3, footnote).
2. CT, 21. 3. CT, 22.
4. Curiously, Strong’s final theology concentrated special-
ly on the first of these problems. Robinson had suggest
ed that, in view of Biblical silence, ”the prudent theo-
logian will be cautious of conjectures and theories”
(CT, 22).
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The natural arguments for God were proclaimed inade-
quate, Robinson was one of the first American theologians
to criticize the theistic proofs in Kantian fashion.'*'
The weakness of the cosmological argument is "its inability
to show beyond a doubt, that the Cosmos is not an endless,
self-contained succession of phenomena, an infinite series
2
of causes and effects.” The design argument proclaims
the existence of a supreme Mind.^ The ontological argument
does not escape a petitio principii , as also the historical
argument.^ The moral argument, Robinson implied, has value,
yet he did not carefully evaluate it. But the inadequacy
of natural theology was clearly affirmed:
But of all the arguments that can be ad-
duced in proof of the existence of God, no
one can be said to be a demonstration, nor
can all combined suffice to convince a de-
termined atheist. The evidence of the di-
vine existence is not so much logical as
moral; it is adjusted rather to the ”eye of
the soul” than to the "logical faculty;”
if that eye be darkened God is not seen in
any evidence he may give of his being. The
validity of the evidence is not so much to
be tested by syllogisms as by analysis of
the moral consciousness.
If it be asked, what then is the value of
these formal proofs, we answer, all depends
on the use to be made of them. To one who
already believes in the existence of God,
1. Strong (Art. Cl&96]
,
169).
2. CT
,
49* Strong pointed out that while Robinson did not
refer to "immanent finality" he avoided a "carpenter
phraseology” in the interest of an organic, rather than
a mechanical, view of God T s relations to the world.
(Art. Cl396], 170).
3. CT, 53. 4. CT, 55.
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they have value as corroborative evidence
and corrective knowledge; to honest en-
quirers, though insufficient to convince
when taken simply, yet unitedly they are
well nigh irresistible; but in the con-
flict with theoretical atheism they can-
not be regarded as decisive.
It is apparent however—from such statements as that
the theistic proofs are "well nigh irresistible" to hon-
est inquirers—that Robinson did not work out critically
the relationship of general to special revelation in his
system, despite his introductory emphasis on the prior
significance of Biblical revelation for Christian theology.
Hardly was the treatment of natural theology concluded,
moreover, than he remarked, in treating of the origin of
our conceptions of God, that it is to the sacred Scriptures
more than to any or all other sources that
every unprejudiced mind must admit that
mankind have been indebted for all just
and worthy conceptions of God. It not
only supplies a corrective and supplement
to both the preceding (i.e., the outer
world of nature and the moral nature with-
in), but from its teachings respecting God,
understood, there can be no ap-
Robinson then argued that Christian experience is the prac-
tical testing of New Testament teaching, but "as experience,
1. CT
,
57* Strong interprets Robinson as giving a much
greater centrality to the moral argument, and it is pos-
sible that he later moved in that direction, substituting
an appeal to the moral consciousness for that to logical
argument (while yet regarding the latter as a valuable
stimulus to the former) (Art. [18961, 170). But, as we
shall see, the decisive appeal in CT is to the Scrip-
tures.
2. CT, 60.
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to be trustworthy, must be strictly a reflex of Scripture,
this source can only be subordinate and subsidiary to that
of the Bible.
Side by side with this emphasis, however, Robinson af-
firmed that "a corrective and regulative principle in all
our thinking of God is the idea of perfection” and adds
that "the idea of perfection evidently underlies the Scrip-
tural conceptions of Godoo.and that idea should be the con-
trolling one, whatever the process by which our present
2
conceptions of God are completed.”
It is not surprising, then, that in his treatment of
the nature of God, Robinson did not appeal consistently to
the revelational and philosophical spheres.
We are urged to believe in the personality of God be-
cause of the "naturalness and necessity of the idea," be-
cause the conception of personality "lies at the basis of
any just conception that we can have of physical law,"
because denial of God T s personality "involves us in self-
contradiction" and "leads inevitably to the most fearful
consequences" for the moral life, but there is no stress
on the significance of special revelation and covenant re-
lationship with God’s people as particularly relevant to
3the case for divine personality.
The unity of God, Robinson related, "has been thought
by some to be easily established as one of the doctrines of
1. CT, 61. 2. CT, 61. 3o CT, 62-63.
*03
'U : j
_
'
' '
- * •
• C
.
: .
•'
'
'
.
_
.c exes riJ 3b sail” x o aoxtf.qeono; sspbo
tt [ X vc
'
>vf’cr ’j.o ' v.srl rt. -
L
in. ££:• at o. Jx-
_ i
:
•
;
'
C
V
\ . ; 1 s
< t
lo 8 nJ"irfoob arl ii o one 8£ beilc xXgTjbJ'89 yX-i-t a ~ ov - oc vd
. -
c
* -
•
Natural Theology."1 After setting forth the philosophical
arguments he appended the Biblical references in which the
divine unity is taught, commenting that it is "more than
doubtful" that, apart from the Scriptures, such a truth
2
could have been reached by the philosophical approach.
The attributes of God, remarked Robinson, are "our
modes of conceiving him."1 But there is no sufficient
reason for regarding what is known to us only in relations
as on that account untrustworthy. 1 Yet the essential na-
ture of God, as distinct from the attributes, is something
of which our notion is "exceedingly dim and ill defined.
The essence of God is not identical "with any one, or with
1. GT, 64.
2. "The unaided Gentile mind was ever oscillating between
the pantheism of the philosophers and the polytheism of
the multitude. .. It is extremely doubtful if the Greek
and Roman classical writers had any definite concep-
tions of the Divine unity. This truth, which to en-
lightened minds is now apparently so self-evident, has
received recognition among men only after those reiter-
ated declarations and that enforcement by a most pro-
tracted and painful discipline, of which the Holy Scrip-
tures contain the details" (CT, 66).
3. GT, 67. 4. CT, 68.
3. CT, 68: "The question of the relation of the substance
or essence of matter to its qualities, differs from that
of the relation of attributes to the essence of a per-
sonal being, by just so much as matter differs from spir-
it, and the intelligent volitional power of a personal
being from the mechanical force of matter. We may know
equally well, by one concrete act of the mind, both the
substance and the qualities of matter, which are insep-
arable but we apprehend being only by its modes or rela-
tions which are variable and totally distinct from it-
self."
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all, of his attributes, but,.. the common subject of them
all.”'*' Again, "attributes do not represent distinguishable
properties in the Divine Essence;” so that ”to suppose that
we treat of essence. . .when we treat of attributes, is to con-
2
found God with our conceptions of him.” from this treat-
ment it is clear that Robinson did not work out a satisfac-
tory statement of the relationship between attributes and
essence in the divine nature, nor did he clearly formulate
the grounds for his affirmation that our knowledge of God
in his relations is trustworthy, if the attributes are not
to be closely related to the essence.^
1. CT, 69. 2. CT, 69.
3 o Robinson’s treatment of the attributes, complained
‘ Strong, "yields too much to the Kantian and Hamiltonian
relativity” (Art. C1&96J 173) despite his insistence
that the trustworthiness of all knowledge is overthrown
if conceptions relatively true to us are not positively
true in themselves. One of the essential differences be-
tween Strong and Robinson was in the making at this
point, for Strong complained that Robinson was hampered
by a wrong philosophy—Kant’s distinction between the phe-
nomenon and the unknowable ding-an-sich — in formulating
his statement of the divine attributes. "A more modern
and more correct philosophy admits no such element of in-
herent and eternal agnosticism. Though essence can be
known only through attributes, it is still true that, in
knowing attributes, we know essence. .. The reason why we
cannot perfectly know. God is that we cannot perfectly know
his attributes; not that knowledge of attributes does not
involve knowledge of essence. We do not fully know God’s
attributes because he has not fully revealed them, and
because we are not great enough to understand them. But
we do know them in part, and in just so far we know God”
(Art. D.396] 173-174).
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In dealing with the divine attributes, Robinson ar-
ranged a new classification, according to the order of re-
lations that make the attributes known, but he fluctuated
between a revelational and philosophical appeal. Although
the Scriptures abound in descriptions of divine omnipres-
ence, they "do not distinctly assert, though they plainly
imply, according to Jewish modes of thought, the divine Im-
mensity in space. The writers of Scripture set forth the
divine eternity as something which they "seem to have appre-
hended" by an act of regression and progression which moves
from past cycles of phenomenal changes through anticipated
future cycles, "finding at the last stage of thought, in ei-
ther direction, an existing Godhead, which, by a necessity
o
of thought, it pronounces eternal: Ro. 1:20." Again,
the Universe or Cosmos, with the necessary
idea of causation in mind, was doubtless the
source of the conceptions of the power,
knowledge, wisdom, presence, &c., of God,
and it is from the study of this source that,
under the guidance of the Scriptures, these„
conceptions can be completed and justified.
The metaphysical conception of absolute omnipotence, we are
told, is "only indirectly given in the Scriptures,"^ whereas
that God T s knowledge is infinite in degree and perfect in
kind is "clearly taught.
. .both by what is implied in their
idea of God, and by what is distinctly asserted. "5 The Scrip-
tures speak of an essential, personal omnipresence. 0
TTCT, 71. 2. CT, 71. 3. CT, 72. 4. CT, 73.
5. CT, 74. 6. CT, 75.
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The attribute of spirituality is, like that of omni-
presence, suggested only on reflection, Robinson remarked . 1
If the physical universe justify our concep-
tions of the power, knowledge, and presence
of God, the question, whether he be material
or spiritual, is also at once suggested.
This question, thrust on us by the very pro-
cess through which we justify our belief in
the Divine existence, has been in part anti-
cipated in treating of the Personality of God,
and it only remains for us at this point, sim-
ply to assure ourselves, on the authority of
Scripture, that God, everywhere present in the
Cosmos, is a Spirit totally distinct from mat-
ter, independent of it, and the almighty Creator
and Controller of it.
Holiness was named the fundamental moral attribute,
^
1. CT, 76. 2. CT, 76.
3. CT, 77. Strong called Robinson’s "greatest originality"
the singling out of holiness as fundamental and supreme,
an emphasis which Strong retained. Whereas Robinson had
opposed this to the New England theology, with its empha-
sis on the divine benevolence and love of being in gener-
al, and the Old School theology, which treated holiness
as the aggregate of all divine perfections, so that it had
no distinct significance, Strong later opposed it to Mod-
ernist theology. That holiness is not a form of love, but
love a form of holiness, Strong learned from Robinson.
Wrote Strong: "This view of holiness as the fundamental
attribute of God prepared the way for what was probably
the most impressive and inspiring part of his teaching; I
mean his idea of law as the expression of God’s holiness,
or the transcript of the moral nature of God. No man who
sat under Dr. Robinson’s instruction can ever forget the
scorn with which he treated the vulgar notion of law as
something devised or invented, a makeshift to meet an exi-
gency, an arbitrary enactment for the good of the creature,
founded in mere will, unmade as easily as made, suspended
or abrogated by fiat even as mere fiat had given it birth.
Nor can any student of his forget his sublime and perpetu-
al insistence on moral law as the eternal and unchangeable
expression of the nature of God and the relations between
God and his creatures,—an expression so eternal and un-
changeable that God himself cannot change his law without
ceasing to be God" (Art. [1396] 173). Added Strong: "By
these conceptions of holiness and law Dr. Robinson defined
his position as an Old-School man, and made it impossible
that he should have any other than an Old-School view of
sin" (Art. [1896] 173-176).
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both because of the testimony of conscience and of the
Bible .
God’s eternal purposes include "his decretive permission
of the free and opposing activities of his creatures# . .as
much. . .as. . .the ultimate and eternal ends to which the uni-
verse of beings and of matter alike contribute.”^ Many have
rejected the doctrine of decrees ’’not so much because unsup-
ported by Scripture, as on account of the supposed impossi-
bility of reconciling it with other recognized truths.”^
But revelation and reason together pronounce the last word
in such disputes:
But in answer to all objections, it should
be remembered that a doctrine is not to be
rejected because it may be misunderstood,
or may have been perverted; not because we
may be unable, in every respect, to harmon-
ize it with every other doctrine. The only
question to be asked is, does Revelation
teach it and reason justify it? If it be
both scriptural and rational, it is idle
to set it aside, or for any reason to at-
tempt to evade it.-'
The same two-fold appeal to revelation and reason,
without a detailed outworking of their relations, was found
in Robinson’s treatment of creation: ’’Creation is strictly
a biblical idea and follows naturally, if not necessarily,
from that of a personal God.”^ The Old and the New Testa-
ments clearly reiterate the doctrine, but ’’whether the
Scriptures teach the absolute origination of matter, its
I." CT, £3. 2. CT, £6.
4. CT,
3. CT, B7-SB
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creation out of nothing, is an open question.” This is
the most natural interpretation, though another sense is
2
not impossible. The question of the origin of matter is
beyond the reach of physical science. Science is compe-
tent to speak of the processes of nature, and here the
theory of evolution has gained ground and "there is no need
that theology should set itself in hostility” to the scien-
tific account of such processes.^"
The conclusions of science may require us
to modify our conceptions of the mode of
man’s creation, but they cannot disprove
the fact of his creation; they may compel
us, contrary to Jewish apprehension, to rec-
ognize the intermediation of second causes,
but they can determine nothing respecting
the presence of the personal agent who gives
1. CT, 88 , "Here we . have another illustration,” wrote Strcng
of Robinson, ”of his refusal to dogmatize where he regard-
ed Scripture as teaching nothing decisive, and of his
earnest effort to reach reality beneath the forms of tra-
ditional statement. To his mind it was an open question
whether the Scriptures teach the absolute origination
of matter. The Hebrew word bara did not seem to him to
settle the question. Yet he recognized in the organic
forms of matter the embodied thought of a creative Will”
(Art
. C1&96] 176-177). Strong here quoted from Robinson:
"Even spontaneous generation does not preclude the idea
of such a creative will, working by natural law and sec-
ondary causes,” a passage taken almost verbatim from
Robinson’s CT, 91. However, Strong’s statements were
sometimes more assertive, in interpreting Robinson, than
the latter’s writings would seem to permit. One cannot
be sure whether Strong at this point reflected the direc-
tion in which Robinson’s thought later crystallized, or
whether Strong read Robinson from the standpoint of
Strong’s own convictions. After all, Robinson did, as
indicated above, proceed to comment that creation ex ni -
hilo is the most natural interpretation of the Scripture
teaching.
2. CT, 89 . 3. CT, 90 4. CT, 92
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to second causes their efficiency. The most
that the Darwinian theory, or that any other
theory, of evolution, has yet accomplished,
is to show the possible method of the Divine
procedure in the creation of man; it throws
no light whatever on the causative power
that used the method and wrought the result.
The teaching of Scripture, that man came into being by the
immediate power of God, is not contradicted, as yet, by any
2trustworthy authority of physical science.
The final cause of creation, according to the Scrip-
tures, is "unquestionably in God himself, but this cause is
not exclusive of human happiness . The Scriptures further
teach that nothing in nature is self-sustaining, but that
God sustains and controls the universe.^" God T s conservation
and government are providential, so that "all events, pheno-
mena of matter as well as of mind, are made to occur accord-
ing to his prevision and prearrangement ; "5 but this special
and particular providence does not require a miraculous de-
flection of the ordinary courses of nature.^ Both Scripture
and consciousness aver that "our responsibility is not an-
nulled by the sustaining providence through which we act. "7
1 .
3.
4 •
5 .
7.
CT, 116. 2. CT, 116.
CT, 94, where Robinson added: "It is a matter of indiffer-
ence, therefore, whether we say that God created all things
for nis own glory, securing thereby the highest good of
his creatures; or that he created all things for the high-
est good of his creatures, accomplishing thereby his own
supreme glory as the final cause of all."
CT, 95* "The Christian theist. accepting the biblical
statement that God is the upholder oi all things and the
continuator of life, sees in the mechanical action of phy-
sical forces the fitting instruments through which he
works
;
in the uniformity of his working, discerns the fix-
edness of his purposes and the stability of his govern-
ment" (CT, 96).
CT
,
95. 6. CT, 97, footnote.
CT, 103.
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In treating special providence, Robinson stressed the
unsatisfactoriness of Scholastic views of divine concursus .
Any explanation that can be given of God’s
relation to the forces of nature, whether
physical or vital, must be purely hypotheti-
cal; dogmatic assertion respecting them is
mere presumption. Matter and physical force
are indissolubly one,.. .but what may be the
relation of the activities of these forces
to the Divine efficiency, in the conservation
and progressive movement of the world,... it
is worse than idle to inquire. We only know
that God rules over all, and that all forces
and wills, in the end, are made to subserve
his immutable purposes.^
1. GT, 102, footnote. Strong later commented: T, I do not
know how much of an attraction the idealistic interpreta-
tion... had for Dr. Robinson. The mention of secondary
causes... and his declaration. . .that space must have exist-
ed before the universe, would seem to show that he sought
no relief from the problem of creation in the thought that
matter, as ideal, may also be eternal. But, in treating
of preservation and providence, he seems to verge toward
the idealistic explanation. Though he denies that law is
simply uniform divine action, he also denies the so-
called concursus of God with finite causes. Though he
declares that ’TIod’s relation to the material universe is
unknown and unknowable’* (Strong was here quoting CT, 99,
but Robinson also wrote that the Scholastic theories of
concursus are unsatisfactory **for they rest on theories
of God’s relation to both matter and mind of which we
know absolutely nothing ** CCT, 102, underscoring supplied!
)
he also declares that ’matter and physical force are in-
dissolubly one,’ that ’all forces are modes of one force,’
and that ’this force is personal force.’ ’The natural is
God’s work. He originated it. There is no separateness
between the natural and the supernatural. The natural 'i^s
the supar natural. God works in everything. Every end,
even though attained by mechanical means, is as truly
God’s end as if wrought by miracle.’ Here the more modern
conception of the universe seems to be working in Dr. Rob-
inson’s mind, and to be coloring his thought. His readi-
ness to recognize the working of God both in nature and in
man, and his unreadiness to postulate a Deus ex machina
where the ’Spirit within the wheels’ would account for all
the facts, seem like an unconscious anticipation of the
thought of God’s immanence, which is so transforming the
theology of our * generation” (Art. £1896] 177-178). But,
it may be asked, did Strong read this into Robinson’s words?
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Robinson refused to press these dissatisfactions to an
idealistic conclusion.^* He complained that theologians
have persisted in theorizing on God 1 s relation to the
universe, despite its unknowability. He criticized es-
pecially the view that
physical phenomena are the products of God T s
direct personal efficiency, law denoting
nothing more than his uniformity of action:
—a theory which is objectionable, as being
pantheistic; as degrading to God, since .many
physical forces are subject to the manipula-
tions of man; as contrary to the analogy
seen in God T s method of accomplishing moral
ends through second causes; and as contrary
to the observed fact that physical force is
the necessary product of matter under given
conditions;—but it is a theory which had
its mediaeval and earlier Protestant advo-
cates. ^
At the same time, he rejected the prevailing notions of
concursus in Protestant as well as Catholic formulations.
Another class, recognizing the efficiency of
second causes in both matter and mind, sup-
poses such a CONCURSUS of the Divine energy
with these as not only imparts to them their
own efficiency but secures its subserviency
to the Divine will: --a theory resting on
purely verbal distinctions, without a shadow
of fact to appeal to, and contradicted by
what we know of the physical world from ob-
servation and of ourselves from conscious-
ness;—but a theory which was accepted by
Augustine and Aquinas, was elaborately ex-
plained and defended by nearly all the prin-
1* Strong does not seem to do justice to passages in Rob-
inson which preclude an interpretation of his state-
ments along the lines of idealistic monism. "Godj
everywhere present in the Cosmos," wrote Robinson,
"is a Spirit totally distinct from matter, independent
of it, and the almighty Creator and Controller of it"
(GT, 76).
2. CT, 99o
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cipal Protestant writers of the 17th and
18th centuries, and perhaps more than any
other, underlies the existing popular
theological conception of a special reve-
lation. 1
Miracles are wrongly confounded with extraordinary
and inexplicable occurrences, Robinson believed. The chief
characteristic of a miracle is T,its significancy or pur-
pose. TT^ The interposition of the Divine Will may accom-
plish new results, either without the slightest interfer-
ence with the uniformity of law, or by modifying the action
of physical and vital forces.-^ The real office of miracle,
in the Scriptures, is the "certification by supernatural
phenomenon of one T s claim to be a messenger from God."^
But miracles were not of themselves a proof of a divine
mission, for such conviction depends upon congruity of the
1. CT, 99.
2. CT, 105. Strong emphasized that this "definition of mir-
acle as a T special sign from God, authenticating the
claim of one of his messengers,’ is confessedly intended
to exclude all dogmatizing with regard to the relation
of the miracle to natural law and to second causes. If
the signality of the miracle be maintained, then it mat-
ters not, even if natural law itself be the perpetual
working of God" (Art. tl896] 178). But it is not so ap-
parent from a reading of CT that Robinson was concerned
to eliminate secondary causation; his concern appeared
rather to remove the tension between the prevailing su-
pernatural and scientific conceptions of the universe.
3. CT, 106. Robinson made a point of observing that "the
personal will of man, even limited as it is to the use
of second causes, is perpetually producing phenomena
that are quite aside from the established order of na-
ture; it surely is not impossible for the infinite power
of the personal God to make such use as he chooses of
the forces, physical and vital, of which he is himself
the Creator, or, even, if need be, to modify their action
altogether by... a new and overriding force of will."
4. CT, 107.
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miracle and the agent’s moral character and also the
character of the beholder; hence, ’’the miracle is a cer-
tification to him only who can perceive its signifi-
cancy.”'*’ The divine commission was perceived not because
of mere outward wonder, but by the moral consciousness.
The existence of the church is proof of Christ’s resur-
rection, although the church would not exist had Christ
remained in the tomb. Biblical miracles were for the
special benefit of immediate witnesses; their evidential
o
value weakens as it is made dependent on testimony.
For us, consequently, miracles as evidence of the Divine
origin and authority of Christianity ’’are inferior to the
existence and contents of the Religion itself. ”3 Hence
Robinson defended miracles, but did not rest the case for
Christianity wholly upon them.
The evidence for angelic existences is primarily
Biblical and is ’’both abundant and decisive.”^ There are
good and evil angels, and the latter have Satan as their
leader. ^ The Scriptural references to Satan preclude
/r
viewing evil merely in terms of an impersonal principle. 0
ITTT, 108. CT, 109.
3. CT, 109. Robinson added, however, that the origin of
the Christian church is rooted in the resurrection
miracle, and that the resurrection gave ’’proof of his
ability to bear our penalty, and, in bearing, to sur-
vive it” (CT, 293).
4. CT, 109. 5.CT, 110.
6. CT
,
114. The dismissal of the Gospel accounts of
demon-possession as superstition cannot be reconciled
with Jesus’ divine authority or the inspiration of the
evangelists (CT, 115, footnote).
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Anthropology
No trustworthy authority of physical science has
"contradicted, as yet"-
1
- the Biblical teaching that man
p
came into being "by the immediate power of God,"
Robinson affirmed. The Bible views man as a compound
being whose two-fold nature allies him to two worlds.-^
There are New Testament hints of a trichotomic division
of man’s nature, but dogmatism involves the risk of con-
jectur e.
In treating anthropology, Robinson diverged from
the traditional view of man’s primitive state by his
denial that man’s created likeness to God consisted in
man’s moral perfection. Correct Biblical exegesis, he
contended, will not sustain such a view. The redemptive
work of Christ does not simply restore a lost relation-
ship, but involves
the carrying of man forward towards the
realization of an ideal perfection to which
he was destined, but with which he was not
at first endowed... in fact, the production
of a new and higher type of rnan than the'
original, 1 Cor., 15:47-49. 1 Pet., 1:15,
16. 1 John, 3:1-3.
5
1. CT, 116.
2. CT, 116, where Robinson added: "There is a noticeable
difference between the biblical prhaseology descriptive
of the origin of man, and that descriptive of the
origin of other forms of organic life .. .Man alone is
the immediate creature of God, and the bearer of his
imag e .
”
3. CT, 118. Man sustains "at once relations to the brute
below him and to the angel above him. He is the only
being, so far as we know, who forms in himself a tan-
gential point between the two worlds of spirit and of
matter" (CT, 118).
4. CT, 119. 5o CT, 120.
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The Genesis account implies, by the phrase ’’very good”,
merely the fitness of man and the whole creation to the
end which the Creator had in view. Moral perfection cannot
be a direct creation, but is attained only through disci-
pline and will Nor do the Scriptures teach that man’s dis-
tinctive image was lost in the fall; rather, the original
image was transmitted. Therefore the image of God consisted
doubtless in that assemblage of qualities
which constitutes the immutable distinction
between man and the brute creation—in other
words, in. his personal existence as a ration-
al, moral being.
The Biblical data on the original condition of man are ’’few
3
and of uncertain import.” Morally, man was originally in-
nocent and sinless; rationally, ’’either an infant... or gift-
ed with some degree of maturity, and accordingly with ideas
and some kind of language which are necessarily coexistent.”^
The Scriptures warrant neither the traditional Protestant
theory of an original perfect holiness, nor the modern scien-
tific theory which
makes man to have arisen from the lowest bar-
barism, and to have been originally not only
a congener of the ape, but the offspring of
still lower animals. . .That man, according to
the Bible, was immature and untried at the
outset, and consequently at the best only
T~, TFiile Robinson denied the first man a primitive holy char-
acter, he seems to grant him right tendencies: ’’Original-
ly faultless as the work of God, all man’s spontaneities
must have been right, and yet to develop these spontanei-
ties into consciously elective and determinative prin-
ciples of character—to secure personal worthiness to in-
dividuals, it was necessary that there should be volition-
al action” (CT, 123).
2. CT, 120. 3. CT, 121. 4. CT, 121.
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sinless, seems clearly enough implied in
the garden that was prepared for him; nor
is there anything in the New Testament im-
plying that his first estate was more than
that of innocence.”
While the New Testament does not directly assert
that man was originally sinless, it everywhere takes for
2
granted that he is now in a fallen state. Man’s sm can-
not be explained either in terms of his possession of a
body, or as a necessity of development, or as a concomi-
3tant of his finiteness, or as efficiently willed by God.
The blame for sin cannot be placed upon God, nor was it a
necessity of man’s development. Sin entered through man’s
abuse of his created free-will, without God’s responsibili-
ty for the abuse. ^ The existence of moral evil is inex-
T~. CT, 122. Strong’s early teaching took vigorous exception
to the concessions of Robinscn’s anthropology. Later
Strong himself, as we shall see, accepted an evolutionary
view, but still insisted on a position nearer that of
traditional Protestantism than Robinson’s. Wrote Strong:
”1 have no doubt that the old orthodoxy, which Dr. Robin-
son was here opposing, unduly magnified the powers and
virtues of the first father of our race. When Dr. South
declared that ’Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam,’
he went far beyond Scripture. But it seems to me that Dr.
Robinson went to quite the opposite extreme when he made
the image of God consist in mere personality, and denied
to the first man any, even a germinal, holiness of char-
acter. If, when God newly creates the soul in Christ, he
gives a germinal ’righteousness and holiness of truth,’
then in the original creation he could also impart a ten-
dency toward the good and a love for himself” (Art. Cl896]
180-181). This emphasis on man’s original righteousness
characterized Strong’s anthropology, in both its creation
and evolutionary statements.
2. .CT, 122. 3. CT, 124ff. 4. CT, 127.
-.
.
-
’
<
-
1
. ir
a l *1 il ;>
'
‘ :?•£’. i i 5 Xc / i; SCf, Ofs
-
• r • <
’
•
f.
,
. ..
'
' '
:
- . r. .J
l I
-
' cn , :
’
-j ande
. :
‘
’
.
t
.1
.
ti
,
'
-
-
,
!.•' o'i :4 -
io o' ^ v ^ <
: .
? • ' J i ' - . 1 *
.
.
.
*
{
,
' f l.- . r . 'J . L>
. . .
; d|
<
'
!. . ,i 0 ' >C- u 'It': : adcfl
5 < V O J
C ;
•
’
t
•
'
• •'
. . .
. , i
,
-
.
:
'
<
noiJ '
,
,
<
. .
plicable.^ But man’s fall from original sinlessness is evi-
denced by the Scriptures and by the reproaches of individual
2conscience.
In consequence of the fall, man lost an "original
righteousness"^ and incurred positive evils. All painful
consequences of wrong acts, whether by the constitution and
course of nature or by guilt incurred by violating revealed
statutes, are penal. ^ There is no distinction between
penalty and consequences, between guilt and liability.
Robinson at this point resisted modern theology, complaining
that a distinction is maintainable only by limiting man’s
moral knowledge to mere Biblical statutes, by restricting
human guilt to violations of such statutes, and by placing
revelation over against nature in such a way as to obscure
t *
God’s authorship of nature. Consequently, he declared,
"all painful consequences of wrong acts must be as distinct-
ly penal as if they had been formally threatened. "5 Penal
evils resulting from the fall of man include spiritual death
and physical death. Man was created mortal, with provision
1. GT, 127 o Robinson wrote: "The result could not have
been purposed, nor yet unforseen, nor yet again beyond
the power of God to prevent. The origin of evil is an
insoluble mystery" (CT, 127). Again: "Against the notion
of a divine efficiency in the origin of evil, stands the
most indubitable evidence that God is an infinitely holy
and just Being; he cannot have been the author of that
which is absolutely opposed to himself" (CT, 126).
2. Cl, 126.
3« The phrase "original righteousness" suggests that Robinson
did not wholly discard the idea of some positive tenden-
ciesto good in primal man: '"By the fall. ..was lost an
original righteousness which, but for its loss, would have
been the birthright of every one of the race, and' in its
stead... were incurred certain positive evils" (CT. 12# ).
. CT, 129. 5. CT, 183. 6. CT., 131.k
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for immortality that need not have required physical death
were it not for sin. But the chief penalty is spiritual;
sin is itself death, as a voluntary withdrawal from God,
the source of life.
Freedom of will also was lost as a consequence of the
fall.'*' Of the two elements in a free will, man retains
the power of mental self-determination (that formal freedom
which is a necessary condition of rational existence), but
has lost "the concurrent and harmonious action of all the
powers that properly make up the human personality . "2 Sepa-
ration from God involves the disintegration of man’s spiri-
tual being. Scripture and conscience attest man’s present
freedom "to discern and to elect, but not to appropriate,
1. CT, 132. Strong expressed the wish that Robinson, in
treating of the will of man, "had more definitely set
himself against determinism. He seems rather to intimate
that Jonathan Edwards’s argument has never been satisfac-
torily answered. . o The will cannot be compelled; for,
unless self-determined, it is no longer will. The con-
sciousness of freedom must be trusted, even though we
cannot reconcile it with our logic.. .Dr. Robinson does
not decide the philosophical question, though it is plain
that his leanings are toward determinism" (Art. [1896)
179)* And yet Robinson insisted, in treating the divine
decrees, that the certainty of their fulfillment does not
involve a divine determinism (CT, $3-87). "For aught we
know to the contrary," Robinson wrote, "the eternal pur-
poses may have been so quadrated with human wills as to
have provided for their largest conceivable f reedom;
indeed, the very constitution of man’s spiritual nature
may have been so grounded in the eternal purposes a s to
make the freedom of his will an essential factor in' their
fulfillment. The purposes may be unalterably fixed,
every act of man may invariably contribute to their ful-
fillment, and yet every act be as voluntary and as free
as if there existed no decrees to be fulfilled" (CT, £7 ) <»
2. CT, 132f.
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the right. Conscience, as a result of the fall, no
longer renders right decisions, but "now often renders
2
false judgments, and positively; misleads." The whole
current of human life has been imparted a wrong tendency,
both by example and corruption of will, so that society
has become "organically evil."^
Sin has three aspects:
as an act, sin is a transgression of God T s
law; as a principle that determines the guilt
of acts, it is opposition or hostility to God;
as state or nature, it is moral unlikeness
to God.^
The essence of sin is selfishness, that is, an inordinate
self-love and self-seeking at the expense of the will of God.^
Mankind is involved in original sin, so that all men are
sinners "in consequence of an inborn sinful nature. Thus
depravity is innate cr inborn $ human nature is morally cor-
rupted or depraved. 7 Robinson appealed to the "universality,
spontaneousness and absolute certainty" of sinful develop-
ment as demonstrative proofs of innateness, ^ and also to the
teachings of the Scriptures. 9 This depravity is not only
innate but also hereditary.10 This Robinson supported by an
1. CT, 133. 2. CT, 136. 3. CT, 137.
4. CT, 138-, Strong later declared that in these words Rcb in
-
son had "probably given us the most comprehensive and
exact definition of sin that can be found in theological
literature" (Art. f18963 184).
5. CT, 143 o
6 . CT
?
1560 Robinson held to the traducian view of the
origin of the soul.
7o CT, 156-157. 8 . CT, 157. 9. CT, 158.
10. Robinson protested against both the New School and the
covenant theologians (immediate iraputationist s
)
; "The
more rational view is... that in his fall we all fell, be-
cause we were all potentially—germinally in him, and
because of his entire nature we, by natural descent, are
all partakers" (CT, 158-159) «>
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appeal to these considerations: the principle of heredity
is the "more reasonable" view of the innateness of deprav-
ity; the evidence from analogy would indicate a formative
principle working in the species; the transmission of
moral, intellectual and physical traits has been established
the doctrine is Scriptural.^
This natural depravity is justly condemnable and pun-
ishable. Robinson held to mediate imputation in explaining
the common guilt of the race; not so much a common act of
the race in Adam, as man’s universal and congenital deprav-
ity, is the ground of his condemnation. Each man is guilty
2because of his own depravity. But "the words sin and
guilt, when applied to an inherited nature, must necessarily
have a restricted meaning as compared with that .. .applied
1. CT, 159.
2. Strong took serious exception to this formulation, de-
claring that here Robinson "diverged from the teaching of
Scripture, became inconsistent with himself, and adopted
a principle which burdened him greatly when he came to
explain Christ’s taking our penalty upon him. Dr. Robin-
son had granted that the consequences of the first sin
are to Adam’s posterity precisely what they were to Adam
himself. But to Adam they were certainly first guilt,
and then depravity. To Adam’s descendants, also, the
consequences of Adam’s sin came in the same order...
Paul... bases God’s infliction of the penalty of death,
not upon the ground that all are sinful, but upon the
ground that ’all sinned!’ Since depravity is caused by
the apostasy, we cannot be guilty of the depravity with-
out first being guilty of the apostasy" (Art. [l$96} 185.
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to our voluntary actions."'*' It is sinful and guilty in a
qualified sense. This sinfulness of hereditary nature the
q
Scriptures "seem very distinctly" to teach. The human
race is an organic unity sharing a common and punishable
guilt.
Man’s predicament is that of total depravity, so that
"without Divine assistance, all men are totally incapable
of any affection, volition, or act, which is acceptable to
3God." But man is responsible despite his inability, as the
Scriptures, consciousness, and experience teach.
^
(3)* Soteriology
The divine redemptive plan was in purpose coeternal
with that of creation; the divine provision of salvation
5is not an afterthought. The history of the world mani-
fests a providential preparation, positively among the He-
brews and negatively elsewhere, for the coming of Christ.
1. CT, l6l. This mitigation of the judgment passed upon
depravity, Strong declared, grew out of Robinson’s
failure to apply his realism consistently. "He should
have considered that as Adam’s act was condemnable apart
from its consequences, so we, who were one with him in
the transgression, have incurred guilt apart from the
depravity which is a consequence of that act... His
theology would have been more consistent if he had been
more thoroughly realistic and Pauline, and had said
plainly, ’In Adam’s fall we sinned all.’ It is unjust
to hold us guilty of the effect if we be not first
guilty of the cause" (Art. fl396] 135-136).
2. CT, 162. 3. GT, 163
. 4. CT, 174-176.
5. CT, 179. 6. CT, 130-131.
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The origin of moral law cannot be referred only to
the sovereign will of God,"^ but is found in the moral na-
2
ture of God. Moral law was not made, but rather, was re-
vealed. Rewards and penalties, therefore, are not arbi-
trary, but are natural and inevitable consequences of man’s
3
relationship to God. The law, as objective statute, was
not given to man as a means of salvation, but rather for
pedagogic purposes, until men should put their trust in the
perfect Redeemer.^" But the law, as subjective principle of
being, reflecting the divine nature, is as immutable as
5God. Hence the Gospel does not annul the law.
The central interest of the Scriptures is the Redeemer,
Jesus Christ. ^ The evidence for the deity of Christ is
chiefly though not exclusively Scriptural. His miracles
prove His divine mission and thus his Messiahship, but not
ghis deity.
Christ united in himself the natures of both man and
n
God . 7 Robinson points out that leading theologians have
held implicitly, though some explicitly, "that there were
necessarily two wills as well as two natures in Christ,
though the human was ever in subordination to the divine.""^
1. CT, 187. 2. CT, 190. 3. CT, 191. 4. CT, 193.
5. CT, 193-194. 6. CT, 196. 7. CT, 198.
8. CT, 201, footnote. 9. CT, 212.
10. CT
,
214. Robinson decided against the Damascene formula
that "as in the Trinity there are three persons with one
will manifested in diversity of acts, so in the person
of Christ there were two wills manifested in unity of
acts .
"
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But the Theanthropic personality possesses "two unmixed
natures (with) unblended but interpenetrating and mutually
modified attributes; but always as one and the same person
with one consciousness and one will. He found as a chief
cause of Christological error "the assumption that if two
natures, the Divine and the human, were united in Christ,
some definite conception of the mode of the union is both
possible and necessary." Robinson thus fluctuated between
the Chalcedonian and a kenosis formulation of Christology .6
In Christ’s person, two distinct natures, possessing their
own unchangeable and incommunicable essence, united to con-
1. CT, 218. 2. CT, 214.
3. It is true that Strong assigned Robinson "the great merit
of being one of the first in America to unfold the doc-
trine of the Kenosis, or self-limitation of the Logos in
becoming man. The old orthodoxy had made the person of
Christ unintelligible and incredible, by maintaining our
Lord’s continual consciousness of his deity, and his con-
tinual use of divine powers. This was either Docetism...
or Nestorianism. . . Our author began his study from the
oneness of Christ’s person... He inveighed against separa-
ting the two natures, and conceiving that our Lord spoke
at one time as man and at another time as God. He main-
tained that this attributes unveracity to Christ, and
held that our Lord spoke everywhere and always as the
God-man, even when he declared that he was ignorant of
the day of the end. I regard this doctrine of the single
personality of Christ, and of the divine self-limitation
in becoming man, as one of the noblest and most valuable
parts of his teaching" (Art. [1896] 187-188). But (1)
the "old orthodoxy" had itself rejected the notion of a
dual personality; (2) Robinson’s rejection of the doc-
trine of dual personality did not clearly commit him to
a Kenosis as against a Chalcedonian formulation, for he
insisted that both natures are fully preserved in the in-
carnation^ (3 ) Robinson’ s insistence on "one conscious-
ness and one will" (CT, 218) was a concession to the
Kenosis view in which Robinson discarded his own plea
for caution about the necessity and possibility of de-
finitely conceiving the mode of union (CT, 214).
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stitute, not a third nature, but a single and unique per-
sonality; the Divine and human were so united, that each
was preserved in the fulness of its essential perfections.^
Christ assumed T,the common nature of the race; not
the nature of the unfallen Adam; nor yet a new-created na-
ture different alike from Adam’s and our own; but the na-
ture of those whom he came to save... with the exception of
2its hereditary depravity.” The assumption of human nature
by a supernatural act cut off hereditary guilt and depravity
but not its consequences, i. e., its penalty. Hereditary
depravity is involved in a derivation of natural descent of
personal life from Adam, but Christ did not thus derive His
personal life. The incarnation involved a circumscription,
3
restriction and limitation of the Divine nature. The
Scriptures ’’represent the humiliation of Christ to have per-
tained mainly, though not exclusively, to his Divine nature;
and to have consisted in His assumption of human nature with
all the limitations and environments which it necessitated,
and in voluntarily bearing in that nature all the penalties
that hung over it."^ His humiliation is that of a Divine
person assuming the finite conditions of human existence
1. CT, 214-215. Robinson wrote: ’’A variable union of the
Divine with the human, or a union consisting of mere
superintendence of the human by the Divine, or any
other union than that of a combination of the two na-
tures into one indivisible and mysterious person, is
neither warranted by Scripture, nor reconcilable with
any clear and rational conception of personality”
(CT, 219). Also, ”a Divine Hypostasis of the triune
Godhead has so assumed real humanity as not thereby to
surrender his Divinity” (CT, 237).
2. CT, 216. 3. CT, 217. 4. CT, 224-225.
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and identifying himself with a. race so under Divine dis-
pleasure that this identification must involve the assump-
tion of the penal consequences of its guilt.
^
In the exaltation, the Divine nature in conjunction
with the human is exalted to the highest conceivable dig-
2
nity. Jesus Christ continues forever to be the Logos,
the Lord, the communicator, between the infinite God and
finite creatures.-^
The personality of the Holy Spirit finds its proof in
the Scriptures only.^ From this, his proper Divinity fol-
lows necessarily, because of the Biblical ascriptions and
affirmations .
^
The problem of the Divine triunity comes next into
view. The numerical unity of God is one of the clearest
biblical truths; numerically and essentially, God is abso-
c
lutely one. The doctrine of the Trinity, however, is de-
rived not from philosophical sources, but from Biblical
data. Robinson regarded the doctrine as transcending rea-
son entirely:
The source of the difficulty is in the incon-
ceivability of the mode of a triune existence;
the absurdity itself lies wholly in the attempt
to reduce a mode of existence which transcends
all our knowledge, to the level of our finite
experiences
.
1.
CT, 226.
5.
CT, 232.
2.
CT, 226.
6.
CT, 235.
3.
CT, 226.
7.
CT, 236.
4. CT, 229.
6. CT, 236.
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Robinson held that the absence of any genuine analogies of
trinitarian being renders impossible the finding of terms
to designate the divine distinctions.^ Any statements
avoid Tritheism or mere Modalism with extreme difficulty.
The basic proof of the doctrine of the Trinity is the New
Testament. The doctrine underlay the Old Testament reve-
lation, unperceived by its writers, but the economic reve-
plation in Christianity articulated it. The Biblical doc-
trine is supported by the confirmation it receives from
Christian experience. ^ Robinson mentioned, without appro-
val or disapproval, the psychological argument for divine
personal distinctions on the ground that the experiences
both of self-consciousness and of knowledge require an
1. Robinson remarked that even in Christian devotion, no
experiential distinction between divine persons can be
made. The protest that Trinitarianism "robs God the
Father of the supreme adoration due his name, by en-
couraging the worship of the Spirit and the Son as dis-
tinct persons, n Robinson rejected on the ground that
the "economic offices of the Son and the Spirit" dis-
tinctively and always lead to the adoration of the Father
(CT, 233)*.
2. CT, 241-243.
3. CT, 243. Robinson did not clearly show any independent
value of Christian experience in this regard. Indeed,
in view of the above footnote quotation from CT, 233,
it is difficult to see how any positive argument could
thus be evolved, other than the claim that experience
does not contradict the doctrine. Elsewhere he remarked
that "every normal Christian consciousness responds at
once to the truth of the economic Trinity as taught in
the New Testament" (CT, 252).
.
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object.^" But our knowledge of the Trinity is derived from
God’s historical revelation in the economy of redemption.
To convert the economic titles into exact descriptions of
immanent and eternal distinctions, however, is to substi-
tute graded personal distinctions in t he Godhead for a
Trinity. On the other hand, to deny the distinctions of
any immanent or ontologic significance is to erect an ab-
2
solute and exclusive divine unity. Thus Robinson served
notice that his basic interest in the Trinity is historic
and economic. For that reason he treated the doctrine not
in conjunction with the attributes of God, but in connec-
tion with sin and redemption.
The question of the mutual relations of the persons
of the Trinity is best resolved by regarding "the titles
Father, Son, and Spirit as borrowed from relations that be-
gan in the work of human redemption," yet as "representing
real and immanent distinctions in the Godhead, which had
3
existed from eternity." Thus Robinson discarded the Nicene
statement of eternal generation, as escaping a suggestion
of derivation and subordination only in a verbal manner.
1. Robinson’s reserve in this regard will be contrasted
later with Strong’s appropriation of idealistic argu-
ments for personal divine distinctions. "Notwithstand-
ing the absence of all trustworthy data from which to
reason in respect to the relation of persons in the
Trinity," wrote Robinson, "attempts are still made to
construct the doctrine from the postulates of specula-
tive philosophy" (GT, 251, footnote).
2. CT, 239. 3. CT, 247.
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There is no adequate Biblical case for eternal generation.^-
In John’s Gospel, the first chapter, Christ is designated
Logos prior to the incarnation, and is called Son of God
only after the incarnation; the entire fourth Gospel is an
2
exhibit of historical evidence, not of eternal Sonship.
The New Testament interest is mainly in the historical,
and not the pre-historical Christ. Yet, Robinson insisted,
The titles Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
though derived from the historical facts
of the Christian economy, do nevertheless
represent eternal ontologic distinctions
in the Godhead. This view discards all
theories of the relations and rests con-
tent on the simple facts of the case.
r:
2 .
CT, 246.
CT, 249. Robinson confined himself mainly to the his-
torical manifestations, avoiding a final attempt to in-
terpret the ante-mundane mystery of the Trinity. This
called forth Strong’s protest: ”We might well follow
his example, if we did not seem to recognize in Scrip-
ture an effort to teach us something with regard to the
pretemporal relations of the persons of the Trinity...
Only when we regard the terms Father, Son and Holy Ghost
as intimations of a relation prior to all time, do we
know anything of God’s essential nature. Revelation is
not revelation if it does not tell us something of what
God is in himself, not simply what he is to us. (Art.
I1896J 194, 195).
CT, 250. Robinson’s expansion of this is a curious ex-
ample of metaphysical reserve and tension. The Bible
gives no information respecting the inner divine rela-
tions except as the ultimate end of Christianity neces-
sitates; Scripture terminology seems to have been sug-
gested by historical phenomena rather than eternal prin-
ciples beyond them. Hence the names and representations
of the divine persons are strictly economic. ’’But it
cannot be denied, that all our necessary conceptions of
God must have some underlying and essential basis of
eternal reality.
. .There must, therefore, be some ontolog-
ic or immanent, and consequently eternal, distinctions
in the Godhead on which are grounded the economic titles
and the conceptions of personality which they suggest...
But what these distinctions were, what their modus exis -
tendi
,
and what their .common relation to the absolute one-
ness of the Divine essence, the Scriptures do not inform
us, and it is idle to inquire” (CT, 250, 251).
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Christ’s mediation between God and man is best des-
cribed under the three-fold offices of Prophet, Priest,
and King."*" These metaphors are not to be interpreted lit-
erally, yet represent ’’real and distinct offices of Christ
2in teaching, redeeming and controlling his people.”
As Prophet, Christ communicates to man the mind and
will of God. But the New Testament chiefly presents Him
as Priest, who transacts with God for men, and becomes
man’s Saviour by the offering of himself as a sacrifice for
the human race on Calvary. Through the Church Christ
reigns preeminently as King, and by its instrumentality
his empire is to become universal.^
The priestly office of Christ centers in the theme of
atonement, which represents ”in respect to God, the expia-
tion of guilt, and, in respect to man, his at-one-ment with
5God.” The term designates all that He accomplished for
man in his life, as well as what he procured for man by his
death. As to the latter,
’’Nothing is more plainly or more emphatic-
ally taught in the Scriptures than that
Jesus Christ died on the cross to procure
for man his salvation from sin and its con-
sequences. The saving efficacy of the
death of Christ is the one idea that gives
organic unity to the... New Testament Scrip-
tures; and it is the appropriation of this
idea in his individual life which makes a
man to be distinctively a Christian.
1.
CT, 252.
4. CT, 255.
2.
CT, 253.
5. CT, 255.
3.
CT, 253f
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But those who agree on this fact, disagree on the method
whereby Christ’s death avails for salvation.
The oldest theory of atonement, that of satisfaction,
which claims to be exclusively orthodox, !,is preeminently
theoretic” and despite any modifications is "as purely a
theory as any that has ever been propounded in its stead.
It is more likely that Anselm held that the death of Christ
was a voluntary sacrifice, rather than a vicarious punish-
o
rnent, contrary to opposing interpretations. The forensic
view of substitutionary satisfaction as objectionable be-
cause it literalizes Biblical figures of speech.
It gives a literal meaning to the words
covenant, sacrifice, propitiation, atone-
ment, and redemption, terms which, as ap-
plied to the redemptive work of Christ,
are manifestly metaphors, though metaphors
laden with the most weighty of meanings;
meanings, also, which carry us beneath the
machinery of government to the moral na-
tures of Him who rules and of them who are
ruled.
3
More than this, the forensic view involves an absolute in-
conceivable juridical transfer of moral penalty from the
consciously guilty to the consciously innocent;^ it contra-
dicts the innate sense of justice which is not satisfied
1. CT
,
256. 2. CT, 2 58
,
footnote.
3. CT
,
260. Robinson did not fully clarify what he meant
by the precise non-literal meaning of the metaphors.
4* i'he transfer of moral penalty from the consciously guilty
to tne consciously innocent "contradicts the very idea
of penalty,” Robinson affirmed (CT, 261). Hence one’ssms are laid on Christ only in the sense that one is
saved by him (metaphorically), not by a transfer ofguilt of penalty.
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by an unqualified escape of the guilty;"
- it contradicts
the established order of the invariable and inevitable
penal consequences of violated law; and it is self-contra-
dictory, for it insists both that the punishment of the
sinner is absolutely demanded by immutable divine justice,
and then that the immutable divine justice is satisfied by
a commutation or substitution of both person and punishment .2
But that men are saved through the sufferings and
death of Christ as representative and personal substitute
1 . The demands of the innate sense of justice, that all
wrong doing be punished, "can be fully satisfied only
when penalty is so inflicted upon the guilty, in. con-
junction with his Deliverer, as that, by its infliction,
he shall be rescued from his sin; but it is not satis-
fied in the unqualified escape of the guilty" (CT, 261),
2. CT, 261-262. Robinson specifically criticized William
G. T. Shedd’s theory of "atonement ab i ntra
,
a self-
oblation on the part of Deity himself, by i^hich to satis-
fy those immanent and eternal imperatives of the divine
nature, which without it must find 'their satisfaction in
the punishment of the transgressor, or else be outraged."
Robinson protested that "an atonement made necessary to
balance the character of God, could not be a gratuity
to men" (CT, 260). Strong, too, objected to 3hedd T s for-
mulation, but not in the interest of the view which
Robinson championed; rather, he retained substitution
and merged it with the newer emphases. Strong declared
that Robinson "does not seem fully to apprehend
Dr. Shedd’s position in the matter of the relation of
the divine attributes. The latter’s conception of jus-
tice does not exclude the possibility of grace, since
but for grace Christ never would have ’offered himself
through the eternal Spirit without blemish unto God’"
(Art. [1696} 190). Shedd had himself asked: "Where is
the mercy of God, in case justice is strictly satisfied
by a vicarious person? There is mercy in permitting
another person to do for the sinner what the sinner is
bound to do for himself; and still greater mercy in pro-
viding that person; and greater still, in becoming that
person" (Shedd, Dogmatic Theology
,
I, 37$).
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before God "there seems to be the clearest evidence,
both in the Scriptures and in Christian experience." The
simple Biblical facts suggest that
our Lord in assuming human nature became
subject to its laws, limitations, exposures
and penal liabilities. Having taken our
nature for the express purpose of inter-
posing in our behalf .. .he actually suffered
the woes which have come, or, without his
interposing help, must come, on every one
of the race. He bore these as the true
penal sufferings for sin. They were not
transferred by literal imputation, from the
race, or from any individual of the race,
to him, but as one of the race, as its in-
terposing and recognized representative, he
bore them, and in bearing them triumphed
over them. And to every one who has fellow-
ship with him as a sufferer for sin, and
faith in him as a personal Saviour from its
power, it is divinely given to share in his
triumphs .
His sufferings need not have been identical with those
1 ~. CT, 262. The subjectivistic emphasis, contrasted with
the objective justification insisted upon by Reforma-
tion theology, here comes clearly to the fore. The
guilt or penalty of humanity is not transferred to
Christ, for such imputation would be immoral, would out
rage the innate sense of justice. Christ assumes our
penalty only in the sense that faith in Him gives us a
sense of peace. Though the sense of guilt "is a per-
sonal possession which cannot be conceived of, either
as being literally transferred, or as being voluntarily
assumed by one for another, yet there is a clearly in-
telligible sense in which it may be said to have been
imputed to Christ, and Christ may be said to have borne
it. Thus, when a sinful man, burdened with a sense of
ill-desert, finds himself consciously and peacefully
trusting in Christ as his Saviour, so complete is the
extinction of his feeling of remorse, that Christ may
justly be said to have borne it in his stead" (CT, 2o4)
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endured by all or any saved by Him.^ The woes which
Christ suffered are thus not positive and external inflic-
tions by God, but natural consequences of Christ’s assump-
tion of human nature; hence the sufferings would have been
the same, though nobody were saved, because of his incarna-
tion. His sufferings were the necessary result of the con-
flict with evil with which he engaged in the flesh. To re-
deem, and by redeeming to purify and rescue human nature,
he must bear its penalties, and endure spiritual death.3
It is not even impossible that, in partaking of human
nature, Christ also partook of the immanent and universal
feeling of guilt before God.^ While personal guilt for
voluntary acts cannot be literally transferred or volun-
tarily assumed by another, Christ assumes it by so fully
1. CT, 263.
2. CT, 264: "As one of mankind, Christ, if he would save
the human nature he had assumed, must have suffered
what he did, whether all the race or none of the race
were to be saved by him."
3. CT, 265.
4. CT, 264f. Strong protested this view, "that Christ was
visited with penalty though he had neither depravity
nor guilt. If both depravity and guilt were cut off
in his case by his supernatural conception, how can he
justly suffer?” (Art. [1896] 193). For Strong, guilt
and penalty necessarily involve each other, but his
solution was, as we shall see, even more unorthodox
than that of Robinson, who resisted the view that the
guilt of the race was imputed to Christ. But how much
both men shared in common, as they came to the subject
of redenption, is seen in Strong’s emphasis that Robin-
son’s views of holiness, law and sin logically necessi-
tated the deity and the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus
Christ "in spite of peculiar views with regard to the
method and application of the atonement” (Art. fl$96]
176)o
.-
'• £
,
I be' bna
_
*
;
: c
' 0
.
•> C
'• -
••
-
•
<
.
• »
. <
• ns • ; ' c -
•
-
-11
t
.
_
3 ' t te
c
" /'
c <
:
t
.
; s i
. C
,
J m C
*
'
£ loci
.'I''" X
,
5
.
0 '3 - • j niil -
i t £ { £
' 2
. M <
.
.
.
.
. 6f z -
:
i
°
v<
'
V'f ;
<
'
•
'
•
-•>•
-V C. ' s
.
'
.... ..
.
: ,'x riJcm
.
.
trustextinguishing the feeling of remorse''' of those who
him that there is no impropriety in declaring that Christ
1. Strong later conceded that T,the subjective element so
predominates” in Robinson's statement of the atonement
"both in the pains Christ bears and in the redemption
the believer experiences, that we can easily under-
stand how Dr. Robinson was regarded by many as holding
to the Socinian or moral influence theory of the atone-
ment” (Art. £l896j 191f.). The peace which the be-
liever experiences by trusting Christ was not, accord-
ing to Robinson, the peace that Christ has borne our
penalties, so as to free us from the necessity of bear-
ing it; rather, Christ’s influence upon us enables us
so to bear the penal consequences of our sins through
saving faith and new affections, that we survive them
and escape from them as he did. The "penalty is so
inflicted, upon the guilty, in conjunction with his
Deliverer, as that, by its infliction, he shall be
rescued from his sin; but (there is no ) « . .unqualified
escape of the guilty” (CT, 261). "Here, then, we have
the abounding grace of God in Christ, first reclaim-
ing a man from his sins, by imparting to him an ab-
horrence of moral evil and the feeling of deliverance
from its hated dominion, and thus of forgiveness on
account of it; and then starting him on that career
of Christian living, which, through the exhaustless
resources of Divine grace, shall gradually erase from
his character the penal traces of his former estate,
and thus carry him endlessly onward and upward”
(CT, 267). Salvation is a remedial redemptive pro-
cess through which the effects of a violated law are
gradually reversed and finally eradicated by the work-
ing of a new law. Strong declared that this reads
much like the Socinian or Bushnellian example and moral
influence theories, wherein the sinner with Christ’s
influence works out both his own atonement and renewal.
But Robinson, he grants, emphasized his rejection of
those views, and insisted that the subjective change
does not come from man, but from God.
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has borne it in their stead. ^ If Christ had actually
borne our personal penalty, then salvation would be due
to individual believers as an act of justice alone;
grace and mercy would be relevant only to His work for
p
us in His own person. Rather, by His obedience and suf-
ferings He has
fulfilled all the moral law and borne all
penalties to which the race are liable; that
every individual trusting in him shall find
all his own obligations fulfilled, all his
personal sins and their consequences taken
away, and himself put upon a career that
shall bring him into a full participation
in the triumphant exaltation of his Saviour
and Lord.
^
Christ thus becomes Saviour, not by an act of imputation,
but rather through the control^4" which He wields over us
1. CT, 264: "When the believer is enabled so to appro-
priate to himself the sacrifice of Christ, that he
may be said to have eaten Christ’s flesh and to have
drunk Christ’s blood, then is his sense of guilt so
overborne and extinguished, by a new and more power-
ful consciousness of release from the dominion of sin
and of reconciliation with God, that Christ may be said
with propriety and emphasis to have borne all his punish-
ment and to have expiated all his guilt.’’
2. CT, 266. 3. CT, 266f.
4. CT, 273: "Thus Christ is a Saviour to all who will be
saved by him; not by any formal imputation of our sins
to him, or of his righteousness to us, but solely
through that control which he exercises over us when-
ever we come to understand him as the One who has borne
all our woes, and so borne them as both to make full
satisfaction to God and to impart to all, who will lov-
ingly trust in him, an everlasting salvation."
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when we see that He has borne our woes in such a way as
to make full satisfaction to God and to inpart to be-
lievers everlasting salvation. Robinson appealed to the
Scriptures for support that
the chief, and in some instances the ex-
clusive, reference is to the subjective
effect of Christ’s redeeming work in the
heart of believers-*-
and that the Scriptures have in view the final object of
Christ’s death rather than the method by which it avails,
yet we are plainly required to regard the death as vicari-
ous; his death has redemptive efficacy. The underlying
conception of the metaphors applied to his death is that
of a Mediator interposing in our behalf." The subjective
influence of Christ’s work in the believer’s heart is an
important, but not an exhaustive explanation, of these
metaphors. The subjective redemption, in fact,
is effected solely through the inward as-
surance of, and experimental acquaintance
with, the objective interposing Ransomer
who places himself between us and the ob-
jective wrath of God. . .Christ, by his life
and death, becomes, to every one who in
loving sympathy and faith obeys him, not
only a Deliverer from the dominion of sin
now, but from its penalties hereafter for-
ever
The moral influence theory of the atonement is inadequate
because it rejects the thought of expiation." That theory
1. CT, 270. 2. CT, 270. 3. CT, 272.
4. CT, 273. 5. CT, 276.
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rests upon a fallacious fundamental postulate, that the
mercy or benevolence of God is more central and more de-
terminate than his justice;^ such a view assumes that jus-
2
tice, lav/ and penalty are strictly decretive. Moreover,
the Scriptures emphasize that divine forgiveness of man’s
sin is on Christ’s account, and not because of any amend-
ment of his life; such amendment is a consequence of the
3
new relationship to God. The governmental theory of the
atonement likewise gives no satisfactory explanation of
Christ’s person and sufferings, for it denies that he died
T
’in satisfaction of the penal justice of God."^" But
1. Strong emphasized that, despite Robinson’s compromise
of a theory of objective atonement (in which God rather
than man is primarily reconciled)
,
he "continuously and
vigorously protested against" the moral influence theory
"in its assertions that God is primarily love rather than
holiness, and that law is essentially decretive or a cre-
ation of will; while he maintained on the contrary, that
it was justice which made the atonement necessary, and
that the sufferings of Christ were an expiatory sacri-
fice for the sins of the world" (Art. £l396J 192).
Robinson seems therefore to have halted midway between a
clearly objective or subjective statement of the atone-
ment. Strong expressed his doubts that Robinson "suc-
ceeded in reconciling Christ’s sufferings with the ortho-
dox premises from which he set out. I must be allowed
to record my doubts. He fails to show that either law
or justice has any claim upon Christ. And yet the foun-
dation of the system is the holiness or justice of God,
and the law as the necessary and unchangeable expres-
sion of God’s nature" (Art. [1896] 192-193)*
2. CT, 276. 3* CT, 278.
4. CT
,
284* Robinson rejected the notion (against Hodge
and others) that the divine nature in Christ was neces-
sary to give dignity and worth to the sufferings of the
man Jesus, on the ground that the divine nature can hard-
ly give v/orth to sufferings in which it did not partici-
pate^ The human nature in that event, he complained;
"differed from that of ordinary men only in being con-
joined with a divine nature" (CT, 285, footnote).
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Robinson does not appear clearly to rise above a metaphori-
cal satisfaction -*- of the justice of God.
The possibility of redemption from sin’s power and
penalty by the vicarious death of Christ Ttis preeminently
a doctrine of Divine revelation.- Without revelational as-
surance, we could know "little, if anything, of its neces-
3
Sity." The atonement finds its necessity in the immutable
nature of God:
God as holy, necessarily repels all sinners
from his presence, and by the very act of re-
pulsion punishes them. ’Whoever, therefore,
should assume our nature and take his place
among us as one of our race, and take it for
the express purpose of redeeming us from sin
and reconciling us to God, would be under the
inexorable necessity of so confronting the Di-
vine repulsion as to remove it or he could not
achieve our redemption.^-
1. This appears true, despite the strong statement that
"if... we find... that he came into the world for the
very purpose of suffering as he did, that thereby he
might release from like mental sufferings all who would
be saved by him, then the conclusion is inevitable that
the sufferings were an actual atonement for sin, and
that he made in his own person a real satisfaction to
moral law and to God" (CT, 296).
2. CT, 288. 3. CT, 288.
4. CT, 291. Robinson protests against distinguishing be-
tween justice and mercy in God as if the divine nature
were divided against itself. "God is always justly mer
ciful and mercifully just. The all-inclusive necessity
of the atonement is in the infinite perfections of the
Divine nature .. .Every attempt to find an ultimate basis
of necessity for an atonement short of the immutable na
ture of God, leaves unanswered the question, why a plan
of the creation should have been adopted in which that
necessity was involved? and no answer can be given
which does not... bring us to the eternal nature of him
whose immutable counsels are what they are because his
eternal nature is what it is" (CT, 291).
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And yet the atonement must be voluntary. ^ It was con-
templated by Christ from eternity, and included in the
original design of creation. The substitute needed ”to se-
cure an actual personal righteousness on the part of the
redeemed”, which Christ accomplished by becoming "security
2for the good conduct of those whose place he takes.” By
virtue of the union of believers with himself, Christ
enables them, through saving faith and the affections he
awakens in them, so to bear the penal consequences of their
sins that they both survive and escape thera.^
The efficacy of the atonement is universal, but the
specific appropriation of its benefits involved the sove-
reign grace of God in the lives of men . 4
In passing from the subject of the provision of re-
demption to that of the application of redemption, Robinson
further discloses the movement of his theology away from
orthodox formulations. Justification is attained solely
through faith in Christ, but
the chief point in dispute turns on the re-
lation to Christ into which faith is sup-
posed to bring the believer, and on what it
is in that relation which constitutes the r
real ground of the believer 1 s justification.'"
Robinson rejects both the Protestant and Roman Catholic
views of justification in the interest of ”the plain
1. CT, 292. 2. CT, 294. 3. CT, 294.
4. CT, 296. 5. CT, 297.
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teaching of the New Testament."^ The Scriptural account
of justification consists in "three distinct but insep-
arable ideas": (1) The interposition of Christ affords
those who trust Him assurance of full acquittal from all
their offences; 2 (2) Justification involves approval, or
restitution to divine favor, of tnose who trust Christ;
(3) Justification involves a personal fitness to be justi-
fied, for Christ’s redemption takes effect in our personal
justification "only by the implanting of a germ of personal
righteousness."-5 Contrary to the Reformation view that jus-
tification is basically a change of attitude in God rather
than a moral change in the sinner, Robinson insists that
justification must be viewed "not only as God’s act for man,
1 . CT, 299. Strong declared that as he had been unable to
find in Robinson’s view of the atonement in its rela-
tion to God "more than a metaphorical execution of the
justice which the atonement is supposed to satisfy, so...
(in) his view of the atonement in its relation to man,
I am unable to find... any other than a metaphorical
bearing of the penalty of human sin on the part of
Christ, or any other than a metaphorical redemption of
those who put their trust in him" (Art. Cl£963 196).
2. CT, 300. Note the subjectivistic note also found here:
"In Christ, man finds himself pardoned—his sense of
guilt removed."
3. CT, 300. "It is Christ alone that saves us; our justi-
fication is solely on his account; metaphorically ex-
pressed, his righteousness is imputed to us, and through
faith in him and in his sacrifice of himself for us, we
are accounted righteous; but the literal fact is, that
our relation to him as a living personal Saviour imparts
to us a new religious life and a personal righteousness,
without which salvation is impossible, and which in
reality are the constituent elements of the salvation
itself"' (CT, 299).
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but also as God’s act in. man. ’’I Both the objective work
of Christ and subjective moral renewal are involved; man
cannot attain personal righteousness by his own unaided ef-
fort. Hence it is one-sided to see nothing but the uncondi-
2
tional act of justification on Christ’s account,'' for actual
justification is always accompanied by actual regeneration.
God does not justify the ungodly in their ungodliness, but
only in a simultaneous moral change. None of the series
of divine acts and human states--effectual calling, regen-
eration, repentance, faith, and so forth— can exist dis-
~ CT, 300. Protestant theologians had denied that justifi-
cation had any subjective element, or that it included
the beginning of a holy character, to make clear that
justification was completely an act of grace, without
works. They had insisted that justification is accom-
panied by a process of sanctification as a concomitant,
but refused to merge the twro in any way. Robinson in-
deed sometimes used this same terminology, speaking of
personal righteousness as a concomitant of justification,
but again he declared uncompromisingly that justifica-
tion includes a moral change by which the justified be-
come personally just. Strong commented that ”In Dr. Rob-
inson’s system,,.. it was necessary that there should be
no merely external acts of God, no judicial decisions
apart from the beings upon whom they terminated. To him
justification that had in it no element of subjective re-
newal was a mere legal fiction. . .Our relation to Christ,
which, so far as I can see, is only an external relation
of gratitude, sympathy and love, imparts to us a new re-
ligious life and a personal righteousness, which together
make up the idea of salvation” (CT, 19&-199).
2. CT, 301. ’’The Catholic confounds the accompanying effect
with the procuring cause; the unguarded Protestant honors
the cause to the exclusion of the effect,” Robinson com-
plains (CT, 301). Protestant orthodoxy, he suggested,
makes justification and sanctification chronologically
separate and causally distinct.
3. CT, 305. Strong saw this intimation that the exercise of
will in faith is somehow the germ of personal righteous-
ness or the faint beginning of a new obedience of our own-
rather than merely the surrender of an empty soul to
Christ—as ”a subtle doctrine of salvation by works”
(Art. [18961 200).
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connectedly from the others: they are parts of an organic
whole iron which the renewed
elated. 1
mam man oe Ysnous^v contem-
Ihe Scriptures indubitably teach that in becoming ihris-
tiar.s ten are roved ar.d transformed. by tue 1 i vine 'fill, or
2 ,
the fact of ejection. ~ Son sovereignly used emcacious
grace in the salvation of a portion cf mankind in contra-
distinction iron all humanity . But both Scripture and con-
science assure nen t .at their damnation is their own fan_t.
jieprotation
,
or absolute predestination t: damnation, is
"neither a sequence of the doctrine of election or the teach
_ 3ing oi tne Denatures. '
By the word regeneration, the Scriptures emphasize that
nan in becoming a Christian undergees a radical moral change.**
Ho satisfactory psychological explanation of this change is
possible, for it can he known only in its fruits, and the
action of the will, from which these are derived, is the
most insoluble of ail psychological problems." But Scrip-
1. CT, 307. 2. CT, 311. 3. CT, 313.
4. C-, 31c . Strong expressed relief that Bobinson’s doc-
trine of regeneration "is so markedly able and Scriptur-
al"
.
:
.rt
.
£lS
_J 19r , ascribin' the* new life tc the
Holy Spirit. Here the tendency to ma.-:e regeneration a
part, oi justification, in making the sinner* s acceptance
with Sod depend umon some beginnings of subjective' right-
eousness, is not further worked cut by Bobir.son. But to
view justification and righteousness as the same thing
from two different viewpoints, remarked Strong j "madedangerous concessions to Romanism^ and raved tne wav for
all manner cf sacramental and Kign Church theories of
Christianity. ** (Art. £189pJ 199,'.
5. 11
,
323. Bobinson protested against Hodge’s view that
regeneration involves, by immediate and absolute divine
creation, the origination of ’the principle of the spirit
of life"1 just as literally as the commencement of the
principle of natural life' (Hodge, 3T, 01) .
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ture and experience make clear that regeneration is a di-
vinely wrought change of the moral affections so great as
to constitute a new man, a creature whose moral aims are
reversed.^* Conversion is oft repeated, and hence is more
2
synonymous with repentance than with regeneration. God is
the author of the regenerative change, which is rather the
impartation of a germinally absolute character, or of or-
ganic force which ultimately reconstructs a man’s character,
than the divine giving to man of a change of character
While regeneration involves a direct influence of the
Holy Spirit on the heart of man, the Spirit makes use of
the instrumentality of truth, and inclines him to obey the
truth/4' Regeneration viewed from the side of conversion
may be tested by the evidence of a delight in the personal
character, blessedness and pursuits of a Christian.
Repentance and faith are inseparable from regenera-
tion. 6 Repentance involves both a grief toward sin and
1. CT, 320. It should be recalled that the 1872 edition
of CT stooped with the treatment of Regeneration.
2. CT, 321.
3 . CT, 322. Robinson tended to empty the New Testament
figures of more content than many theologians: ’’The
metaphorical terms which designate the act itself, such
as regeneration, renewal, recreation, distinctly de-
clare the change to be wrought by some power outside of
man’s own will. The changed man is said to have been
born again, .. .raised from the dead ,.. .renewed, ..
.
created anew. ..These are figures or speech which, if
language has meaning, must denote the putting forth upon
man of a controlling power from without and above”
(CT, 323). Strong wrote: ’’The idea of the believer’s
spiritual union with the Redeemer had no special chapter
given to it in Dr. Robinson’s system. He did not believe
in what is commonly called the mystical union, and he re-
garded the parable of the vine and the branches as an
Orientalism. The real truth was the influence of Christ
upon us. Our union with Christ is a union of sympathy,
oi gratitude, of love. The term ’union, ’ like the term
’substitution,’ is a figure of speech which expresses the
result in us of his work for us”* (Art. Cl896} 195).
4. CT, 324. 5. CT, 327. 6. CT, 327.
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an active trust in Christ. Faith involves assent of the
intellect to the divine declarations and consent of the
2heart to all divine requirements. Saving faith is neither
mere historical faith, or belief in historical facts, nor
is it full assurance.-^ Saving faith involves the element
of will, for a faith which does not issue in radical trans-
formation will not justify.'' Saving grace brings us into a
personal union with Christ.
Sanctification differs from justification only in de-
gree.^ Sanctification is t he nurturing into fruitage of
the germ of a new life implanted in the two-fold but in-
separable act of justification and regeneration. The denial
that perfection, or absolute holiness, is attainable, should
not involve a lowering beyond warrant of the true ideal of
Christian character.
?
1. CT, 328-329.
2. CT, 331. This precluded the possibility of infant bap-
tism, which Robinson called "a rag of Romanism.”
3. CT, 333. 4. CT, 335.
5. CT, 339* Robinson developed, this in two sentences:
”The often recurring phrase,
,
and its corre-
lative, ’Christ in us,’ cannot be satisfactorily ex-
plained by the interpretation which makes them to consist
in the mere influence of truth. Such explanation does
not accord with the intimacy of relationship between
Christ and his disciples so often dwelt upon and so va-
riously illustrated by Christ and the apostles” (CT, 339 )»
But Strong was hardly satisfied with this. ”1 wish,” he
remarked, ’’that (the) thought of the will in faith, as
not only seeing, but appropriating the personal Saviour,
had led Dr. Robinson to the more spiritual conception of
that union with Christ of which faith is the medium”
(Art. L13961 200)'.
6. Robinson held, contrary to Reformation theology, that jus-
tification includes ”a conception of a divinely provided
condition of spiritual renewal, a making just” (CT, 340).
7. CT
,
341, 342.
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Robinson held an essentially Baptist view of the
Church.^ The Church’s central purpose is to proclaim the
Gospel and to win men to Christ, not directly to suppress
vice or to regenerate society. Its aim is basically re-
ligious and spiritual, not moral and social. Baptism and
the Lord’s Supper are ordinances for believers, and the lat-
ter is for baptized Christians who are members of the local
church. Yet Robinson decried a divisive churchism or sec-
tarianism among Christians.
Christ is portrayed in Scripture as king no less than
prophet and priest. An intimate and indissoluble connec-
tion exists between the church of Christ and the kingdom of
God; the church is the only visible exhibition of the king-
dom.-*
(4). Eschatology
The notes on eschatology in Robinson’s volume of
theology are mere outlines of his thought. But he empha-
sizes how dependent the doctrine of future events is upon
1. No notes on the subject are included in CT, but Strong
reproduced the essence of notes dictated to students
in Robinson’s classes (Art. [1596] 201-202) and this
paragraph rests upon that material. Robinson taught
also Church Polity and Pastoral Theology as well as Sys-
tematic Theology. Three of his contributions relating
to Ecclesiology have been printed, viz.: "The Relation
of the Bible to the Church," Madison Avenue Lectures
,
pp. 357-419 American Baptist Publication Society)
,
also revised and reissued as a pamphlet; "Ritualism in
the Church of England, Baptist Quarterly
,
Jan., 1569;
Yale Lectures on Preaching (Henry Holt & Co., 1553).
2. CT, 342. 3. CT, 343.
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Biblical revelation.^ Christianity discloses the divine
purpose of a consummation. The doctrines of eschatology
rest on Scripture alone and, since they are prospective,
create the possibility of some diversity of view.
Physical death, or separation of the soul f rom the
body, comes to the believer in Christ as a transition to
a higher state, whereas for the unbeliever it concludes hope
and is the consummation of evil. The soul is ushered imme-
diately, consciously, and irrevocably, according to the
2
Scriptures, into a state of blessedness or woe.
The divine consummation centers in the personal and
permanent appearance of Jesus Christ, but it is almost im-
possible fully to interpret the prophecies relating thereto
until after their fulfillment.-^ The great unanimity among
theologians regarding the fact of the final personal return
of Christ, coupled with great diversity regarding its pre-
liminaries and adjuncts, are understandable.^ At most it can
be confidently affirmed that before Christ’s personal coming
the Gospel will have achieved its widest and ablest possible
|
5
results under the dispensation of the Spirit: the Jewish
1. CT, 344.
2. Strong apparently had access to later notes, in which Rob-
inson spoke more guardedly of personal immortality, while
not denying the possibility of bodiless existence in the
intermediate state (Art. tl$96J 293).
3. CT, 347. 4. CT, 34S.
5. CT, 34#. Strong remarked that Robinson held that premil-
lenialism and detailed prophetic prediction "stultifies
the system and scheme of Christianity. .. To depend for the
progress of the Church upon Christ’s visible and literal
return is to discredit the dispensation and power of the
Holy Spirit, which Christ himself declared to be better
for the Church than his own bodily presence would be"
(Art. ^18963 203).
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nation will partake of the blessings of Christianity, which
will come into a deadly, final conflict with false religion
and secularism, and then Christ will appear suddenly and un-
expectedly, followed by a simultaneous resurrection of
righteous and wicked dead, the instantaneous translation of
the living, and a final and irrevocable dismission of right-
eous and wicked to their eternal state.
The resurrection of the dead is to be accomplished by
supernatural intervention. The resurrection bodies are not
necessarily constructed out of the identical particles of
matter which previously composed the human body; only the in-
dividuality or personal identity need be preserved.^-
The last judgment involves a formal, visible, and uni-
versally recognized adjudication of the two great divisions
of the race to their opposite destinies, but conscience will
cooperate to necessitate and sanction that final discrimi-
nation.
The redeemed are promised a state of future blessedness,
and there is "a very good degree of unanimity" in viewing
this state as spatially localized, although its location is
3
uncertain. The wicked will be exposed to punishment largely
1
.
2 .
3.
CT, 349. Robinson denied that judgment is confined to the
future; there is a future culmination of the judicial pro-
cess. But judgment began with the first advent, and has
continued in successive manifestations of power and grace.
CT, 350.
CT, 350. Strong apparently referred to class statements
not included in CT when he represented Robinson as having
taught that believers are not suddenly perfected at death
in passing into the presence of Christ.' "There is no in-
timation of that sudden transformation at the hour of dis-
solution which is commonly supposed. No sinners can go
there, but men may enter there who still possess defects
(in the sense of incompletenesses), of character" which
may be gradually removed (Art. [189o} 205).
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i
as the natural result of cumulative rebellion, though not
to the exclusion of supernaturally inflicted penalties.
The Scriptures teach an eternal wretchedness of the wicked.
Such eternal punishment does not impugn divine benevolence,
for the latter effectively suppresses evil and promotes the
good.
^
4. Strong 1 s 1867 and 1863 Addresses
After his post-commencement European travels, Strong
was ordained to the Baptist ministry at Haverhill, Massa-
chusetts, on August 31, 1861, and served the First Baptist
Church there from 1861 to I865 .
That he was called from Haverhill to the scholarly,
theologically-minded First Baptist Church of Cleveland,
widely known as "the Rockefeller church”, which he served
until his call to Rochester Theological Seminary in 1872,
is itself an indication of Strong 1 s erudite pulpit ability.
But this is not the only suggestion preserved to us
from those years, to indicate that Strong had interacted
constantly and effectively with philosophical and scienti-
fic interests bearing upon the Christian message. Two ad-
dresses, titled respectively "Science and Religion” and
"Philosophy and Religion,” and delivered in I867 and 1868,
appear in a later collection of forty-nine of Strong's ad-
dresses and sermons, issued in 1888 under the title of
1. CT,351. Moral penalty is grounded in the moral consti-
tution of the universe, so that punishment is essentially
subjective, and not merely an objective judicial inflic-
tion.
2. CT, 352.
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the second of these addresses, Philosophy and Religion .^
i. Address on "Science and Religion"
Strong
1
s address on "Science and Religion" was de-
livered February IS, 1867, at the commencement of the Medi-
cal College of Cleveland, Ohio, where he cautioned his
hearers that medicine shares with all pursuits of natural
science "the common danger of forgetting those spiritual
facts which give to its conclusions all their validity and
p
significance." Despite the tendency of scientists to be
"practical unbelievers in anything but nature," mental and
spiritual facts are as demonstrable as visible and material
facts, though by another kind of evidence, Strong urged.
The address developed the proposition: that no system
of thought merits the name of true science which "does not
recognize the existence and importance of a realm of meta-
physical, moral and spiritual truth, side by side with the
3great fields of physical inquiry." Of particular interest
for this dissertation, is Strong 1 s plea for balance with
regard to the physical and the psychical, as against the
philosophic movements to the so-called extremes of natur-
alism or spiritualism:
Idealism and Materialism have alternately
held sway, and the world, in the heat of
controversy between them, has forgotten
that the rounded globe of truth must have
1. Referred to hereafter as PAR. In this volume, the intro
ductory address is "Philosophy and Religion" and the
second, "Science and Religion," although they were de-
livered in reverse order.
2. PAR, 19. 3. PAR, 20.
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two poles, not one. There is truth in both,
but either taken singly is false by defect...
The fatal tendency to merge matter in mind or
mind in matter, and so convert the universe
into one substance, can only be counteracted
by a study of both. . .Nature. . .is different
from mind or God. 1
Strong’s hostility to idealism derived mainly from the con-
p
viction that it led inevitably to pantheism. Between a
view which made everything nature and one that made every-
thing God, Strong found little to choose.
The same address indicated a receptivity to evolution
which, curiously, appears somewhat modified in Strong’s ini-
tial theology lectures almost a decade later. Evolution, he
declared, is but a mode of divine action; rather than con-
flicting with the argument from design, it affords ”a new
illustration of it,—a method of securing a result, and so
the latest and best proof of a designing God.”-^ The cre-
ated world is pliable in God’s hands, Strong urged, and so
miracles are possible.^ If a sufficient end is to be gained
by their performance, an end such as ’’the authentication of
that very revelation which nature makes only imperfectly , ”5
the possibility is converted into a natural probability.
Faith is acceptance of the testimony of almighty God
1 . PAR
,
23. Strong employed terminology found frequently in
his later writings with but slight variation of expres-
sion, but which is intended here in a non-mental view of
nature, e.g., ’’Nature is but the manifestation of God, and
the laws of nature are only the fixed methods of His work-
ing. He orders and governs the universe, not for its own
sake, but for the revelation of Himself” (PAR, 29).
2. Strong’s mode of argument against pantheism suggests that
an idealism (like personalism) which provides for human
responsibility and the possibility of* moral failure by
man 1 s relative independence, would circumvent his main
objections. His constant assumption appears to be that
only realism avoids losing human freedom and responsibil-
ity in God. But while opposing monism of any kind, he
insisted that ’’nature must be interpreted by our knowl-
edge of mind” (PAR, 24) and that ’’personal will” affords
’’the only key to tne interpretation of nature" (PAR, 25).
3. PAR, 23. 4. PAR, 29. 5. PAR, 30.
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f,on evidence as accessible and as valid as that on which
we accept the reality of outward phenomena . "^
ii. Address on "Philosophy and Religion"
The address on "Philosophy and Religion" was delivered
May 20, 1868, before the alumni of Rochester Theological
Seminary, and was subsequently published in the Baptist
Quarterly
,
prior to inclusion in the volume of addresses,
essays and sermons. It may be questioned whether Strong
anywhere gave philosophy broader rights against religion
than in this address.
Religion, as a scientific system, affirmed Strong,
rests upon a basis of philosophy. For the mind "cannot
content itself with theology proper," not alone because it
seeks a systematic statement of its beliefs, but because
"it desires to know what are the proofs of revelation, and
what are the evidences that a God exists from whom a reve-
2lation might cane."
Moreover, Strong assigned to philosophy the service of
"defining and correlating the great primary conceptions of
3
religion." Theology
1
s
doctrine of the will, and her determin-
ation of the limits of the human faculties,
her application of realism to the unity of
the race, and her theory of the true end
of being, must all be ultimately given her
1. PAR, 30.
2. PAR, 3. "Philosophy is the science of foundation,"
Strong stated. "It busies itself with the examina-
tion of the grounds of faith. It seeks to determine
whether religion has a safe basis and support in the
facts of Consciousness" (PAR, 3).
3. PAR, 3.
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by the prior philosophy with which
she sets out in her investigations.
Both in her account of the universe and
in her account of God, theology is o-
bliged to combine with the facts of reve-
lation the facts of conscious ness
,
since
only through consciousness haye we any
personal knowledge of either.
Theology, furthermore, received its status as a
2
science, through the logical impetus of Aristotle. But
theology has its debt not alone to ancient philosophers,
but to moderns like Bishop Butler, with his doctrine of
the supremacy of conscience in the moral constitution of
man; Coleridge, with his splendid but incomplete spirit-
ual philosophy in opposition to German pantheism; and
Jonathan Edwards, with his enthronement of love as the cen-
3tral emphasis in a Calvinistic view of creation.
But philosophy and religion share a common danger in
the tendency to extremes. Theology has swung to extremes
between an emphasis on divine sovereignty and human free-
dom, which are true but "logically irreconcilable" factors,
T7 PAR, 3. Strong stressed the abstract approach which
philosophy makes to the concrete revelational ideas of
God, providence, liberty, virtue, conscience. Philoso-
phy analysis these, and reconciles them with the remain-
ing facts of our mental constitution and with our obser-
vation of nature (PAR, 3).
2. "Have you ever reflected upon the remarkable difference
in form that exists between Augustine and Calvin? .. .And
to what shall we attribute this advance? To nothing
more or less than the influence of that Aristotle, whom
Luther called ’an accursed, mischief-making heathen.’
It was the study of Aristotle which first made theology
a science, and rendered possible a Calvin. . .Take away
the influence of Plato and Aristotle, and you put a
scientific theology where John of Damascus found it
eleven centuries ago" (PAR, 4).
3. PAR, 4-5.
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and philosophy has swung to extremes touching the duality
of matter and spirit.^-
Strong T s uncompromising hostility to metaphysical
monism, invariably equated with pantheism in this period of
his thought, is seen from the warning that
any theory of philosophy which is based
upon a monistic hypothesis, and which
denies the facts of either matter or mind,
must exert a deadly influence upon theology
and religion. The ultimate conclusion must
be that God is the universe or that the uni-
verse is God—in other words, there is no
God separate from the soul or the world.
At the same time, Strong attacked "the new philosophy
of Nescience" inspired by Comte, as denying the direct in-
tuitions of human consciousness in such a way as consis-
to make all science impossible:
unless the primitive beliefs of sub-
stance, resemblance, power, which are
a part of the original endowment of the
mind, and which flash out from latency
into living energy the moment we are
brought in contact with the phenomena of
the outer world. ..all science is forever
impossible.'5
view, Strong protested, tears up philosophy by the
and "Religion must share the fate of philosophy."^
1. PAR, 6. "In the precise proportion to which the view
of mind leans to one or the other extreme," Strong re-
marked, "will the religious thinking of the individual
and the age lean towards Materialism or Pantheism"
(PAR, 7).
2. PAR, 7.
3. PAR, 9-10. Strong here attacked Comte’s thesis that we
know nothing but the phenomena of matter, and that mind
lies wholly out of reach of direct observation, by the
emphasis that no experience at all is possible, but for
a mental potency which is prior to all experience.
. PAR, 13.
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Essential to the perfect triumph of religion is an
impartial philosophy . And a true philosophy "must be
one of God T s chosen weapons for subduing the world to
Christ" if the triumph of Christianity is to be accom-
2plished "in accordance with the common laws of mind."
The philosophic trend happily had already championed an
inductive method which "begins with the fundamental facts
of cons ciousness—the intuitive knowledge of matter, of
mind, of God, and of each as distinct and differing in na-
3ture from the others." The door must not be left ajar
"for a subtle Idealism."^ The clearness and power of man T s
intuitive knowledge of God may be "dimmed and blunted" by
sin, but
still the fact remains that an intuitive
knowledge of God, distorted, blunted, over-
laid with a thousand superstitious fancies
though it be, belongs to man as man, reveal-
ing itself in his consciousness of the In-
finite around him and in his fears of the
judgment before him .'5
This intuition is awakened into living power, and the soul
restored to actual communion with God, by the coming of
Christ. ^ The establishment of this intuition upon a sci-
entific basis is "the test and the goal of a true philo-
sophy.
It is clear from a study of these addresses delivered
by Strong in 1867 and 1868, that he resisted metaphysical
1. PAR, 14. 2. PAR, 14. 3. PAR, 16.
4. PAR, 16. 5. PAR, 16. 6. PAR, 17.
7. PAR, 17.
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monism of an idealistic no less than a materialistic sort,
on the ground that the former led invariably to pantheism;
that he was receptive to the view of theistic evolution,
as long as the miraculous was not precluded; that he
gave to philosophy broad rights as against theology
—
rights so broad, indeed, that it is difficult to see how,
at the same time, the revelational view of God could be
made a true philosophy 1 s test and goal.
5. The Initial Theology Taught by Strong
Strong returned to the classroom, this time as
teacher rather than as student, in 1872, and behind him in
Christian experience there stood a decade of Baptist pas-
toral effort, and three strands of theological statement
which, while insisting on the main doctrines of an evan-
gelical view., yet included various shades of departure
from the current orthodoxy. His divinity studies had cen-
tered, in the first place, in a committment to an essen-
tially Calyinistic, rather than Arminian, theology. But
his studies with Robinson, while orthodox in the main, af-
forded both an orientation to the rising liberal thought,
as well as, in certain significant respects, an occasion
of compromise with it, and an incentive to state his own
position in clearer affinity to or contrast with the pre-
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vailing competitive influences of the day.'*'
Doubtless the compromise elements in Robinson’s
thought were not as conspicuous, because not as carefully
worked out, when Strong studied under him. But before
Robinson left the divinity lecture room, Strong later
stated, he
probably taught in the Rochester theolog-
ical Seminary a more modern system than
was at that time taught in any other evan-
gelical Seminary of any denomination what-
ever...! find myself impressed anew with
the boldness and independence of his views,
but also with the fact that he represented
consciously or unconsciously a great move-
ment of human thought, a movement of which
the Ritschlian School in Germany and the
New Theology of this country are later types
and manifestations.
Yet it should be recalled that, with the commencement
of his teaching duties, Strong deliberately turned aside
from employing Robinson’s theology notes, just then pub-
lished, in order to overcome a complete dependence upon
the revered teacher from whom he had first studied Sys-
tematic Theology. Strong candidly related:
when I began. . .as. . .successor , o . .1 knew
that my ways of theological thinking had
been largely shaped by him. I feared,
1. It should be recalled also that, as Strong looked back
two decades later, he recalled early impulses toward
monism in Robinson’s teaching that the Scriptures
do not indubitably teach the absolute origination of
matter, and his dissatisfaction with the Scholastic
doctrine of concursus.
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if I made use of his recently printed
notes, that I should become a copyist.
I resolved, therefore, to construct my
own system de novo
,
without once look-
ing at what my former teacher had writ-
ten."
i. The 1876 Lectures
o
for this reason alone, Strong’s Lectures on Theology ,
which appeared in 1876
,
hold no little historical inter-
est.-^ The early theology of Strong was essentially evan-
gelical, and the differences with Robinson were almost all
in the direction of a more traditional and orthodox state-
ment. There is no indication of any interest in the newer
philosophies of divine immanence, and the lecture notes and
reading references are without reference to Lotze.^ It will
not be necessary to give a comprehensive summary of Strong’s
views, but only to set forth in main outline his doctrinal
insistences.
(1). Prolegomena
Theology was defined by Strong as ,Tthe science of God
1. Art. C1B963 167-168.
2. Referred to hereafter simply as LOT.
3. The writer possesses a copy of LOT interleaved for stu-
dent notes. A prefatory note affirms that ’’These lec-
tures are printed, not published." The fly-leaf bears
the legend of a Rochester student, "A. S. Carman,
Sent. l$82-R.T.S.-’85", so that the fading but legible
inked notes serve to show later modifications in Strong’s
thought. Carman later became a professor and his son,
Prof. E. A. Carman, presented the father’s text to the
writer.
4. There are perhaps a half-dozen references to Bowne’s Re -
view of H. Spencer
, so that the limited interest in phi-
losophical idealism appears rather along epistemological
than ontological lines.
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and of the relations between God and the universe.”^
The sources of theology are natural theology and its
2
supplement, the Scriptures.
(2). The Existence of God
The existence of God is a first truth, not derived
from but developed upon the occasion of observation and re-
flection.^ The Scriptures therefore attempt no proof of
God’s existence, but assume and declare the universality of
that knowledge.'" The intuitive knowledge of God may be con-
firmed and explicated by arguments from general revelation. 0
Such arguments are probable, not demonstrative, but taken
together furnish moral certainty.^ The cosmological argu-
ed
ment proves ’’some cause of the universe indefinitely great.”
The teleological argument proves ”an intelligence adequate to
(the) contrivance” of the present harmony of the universe,
but cannot assure us ’’whether this intelligence is creator
1. LOT, 1. There was no contrastive reference to Robinson’s
metaphysical reserve. The possibility of theology, de-
clared Strong, is lodged in (1) The existence of a God who
has relations to the universe; (2) The capacity of the hu-
man mind for knowdng God and certain of these relations;
(3) God’s actual revelation of himself and certain of
these relations (LOT, 2-5). Strong pressed the case
against Sir William Hamilton and Herbert Spencer.
2. LOT, 9. Strong therefore was not adverse to the possi-
bility of developing general revelation into a positive
but incomplete theism.
3. LOT, 17. 4. LOT, IS. 5. LOT, 21. 6. LOT, 22.
7. Strong’s words are: ’’They together furnish a corrobora-
tion of our primitive conviction of God’s existence,
which is of great practical value, and is in itself suffi-
cient to bind the moral action of men” (LOT, 23).
S. LOT, 23.
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or only fashioner, personal or impersonal, one or many,
finite or infinite, eternal or owing its being to anoth-
er. The moral argument assures a personal, ethical Be-
ing who is the '’proper object of supreme affection and ser-
vice”, but cannot prove God’s creatorship, infinity, or
mercy. Strong assigned the moral argument ”chief place”
because it adds to the other evidences the "far wider ideas
of personality and righteous lordship. The ontological
argument Strong dismissed as confounding ideal and real
existence
Strong seemed to waver as to the cumulative value of
the empirical proofs, however. On the one hand, he de-
clared that the existence of ”a Being indefinitely great,
a personal Cause, Contriver and Lawgiver”, had been
’’proved” by the arguments on the other, that "as a log-
ical process this is indeed defective, since all logic as
well as all observation depends for its validity upon the
presupposed existence of God” and that the bridge to God
1. LOT, 25. 2. LOT, 26. 3. LOT, 26. 4. LOT, 27.
5. Since, he added, the law of parsimony requires that the
conclusions be applied to one Being, not to many (LOT, 27).
6. In an address titled ’’Scientific Theism” (PAR, 75-89),
read before ’’The Club” in Rochester on February 16, lo75,
Strong presented his most closely worked statement of the
evidences for God. He rested his case especially on the
conviction that God is the logical presupposition of any
knowledge at all: ”To all arguments for the existence of
God, we have a still more radical objection to urge,
namely that all reasoning presupposes the existence of
God as its logical condition and foundation. Not only...
the trustworthiness of the simplest mental acts... but the
more complex processes, such as induction and deduction,
can be relied upon only by supposing a thinking Deity,
who has made the various parts of the universe to corres-
pond to each other and to the investigating faculties
of man” (PAR, 85).
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can be made only upon the assumption that "our abstract
ideas of infinity and perfection are to be applied to
the Being to whom argument has actually conducted us."'*'
What is significant here is that, although Strong pre-
sents a revelational theology, the case for God is
settled without any appeal to the significance of special
revelation at this juncture. It is not that Strong de-
nied that special revelation is required as a corrective,
in view of man’s sin, but that he appeared to construct
the argument for the existence of God without any appeal
to special divine disclosure.
Any correct interpretation of the universe must pos-
tulate, declared Strong, an intuitive knowledge of the ex-
ternal world, of the self, and of God. But these three
factors cannot be reduced to one, as materialism, idealism,
3
or pantheism would do.
1. LOT, 27. 2. LOT, 28.
3. LOT, 28. Strong had contributed an essay to the Oct-
ober 2, 1873, issue of The Examiner , under the topic of
"Materialistic Skepticism" (PAR, 31-38), in which he
viewed the mechanical philosophies as a natural reaction
from the transcendental idealism of Hegel which had
"threatened to sweep away the faith of the world" (RAR,31)
He seized on the emphasis of the later materialism that
reality must be interpreted in terms both of matter and
force, while regarding force as an inseparable property
of matter, since "to make it a separate and independent
existence would be, for the materialist, to give up the
theory of matter as a cause, and to make shipwreck of his
materialism" (PAR, 33). Strong urged that, because of
the harmonious working of nature toward useful ends, a
force both immaterial and mental must be postulated
(PAR, 33), an interesting circumstance in view of Strong’
later contention that matter is idea plus will. To this
he added the arguments from the organization of nature
and from the intuition of the priority of mind.
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(3). The Scriptures a Revelation from God
The appeal to divine revelation is made by Strong,
on the ground of both a psychological and historical
need for it.^ There is a presumption that this need will
2be met in view of "what we know of God by nature."
Divine revelation is attested by miracles and pro-
phecy.
Miracles contravene no laws of nature, but those
laws cannot explain them, for miracles are produced by
3God's immediate agency for a religious purpose. Miracles
draw attention to new truth and cease when that truth has
gained foothold.^ They certify to doctrinal truth only
indirectly; directly they attest the divine commission
and authority of a religious teacher.
^
1. LOT, 31.
2. LOT, 31. Strong's argument here was curiously circu-
lar. Since God made man a spiritual being for spiri-
tual ends, the means to secure these ends might be ex-
pected. Since God had begun an incompleted revelation,
He may be expected to complete it (by special revela-
tion?). Since other wants are supplied, it is unlikely
that the highest want would be unsupplied (would man
want a special revelation apart from knowledge of its
possibility?). The signs of a reparative goodness in
nature and history suggest a likelihood of revelation
(do they suggest mercy?). The further appeal to expec-
tations in view of other communications of divine truth
in general revelation would seem to rule out, rather
than to encourage, as Strong thought, the expectation
of a once-for-all disclosure.
. LOT, 33. 4. LOT, 35.3 5. LOT, 35
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Purity of life and doctrine, however, must go with
the miracles to assure divine commission; miracles and doc-
trine support each other, and internal evidence may have
greater power than external over some minds and ages. Still,
the miracles do not lose their value as evidences; the au-
thority of Christ as teacher rests upon his miracles, specifi-
cally the resurrection.
^
Prophecy proceeds from divine knowledge to attest reve-
lation, as miracles proceed from divine power. 1' But, like
miracle,
,
prophecy is a corroborative evidence which does not
stand alone; it unites with miracle to prove the divine com-
3
mission and authority of a teacher.
Strong considered it from the first to be a part of Sys-
tematic Theology to discuss the genuineness of the books of
the Bible, and the credibility of the writers, and estab-
lished this along thoroughly conservative views of author-
ship.^ The supernatural character of the Scriptures is sup-
ported by their unity, their meeting of human needs, the
moral system of the New Testament, the person and character
of Christ, and the historical results of the proclamation
c
of Christianity.
1 .
3.
4.
LOT, 35. 2. LOT, 36.
LOT, 37o Strong does not seem to have given any clearly
worked out statement of the relationship between the com-
pulsion of truth and miracle in the introduction of new
doctrine. This difficulty was noted also in Robinson.
LOT, 39-45. 5. LOT, 45-49.
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A special divine influence was exerted upon the Scrip-
ture writers so that their productions constitute "an in-
fallible and sufficient rule of faith and practice.”'1' In-
spiration resures as its result a trustworthy record. It is
supernatural, plenary, and dynamical as opposed to mechani-
cal. 2 They are a joint divine-human production incorporating
the personal peculiarities of the writers. The precise
words were not generally communicated to them, but the
thoughts were; inspiration is verbal as to result, but not
as to method.^ If errors in secular matters were proved,
c
this would not overthrow the doctrine of inspiration,^ but
c
in fact no scientific or historical or moral errors exist.
(4). The Nature, Decrees and Works of God
The works of God form a natural transition to a study
7
of the attributes and essence of God. The attributes are
not merely subjective distinctions, but have an objective
1. LOT, 50. 2. LOT, 53. 3. LOT, 53. 4. LOT, 54.
5. ”It would only compel us to give a larger place to the
human element in the composition of the Scriptures, and
to regard them more exclusively as a text-book of re-
ligion” (LOT, 55).
6. LOT, 55-57.
7. It should be noted that Strong, like Robinson before
him, fluctuated in an appeal to philosophical and revela-
tional considerations. Strong remarked, however, that
the rational method (via negationis. via eminentiae, and
via causalitatis ) ”is valuable (but) it has insuperable
difficulties and its place is a subordinate one. While
we use it continually to confirm and supplement results
otherwise obtained, our chief means of determining the
divine attributes must be the Biblical method” (LOT, 62).
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existence.^- The attributes inhere in the divine essence,
but the essence is known only as manifested through the
attributes, 2
Strong divided the attributes into absolute and imma-
nent; the former belonging to God’s nature independently of
his connection with the universe, and the latter being in-
3
volved in His relations to creation. The absolute attri-
butes are spirituality (holiness, love, truth) and infinity
(self-existence, immutability, unity). The relative
attributes are those related to time and space (eternity,
immensity), to creation (omnipresence, omniscience, omnipo-
tence), and to moral beings (justice, goodness, mercy).
The predominant appeal, in establishing these attributes,
is to the Scripture, although a philosophical justification
is sometimes also given. ^ God’s nature is not subject to
time, and to him, past, present and future are "one eternal
now," not as being indistinguishable, but in the sense that
God sees past and future as vividly as the present. 5 God’s
mercy is that eternal principle of his nature which "leads
him to seek the temporal good and eternal salvation of
those who have opposed themselves to his will, even at the
1. Robinson, it will be recalled, held metaphysical reser-
vations at this point .
2. LOT, 61. Strong thus held a realist rather than an
idealist view of the relation of attributes and sub-
stance.
3. LOT, 62.
4. Strong argued that "reason teaches no change is possible
in God" (LOT, 66) and that "the notion of two or more
Gods is self-contradictory; since each limits the other
and destroys his Godhead... It is unphilosophical
,
more-
over, to assume the existence of two or more Gods when
one will explain all the facts" (LOT, 67).
5o LOT, 67. .
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cost of infinite self-sacrifice."^-
o
The fundamental divine attribute is holiness. The
divine justice and mercy are reconciled in the salvation
of sinful man only by the substitutionary death of the
God-man. ^ The ground of moral obligation is the moral
perfection of the divine nature.^
The tripersonality of God is exclusively a truth of
revelation.^ This triunity is not merely economic and tem-
poral, but is immanent and eternal. The terms "generation
and "procession" as applied to the Son and to the Holy
Spirit only approximate the truth, and the impressions
gained from them are to be corrected by the whole tenor of
7Scripture. While the mode. of divine triunity is unre-
vealed and inscrutable, the doctrine contains no self-
contradictory elements, and furnishes a principle of con-
g
nection between all other Christian doctrines.
God*s eternal plan has rendered certain all events of
9the universe, past, present and future. The decrees are
consistent With the free agency of man.^ They do not make
1. LOT, 70. '
2. This is evidenced, Strong wrote, by the Scriptures, by
our own moral constitution, and by the actual dealings
of God in terms of penalty and requirement of atonement
(LOT, 70).
3
o
LOT, 71. 4. LOT, 71. 5. LOT, 72.
6. LOT, 79* The three persons have an undivided essence,
Strong stated, in line with the orthodox tradition
(LOT, 80). Strong commented that the term "person" is
only an approximation of the truth, since it does not
imply three essences in the trinity, yet it is the best
approximation of the Biblical conception (LOT, 80). *
7. LOT, 82. 8. LOT, 84 . 9. LOT, 86. 10. LOT, 88
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God the author of sin, but of free agents who sin. 1
o
The universe is a voluntary ex nihilo creation.
The Mosaic account recognizes an original creation and a
subsequent arrangement and development . If science shculd
"ultimately render it certain" that all present species were
derived by natural descent from a few original germs which
evolved from inorganic forces and materials, the Mosaic
account "would not therefore be proved untrue."^" But such
derivation has not been demonstrated, and there is no
reason for disbelieving that brute and human life were in-
5troduced by absolute origination. The pictorial-summary
interpretation, which views the Mosaic account as a rough
sketch of the creation history presented in graphic form,
is most acceptable.
7God’s supreme end in creation is his glory. The
g
creation necessarily manifests his moral attributes. But
we are not justified in assuming that the actual creation
1. LOT, 90.
2. LOT, 92. Strong deliberately set creation over against
the idealistic theories: "If the world be eternal, like
God, it must be an efflux from the substance of God and
must be absolutely equal with God. Only a proper doc-
trine of creation can secure God’s absolute distinctness
from the v/orld and his sovereignty over it. The logical
alternative of creation is therefore a system of pan-
theism, in which God is an impersonal and necessary force.
Hence the pantheistic dicta of Fichte: ’The assumption of
a creation is the fundamental error of all false meta-
physics and false theology ’
;
of Hegel: ’God evolves the
world out of himself in order to take it back into himself
again in the Spirit’" (LOT, 103).
. LOT, 97. 4. LOT, 97. 5. LOT, 93.
. LOT, 101. 8. LOT, 102.
3
7
6. LOT, 99.
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was the best possible or the only possible creation.'*-
God continually preserves his creation by a positive
2
sustaining agency. But the properties and powers of na-
ture have objective reality:
although matter and mind retain their
existence and endowments only by the
constant energy of God, second causes
are not mere names for the great first
cause .
There is a natural concurrence of God in all operations
of matter and mind so that, while God’s will is not the
sole force, without his concurrence no being or sub-
stance could continue to exist or act.^ The divine ef-
ficiency interpenetrates nature and man without absorbing
them. God concurs with evil acts only insofar as they
are natural, and not as they are evil, acts.^
God by a continuous providential agency makes all
events of the physical and moral universe fulfill the ori
7ginal design of the creation. Providence extends to par
a
ticular events. Special providence is a type of parti-
cular providence which produces an impressive effect upon
9
us, contrasted with miracles and works of grace like re-
generation which are supernatural acts. God may answer
prayer even by changing the sequence of nature. 10 But
1 .
2 .
5 .
8 .
9 .
LOT, 102. Strong remarked: ’’Since the resources of
God’s wisdom are infinite, there may have been in the
divine mind many possible systems, equally adapted to
manifest his glory. We must therefore regard the pre-
sent creation simply as the act of God’s free and sove
reign will.”
LOT, 103. 3. LOT, 103. 4. LOT, 103.
LOT, 103. 6. LOT, 106. 7. LOT, 106.
LOT, 106. The theory of general providence Strong dis
missed as ’’only a form of deism” (LOT, 109).
LOT, 110. 10. LOT, 111.
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since he is immanent in nature, an answer coming by na-
tural agencies alone is equally a revelation of his per-
sonal care."*"
The probability of angelic existences, in view of
ascending scale of created intelligences, is turned to cer-
o
tainty by Biblical statement. The Scriptures preclude
any view of evil except in terms of a personal being of
great power who leads an organized opposition to the divine
government
.
(5). Anthropology
The Scriptures negate a purely naturalistic origin of
man, yet do not disclose the divine method of creation,
whether mediate or immediate.^ Psychology suggests that
what chiefly distinguishes man from the beasts could not
have been derived by any natural process of development,
and comparative physiology does not preclude a similar
view of his body. The human race is descended from a
single pair.
The Bible supports a dichotomous view of the essen-
tial elements of human nature; man consists of body, and
7
of spirit or soul. The traducian theory of the origin
g
of the soul seems to accord best with Scripture.
1. LOT, 112. 2. LOT, 114. 3. LOT, 115.
4. LOT, 121. 5. LOT, 121. 6. LOT, 122.
7. LOT, 124. 8. LOT, 128.
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Man’s original state is disclosed in the Scriptures
alone. ^ He was created a personal being, and hence pos-
sessed in distinction from the brute self-consciousness,
God-consciousness, and self-determination, and also moral
2likeness to God.'1' Yet his perfection was not final and
3
absolute, but relative and provisional.
Before treating man’s apostasy, Strong discussed the
nature of divine law, whi ch he designated as a general ex-
pression of God’s nature, and thus leaves open the possi-
bility of grace, not as abrogating but as republishing and
enforcing law.^
Sin is lack of conformity to God’s moral lav;, either
in act, disposition or state. Ability to fulfill the law
7is not essential to constitute the non-fulfillment sin.
The essential principle of sin is selfishness, or that
choice of self as the end which is antithetic to supreme
love of God.^’ Sin is universal in the human raceM All
men possess a sinful nature, and the Scriptures refer the
origin of this nature to oar first parents.^ The Genesis
account of man’s fall from primal holiness is historical
The consequences of the fall for Adam were physical and
12spiritual death, and positive and formal exclusion from
God’s presence.
^
1. LOT, 130. 2. LOT, 130. 3. LOT, 133.
4. LOT, 137. 5. LOT, 139. 6. LOT, 140.
7. LOT, 142. 8. LOT, 144. 9. LOT, 146.
10. LOT, 146. 11. LOT, 148. 12. LOT, 150.
13. LOT, 151.
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The transgression of the first parents constituted
their posterity sinners, according to the Scriptures, so
that Adam’s sin is ’’imputed to every member of the race
of whi ch he was the germ and head.”"*' Strong declared for
a theory of natural headship of Adam, against the Prince-
ton theory of federal headship and the theory of mediate
o
imputation of Adam’s sin. He warned, however, that any
theory of the method of man’s union with Adam
is merely a valuable hypothesis. . .A cen-
tral fact is announced in Scripture,
which we feel compelled to believe upon
divine testimony, even though every at-
tempted explanation should prove unsatis-
factory. That central fact, which con-
stitutes the substance of the Scripture
doctrine of original sin, is simply this,
that the sin of Adam is the immediate
cause and ground of inborn depravity,
guilt and condemnation to the whole human
race.
^
Thus mankind has lost original righteousness and has suf-
fered the total depravity of the moral nature,^ is obli-
c
gated to render satisfaction to God’s justice, and sub-
jected to pain or loss inflicted directly or indirectly
in vindication of divine justice.^1 The penalty of sin
7is physical and spiritual death; if the latter is not
1. LOT, 151.
2. Strong objected that the federal theory made imputation
the cause of depravity, and the mediate theory made de-
pravity the cause of imputation, whereas the Biblical
account is that all men sinned seminally in Adam (LOT,
155-158).
3. LOT, 159. 4. LOT, 162. 5. LOT, 165 .
6. LOT, 167. 7. LOT, 167-168.
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reversed before physical death, it passes irreversibly
into eternal death. ^ Those who die in infancy are saved
because they have not personally transgressed and their
2
racial guilt is atoned for by the death of Christ.
(6). Soteriology
The history of the race discloses a providential pre-
paration for the provision of redemption, negatively in
heathen history, and positively in the history of Israel.-^
This redemption was to be effected through a Media-
tor uniting divine and human natures for purposes of re-
conciliation.^ The orthodox view of Jesus Christ was pro-
mulgated at Chalcedon.5 The attributes and powers of both
natures are ascribed to the one Christ, and conversely the
works and dignities of the one Christ to either nature,
thus requiring an organic and indissoluble union of the
two natures in a single person.^
1
Strong resisted such
views as that the divine Logos reduced himself to the con-
7dition and limits of human nature, or that the incarna-
tion was progressive and gradual. The union of natures
o
is necessarily inscrutable because without analogy.
1. LOT, 168. 2. LOT, 169. 3. LOT, 171.
4. LOT, 172. 5. LOT, 174.
6. LOT, 176; "Hence we can say on the one hand, that the
God-man existed before Abraham, yet was born in the reign
of Augustus Caesar, and that Jesus Christ wept, was weary,
suffered, died, yet is the same yesterday, to-aay and
forever.
.
.
n
7. LOT, 177. 8. LOT, 178.
9. LOT, 179. "The possibility of the union of deity and
humanity in one person," Strong wrote, "is grounded in
the original creation of man in the divine image. Man's
kinship to God, in other words, his possession of a
rational and spiritual image, is the condition of incar-
nation" (LOT, 179).
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Christ’s human nature is impersonal in that it attained
self-consciousness and self-determination only in the per-
sonality of the God-man; the Logos furnished the principle
of personality."^ Self-consciousness and self-determination
belong to personality, and not to nature as such, and hence
Christ has but a single consciousness and a single will,
and this consciousness and will is never simply human, but
o
theanthropic . The divine attributes are imparted to the
human without passing over into its essence, although this
power was only rarely manifested because of the God-man T s
3
chosen state of humiliation. The union of the two natures
in one person, necessary to constitute Jesus Christ a pro-
per mediator between man and God, is indissoluble and eter-
nal.^"
The humiliation of Christ consisted in the assumption
of a servant-form in which he resigned the independent ex-
ercise of the divine attributes, in his submission to the
control of the Holy Spirit, and his continuous surrender of
the exercise of divine powers so far as his human nature
was concerned. ^ But in becoming man he did not divest him-
self of the substance of his Godhead.^ His exaltation
I. LOT, ISO. 2. LOT, 180.
3. LOT, 130. Strong added: TtAs the human Saviour can ex-
ercise divine attributes, not in virtue of his humanity
alone, but derivatively by virtue of his possession of a
divine nature, so the divine Saciour can suffer and be
ignorant as man, not in his divine nature, but deriva-
tively by virtue of his possession of a human nature”
(LOT, 131).
4. LOT, 131. 5. LOT, 133. 6. LOT, 133 .
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consisted in resumption of his independent exercise of di-
vine attributes, in the withdrawal by the Logos of all
limitations in the communication of the divine fulness to
the human nature of Christ, and in the corresponding exer-
cise on the part of the human nature of these powers which
belonged to it by virtue of union with the divine.^" The
stages of the exaltation were the quickening and resurrec-
tion, and the ascension and sitting on the right hand of
God. 2
Christ’s offices are represented in Scripture as three
3fold: prophetic, priestly and kingly.
His prophetic work included teaching, predicting, and
miracle-working
,
and has four stages: the preparatory work
of the Logos, ^ his earthly incarnate ministry, his guidance
and teaching of the church on earth since the ascension,
and his final revelation of the Father to the saints in
glory.
His priestly office is fulfilled by his sacrifice and
by making intercession.'"
The Scriptures represent his sacrificial work as a
provision originating in God’s love, as an example of dis-
interested love to secure our deliverance from selfishness,
as a ransom paid to free us from the bondage of sin, as a
penalty borne in order to rescue the guilty, as an exhibi-
tion of God’s righteousness, as a substitution, as a
I. LOT. 184. 2. LOT, 184-185. 3. LOT, 185.
4. ’’All preliminary religious knowledge, whether within or
without the bounds of the chosen people, is from Christ,
the revealer of God” (LOT, 185-186).*
5. LOT, 186.
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sin-offering, as a propitiation, and as a work of priest-
ly mediation which reconciles God to men.^ His atonement
2
was prefigured by the Old Testament sacrificial system.
Scripture compels us to view the death of Christ as
a vicarious offering, provided by God’s
love for the purpose of satisfying an
internal demand of the divine holiness,
and of removing an obstacle in the divine ~
mind to the renewal and pardon of sinners.^
But the Anselmic theory conceives the principle which is
satisfied in a manner too formal and external, making the
divine honor or majesty more prominent than the divine ho-
liness, holds merely to an external transfer of the merit
of Christ’s work, and does not clearly state the internal
ground of that transfer in the believer’s union with Christ.^
In its stead, Strong proposed the "ethical theory" of the
atonement, which holds that the necessity of the atonement
is grounded in divine holiness, ^ so that the atonement an-
swers the ethical demand of the divine nature that sin be
visited with penalty. ^ The atonemoit is sufficient for
all men; it is limited not in extent, but in application
to the elect.
^
IT
4.
5.
6 .
7.
LOT, 186-187. 2. LOT, 187-189. 3. LOT, 189.
LOT, 194.
There is no doubt, however, that most contemporary state-
ments of Anselm’s satisfaction theory took this view also.
Strong later acknowledged that Thomas Aquinas had suople-
raentea the Anselmic theory in this regard ( Summa , III", 8).
LOT, 194-195. Strong held that the ethical theory es-
capes the objection made against "a merely commercial
view of the Atonement", that satisfaction and forgiveness
are mutually exclusive. "Since it is not a third party
but the Judge himself who makes satisfaction to his own
violated holiness, forgiveness is still optional, and
may be offered upon terms agreeable to himself” (LOT, 197).
LOT, 196.
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The priesthood of Christ did not cease with the atone-
ment, but He fulfills the office of intercession in the
presence of God."*' By this special activity He secures,
upon the ground of His sacrifice, whatever temporal or
2
spiritual blessing comes to man.
Christ’s kingdom is the sovereignty not of his divine
nature, but a sovereignty which He possesses as divine-
human Redeemer, and by which He rules all things for the
glory of God and for the execution of the divine purpose
of salvation.
Strong declared for the sublapsarian as against the
supralapsarian order of divine decrees,^ at the same time
inverting (in view of his conviction against limited atone-
ment) the decree to elect some and the decree to provide
salvation. Strong’s view of the true order, therefore, was:
(1) the decree to create; (2) the decree to permit the fall;
(3) the decree to provide salvation in Christ sufficient
for the needs of all; (4) the decree to elect some.
God’s election is that eternal act whereby, in his
sovereign pleasure and not on account of foreseen merit, he
chooses certain sinful men to receive special grace and be
made voluntary partakers of Christ’s election. 5 This in-
volves no injustice, for the unsaved suffer only the due
1. LOT, 193. 2. LOT, 193.
3. LOT, 199* He upholds the universe by a kingdom of power,
the militant church in a kingdom of grace, and ultimately
the church triumphant as a kingdom of glory, Strong wrote.
4. LOT, 200. 5. LOT, 201.
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reward of their deeds; 1 nor is it arbitrary, but is the
free choice of a wise and sovereign will. The Scriptures
distinguish between a general, external call to all men,
and a special, efficacious call of the Spirit to the elect.
^
Regeneration is the divine act which, through the truth as
a means, makes holy the governing disposition of the soul.1'
The Holy Spirit is the immediate agent. 5 Regeneration is
wrought in conjunction with the presentation of truth to
the intellect. 0 The change is instantaneous, in a region
of the soul below consciousness, and hence known only in its
results.*'
7 Conversion is a voluntary change by which the
sinner turns from sin to Christ; the turning from sin is re-
pentance, the turning to Christ is faith. Repentance has
intellectual, emotional and volitional elements,^ as also
does faith.^ By faith there is constituted a union of the
soul with Christ which transcends associational and moral
union and is a union of life. 11 The consequences of this
I. LOT, 201. 2. LOT, 202.
3. LOT, 203. The general call is not insincere, Strong af-
firmed. for the inability to respond to it is not physi-
cal but moral, in view or the settled perversity or
man's will (l6t, 203).
4. LOT, 204. 5. LOT, 206. 6. LOT, 206.
7. LOT, 208. "Although man is conscious, he is not conscious
of God’s regenerating agency" (LOT, 209).
8. LOT, 209. 9. LOT. 210. 10. LOT, 212.
II. In this union of life, Strong wrote, "the human spirit,
while then most truly possessing its own individuality
and personal distinctness, is interpenetrated and ener-
gized bv the Spirit of Christ, is made inscrutably but
indissolubly one with him, and so becomes a member of
that new humanity of which he is the head" (LOT, 214-215).
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union are the believer’s justification, sanctification,
perseverance, and ultimate glorification.^
Justification is a judicial act by which God, on ac-
count of Christ, declares the sinner to be no longer ex-
2
posed to penalty, but to be restored to favor. Justifi-
cation is a forensic term, and is to be accepted on the
3testimony of Scripture. Justification is possible because
it is "always accompanied by regeneration and union with
Christ and is followed by sanctification. Christ is the
ground of our justification and faith is the instrument.
^
Sanctification is that continuous operation of the Spirit
which strengthens and confirms the holy disposition impart-
ed in regeneration.^ This is a continuous process which is
completed in the life to cocne.^ The voluntary continuance
of the Christian is its human side, and is called persever-
g
ance. All who are united to Christ by faith "will infalli-
bly continue in a state of grace and finally attain to ever»-
lasting life.
(7). Ecclesiology
The church of Christ is the whole company of regen-
erate persons in all ages, in heaven and earth.^ The
' 1." LOT, 216. 2. LOT, 217. 3. LOT, 220.
4. LOT, 221. Strong’s notes indicate no reference at this
time to Robinsonrs position, which seemed to confusejustification and sanctification, although Strong for-
mulated his view to hold fast "to the Scripture distinc-
tion between justification as a declarative act of God,
and regeneration and sanctification as those efficient
acts of God by which justification is accompanied and
followed" (LOT, 222).
5. LOT, 222. 6. LOT, 223.
8. LOT, 226. 9. LOT, 226 .
10. LOT, 228.
7. LOT, 224
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individual church exhibits the universal church concrete-
ly.'*' The New Testament does not use the word "church” in
any other sense, and its prevailing reference is to the
local church.-^ The church is an institution of divine ap-
pointment and also a voluntary society.^ Strong then set
forth, of course, the Baptist view of church organization
and government. ^ Baptism by immersion and the Lord T s Sup-
per are ordinances, and are for believers only, thus mani-
festing a preceding union with Christ. Both are symbols
of the substitutionary death of Christ,^ but the Supper
expresses primarily the believer 1 s fellowship with his
d o
Lord . 0 Strong vigorously opposed open communion . 7
(6). Eschatology
The perfection of individual Christian character
and of the church as a whole is to be attained only in the
world to come.^ The future condition of men includes an
intermediate and an ultimate state . 11 Physical death re-
sults from the separation of soul and body, but this does
“T. LOT, 226. 2. LOT, 226. 3. LOT, 229.
4. LOT, 229. 5. LOT, 229-238. 6 . LOT, 239-249.
7. LOT, 249. 8. LOT, 250.
9. That is, the view that baptism, as not being an indis-
pensable term of salvation, cannot properly be made an
indispensable term of communion. The practise, Strong
wrote, "tends to do away with all discipline. .. (and
)
with the visible church... For no visible church is pos-
sible unless some sign of membership be required, in
addition to the signs of membership in the invisible
church. Open communion logically leads to open church
membership.
.. (which) is virtually an identification of
the church with the world" (LOT, 254).
. LOT, 256. 11. LOT, 256.10
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not involve cessation of being for either sinner or
1
saint
.
The case which Strong presented for immortality, al-
though involving both philosophical and Biblical appeals,
developed the former arguments with uncompromised confi-
dence. The metaphysical argument from the simplicity of
2
the soul shows it to be indestructible. The teleological
argument, from the incompleteness of human development in
this life, demands a hereafter for the satisfaction of hu-
man aspirations. The inequity of rewards or punishments
demands a future rectification.^ The universal belief in
immortality shows that this is an idea natural to the hu-
5
man mind. The Biblical teaching with regard to man’s spir-
itual nature is decisive, but the most impressive and con-
clusive of proofs is the bodily resurrection of Jesus
ou . 6Christ.
The intermediate state of the righteous is conscious
joy, of the unrighteous, conscious suffering.^ The Roman
gCatholic view of purgatorial suffering is unbiblical.
But the intermediate state is one of incompleteness, and
the perfect joy of saints and utter misery of the wicked
begin only with the resurrection and general judgment.
^
1. LOT, 256. 2. LOT, 256. 3. LOT, 256.
4. LOT, 257.
5. LOT, 257* This argument appears to be stated with a
good deal of circumlocation : ’’The popular belief of
all nations and ages shows that the idea of immortality
is natural to the human mind” (LOT, 257).
6. LOT, 256. 7. LOT, 256. g. LOT, 259.
9. LOT, 260.
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A final, triumphant return of Christ, to punish the
wicked and to complete the salvation of his people will
terminate earthly history.^- Although accompanied in the
case of the regenerate by inward and invisible influences
of the Holy Spirit, the second advent will be outward and
o
visible. The precursors of Christ’s coming include the
general prevalence of Christianity throughout the earth,
a corresponding development of evil, and a final spiritual
struggle between these two forces.-^ Strong therefore ac-
cepted a post-millennial view of Christ’s second advent.
At the second coming of Christ, the resurrection of
the body is to occur, involving a reunion of the body to
the soul from which it had been separated during the inter-
mediate state. ^ This material organism will be perfectly
adapted as the outward expression and vehicle of the puri-
fied soul. ^ The Scripture itself denies that all particles
which exist in the body at death are present in the resur-
rection body, but intimate only a certain physical connec-
tion between the old and the new without disclosing its
nature. ^ The bodily identity is to consist in the organi-
zing force which binds the old and new together in the unity
of a single consciousness.^
1.
LOT, 260.
4.
LOT, 263.
7. LOT, 265.
2.
LOT, 260.
5.
LOT, 264.
3.
LOT, 261.
6.
LOT, 264.
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The manifestations of God T s vindicatory justice
in history are to be concluded by a final and complete
vindication of God T s righteousness." The final judgment
2
is to be an outward, visible event. Its object is nnot
the ascertainment, but the manifestation, of character,
and the assignment of outward condition corresponding to
it."^ The judge is to be God, in the person of Christ
Jesus. ^ Both men and evil angels are to be judged.'
The grounds of judgment will be the law of God known in
conscience and Scripture, and the grace of Christ.^ The
7
final state of the righteous is one of eternal bliss,
that of the wicked, eternal punishment . 0 On the question,
whether heaven is a place, Strong vacillated.^ As to hell,
the decisive element is not the outward, but the inward
state.^ Preaching which ignores eternal punishment low-
ers the holiness of God and degrades the saving work of
Christ.^ The fear of punishment is not the highest mo-
tive, yet is a proper motive, for seeking salvation in
Christ.^
L
l. LOT, 265. 2. LOT, 266. 3. LOT, 266.
4. LOT, 266. 5. LOT, 267. 6. LOT, 267 .
7. LOT, 267. 8. LOT, 268.
9. Christ’s human body does not require limitation to
place because deity and humanity are indissolubly
united in his single person, Strong explained.
"Though there may be such a place of Christ’s special
manifestation to his people, our ruling conception of
heaven must be that of a state of holy communion with
God" (LOT, 268).
10. Strong wrote: "If hell be a place, it is only that
the outward may correspond to the inward" (LOT, 268).
. LOT, 271. 12. LOT/ 271.11
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ii. Addresses and Essays Between 1376 and 1334
Between the first and second editions of Strong’s
volume on theology, he provided a number of addresses
and essays which furnish added perspective on his earlier
theology. The topics covered by such addresses and ar-
ticles included the holiness of God, evolution, miracles,
union with Christ, the will, the baptism of Jesus, inspir-
ation, human freedom, and the two natures of Christ.
(1). Sermon on TTThe Holiness of God"
Strong preached in the University of Rochester chapel
on the Day of Prayer for Colleges, January 31, 1378, de-
livering a sermon on "The Holiness of God"^ which subse-
quently appeared serially as an article in The Examiner
for January 26, February 9, and February 22, 1332. In this,
Strong emphasized that holiness is the basic divine attri-
o
bute, that the universe is built upon a plan whereby the
finally impenitent secure everlasting destruction from the
presence of God, that God’s love to sinners can be proper-
ly estimated only in the light of such supreme holiness,^
that the universe shall ultimately assemble to recognize
the right of holiness to reign.
^
1. PAR, 188-200. 2. PAR, 189. 3. PAR, 196.
4. "God is strangely capable at once of these two mighty
emotions—hatred of the sin and love for the sinner;
or, to put it more accurately, love for the sinner, as
he is a creature with infinite capacities of joy or sor-
row, of purity or wickedness, but simultaneous hatred
for that same sinner, as he is an enemy to holiness and
to God" (PAR, 196).
5. PAR, 200.
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(2). Address on nThe Philosophy of Evolution”
Speaking before the Literary Societies of Colby Uni-
versity in V.aterville, Maine, on July 23, 1878, Strong
delivered an address on "The Philosophy of Evolution."-^
By way of introduction, Strong recalled how British
empiricism had been "attacked and seemingly overthrown by
the transcendentalism of Germany" only to become, in turn,
"the bugbear of orthodox thinkers" and then again to give
way to positivism and materialism.^
Strong appealed now that the fundamental principle of
Spencer’s philosophy, false by defect, be
enlarged to take in the full compass of
this intuitive deliverance of reason, and
that he build his system henceforth, if he
can, upon the broader truth that, as the
ultimate basis and explanation of all
things, there exists and persists an infin-
ite source of energy whose nature is con-
scious intelligence and will.-*
Before Spencer’s forces can build up a universe, a Creator
is required.^ His theory is defective as an explanation of
the origin of life and mind, as a theory of huma'n knowledge
with regard to truth and to God, and as a basis for scien-
5tific and practical morality.
The Mosaic record recognizes the present order of
things as the result both of an originating fiat of God
and of subsequent arrangement and development.^ This prin-
ciple of development in Genesis, perceived many centuries
1. PAR, 39-57. 2. PAR, 39. 3. PAR, 42
4. PAR, 43. 5. PAR, 44. 6 . PAR, 45.
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ago by Origen, Augustine and Anselm, "has not been allowed
its full weight."^- The interpreters of Scripture
have been so impressed with the unique
declarations of God’s absolute Creatorship
that they have not sufficiently attended
to the accompanying declarations of sub-
sequent evolution according to natural
law.
Strong acknowledged that "we are ourselves evolutionists...
within certain limits, and we accept a large portion of the
3
results of Mr. Spencer’s work." He gave it as his judgment
that the day is past "when thoughtful men can believe that
there was a creative fiat of God at the introduction of
every variety of vegetable and animal life."^ The possibili
ty of such divine acts Strong did not question, but he urged
that "God nay work by means, and a law of variation and of
natural selection may have been and probably was the method"
by which the vast majority of living forms came into being.
But evolution does not furnish an exhaustive explanation of
the facts. For organic life, the human soul, and the real-
ized ideal of manhood in Christ "owe their origin, not to
1. PAR, 45.
2. PAR, 45. "It is this last principle which Mr. Spencer
has made the characteristic of his system," Strong ob-
served, "but the principle is not only as old as the
church-fathers,—it is as old as Moses. We thank him
for emphasizing a truth too much neglected. But we
charge him with narrowness in excluding from his scheme
the greater truth that in the beginning God created the
heavens and the earth. His philosophy demands this truth
for its supplement and explanation, but, since it is a
truth which could come only from revelation, he will none
of it. How is it that the Hebrews alone of all nations
had the idea of absolute creation?" (PAR, 45).
3. PAR, 45. 4. PAR, 45.
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processes of natural law, but to direct interposition of
God.”^ The facts thus require both the truth of creation,
ensuring God’s independence and sovereignty, and his super-
intendence; neither his transcendence nor his immanence is
^ ... ,
2
to be minimized.
(3). Essay on ’’The Christian Miracles”
Strong read an essay on the theme of miracles as at-
testing a divine revelation, before the Baptist Pastors’
Conference of the State of New York on October 23, 1$78,
in Binghampton. The essay, titled ’’The Christian Miracles,’^
subsequently appeared in the April, 1$79 issue, of the
Baptist Review.
Referring to the recent tendency to lay stress upon in-
ternal evidences^- in Christian apologetics, Strong expressed
the conviction that this is necess'arily secondary and sup-
plementary, and apart from an appeal to miracle is insuffi-
cient to substantiate the divine authority of the Christian
system. For the Christian system includes doctrines which
are beyond the power of reason to discover, or even to de-
monstrate once they are made known. Since the Scriptures
are an unveiling of truth which is beyond our natural powers,
some external proof of divine origin is requisite.
^
1. PAR, 46. 2. PAR, 50. 3. PAR, 129-147.
4. Strong cited, by way of illustration, the efforts to
show the supernatural character of the Scripture teaching
by appeals to the unity of revelation, the superiority of
the New Testament system of morality, the conception of
Christ’s person and character, and the witness of Jesus
to his divinity and lordship (PAR, 129).
5. PAR, 129-130.
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j
Strong anticipated the objection that divine testi-
mony to the truth of revelation might be given internally,
by direct action of the divine upon the human mind, thus
dispensing with the necessity of external certification.
For such testimony could not be indubitably traced to a God
external to the soul, and consequently the evidence of di-
vine authorship would not be as clear."*" Even among original
recipients of revelation, outward certification was advan-
tageous, and in the case of the multitude to whom the message
p
was proclaimed, it was an absolute necessity. Although God
might make the same revelation inwardly, simultaneously to
each member of the race, it is manifest that the divine meth-
od is different from this; great secular truths are first
perceived by a few, and then mediated by them to the multi-
tudes.-^
The defense of miracles is therefore not optional for
those who accept the internal evidences, "the internal and
the external are so inextricably interwoven, that loss of
faith in the one involves loss of faith in the other.
But the primary importance of external evidences must not
be urged in such a way as to sunder them from the internal.
1. PAR, 130. 2. PAR, 130. 3. PAR, 130.
4. PAR, 131. Strong added: "However impressive the doc-
trine of Scripture may be, if it be accompanied by false-
hood in matters of fact, it is proved thereby to have not
a divine but a human origin. But facts are not merely
accompaniments here—they are the centre and core of its
teaching. Its main doctrines claim to be facts as well
as doctrines, and to be doctrines only because they are
facts. The incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ
are valuable for purposes of doctrine, only as they are
first allowed to be facts of history. But such facts as
these are miracles. And therefore Christianity stands
or falls with its miracles" (PAR, 131).
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Miracles do not stand alone as evidences, for power by it-
self cannot prove a divine commission; purity of life and
doctrine must go with the miracles.^ Miracle and doctrine
supplement each other, forming parts of one whole. Granted
that the internal evidence has greater power over certain
minds and ages, however, miracle is "logically the prior
2
and the more important, 11
Strong did not rule on the question whether miracle re-
quires a suspension or violation of natural law, or whether
it dispenses absolutely with all physical means and antece-
dents so that the result is simply that of an immediate di-
vine volition.^ On whatever alternative, Strong insisted,
Christian miracle might be successfully defended. But a
miracle is not simply an unusual physical event, but T,an
extraordinary physical event in peculiar connection with the
word of a religious teacher or leader."^ Strong took excep-
tion, however, to the view that the essence of miracle is a
supernatural impression of wonder engendered in the witness,
whereas the external events themselves were merely explained
5in terms of special providence
•
rrrA'R, i3i.
2. PAR, 131. "It has been well said," Strong commented, "that
a supernatural fact is the proper proof of a supernatural
doctrine, but a supernatural doctrine is not the proper
proof of a supernatural fact" (PAR, 131;.
3. PAR, 133. 4. PAR, 137.
5. Strong readily granted that one might believe in miracle
and yet consider miracle as divine ^works par excellence
because they awakened more distinct thoughts of God, but
he preferred "the view which holds to an immediate divine
operation in the realm of nature as well as in the realm
of mind, and that because of its greater fitness to ac-
complish the object aimed at in the miracle. That object
is the giving of a sign,.. But upon the view here consid-
ered. this signality does not seem to be perfectly se-
cured" (PAR, 138)
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(4). Article on "The Believer’s Union with Christ"
The June 12, 1679 issue of The Examiner contained an
article written by Strong under the title, "The Believer’s
Union with Christ,"^ Strong expressed surprise that this
central theological truth should have been so little consid-
ered in treatises both on dogmatics and religious exper-
ience. He proposed to rescue this doctrine from an exag-
gerated reaction against a false mysticism, for "the doctrine
of Union with Christ... is taught (in the New Testament) so
variously and abundantly, that to deny it is to deny inspir-
ation itself."-'
Strong developed this treatment of a vital and organic
union of the believer and Christ, in a wholly orthodox man-
ner, guarding against the loss of separate personality in an
encounter of fellowship and cleansing from sin. There is
here no trace of the later view, of a pre-incarnation unipn
of the Logos and humanity; rather, the union of Christ with
the race in incarnation, and the application of the princi-
ple of imputation, is felt to safeguard the doctrine of atone-
ment and justification against mechanical interpretation:
The nature of our relation to Adam, in whom
the old humanity as an organic unit fell,
can be understood only in the light of our
relation to Christ, in whom the new humanity,
in its principle and germ, atoned for sin
and wrought out a perfect righteousness.
1. PAR, 220-225.
2. "The majority of Christians," Strong lamented, "much
more frequently think of Christ as a Savior outside of
them, than as a Savior who dwells within" (PAR, 220).
3. PAR, 220.
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The atonement itself, in the aspect of it
which is most difficult to reason, the
just suffering for others of one who was
personally innocent, has more light re-
flected upon it from this doctrine of our
union with Christ than from any other.
There is a race-responsibility which be-
longs to every descendant of Adam, and
this race-responsibility is distinguishable
from personal responsibility. Chrises cor-
porate union with humanity involved him in
that race-responsibility, and so, though
he was personally pure, law could lay her
penalties upon the head of our Redeemer.
Christ took our guilt when he took out na-
ture; he has delivered us from the curse
of the law by being made a curse for us...
This connection of atonement and of justi-
fication with the doctrine under consider-
ation, relieves both of them from the charge
of being mechanical and arbitrary procedures...
As Adam’s sin is imputed to us, not because
Adam is in us, but because we were in Adam,
so Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us,
not because Christ is in us, but because we
are in Christ, that is, joined by faith to
one whose righteousness and life are infin-
itely greater than our power to appropriate
or contain.
(5). article on "The Will in Theology"
Strong’s article on. "The Will in Theology"^ appeared
in the Baptist Review of i860 and 1381 in several install-
ments .
Philosophy has no more difficult problem, Strong de-
clared, than that of the will. The interpretation placed
on the testimony of consciousness to human freedom has been
interpreted within the extremes of fatalism and arbitrari-
ness .
XT PAR
,
223-224. The emphasis that Christ is involved in
race-resoonsibility through his corporate union with hu-
manity should be especially notecf; in anticipating
Strong’s later position.
2. PAR, 90-113'.
r. . :
. <
•
'•
v
>
: ,
. 0
’
'
'
11
_
. j .
t «
Tv.
.
•
_
...
.
_
. •
,
. t
. V J. .
...
t
1 ; : • J {
^
’
'
_ i
•
*
. ;
-
- o o
IO •V. .(cl
<.
1
;
•• c.-:j
: I .a: i iBT^vdr. i r.i, -i or.e Obbl 1o ..elvo.
'
V . . ion!
t
,
.
•
• ;
• ol If
,
• n •
/' «
f i • F .-j ‘'j': •. Si.: f I-J e • Hci ; - QE oo 1o ^norilw iSO ->rf? ao
-
. n
117
A satisfactory view can be attained only by "new ex-
amination of the facts of consciousness, with the added
help of Christian experience and of Scripture. From the
simple facts of consciousness, it may be shown that the
will as a faculty of volitions is the efficient cause of
mental actions; that its efficient faculty depends for its
particular direction upon occasional causes, or objects or
reasons for its activity; that these motives are always,
ultimately, internal and not external to the mind; that in-
ternal dispositions and desires are optative states of the
soul into which the will enters as a constituent element;
that will therefore includes both the faculty of individual
choices and states of immanent preference; that this deter-
mination of action by character suggests how freedom in ex-
ecutive acts "may coexist with certainty and even necessity
as to their particular nature"; that man has liberty in man-
ifesting his character, but cannot by a power of contrary
choice permanently reverse his moral nature; that will’s
freedom is so limited by its own character and condition
that man cannot justly be called a creative first cause,
nor be admitted the power of contrary choice in moral and
2
religious matters. Precisely this view is that also of
revelation.-^
Consequently, the very beginnings of moral good are im
possible without the activity of the Holy Spirit.^"
1. PAR, 90. 2. PAR, 91-93. 3. PAR, 99-107.
4. PAR, 112.
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alone can furnish the new motive for holiness.^ Without
a renewal of their wills, men will not and cannot accept
salvation. 2
(6). Sermon on "The Baptism of Jesus"
The February 12 and February 19, 1660 issues of the
3
Examiner contained a sermon on "The Baptism of Jesus,"
which Strong had delivered before the Cincinnati Baptist
Union. Since it bears upon the nature of Christ’s redemp-
tive union with humanity, it will be well to observe a
few passages reflective of his early theological view in
this regard.
Strong held that the baptism of Jesus can be explained
only by an awareness that he assumed our nature, with "all
its exposures and liabilities, yet without its hereditary
corruption, that he might redeem it and reunite it to God."^
The taking of human nature in the incarnation is the central
point of reference. He could be the head of a new race and
the source of its righteousness only "by first suffering the
death due to the nature he had assumed, thereby delivering
it from its exposures and perfecting it forever.
(7). Essay on "The Method of Inspiration"
The October 7 and October 14, 1BB0, issues of The Ex-
aminer contained an essay of Strong’s titled "The Method of
Inspiration.
IV PAR, 112. 2. PAR, 113. 3. PAR, 226-237.
4. PAR, 230. 5. PAR, 231. 6. PAR, 146-155.
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In this study, Strong turned to the theology of Dor-
ner, the German Lutheran scholar, as furnishing the key to
a statement of a satisfactory doctrine of inspiration by
his emphasis that T,man is not a mere tangent to God, capable
of juxtaposition and contact with him, but of no interpene-
tration and indwelling of the divine Spirit.”'*' The effect
of God’s union with the believing soul is to put man more
fully in possession of his own powers; man is never more
fully himself than when God works in and through him. The
Scriptures are the product ’’equally of God and man’’ by the
2
union of the two. Divinely chosen men spoke and wrote
God's words ’’not as from without but as from within; and
that, not passively, but in the most conscious possession
and the most exalted exercise of their own powers of intel-
3lect, emotion and will.”
Strong insisted on ”a possession and enlightenment of
the writers in all parts of their work,” yet also emphasized
that it must be such ”as left them in the fullest exercise
of their natural powers.”^
All parts of the Bible are inspired, but must be taken
5in their connection and relation to each other, Strong urged.
At the same time, he asserted that there are degrees of val-
ue in the Scripture, but not degrees of inspiration . 0
1. PAR, 150. 2. PAR, 150. 3. PAR, 150.
4. PAR, 154. ”Y/hen they wrote,” he added, ”they wrote in
the method and vocabulary of their time, and out of their
present conscious experience under the influence of the
Spirit” (PAR, 154).
5. PAR, 155. 6. PAR, 155.
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($). Essay on "Modified Calvinism”
A discussion of the remainders of freedom in man was
contributed by Strong, under the title of "Modified Calvin-
ism,"^ to the April, 1883
,
issue of the Baptist Review *
Strong complained that Jonathan Edwards’ theory, that
an act of will contrary to the soul’s fundamental prefer-
ence is inconceivable and impossible, is too narrow to em-
brace all facts, and contended that both Augustine and Cal-
vin held "a somewhat broader and a more Scriptural view of
2human liberty."
The highest freedom is "such an inwDrking of law into
the heart and soul of a man, that there is a spontaneous
and infallible choosing of the right. Hence, there is no
true freedom without God.^ But the Scripture emphasizes
both divine sovereignty and efficiency and human freedom and
5
responsibility. But Paul does not urge human duty by under»-
valuing divine activity. God is the efficient cause, how-
ever, only of all good.? Man is responsible for his evil na-
ture only because he is in some proper sense the originator
of it.^
An adequate Biblical view rejects not only the theory
that man’s acts are all determined from without, but also
the theory that man’s freedom is simply freedom to act
1. PAR, 114-12$. Strong quoted W. G. T. Shedd as saying
that the answer to the question, how much freedom is
left to man in an unregenerate state, "determines a man’s
position in theology" more than anything else.
2. PAR, 114. 3. PAR, 114. 4. PAR, 115.
5. PAR, 115. 6. PAR, 116. 7. PAR, 117.
8. PAR, 118.
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conformably to his existing evil inclination.^ The facts
of experience, no less than the Scriptures, oppose the lat-
2
ter view. Man is not compelled to commit the sm against
the Holy Ghost, he can choose a less degree of sin instead
of a greater, he can do outwardly good acts with imperfect
motives, and can even seek God from selfish considerations.^
Man’s only probation is not in Adam, for there is an indi-
vidual probation as well, with reference- to light which is
given to each.^
Both Augustine and Galvin held that Adam at least had
a power of contrary choice, and that despite inherited hu-
man depravity, each individual has power to check and modi-
fy his evil nature in the interest of less or more guilt be-
fore God. ^ Character does not absolutely bind us. Man may
choose between motives. The desire and the will always go
together. Man has not lost his natural power of will, but
rather the inclination to will conformably to God’s law.^
But there remains "a power to check the manifestations of
evil inclination, and at least indirectly and with imper-
fect motives to seek its reversal.
That God alone can regenerate man does not preclude
d
human activity, for Christ does not constrain or compel.
1. This latter view, Strong protested, ’’grants a freedom
to action, but denies a freedom from action” (PAR, 118).
2. PAR, 118. Jonathan Edwards made no attempt to explain--
because he could not
,
on his theory—how Adam could fall
from holiness, or how the regenerated Christian can ever
sin, remarked Strong.
3. PAR, 119. 4. PAR, 119. 5. PAR, 121-122.
6. PAR, 124. 7. PAR, 125. 8. PAR, 125.
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Regeneration is T,a work of personal influence upon the
sinner’s affections.”'*' In developing this, Strong stated
the relationship in such a way as to stress that communi-
cation between spirits is here not limited to logical in-
sight, but involves also a vital union.- Man’s real free-
dom, or the power to love God will all his heart, is par-
tially restored in regeneration, and will be perfected in
3future glorification.
(9). Sermon on ’’The Two Natures of Christ”
On May 25, 1884, Strong preached in Sage Chapel of
Cornell University on the subject, ’’The Two Natures of
Christ.”^ Here he championed both the true deity and true
humanity of Christ.
In presenting the case for Christ’s humanity, Strong
emphasized that Christ had a human mind as well as a human
body, and
that mind was subject to the ordinary laws
of human development. He grew in wisdom,
as well as in stature and in favor with God
1. PAR, 125.
2. ”Nor is it (regeneration) an influence exerted only
through the truth, as if man were the only agent, and
moral suasion were the only method God could employ to
change man’s will. We repel the notion that the only com'
munication between spirit and spirit is through truth;
for this is a virtual denial of the Christian’s union
with Christ and of God’s personal communion with the hu-
man soul. We know of an influence exerted by the ora-
tor, which is above and beyond that of the words he
speaks” (PAR, 125). This is a curious passage. In all
editions of his Systematic Theology, Strong took the
view that the testimony of the Holy Spirit terminates
upon truth.
. PAR, 126.3 4. PAR, 201-212.
aritf :mn u s onsuI'Lni Xf>non©c* 'to 3i*io £ £ ' /.
r
"
•
'
•
f
•
.
.
•'
» c
-
«
4
j : t - • 1 1
. oi^Box 2 'j cl ’ 1 1
•
I t t
r '
t
'v i - cjrf
<
:
BBaOtti * 8B XX©w es bnxm nBaud s bad
I
,
.
t
j": * > > • > ! -
v .Si < .V
?
«
,
• ad noid Boltwta
! leine b Xfttftf'iJty s ex eliiJ nol
!
•
••
- •
- t
.
• <
«
fcscffinirnscf xfi* jt< c ^Xcx *3*13 ‘to ynor:i3- 3 >iJC- Jt>cJ wslv
.
.C‘-:
«.
123
and man. In his mother’s arms he was not
the omniscient babe that some have sup-
posed. In his later years he suffered,
being tempted, as he could not have suf-
fered, if all things had been open to his
gaze. Even to the last, it would seem that
he was ignorant of the day of the end.
Strong attempted no reconiliation of this denial of omni-
science to Christ’s human nature, with the correlative em-
phasis that he possessed also a perfect divine nature.
The main distinction of Jesus’ manhood was its ideal and
life-giving quality; in him the fallen race finds its true
source of spiritual life.-^
But Christ can suffer vicariously for humanity only
because he is God as well as man.^ Because of his divine
nature he underwent a suffering absolutely infinite.
5
Strong then pressed the Chalcedonian insistence that the
two natures are perfectly and eternally united in his one
person.
^
This concludes the sermons, addresses and essays pre-
pared by Strong between 1376 and 1334, from which some sig-
nificant insights into his theological position, as con-
trasted with its later reformulation under the influence of
monistic thought. ^ It is clear that in the main Strong’s
views were solidly in the evangelical bracket, although he
was ready to yield to a theistic evolutionary formulation,
and although the relationship of special revelation and phi-
losophy appears not to have been worked out in any detailed
rrVA’ft, 201. 2. PAR, 202. 3. PAR, 204.
4. PAR, 203
.
5. PAR, 209. 6. PAR, 209.
7. It was monism of the qualitative type which later influ-
enced^ Strong; quantitative monism ne opposed throughout
his life, in the interest of human freedom and moral re-
sponsibility.
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manner. It is clear also that, during these years, there
was no favor for any monistic hypothesis; idealisms of
all sorts were resisted in the name of pantheism,
iii. The 1832-1885 Lectures
Strong T s I876 lectures, as well as his formulations
of the next decade, it was evident, stood in the tradition
of Protestant orthodoxy and contained little interaction
with the heightened emphasis on divine immanence to be
found in the idealistic philosophies. There were, in the
1876 lectures, it is true, elements quite congenial to
idealistic metaphysics, such as the scope assigned to na-
tural theology, so that the employment of rationalistic ar-
gument side by side with revelational appeal is frequently
carried on, from the proofs for the existence of God to the
proofs for immortality, as if the former led directly to
a Biblical view, except not quite so certainly. There can
be no doubt that in principle Strong insisted on the priori-
ty of revelation, though in practise his arguments quite
often veer to philosophy in such a way as to expect specifi-
cally Christian conclusions from speculative study of the
data. While such methodology would create a natural interest
in idealistic refutations of naturalism, there is no indica-
tion that Strong was to any marked extent influenced by
idealism in the formulation of his convictions; indeed, the
insistence on the reality of secondary causes points in the
other direction. At the same time, his cautious statement
of the origin of man, suggesting in view of the evolutionary
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trend of modern science that the Scriptures preclude
naturalism and require the view of man’s initial perfec-
tion, but do not legislate on whether the divine creation
of primal man was mediate or immediate, suggests a frame
of mind which would welcome a new philosophy which would
stress the uniqueness of man as against the naturalistic
interpretations .
When one scans the lecture notes made almost a decade
later by one of Strong’s students in the inter-leaved cop-
ies of Lectures on Theology then in use, one finds little
in the way of concession to the idealists. But one fact
is clear, and that is Strong’s constant reference to
Bowne’s writings, and a far greater use of Bowne for illus-
trative and supplementary purposes in the lectures. Yet
there are some signs also of slight modifications of view,
although these are not exclusively in the direction of per-
sonalistic idealism.
Instead of reviewing Strong’s whole theological system,
already set forth in its evangelical outlines for background
purposes, we shall be able to discern the modifications to
better advantage simply by considering the directions in
which changes are made, sometimes in the interest of a more
thorough evangelical position, sometimes haltingly away from
the traditional formulation in the direction of liberal
theology--though not in either case under the impulse of
idealistic thought—and again in what might legitimately be
considered the direction of idealism.
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(1). Supplementation in the Traditional Direction
Strong’s main supplementations here indicate how solid-
ly he stood, in the main, with a Reformation view of theolo-
gy. These occur especially with reference to the relation-
ship of miracle and revelation, the view of inspiration,
the place of imputation in soteriology, the Christological
views, and the restatement of the case for immortality.
Special revelation is attested by miracles, so that
the ceasing of such revelation is T,a reason for the ceasing
of miracles, ” Strong emphasized. ^ ’’Miracle affords a full
warrant that a revelation comes from God, ”2 he declared.
The resurrection of Christ is therefore ’’the central ele-
3
ment of Christianity.”
Strong clarified his earlier statement that "the Scrip-
tures are the product equally of God and of man” to mean
that they are "just as truly” the product of both.^ Strong
reiterated his earlier view that inspiration secured infall-
ible transmission of divine truth, that the Bible is an
1. LOT(CN)
,
9. Strong urged his class to read Mozley’s
Miracles (Bampton Lectures), widely regarded as the clas-
sic statement of the traditional Protestant view.
Against Pascal’s view that miracle is to be judged by
doctrine and doctrine by miracle, Strong quoted Mozley:
"Fact proves doctrine, but not vice versa.”
2. LOT(CN), 33. Strong even strengthened his earlier view
at this point, that miracles certify truth not directly
but only indirectly (or a new miracle, he then said,
would have to accompany each new doctrine). But Strong
now affirmed that "the attestation of a foundation doc-
trine might serve for a whole system built upon it”
(lotCcn], 35).
3. LOTtCNj, 35. 4. LOTlCN], 53.
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organic whole, and that inspiration while not verbal as to
method is yet verbal as to result.
^
As to sin and redemption, Strong strengthened his views
in the orthodox direction. He emphasized the reality of a
2
state of sin. At the same time, he insisted even more vig-
orously on the centrality of imputation for an understanding
of the Biblical view of condemnation and justification. He
continued, however, his attack on the Princeton theology,
with its view of the federal headship of Christ, in the inter-
est of the natural headship theory. The Biblical view, he
1. LOT(CN)
,
53. The writers were held back from the selec-
tion of wrong words, but inspiration did not generally in-
volve direct communication of the words, Strong affirmed.
2. Strong held that T,the Old School and the New School are
not so far apart when we remember that the New School
’choice’ is an elective preference exercised. . .as soon as
the child is born and reasserting itself in all the subor-
dinate choices of life; while the Old School ’state’ is not
a dead, passive, mechanical thing, but is a state of active
movement or of tendency to move toward evil” (LOTfCNJ, 140 )»
Yet he emphasized that the watchword of the New School is
that ’’all sin consists in sinning” (an atomistic theory
of human nature), whereas that of the Old School is ’’all
sin in Adam” (LOTfClil, 151). The New School held to sin
as personal alone, the Old School affirmed the guilt of
hereditary depravity (LOTCCNj, 154).
3. Strong reaffirmed that any theory of the method of man’s
union with Adam is merely hypothetical, his own view of
natural headship no less than any other, but added in the
interest of that view: "From. ..( the )... Scripture it seems
not only natural, but inevitable to draw the inference
that we ’all sinned’ in Adam. The Augustinian theory
simply puts in that link of connection between two sets of
facts which otherwise would be difficult to reconcile.
But in putting in that link of connection it claims that
it is merely bringing out into clear light an underlying
but implicit assumption of Paul’s reasoning and this it
seeks to prove by showing that upon no other assumption
can Paul’s reasoning be understood at all” (LOTCcn)
,
159).
The class notes indicate that Strong took at least one
period to dictate the exposition of Romans 5:12-19 as
given chiefly by Meyer and Shedd (L0T[CN), 160-161).
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stressed, provides for degrees of guilt between original
and actual sin, the final condemnation of none on account
of original sin alone, and an original act of free will in
Adam.^ But three beliefs must be accepted on the testimony
of Scripture: inborn depravity, guilt and condemnation in
view of this depravity, and Adam T s sin the cause and ground
2
of both depravity and the resultant guilt and condemnation.
Strong emphasized that guilt and penalty are correlative.-^
Penalty primarily vindicates the righteousness of God.^
Strong undergirded his conviction that the atonement of
Christ is substitutionary and propitiatory. He urged the
reading of Shedd’s essay on the atonement as T,the best thing
on the subject, and stressed the substitutionary implica-
tions of the Greek prepositions in the relevant New Testament
passages, singling out Romans 5:12, Philippians 2 and Ro-
mans 3:24-26 as "the three most important theological pas-
sages in the Bible."0 At the same time, Strong emphasized
the difference "between holding to a substitute for penalty
as Grotius did, and holding to an equivalent substituted
penalty as the Scriptures do."''
7
One significant development
1. LOT ( CN ) , 151. 2. LOT(CN), 159. 3. LOT(CN), 165.
4. LOT(GN), 167. Penalty is not essentially reformatory,
nor deterrent, nor preventative, but has a fundamental
reference to vindication, Strong held.
5. LOT(CN), 186. Strong apparently had in view Shedd’s Dis -
courses and Essays
, 272-324.
6. LOT(CN), 187. 7* LOT(CN), 191.
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of Strong’s doctrine, however, appears in the class notes.
Although Strong had previously related the necessity for
the atonement solely to the holiness of God, he now stressed
the obligation of Christ to meet the penalty of sin in view
of his organic and corporate union with humanity.^
2
In reaffirming a sublapsarian view of the divine de-
crees,^ Strong at the same time supported his view of elec-
tion by an appeal to Shedd’s insistence that the New Testa-
ment use of the word ’’foreknow" involves not simply pre-
science, but "selection with a benignant and kindly feeling
toward the object."^
Strong strengthened the definitions of the law of God
to stress that it is the nature of God expressed in the form
of moral requirement, and not in any sense merely arbitrary.
^
He modified his vi ew of free agency, defining moral freedom
no longer as "power to manifest character in action" but as
"self-determination in view of motive." Such free agency
is not inconsistent with the certainty of the result involved
in the divine decrees, he reiterated.^
Strong’s Christology remained quite unchanged, though
there is a reserve and caution in some of his statements.
T. LOT ( QN)
,
196.
2. LOT(CN), 200. Strong now revised his earlier appraisal
of Calvin, and said that sublapsarianism, and not supra-
lapsarianism, was also the final position of Calvin.
3. Strong now eliminated his earlier statement that the uni-
verse need not have been the best possible creation of
God, and affirmed instead only that God had the best pos-
sible plan (LOTCCN), 102).
4. LOT(CN), 201. 5 . LOT ( CN)
,
137. 6 . LOT(CN), 33ff.
7. LOT(CN), 90, where Strong pointed out also that Shedd re-
garded as unanswerable the question, how the divine per-
mission of sin makes sin certain.
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The Chalcedonian doctrine proceeds from the natures, he em-
phasized, and regards the result of the union to be the per-
son; it did not say that the Logos furnishes the ego in the
personality, but John of Damascus pushed forward to this con-
clusion.^ Yet Strong expressed no dissatisfaction with the
traditional Christology. The Divine and the human, he re-
marked, are not to be regarded as foreign to each other and
2
mutually exclusive. Strong supplemented his Christology
by the affirmation that the exalted Christ in heaven fills
all things not in his divine nature alone, not in the sense
that his human body is everywhere present, but his manhood
is ubiquitous by virtue of his union with the Godhead, al-
though the body necessarily exists in spatial relations.
There are several indications of a clearer emphasis on
the priority of special revelation. One instance is the de-
claration that while "reason shows us the unity of God, only
Revelation shows us the trinity."^ Another is afforded by
the modification of philosophical arguments intended to show
what might be antecedently expected of the divine being.
In this spirit Strong now declared that God’s mercy cannot
be demonstrated a priori
.
for He did not spare the angels
that sinned. ^ Again, Strong revised his references to the
lY LOT ( CN ) , 174.
2. This is an emphasis of the Chalcedonian formulation also.
3. This emphasis likewise would have been compatible with a
view that all reality is mental, but there appears no
idealistic motivation for Strong’s revision.
4. LOT ( CN)
,
73. 5. LOT(CN), 70.
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antecedent "probability" of the existence of angels to
merely an antecedent "possibility."^ The third example is
found in the treatment of immortality.
Strong quite radically revised his case for immortali-
ty in accord with a revelational view. The Platonic argu-
ment from the simplicity of the soul' "would apparently prove
the immortality of the brute" also and actually shows only
"the inconclusiveness of materialism and leaves the matter
o
open for positive proof from Revelation." The teleological
argument is significant "only for the immortality of the
righteous" and "assumes the fact of God’s love and so assumes
3the very revelation which assures us of immortality." The
argument from God’s justice to the immortality of the wicked
is inconclusive, for "may not the judgment which conscience
threatens be extinction of being—not immortality?"^ The
universal belief in immortality "shows only a general design
for immortality which may be nothing more than the love of
life which is necessary to self preservation. It is the
revelational assurance of immortality and especially the
bodily resurrection of Christ which are crucial for the con-
viction.
^
1. LOT
(
CN ) , 114. This revision was not in the interest of
doubt, but rather in the interest of the exclusively Bib-
lical nature of the belief in angels. There is "no a
priori argument for the existence of angels (but the doc-
trine is) founded primarily on Scripture" (LOTCCNl, 115).
2. LOT(CN), 256. 3. LOT(CN), 256. 4. LOT(CN), 257.
5. LOT(CN), 257.
6. LOT, 25&. In treating the scientific objection to bodily
resurrection, Strong no longer thought it necessary to
insist that there need be any physical continuity what-
ever between the old and new bodies (LOTCCNj, 264 ).
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(2). Tendencies in the Liberal Direction
Strong’s lectures now disclosed modifications in the
interest of the contemporary evolutionary and higher cri-
tical views. He instructed his classes to omit the ear-
lier treatment of the Mosaic account of creation, and now
developed the creation story in terms of the nebular hy-
pothesis of origins as the divine method--a scheme already
developed in outline in his first printed lectures, where
the pictorial summary view of Genesis was upheld, but with
more reserve. Strong now intensified the emphasis on the
mental differences between man and the brute. ^ At the same
time, he accepted a long period of evolutionary develop-
ment.^
To higher criticism Strong now granted that the Penta-
teuch may include documents of previous ages, and he accept-
ed the division into Jehovistic and Elohistic documents, but
. 3insisted at the same time on Mosaic authorship.
In two respects, the priority of special revelation and
the significance of general revelation were not carefully
worked out, and created a mood compatible with much liberal
apologetic. Strong’s insistence on the intuitive belief in
God was formulated in such a way as to make this belief
1. LOT(CN), 122.
2. He stated: ”We are not limited to 6000 years for the
period of development. (We are) not bound to any scheme
for the chronology of the earth’s history” (LOTCgnJ, 124).
3. LOT(CN)
,
44.
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quite anticipative both of the theistic proofs and of spe-
cial revelation, without the frequent evangelical emphasis
on the distorting noetic effect of sin.'*' Furthermore, in
treating the divine nature Strong, although insisting that
the Scriptures are ,Tthe decisive authority with regard to
God’s attributes,” tends to argue at times as if the Bibli-
cal view could be independently reached on philosophical
3ground.
At one point the increasing emphasis on a heightened
divine immanence was appropriated by Strong in such a way as
to concede the possibility of error in the Scriptures and
yet to insist that the influence of the Holy Spirit can safe-
guard the communication of the divine revelation. While the
class notes do not indicate more than a passing remark on
the subject, the question may be raised whether Strong might
welcome an emphasis which would enable an acceptance of an
evolutionary and higher critical view and yet maintain a
revelational view.^
1. The theistic arguments, Strong affirmed, are "not a
bridge to conduct us to our belief in such existence but
rather the guides to a bridge already existing in intui-
tive belief in God” (LOTfCNJ, 27). But he stressed also
that this intuitive knowledge is not ”so complete and
sufficient as to render reasoning and revelation unneces-
sary" (LOTfCNJ, 21 ) 0
2. LOT(CN), 62.
3. This same mood is seen in the rationalistic argument,
which appears side by side with the Biblical, for the Trin-
ity: "God’s love must have an object in himself, i.e., <
the second Person of the Trinity” (LOT[CN], 64).
4. The comment referred to is: "We grant that revelation, in
order to attain its purpose, and generally in the first
instance, is internal and subjective. We claim, however,
that the same Spirit who originally communicated the truth
has also secured its preservation in permanent and writ-
ten form. Though this form is in itself imperfect it is
sufficient under the influence of the Spirit to reproduce
in. others’ minds nhe ideas 'With Which the ffllpds of.tne
writers were at first divinely filled” (LOTFCNJ, 5).
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(3). Glances in the Idealist Direction
And yet the emphasis of Strong T s lectures at this
time, while aware of current idealist emphases, hardly per-
mits the judgment that any fundamental concession to that
school had been made.
That Strong followed carefully the idealist-material-
ist controversy is beyond doubt, not only from the references
to Borden P. Bowne’s writings^* but from conscious effort ei-
ther to improve the statement of his own position with a
reference to the personalistic philosophy, or more clearly
to differentiate it.
An instance of restatement which may have been encour-
aged by a spiritualistic philosophy is the deletion from
Strong 1 s original definition of God of the words "the abso-
lutely perfect being" and the substitution of "the infinite-
ply perfect Spirit. r,<c Moreover, there was additional emphasis
on the reality of the general revelation of the Logos, with
more stress on its trustworthiness than most evangelical
theology would readily have admitted.
^
1. "Bowne’s idealism differs from Berkeley," Strong told his
classes, "in that he believes in an energizing by God
from the inside, while Berkeley believed in the energiz-
ing from the outside" (LOT (CN), 29). Bowne had now writ-
ten PHS (1£74), SIT(1B79), and. M3FP (1S82 )
.
2. LOT(CN)
,
17.
3. Strong declared that the Logos is "working even among the
heathen, through such men as Confucius, Buddha, Pythagor-
as, who made their fellow-men better. Yet this light is
so small that Scripture in general does not recognize it"
(LOTfCN], 172). The available class notes do not indi-
cate any expansion of his remarks as to the relation of
general and special revelation. The usual Protestant
view is that the general revelation of the Logos, while
not completely destroyed, is nonetheless distorted by
the noetic effects of sin. Strong may not have guarded
his view here against the possibility of a minimal, but
pure, revelation outside the Scriptures.
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But consideration of Strong’s general position makes
clear that he had made no unilateral commitment to ideal-
ism by any means. He clearly differentiated his position
from that of Bowne.^ In the discussion of the relation of
attribute and essence, he retained the Aristotelian distinc-
p
tion between substance and its qualities. Miracle was de-
fined still in relation to natural or secondary law; while
Strong protested against miracle as superseding secondary
causes, he protested also against the idealistic destruction
of them.^ The Biblical doctrine of preservation, Strong in-
sisted, is ’’midway between the two errors of denying the
first cause (Deism or Atheism) and denying second causes
(Pantheism)
.
There were indeed areas of thought in which Strong was
on the move, in such a way as would lead him to welcome the
personalistic view, even it not consciously. Both in his
doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and his formulation of atonement
1. Referring to the view advanced in Bowne’s Metaphysics
,
that all force is due to the Divine will, Strong countered
that all force ’’implies, not is, the Divine will”
(lot[cn], 104).
2. Strong called attention to an ’’analogous necessity of at-
tributing the properties of matter to an underlying sub-
stance and the phenomena of thought to an underlying
spiritual essence, else matter be resolved into mere
force, and mind into mere sensation. In short, all thin^
are swallowed up in a vast idealism” (L0T[CN], 6l).
3. ’’The original act of creation was not a miracle,” Strong
explained, ’’because there was no natural law to be tran-
scended prior to creation,
. .He who created the second
causes, can supplement them” (LOTfCNj, 33).
4. LOT(CN), 105. The fact that Strong did not here differ-
entiate between pantheism (which includes selves in God)
and personalistic idealism (which holds that selves are
outside God) suggests that he had not yet clearly dis-
tinguished Bowne’s view from absolutistic idealism.
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there are clear evidences of reconstruction. He expressed
to his classes a personal dissatisfaction with his statement
of the role of the Holy Spirit in creation, 1 And in treat-
ing the divine provision of atonement, he now stressed a two-
fold necessity, lodged both in the holiness of God and in the
organic and corporate union of Christ with humanity. The
earlier lectures had already made Christ’s liability to offer
satisfaction contingent upon a covenanted incarnation, but
now Strong heightened the emphasis that Christ’s ability to
bear penalty and to make satisfaction to the divine justice
were consequences of his union with humanity. 2 But, as dis-
tinguished from a later view, Strong at this time still
lodged the union of Christ with humanity in the incarnation,
rather than in the creation.
T
.Nhat makes most clear, however, that the changes in
Strong’s thought at this period were not motivated by per-
sonalistic idealism, is another circumstance. If there had
been one central doctrine at which the issue would have been
made apparent, it is in the statement of the union of belie-
vers with Christ, to which doctrine Strong at this time gave a
1. In his earlier notes, Strong had stated merely that the
Father is the originating, the Son the mediating, and the
Spirit the realizing cause of Creation. Strong explained
that by "the Spirit as the realizing cause" he meant "the
perfecting cause" and indicated dissatisfaction with
the incompleteness of this treatment (L0T(CN7, 92).
Yet the lecture notes give no encouragement to any view
that the dissatisfaction evidenced an interest in ethical
monism. Rather, Strong held "there is nothing divine in
creation but the origination of substance" and that "un-
like the generation of the Son, creation brings into
being a new essence that is not God" (LOT[CNj, 92, 94).
2. LOT(CN), 204.
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new importance, although in a way that disclosed no person-
alistic influences. Strong restated at this time the logi-
cal order of the phases of Christian experience, in such a
way as to make union with Christ the first and central point
of reference."*- But there is no indication in the treatment
that the motivation for this change grew out of any greater
emphasis in his own thinking upon divine immanence; rather,
the change appears to have been made in the interest of a
more coherent treatment.
iv. The 18S6 Lectures
The enlarged and amended edition of Strong’s early lec-
tures appeared in 1386, and contained nearly four times the
material in the first volume. Strong commented in the pre-
face on the substantial similarity of the main text, but
called attention to the fact that
important additions have been made to the
treatment of the intuition of the divine
existence, the classification of the attri-
butes, the statement of the doctrine of de-
crees, the teaching as to race-sin and race-
responsibility, ability or inability, the
ethical theory of the atonement, and the fi-
nal state of the wicked. The section on the
moral nature of man (conscience and will)
is new; a few minor paragraphs of the older
book have been omitted; and the work has
been somewhat altered in arrangement .3
IT
2 .
3.
Strong remarked: ’’Union with Christ logically precedes
both regeneration and justification, and yet chronologi-
cally the moment of our union with Christ is also the
moment when we are regenerated and justified” (LOTfCNl
,
204).
Hereafter referred to as ST(1886).
ST(1886), vii
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Strong expressed his "peculiar obligation" to three living
persons: President Noah Porter of Yale College, President
Ezekiel G. Robinson of Brown University, and Professor
William G. T. Shedd of Union Theological Seminary. At the
same time, the number of index references to idealists
p
showed a marked increase, especially those to Lotze and to
1. Strong said he owed his first insight into philosophy to
Porter; into theology, to Robinson; and that from Shedd’
s
writings he had for many years derived stimulus and sug-
gestion.
2. The numerous quotations from these writers, however, are
in the interest of support for Strong’s views, rather than
of a modification of Strong’s outlook in the direction of
personalistic idealism. Strong referred seventeen times
to Lotze’ s POR, and once each to the following of Lotze’
works: M, 00M, OOP, and PP. In these references Strong
appealed to Lotze’
s
idealism for philosophic opposition
to the pantheistic view that the divine knowledge requires
an eternal non-ego to call forth self-consciousness
(STC1666J, 260, referring to Lotze, POR, 55-69, and M,
III, 191-200); quoted Lotze in support of the responsibil-
ity and freedom of the human will (STC16S6J, 260, referr-
ing to Lotze, POR, 95-106, and PP, 35-50); appealed to
Lotze in support of the accessibility of the human soul to
the omnipresent Creator (STp.6663, 454, referring to
Lotze, OOP, 142). He opposed to Lotze’s views the insis-
tence that God’s holy bein^ must be affirmed independent
of his holy activity (ST£lS66J, 129, referring to Lotze,
POR, 139), and that faith is conditioned upon a right
state of affections (ST£l666J, 4, referring to Lotze,
POR, 1-7). Strong called attention to Lotze’s formulation
of the ontological argument (3T£l666J, 50, referring to
Lotze, POR, 6-34). But that Strong did not yet regard
Lotze’s view as substantially different from other ideal-
istic statements, in terms of a distinction between quan-
titative and qualitative monism, is quite apparent from
his reference to Lotze "for the idealistic and monistic
theory of creation" (STC1666J, 191, referring to Lotze,
POR, 70-60). The wide appropriation of idealistic argu-
ment, to support Strong’s own views, is seen in refer-
ences to Hegel, Fichte and others, as well as from Lotze;
Strong seems to have considered all idealism as panthe-
istic in spirit at this stage of his thought, despite the
awareness that Lotze insisted on creation and on human
responsibility and freedom.
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Bowne , ^ which reflect a growing interaction with represen-
tatives of qualitative raonism.
(1). The Intuitive Knowledge of God
In restating man’s intuitive knowledge of God, Strong
found among the idealists useful material which would af-
ford a philosophic undergirding for the Biblical sugges-
tions of an innate knowledge of the Deity. But the refer-
ences are introduced in a wholly supplementary manner, merely
1. Strong’s references to Bowne likewise were not in the
interest of a strictly personalistic formulation. In
these early years, in fact, Bowne could be appealed to
in behalf of a substance philosophy, although he stood
solidly in the tradition of qualitative monism, insist-
ing that all reality is of the nature of consciousness,
but created selves are not to be regarded as parts of
God. Strong cited Bowne in support of the view that
qualities imply the existence of a substance to which
they belong (ST[l£S6j, 4, referring to Borne, PHS, 47,
207-217); that we have an intuitive and direct knowledge
of substance (ST[lS86J, 54
?
quoting Bowne, M, 432); that
the formation of a mental imas-e is not necessary to con-
PHS, 30-34); that pari ledge is not on that ac-
count invalid (ST C13S6), 6, referring to Bowne, PHS, 72);
that evolution and’ theism are compatible (ST[loB63, 35,
referring to Bowne
,
PHS, 163, 164 ) ; that knowledge of
God is intuitive. (ST[l&vo4J, 37, referring to Bowne, T,
79); that the hypothesis of infinite causal regress is
unacceptable (ST^lSSoJ, 41, referring to Bowne, PHS, 36);
that law is merely method, and not cause ST[l$s63
, 43,
referring to Bowne, PHS, 231-247); that natural evil is
compatible with theism (ST£l886Q
, 7, referring to Borne,
PHS, 76); against the view that God’s omnipresence is
merely
'
potential and not essential (ST[18S63, 132, re-
ferring to Bowne, M, 136); and against the view that free-
dom requires the power of acting apart from motives
(ST[l8S6j, 259, quoting Bowne, M, 169).
ception or knowl edge 5, referring to Bowne,

to call attention to representative thinkers who find
an infinite mind implied in human knowing, and in no way
suggest that the case for theism is lodged on this ground.
^
3trong T s restatement at this point, then, consisted
in an enlarged treatment of the knowledge of God as rooted
in a rational intuition, which logically precedes and con-
ditions all observation and reasoning, and which chronolog-
ically rises in consciousness only upon the occasion of
p
reflection upon the phenomena of nature and of mind.
Strong held that the idea of God meets all the conditions
for a first truth: universality, necessity, logical inde-
pendence and priority.^ The intuitive knowledge of God’s
existence, he affirmed, is explicated and confirmed by ar-
guments drawn from the universe and from abstract thought <A
It is curious, in view of the firm .emphasis on intuitive
knowledge, that Strong dismissed the ontological argument
as leading ’’only to an ideal conclusion. ”5 But the empir-
1. Despite the incidental treatment, it is significant
that Strong affirmed that ,Twe cannot prove that God is,
but we can show that, in order to the existence of any
knowledge. . .man must assume that God is” (ST(1$B63,
34), and then quoted without comment Bowne’s words:
”Our objective knowledge of the finite must rest upon
an ethical trust in the infinite” (M, 472).
2. ST(18S6), 29. 3. ST(lS86), 31-34.
4. ST(1S$6), 39. 5. ST(1886), 49.
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ical arguments are assigned greater significance, but
the case for an infinite, personal Creator, the source
of our moral laws, is "probable, not demonstrative .
But the theistic evidences afford moral certainty. ^ The
law of parsimony requires that the conclusions of the
cosmological, teleological and anthropological arguments
be applied to a single Being . 3 "To this one Being we
may. . .ascribe. . .infinity and perfection, the idea of which
lies at the basis of the Ontological Argument," wrote
Strong, "not because they are demonstrably his, but because
our mental constitution will not allow us to think other-
wise."^ These circumstances afford reasons for expect-
ing a special divine revelation of an authoritative nature.
5
1.
' ST (1886), 39.
2. Strong wrote: "They supplement each other, and consti-
tute a series of evidences which is cumulative in its
nature. Though, taken singly, none of them can be con-
sidered absolutely decisive, they together furnish a
corroboration of our primitive conviction of God’s
existence, which is of great practical value, and is in
itself sufficient to bind the moral action of men"
(3T[1886J, 39).
3. ST(1886)
,
49. 4. ST(1886), 49.
5. Strong affirmed: "Man’s intellectual and moral na-
ture requires, in order to preserve it from constant
deterioration, and to ensure its moral growth and pro-
gress, an authoritative and helpful revelation of re-
ligious truth, of a higher and completer sort than
any to which, in its present state of sin, it can at-
tain by the use of its unaided powers" (ST[1886J, 58).
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Hence the essential continuity of general and special reve-
lation is assumed not to be obscured by sin to the extent af-
firmed by Reformation theology.
(2). The Classification of Divine Attributes
Strong 1 s reclassification of the divine attributes car-
ried out his definition of theology as T,the science of God
and His relation to the universe” and his definition of God
as T,Spirit, infinite and perfect, the source, support and
end of all things." The attributes he divided into two
groups: absolute or immanent, and relative or transitive.^
The former exist in no necessary relation to things outside
p
of God, the latter exist in such relation.
Significantly, Strong did not affirm that the order
of attributes is merely a logical reconstruction of the in-
ductive facts of Scripture. It is true that he appeals! again
1. 3T(1886), 119.
2. ST(1886), 120. Strong’s chart listed:
”1. Absolute or Immanent Attributes:
A. Spirituality, involving (a) Life, (b) Personality.
B. Infinity, involving (a) Self-existence, (b) Immu-
tability, (c) Unity.
C. Perfection, involving (a) Truth, (b) Love, (c) Ho-
liness.
2. Relative or Transitive Attributes:
A. Related to Time and Space
—
(a) Eternity, (b) Im-
mensity.
B. Related to Creation
—
(a) Omnipresence, (b) Omnis-
cience, (c) Omnipotence.
C. Related to Moral Beings
—
(a) Veracity and Faith-
fulness, or Transitive Truth* (b) Mercy and Good-
ness, or Transitive Love; (c) Justice and Right-
eousness, or Transitive Holiness" (STp-886], 119).
-9YS~ x£i0‘
.
'
s? 1
sonsioe eri.
t$$& srl?
<
-
'
:
. . © 2* . : •' J nol: stsT 90S - -xs 9i.*io yri-T
.
‘ j£.‘
: C ..••••i' *• t
«
-fll lc noi^o • lo
.
t
:
r
, (
:
-
: • Jr . .
. < t •
,
-
- T • * t
- t
-
. .
: .
' •$
,
K.'
.
<
0 r l . — * -
• : r ' t
’
.
-
.
ijnji • j r \ r c i <
.
. t [ 1. t ?
to the Scripture as the decisive authority,* but he empha-
sizes that his arrangement "corresponds with the order in
which the attributes commonly present themselves to the hu-
nan nine." Here again there is a methodological tendency
to regard revelation and philosophy as leading to equivalent
results, although the principle is rejected. The clearest
suprort of this claim is seen in Strong’s presentation of
the doctrine of the Trinity, which he placed after the treat-
ment of the divine attributes, as if the being and nature of
God could be determined without a consideration of any spec-
ial divine self-disclosure.-'
(3). The Statement of Divine decrees
The problem to which Strong devoted himself with ref-
erence to the divine decrees was that of affirming the cer-
tainty of all events, and yet of escaping their necessity,
especially in view of man’s moral deeds. Strong reempha-
sized that God’s actual agency with regard to evil is only
permissive.^ But Clod’s knowledge of the future is not
merely a natter of foreknowledge; it is more true to hold
1. 31(1886’, 118. The rational arguments, he stated, are
usually a merger of intuition and theological results.
2. 5T(1366), 119, where Strong explained: "Our first thought
of God is that of mere Spirit, mysterious and undefined,
over against our own spirits. Our next thought is that
of God’s greatness; the quantitative element suggests
itself; his natural attributes rise before us; we recog-
nize him as the infinite One. finally comes the qualita-
tive element; our moral natures recognize a moral God;
over against our error, selfishness, and impurity, we per-
ceive his absolute oerfection.
”
3. ST (1886)
,
144-170. * 4. 3T(1886), 172.
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that "he decrees his foreknowledge,"^- for he foreknows be-
cause he has decreed. Free agency is inconsistent with
necessity, but not with certainty; God’s acts render the
2
future certain, but not necessary.
(4). The Subject of Race-Sin and Race-Responsibility
It will be recalled that the class notes for Strong’s
1882-1885 lectures disclosed an emphasis upon imputation as
the key to understanding the Biblical view of justification
and condemnation. Strong made the remark to a class in
1901 that previous to his work at Rochester "there had been
no attempt to explain the imputation of the sin of the race
to Christ."-^ In view of the fact that in his later thought
ethical monism came to play so large a part in the explana-
tion of his view of the vital relationship of the race to
the Logos, it is worthy of comment here that the 1882-1885
attempts at a fuller statement of the imputation of guilt
from Adam to the race, of human guilt to Christ, and of
Christ’s righteousness to believing humanity, are carried
forward to completer statement in this edition, although
without an appeal to monism.^-
1. ST (1886), 174.
2. ST(1886), 176 . Strong cautioned: "In reconciling God’s
decrees with human freedom, we must not go to the other
extreme (from the Arminian, who denies the certainty of
human action), and reduce human freedom to mere determin-
ism,.. Human action is not simply the expression of pre-
viously dominant affections .. .We therefore part company
with Jonathan Edwards, . .and Charles Hodge... We hold, on
the contrary, that sensibility and will are two distinct
powers, that affections are occasions but never causes of
volitions, and that, while motives may infallibly per-
suade, they never compel the will" (ST(1886J, 178)*.
3. ST(1896)CN, 309.
4° It is not until the fifth edition of ST(1886), referred
to as ST(l89o), that Strong adopts the principle of ethi-
cal monism and applies it to the doctrines of* preserva-
tion and the atonement.
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Strong 1 s chief concern is to defend the reality of the
implication of the race in the penalty, corruption and
guilt of Adamic sin, but in such a way as to deny the fed-
eral headship of Adam proclaimed by the Princeton theolog-
ians. The Princeton view, he contended, did not provide
for a real union of the race with Adam as the basis of im-
putation, whereas Strong held that in the cases of the im-
putation of Adam’s sin to humanity, of humanity 1 s sin to
Christ, and of Christ’s righteousness to the believer, a
real union constitutes the basis for the imputation .
^
Strong upheld, therefore, the Augustinian view that mankind
is guilty in Adam on the ground that all men existed as one
moral whole in him, and our corruption in Adam precedes the
o
imputation of penalty and guilt to us.
(5)* The Debate over Ability or Inability
Strong reaffirmed the total inability of the sinner to
3turn to God or to do what is truly good in God’s sight,
but contended also that ”a certain remnant of freedom” is
left to man.^ The sinner can avoid sinning against the
Holy Ghost, can choose the lesser sin, can refuse entirely
to yield to some temptations, can do outwardly good acts
from imperfect motives, and can seek God from motives of
self-interest. But he cannot "by a single volition bring
his character and life into complete conformity to God’s
law,” nor can he "change his fundamental preference for
TT“ST(18B6), 309. 2. ST(lB£6), 32B-334.
3. ST(1BB6), 342. 4. ST (1386), 342. . ..
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self and sin to supreme love for God,” nor TTdo any act,
however insignificant, which shall meet with God’s appro-
val or answer fully to the demands of the law.”^ Freedom
of choice within the affirmed limits, declared Strong, is
”by no means incompatible with complete bondage of the will
2in spiritual things.”
(6). The Ethical Theory of the Atonement
Strong reiterated that Christ’s death is a propitia-
tory sacrifice, the first and main effect of which is upon
God, in view of the demand of divine justice or holiness,
the satisfaction of which is the necessary condition of God’s
3justification of the believer. But the relation of the
atonement to humanity in Christ, which Strong had already de-
veloped in his class notes of 1882 to 1885 in such a way as
to stress the obligation of Christ to meet the penalty of
sin in view of his organic and corporate union with the race,
was now developed.^ Christ’s union with humanity obligated
him to suffer for men since, being one with the race, he
then had a share in race-responsibility to divine law and
justice.-' The organic unity of the race has involved each
member since Adam in the consequences of depravity, guilt
and penalty, but the supernatural conception of Christ puri-
fied his nature, so that he was exposed to guilt and penalty,
but not to depravity. He assumed no personal guilt, but
1. ST(1886)
,
342. 2. ST(l886), 344. 3. ST(l886), 411.
4. ST(1886)
,
412-421. 5. ST(l886), 412.
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solely the guilt of Adam T s sin; he can justly bear penalty,
because he inherits guilt. "Once born of the Virgin, once
possessed of the human nature that was under the curse,"
wrote Strong, "he was bound to suffer."^" Since his guilt
is not personal, but the guilt of common racial transgres-
sion in Adam, "he who is personally pure can vicariously
2bear the penalty due to the sin of all."
The problem which Strong sought to solve in this state-
ment was, how can the innocent justly suffer for the guilty?
Quite clearly, he was reaching for a ground of real union
between Christ and humanity, as an alternative to the feder-
al theory that Adam and Christ stand related primarily in a
representative manner, in an application of the principle
of imputation. While Strong at this time found the ground
of union in the incarnation, it is clear that his mood at
this point would be very hospitable to the suggestion that
there is a more basic union of the Logos and humanity, on
the pattern of ontological monism.
(7). The Final State of the Wicked
Strong did not change his view of the eternal punish-
ment of the lost, but strengthened it against the theories
of universal restoration and annihilation, which were being
widely opposed in that decade to the traditional view.^
He gave eternal punishment more of an inner basis, holding
I. ST ( 1886 ) , 412. 2. ST (1886)
,
412.
3. ST(1886)
,
587-600.
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that a correct view of the will supports the view that the
moral condition in which death finds men is their eternal
condition.^ The impenitent sinner makes for himself a char-
acter which, while not rendering the continuance of sinful
action necessary, renders it certain apart from divine
p
grace. The everlasting punishment of the wicked is not in-
consistent with, but is a revelation of, God T s justice.-^
v. The 1888 Volume, Philosophy and Religion
Consideration has already been given to numerous ser-
mons, essays and articles prepared by Strong, and later
included in the volume Philosophy and Religion
,
which ap-
peared in 1888. Included in this volume were four essays
which were written specifically for this publication. They
bore the titles "Modern Idealism," "The New Theology,"
"Dante and the Divine Comedy," and "Poetry and Robert Brown-
ing." Also included were numerous writings which had never
before appeared in print, and of these, a sermon on
"The Necessity of the Atonement" is of interest for this
study. The essays on Dante and Browning are significant in
that they indicate that Strong already was pursuing a study
of the religious views of great poets, which later resulted
in works on that theme.
1. "Suffering has in itself no reforming power," Strong af-
firmed. "Unless accompanied by special renewing influ-
ences of the Holy Spirit, it only hardens and embitters
the soul. We have no Scripture evidence that such in-
fluences of the Spirit are exerted, after death, upon
the still impenitent" (STC1886], 591).
2. ST ( 1886 ) „ 591. 3. ST(l886), 594.
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(1). Sermon on ’’The Necessity of the Atonement”
Strong’s sermon on ’’The Necessity of the Atonement”
stressed that the world could not be redeemed without the
sufferings of Christ for two reasons:
first, because there is an ethical prin-
ciple in God’s nature which demands that
sin shall be punished. .. secondly
,
because
Christ stands in such a relation to human-
ity that what God’s holiness demands,
Christ is under obligation to pay, longs
to pay, inevitably does pay, and pays so
fully, in virtue of his twofold nature,
that every claim of justice is satisfied
and the sinner who accepts what he has
done in his behalf is saved.
It is to Christ as obligated to make atonement to which
Strong directed attention.
Many persons who concede that God can justly demand
satisfaction, Strong pointed out, cannot see how the suffer'
ing of the innocent can justly replace that of the guilty,
that is, how Christ can justly make satisfaction, Of this
view, which recognizes no obligation on the part of Christ
to suffer, Strong remarked:
I am persuaded that light can be thrown
upon this particular point in the great
doctrine. We shall understand the neces-
sity of Christ’s sufferings, when we con-
sider what Christ was, and what were his
relations to the race.^
In the subsequent formulation of his view, Strong
listed Christ’s obligation to suffer for men as being one
k
of the results of his union with humanity.^4" There is noth-
ing to indicate that Strong had in view any preincarnation
1. PAR, 213-219. 2. PAR, 213. 3. PAR, 213.
4. PAR, 213.
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union of the Logos and mankind; rather, he stressed that
Christ’s union with humanity "put him under obligation to
suffer for the sins of men” in such a way as to designate
the incarnation as the time of union. ^ Strong explained:
being one with the race, he had a share
in the responsibility of the race to
the law and the justice of God—a respon-
sibility not destroyed by his purifica-
tion in the womb of the virgin...
Christ ’’recognized the organic unity of the race, and saw
that, having become one of the sinning race,” Strong added,
”he had involved himself in all its liabilities, even to the
suffering of death, the great penalty of sin.”^ That the
obligation of Christ to suffer was not conceived at this
time by Strong to derive from a pre-incarnate union with hu-
manity is plain from the statement that:
he might have declined to join himself to
humanity, and then he need not have suf-
fered. He might have sundered his connec-
tion with the race, and then he need not
have suffered. But once born of the Vir-
gin, and possessed of the human nature
that was under the curse, he was bound to
suffer.**
While the problem of justifying the sufferings of
Christ for the innocent seemed now to press upon Strong,
it is clear that the view of an incarnate union with human-
1. PAR, 215.
2. PAR, 213-214. ”If Christ had been born into the world
like other men, he too would have had... to bear , --first
,
the burden of depravity, and secondly, the burden of
guilt... The purging away of all depravity did not take
away guilt, in the sense of just exposure to the penal-
ties of violated law. .. Justice still held him to answer
for the common sin of the race” (PAR, 214).
3. PAR, 214. 4. PAR, 214.
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ity seemed a sufficient explanation. But Strong sought to
supplement the traditional view that an imputed guilt fur-
nished the explanation of Christ’s sufferings. The doctrine
of atonement, he pointed out,
needs such an actual union of Christ with
humanity and such a derivation of the sub-
stance of his being by natural generation
from Adam as will make him, not simply the
constructive heir, but the natural heir,
of the guilt of the race ... Christ
,
then, so
far as his humanity was concerned, was in
Adam just as we were, and, as Adam’s de-
scendant, he was responsible for Adam’s sin
like every other member of the race; the
chief difference being that
,
while we in-
herit from Adam both guilt and depravity,
he whom the Holy Spirit purified, inherited
not the depravity but only the guilt. 1
Consequently, Strong found a sufficient union of Christ and
the race, to obligate the provision of atonement, by af-
firming that ’’guilt was not simply imputed to Christ; it
was imparted also.” The question which would soon present
itself was, did not the incarnation union with humanity have
its roots in an even deeper, pre-incarnation union?
(2|. Essay on ’’The New Theology”
The trend to an inner, spiritual interpretation of
Christian doctrine, in the theological movements contempo-
rary with Strong, was evaluated in his essay on ’’The New
Theology,”-^ which appeared in the January, 1888, Baptist
Quarterly Review .
The newer emphasis on divine immanence which charac-
terized the New Theology,^ Strong reported, was ’’derived
1. PAR, 215. 2. PAR, 21$. 3. PAR, 164-179.
4. Strong also designated this as ”a theology of exagger-
ated individualism” (PAR, 164).
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from idealistic sources, and is distinctly Berkeleian and
Hegelian in its spirit’’, although many contemporary theo-
logians were not consistently applying the idealistic prin-
ciples."*' Strong expressed the new mood:
Internal revelation is substituted for ex-
ternal; all man are conceived of as more
or less inspired; the boundaries between
the natural and the supernatural are broken
down. Some recent writers pride themselves
on having discovered anew the thought which
made the early church so devoted and yet so
active—the thought that in God we live and
move and have our being, and they ascribe
the decline of Christianity to the face that
Augustine and Calvin lost sight of it, and
looked upon God, after a deistic fashion,
as a mechanical contriver of the universe
and a worker upon it from without. As if
some of the noblest utterances of this great
truth of God’s immanence had not proceeded
from Augustine’s and from Calvin’s lips.^
Strong granted that divine immanence did not receive suf-
ficient attention from Butler and Paley, and that it should
be given proper emphasis, and the new light thrown unon it
by contemporary thought should be welcomed. ’’But, then,”
he added,
let us equally remember that God not only
speaks with the still small voice in the
constitution of man and in the course of
human history, but also by outward miracles
of healing and resurrection, by the incar-
nation and death of his Son, and by the ex-
ternal revelations of Scripture. God’s im-
manence is a vast truth; but we must not
let it hide from our eyes the other truth
of God’s transcendence. He who is ’in all,’
and ’through all,’ is also ’above all;’ and,
if he had not by miracle proved his tran-
scendence, we probably should never have be-
lieved in his immanence . ”3
1.
PAR, 167.
2.
PAR, 167. 3. PAR, 167.
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The influence of idealism upon the New Theology,
Strong said, came through the identity-system of Jonathan
Edwards. The radical error in Edwards’ philosophy, he add-
ed, was ,rhis denial of substance. The idea of a unity of
divine ideas was taken as itself constituting the reality
of things. Such a view, Strong insisted, could not avoid
pantheism :
No such things as physical forces exist.
Nature becomes a mere phantom, and God is
the only cause in the universe. It seems
plain to me that this doctrine tends to
pantheism. If all natural forces are
merged in the one all-comprehending will
of God, why should not the human will be
merged in the will of God also? Why should
not mind and matter alike be the phenomena
of one force which has the attributes of
both? Such a scheme makes supernatural re-
ligion impossible, for the reason that na-
ture is denied, and everything— that is to
say, nothing—becomes supernatural. How
shall we save the sense of sin, if every
sinful thought and impulse is the result
of the divine efficiency? And, finally,
how shall we save the character of God,
if he is the direct author of moral evil? 4^
Strong scored especially the relationship between
Christian consciousness and t he Scriptures, as required by
the New Theology. While not formally setting the Scrip-
tures aside, or assigning them an inferior authority, it
sets them side by side with the intuitions and experience
1. PAR, 168.
2. PAR, 169. It is curious how often Strong rejected ideal-
ism on the ground that it led invariably to pantheism.
Given such a mood, an idealism which was not pantheistic
in the sense that selves are not parts of God, would re-
move his most frequent objection.
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*i
of the believer, he protested. The idealistic scheme
"depreciates the outward revelation, with the intent of
exalting the inward ." 1 Its motivation is "a spirit of sci-
entific unity," by which it appears constrained to argue,
from the presence of something of the nature of inward re-
velation, to the position that all revelation is necessari-
ly inward. He added:
Christian consciousness becomes the only
medium of receiving religious truth. The
intuitions of the Christian are the final
test. And so we have Christian preachers
declaring that they will preach no doc-
trines which they have not realized in
their own experience, and private Chris-
tians asserting that what they cannot un-
derstand they will not believe.
^
Consciousness, Strong warned, is a con-knowing, not a new
or collateral source of truth but a con-knowing of truth
about God "in connection with and by means of his written
word."-^ The Christian’s spiritual perception is always
somewhat imperfect and deceptive by virtue of remaining de-
pravity, so that the ethico-religious consciousness is, with-
out rectification by express divine revelation, "utterly un
trustworthy."^ Nor does an appeal to the Holy Spirit war-
rant attributing to Christian consciousness an "authority
1. PAR, 170. This emphasis, Strong pointed out, "connects
itself very naturally with. ..the illumination-theory of
inspiration, which regards inspiration as merely an in-
tensifying and elevating of the religious perceptions of
the Christian, the same in kind, though greater in degree,
with the illumination of every believer by the Holy Spirit;
and which holds, not that the Bible is, but that it con-
tains the word of God—not the writings, but only the
writers being inspired" (PAR, 170).
2. PAR, 170. 3. PAR, 171.
4. PAR, 171. Strong wrote: "Where revelation speaks, there
Christian consciousness may safely speak; where that is
silent, the latter must be silent" (PAR, 171).
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aside from or co-ordinate with that of Scripture
.
1,1 The
moment Christian experience is exalted into a source of
Christian doctrine, the Scriptures, which constitute the
only safe foundation for Christian experience, are under-
mined,
2
Strong traced responsibility for the newer emphases to
an insistence on the immanence of God to the exclusion of
3his transcendence. That encouraged not only an internal
view of revelation, but emphasized the extra-temporal Christ
or eternal Logos who upholds all things in such a way as to
"forget that the historical manifestation of Christ is in
the Scriptures declared to be the only ground of hope for
sinners."^ It substitutes an inward for an outward view of
Jesus’ atonement, for it begins with the assumption that
no principle in the divine nature needs to be propitiated.
Man, not God, needs to be reconciled, on this approach; the
atonement exhibits God’s love, convincing sinners that no
obstacle to forgiveness exists on God’s part, instead of
satisfying divine justice. Along with this, the New The-
<3
ology champions the notion of a second probation. The ex-
1. PAR, 171.
2. PAR, 172. "The logical result." Strong warned, is "the
teaching that the only inspiration is Christian experience,
and that all Christian experience is inspiration. We
shall then cherish a thousand blind hopes for which reve-
lation furnishes no solid basis; but with these hopes will
come a thousand vagaries of doctrine, and finally both
the vagaries and hopes will be succeeded by the uncertain-
ty, the unbelief, and the despair, into which an unbridled
rationalism plunges the soul"* (PAR, 172).
3. PAR, 172-173. 4. PAR, 173. 5. PAR, 173.
6. PAR, 174.
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istence of Christ as eternal Logos, beyond the bounds of
his historic work, is urged against the teaching of the
guilt of the heathen.^ But this overlooks that Christ’s
supra-historic manifestation is granted to the heathen in
this life, and that all natural conscience and religious
ideas, so far as true, are derived from him, and yet the
heathen are without excuse because of their sin against
light. Men do not need to see the cross on which Christ
died in order to reject him. The Scripture states the lim-
its of divine mercy, and whatever heathen are saved must
cast themselves as helpless sinners upon God’s plan of sal-
' p
vation, dimly prefigured in nature and providence.
(3). Essay on ’’Modern Idealism”
Doubtless the most significant essay written by Strong
for the volume on Philosophy and Religion is the one which
3
remains for our examination, titled ’’Modern Idealism,
which appeared also in the January, l8o&, issue of Biblio -
theca Sacra . Its special interest derives from the fact
that it furnished so unqualified an indictment of a ’’one
substance” theory of reality, so short a time before Strong
declared for ethical monism.
1 . PAR
,
176.
2. PAR, 177. Strong used firm language in indicting the
leaning of the new immanentism toward a second probation
of the heathen: ”In this great controversy between God
and the sinning children of men, let us put ourselves
upon the side of God and not upon the side of his enemies.
Let us declare God to be true, though we have to call
every man a liar” (PAR, 176).
3. PAR, 56-74.
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Strong's essay was devoted to an examination of the
view which "regards ideas as the only objects of knowl-
edge and denies the independent existence of the external
world.
Kant circumvented the logical descent of Berkeleian to
Humean philosophy, by going back to Locke and insisting
that all sense-perception involves elements not derived
from sense—but he erred in claiming for such intuitions as
space, time and cause only a subjective existence and valid-
ity. Kant's failure to see that the mind, in cognizing the
qualities of objects, cognizes also a substance to which the
qualities belong, led Fichte to reduce all knowledge to
knowledge of self.^ Hegel revived and carried to its extreme
the idealistic principle v/hich Kant purposed to check.
^
Strong explained the influence of Hegelianism upon
later philosophy in terms of the gratification which monism
affords to the speculative intellect. He granted that
"omniscient idealism has been a valuable counter-weight to
the agnostic materialism" of the day.^ But the view "re-
quires of its consistent defenders," of which Strong sug-
gested there are few, "a rejection of the facts of history
1. PAR, 58. 2. PAR, 59-60. 3. PAR, 60.
4. PAR, 61.
5. PAR, 61 . "Together with the evolutionary hypothesis of
the origin of the world, it has found able advocates in
Caird, Green and Seth, in Great Britain, and in Harris,
Bowne and Royce in America" (PAR, 61).
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and of our moral nature.""^
The indictment of idealism here, as always in Strong’s
earlier statements, is coupled with an indictment of pan-
\
theism. Strong distinguished Lotze by a view of idealism
which regards idea as in the divine Intelligence, to which
the perceiving mind is intimately present,' and in which the
perceiving mind views it, but there is no differentiation
p
of his position from pantheistic idealism in general.
Strong’s attacks are concentrated, therefore, against quan-
titative monism, with its contention that all reality is
reducible numerically to God—a thesis to which personal-
istic idealism also was opposed.
Strong conceded that the objective idealisms are not
subject to many of the attacks which could be pressed against
3
subjective idealisms.
1. On this view, Strong complained, "sin is a necessity of
finiteness and progress. Even Jesus, as he was a man,
must be a sinner. The sence of remorse and the belief in
freedom are alike illusions. It can hold no view of God
which regards him as a veritable moral personality, or
as the author of a supernatural revelation. Conscience
with its testimony to the voluntariness and the damnable-
ness of sin, as it is the eternal witness against Pan-
theism, is also the eternal witness against the Idealism
of Hegel. We may believe that the utter inability of
Hegelianism to explain or even to recognize the ethical
problems of the universe is the chief reason for the re-
cent cry, ’Back to Kant!’ by which the younger thinkers
are summoned to return to the feet of a master who at
least recognized a moral law and a God who vindicates
it’’ (PAR, 61).
2. PAR, 63.
3. Objective idealism ’’regards ideas as something distinct
from the cognition of them.; it may even hold that these
ideas are themselves extended, and that they have all the
qualities which we now attribute to the material and ex-
ternal object. May not God suggest ideas to me, which are
not in me nor of me?... While it is objective to man, it
is
#
subjective to God. So, it may be argued, does the
universe exist. God’s ideas constitute its reality, its
permanence, its stability” (PAR, 65).
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But he offered vigorous objections to objective
idealism also. It rests upon T,the exceedingly precarious
assumption” that the mind knows "only ideas , while Natural
Realism has in its favor the universal belief of mankind
that we know things as well.”^ Furthermore, idealism is
inconsistent, for it must admit that T, in knowing ideas the
mind knows self” and "self-consciousness is a witness to
the existence of a permanent somewhat underneath all ideas,
and which all ideas presuppose,” so that idealism is driven
to grant the existence of something before ideas and more
than ideas, that is, the self. Moreover, objective idealism
unavailingly tries to maintain at the same time the purely
$
ideal character of the external world and "that the object
perceived is different from the act of perception."-^ In ad-
dition, idealism affords ”no proper account of the distinc-
tion between the non-ego in the shape of ideas and the non-
ego in the shape of our bodily organism” and thus ignores
1 • PAR
,
66. "Certainly the presumption is,” Strong wrote,
"that the universal belief of mankind is a correct one;
and this belief is not to be surrendered until it be
shown self-contradictory. To say that things are ideas,
is to common sense a yet greater absurdity” (PAR, 66).
2. PAR, 66.
3. "If objective idealism be not resolved into subjective
idealism, if non-egoistic idealistic idealism be not re-
solved into subjective idealism—then the existence of
the object cannot be dependent upon the percipient act,
i'ts esse cannot be percipi . Its intellectual existence...
is contingent upon the existence of a perceiving intel-
lect. But this is only to say that it cannot be known
without knowledge.
. .The error of the theory is in con-
founding intellectual existence, or the existence of the
object as known, with its real existence” (PAR, 67).
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the distinction between the body and the idea of the body.,'*'
The new idealism seeks to avoid solipsism, Strong added,
by taking refuge in the consciousness of God and "making that
the guarantee for the objective existence of our fellow-
men." But the same principle which removes all guarantee
of our fellow-men at the same time destroys any guarantee for
3the existence of God.
Strong attacked the monistic conception of the universe
espoused by idealism. He wrote:
It claims to be a ’one-substance’ theory,
although it should in consistency call it-
self a ’no-substance’ theory instead. It
repudiates the doctrine of two substances,
matter and mind, because it cannot under-
stand how mind should ever in that case be
able to know matter. Materialism declares
that mind knows matter because mind is mat-
ter; idealism declares that mind knows mat-
ter because matter is mind. The one is just
as much an arbitrary assumption as is the
other. Both are argumenta ad ignorantiam .
Because we cannot explain how we knov; that
which is other than ourselves, shall we deny
that we do know things and beings other than
ourselves?^-
1. PAR, 67 . "This belief in the existence of a real in dis-
tinction from a merely ideal body, a body that is extend-
ed and external to the mind, is the most primary and im-
portant fact of sense-perception," Strong affirmed.
"Here. . .Natural Realism has a stronghold from which no
speculative Idealism can ever dislodge it... The latter
(realism) represents the facts of our experience, while
the former (idealism) contradicts them" (PAR, 67
,
6S).
2. PAR, 69 .
3. PAR, 69 . "If we know only ideas in the case of our fel-
low-men," Strong argued, "we can know only ideas in the
case of God" (PAR, 69-70). This yields "a consciousness,
with no being to jbe conscious; consciousness without a
self; universal thinking without a thinker—ah, it is our
old Hegelian acquaintance: ’thinking thinks’.’" (PAR, 70).
4. PAR, 70.
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Since idealism must recognize the action of will upon mat-
ter, argued Strong, it ought not to be reluctant to recog-
nize an action of the intellect upon matter.^-
After exhausting philosophical criticisms of idealism,
Strong asked that the view be judged TTby its probably influ-
ence upon Christian faith. He called attention to logical
tendencies of the system, which would ultimately make them-
selves felt.
The first tendency listed, that of merging all things
in God, shows how exclusively Strong viewed idealism in pan-
theistic terms at this time. "Instead of tracing all things
to one source," Strong affirmed, "it prefers the shorter and
easier method of asserting that all things are but forms of
one substance."-^
Secondly, idealism destroys all distinction between the
possible and the actual, Strong complained. A possible uni-
verse, in God’s thoughts, is already an actual universe,
just as an actual universe, in God’s thoughts, is but a pos-
sible universe.^- The universe is as eternal as God’s thought
1. "If I can move something outside myself, why can I not
know something outside myself?" Strong asked. "It seems
absurd to suppose that I produce effects only upon an
ideal world when I exert my powers 01 volition—why is it
not equally absurd to suppose that I know only an ideal
^orld wh^n 1 exert my powers of sense-perception?"
2. PAR, *71.
3. PAR, 71 • "The conception of a God who i_s all, seems to it
preferable to that of a God who creates all. In this, the
doctrine runs directly counter to the Scripture teaching
that ’in the beginning God created the heaven and the
earth,’ and so removes the barrier which God himself has
set up against a pantheistic confounding of himself with
his works" (PAR, 71).
4. PAR, 71-72.
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of it, for the divine thought is the universe. Strong
protested
:
Second causes do not exist; for, as things
are but the ideas of God, all changes in
these things are but the direct effects of
a divine efficiency. All causal connec-
tions between different objects of the uni-
verse are at an end. No such things as phy-
sical forces exist. Nature becomes a mere
phantom, and God is the only cause of all
physical events. Sciences become at once
not the study of nature, but the study of God.
Thirdly, idealism destroys all distinction between
truth and error, Strong contended. If ideas are the real-
ity, how can false ideas exist, he asked, since the objects
2
are presumed to be mental. Moreover, since all motives
are ideas, and all ideas are due to direct divine causation,
the necessitarian can insist that the soul has no permanent
existence of its own and no freedom to furnish a basis for
responsibility
1. PAR, 72.
2. PAR, 72. It is significant that Strong assumed that
idealism necessarily involved not only quantitative mon-
ism, but also epistemological monism* actually, personal-
istic idealism rejected both in the interest of qualita-
tive monism, numerical pluralism, and epistemological
dualism. Strong asked: Tf Is it not beyond dispute that
we have ideas which do not correspond to the objective
truth? Are these realities also?* and is God the author
of them? . . . Is" it not plain that no explanation is possible
that identifies the idea with the object? Does not this
abolish the distinction between truth and error, and make
both our right and our wrong the direct product of the
divine will?" (PAR, 72).
3. PAR, 72. "What we call the moral law is nothing but the
presentation of a sublime divine idea," Strong suggested,
in evaluating idealism, "and what we call sin is nothing
but the presentation of another divine idea which is giv-
en us simply to contrast with, and to emphasize, the
first. Both evil and good are purely ideal... The freedom
to choose the good and to refuse the evil—this does not
exist; for this would imply the existence of a uubstance
separate from that of God" (PAR, 72-73).
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Fourthly, idealism cannot safeguard the identity of
personal beings. If man’s body, so far as objective to
him, is an idea of God, then his soul likewise ’’may be
a mere idea of God also.”^
Fifthly, the Christian doctrine of redemption is by-
passed when once sin is viewed as a natural necessity and
ideas are regarded as the only real objects of knowledge:
It is no longer necessary to believe in
an external revelation of God’s will.
Internal revelation, Christian conscious-
ness, the direct presentation to our minds
of new ideas from God, takes the place of
outward Scripture, or assumes coordinate
importance and authority with it.
Nor is it necessary, on idealist premises, to distinguish
clearly between ideal characterization and real history,
and consequently the historical Jesus, his atoning death,
resurrection and ascension, may be conceived ideally.
Historical testimony becomes of little
account when it contradicts a preconceived
theory; the idea is better than the fact
—
for the fact itself is only an idea.
3
Idealism fluctuates therefore between the self-deifi-
cation of solipsism and a morality-abolishing pantheism,
Strong summarized. In the concluding evaluation, he in-
dicted the new view in the harshest terms. Concerning the
idealist, remarked Strong, ”1 know of no better remedy for
his disease than the acceptance of the Lord Jesus Christ.”^
1. PAR, 72. The context makes clear that Strong’s use of
the word ’’may” here does not imply a wavering in his
identification of idealism with quantitative monism.
The ’’may” does not express doubt, but is consequential.
Strong added: ”With the evidence of personal identity
the evidence of personal immortality is lost also”
(PAR, 73).
2. PAR, 73. 3. PAR, 73 A. PAR, 74.
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As at the Reformation, by reception of Christ, men had
been delivered from their skepticism of the existence of
objective truth and righteousness, and of God himself, "so
now in the individual heart, again and again, the reception
of Christ, giving the first sense of reality within, leads
the soul outward to the recognition of a real world and of
a real morality outside of it."^
vi. The 1889 Lectures
In 1889 appeared the second edition^ of Strong 1 s System-
atic Theology . In the preface, Strong wrote that he had sub-
jected the first edition
to a thorough revision, and now sends it
out with its errata so far as possible
corrected with many slight improvements
of statement, and with more than seven
hundred new references, quotations, or
brief additions to the substance of the
work .
3
But an examination of the work, coupled with Strong 1 s fail-
ure to indicate any important theological changes, and the
fact that the paging of the old edition is almost uniformly
preserved, except in the indexes, supports the conviction
that there was in this period no substantial change of view-
point,
vii. The 1890 Lectures
Nor does there appear any significant development in
Strong 1 s thought by the time of the third edition^ of his
work a year later. That edition Strong himself described
1. PAR, 74. 2. ST(1889). 3. ST(l889), x.
4. ST(1890).
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in the preface as "a reprint, with slight alterations, of
the second."'*' Strong expressed appreciation of the notice
given his work in England as well as in America, but there
is no indication of substantial theological change in the
i
third edition.
viii. The 1892 Lectures
The demand for a fourth edition^ of Strong 1 s work re-
sulted, he commented in the preface, in a publication in
1892 "once more substantially without change from the second
edition.
Before Strong brought out another edition of his work,
his theological perspective had radically changed. The I896
edition of his Systematic Theology ,*4- no less than a series
of articles which appeared before that volume, indicate his
espousal of a new philosophic principle. But it is clear
from the consideration of Strong 1 s writings prior to 1892
that ethical monism, as he came to designate his later view-
point, was at most a marginal interest. Both in his conver-
sion experience and in the Christian home in which he was
raised was discerned the influence of the evangelist Charles
G. Finney. His seminary studies at Rochester, under Ezekiel
Gilman Robinson, afforded no encouragement in the direction
of a thorough-going spiritualistic view. Strong 1 s studies
under Robinson in 1858 and 1859 were in the earlier days,
1. ST (1890)
,
xi. 2. ST(1892). 3. ST( 1892 ) , xi.
4. ST(1896).
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before his teacher had worked out a final system. When
Strong began teaching in 1872, he had worked out his lec-
tures, as we have seen,"'' independently of Robinson’s wri-
tings, in order not to stifle the creative urge. The cur-
ious fact, in view of the partial concessions made by Rob-
inson in the liberal direction, is that Strong’s teaching
from the beginning stood more firmly in the evangelical
tradition. Strong’s treatment of the divine attributes
and of the Trinity disclosed less metaphysical reserve,
his early view of the Scriptures was higher than Robinson’s,
his view of man’s primitive state involved a primal perfec-
tion rather than the primal innocence which Robinson upheld,
his view of atonement protested against the subjectivistic
factors in Robinson’s statement whiGh seemed to jeopardize
an objective substitution, and declared also for forensic
justification as against Robinson’s tendency to incorporate
elements of sanctification in this experience. The openness
of Strong to the Darwinian theory, from the very first,
was encouraged by Robinson’s attitude that science at most
could determine the method of divine creation, and that
there was no need for theology to place itself in hostility
to scientific findings. Robinson, however, had refused
to concede the case for animal ancestry. 2 Strong
1 . Supra « 83-84.
2. Robinson wrote: ’’The supposition of an original savage
condition, but little if any removed from the level of
the more intelligent brutes, is a mere conjecture, unsup-
ported by any decisive evidence, besides being wholly
contrary to the Scriptures” (CT, 122).
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expressed the view that, had Robinson written his theologi-
cal effort a quarter century later, he would not have hesi-
tated to affirm man’s descent from the brute. ^ As Strong
moved to a pictorial interpretation of the Genesis account,
and accepted also the theistic evolution of man, he came
also to raise more critical questions about the infallibili-
ty of Scripture in the areas of history and science, yet was
reluctant to concede error even in these areas, although he
expressed appreciation of the spirit of reverent criticism
found in Robinson’s approach. Neither Robinson nor Strong
had worked out carefully the relationship between general
and special revelation, though both affirmed the priority
of Biblical disclosure, and both assumed, that, despite the
noetic distortion of sin, the continuity of general and
special revelation is apparent. There was therefore a deep
interest, seen especially in Strong’s voluminous quotations
from contemporary sources, in the speculative theisms of
the day. But at one point they agreed wholly, as far as the
published lecture notes tell the story: there was in the
writings of neither Robinson nor of Strong any special en-
thusiasm for the contemporary idealisms, so far as a monistic
1. Strong’s statement was: ’’One may question. . .whether the
Scriptural argument against man’s descent from the brute
would have seemed to him too conclusive, if this chapter
had been written a quarter of a century later, when the
Darwinian theory is so generally accepted, and when evo-
lution is regarded by so many theologians as the method
of creation pursued by the immanent God” (Art. (IB96 ),
162). The emphasis on divine immanence should be noted.
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view of substance is concerned, Robinson was non-committal
in such a way as to preclude assigning this to an openness
to the newer emphasis on a more complete divine immanence,
whereas Strong 1 s proclamation of ethical monism did not come
until after the 1892 revision of his work.
Two years later, in 1894, at least three events vitally
significant for this study took place. In terms of them we
may consider Strong T s espousal of ethical monism.
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CHAPTER III
THE LATER INTERACTION WITH PERSONALISTIC IDEALISM
The year 1894 marks a turning-point in Strong’s
theology. The importance of the ideological change could
hardly be discerned two years later, when the fifth edition
of Strong’s theological system appeared, with the brief
statement in the preface that
for substance. . .the book remains un-
changed—but with four exceptions...
where the principle of Ethical Monism
is adopted, and application of it made
to the explanation of the doctrines of
Preservation and of the Atonement.
1
That the changes in the interest of ethical monism should
be confined to "four exceptions” in a prevailingly orthodox
system suggested, both to evangelical and non-evangelical
theologians, that Strong had not yet discerned the implica-
tions of the new immanentism. But the public change in
Strong’s theological views came midway between the 1892 and
1896 editions of his theology, and can be dated more pre-
cisely in 1894.
In the latter year, three significant occurrences may
be noted. The death of Ezekiel Gilman Robinson, Strong’s
predecessor, occurred on June 13, 1894. Several months pre-
viously, Strong read for the first time Robinson’s Christian
1. ST(1896), x. Strong was not alone, in the world of the-
ology and philosophy, in underestimating the significance of
revisions made in a new edition. The revisions made by
Kant in the second edition of his Critique constitute a
striking instance of this. It is not safe to trust $n au-
thor’s own appraisal of the significance of changes m
his thought.
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Theology In his contribution to a memorial volume, Strong
affirmed that he had constructed his system "without once
looking at what my former teacher had written" and added that
"in fact, the pages of his work have only, within a few
months, been in my hands for careful scrutiny." Also in
1^94 Strong began contributing to The Examiner , a Baptist
publication in its eighty-first year, a series of articles
which he cautiously characterized as tentative and which,
upon their later inclusion in 1899 in a published volume,
titled Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism ,^ he qualified
as "a series of guesses at truth," although a more positive
attitude toward the views is quite apparent in their presenta-
tion. It is the more remarkable that in 1896, when Strong
1
s
memorial appreciation of Robinson was published, he wrote::
I am humbled to find how much of my own
thinking that I thought original has been
an unconscious reproduction of his own.
Words and phrases which I must have heard
from him in the class-room thirty-five years
ago, and which have come to be a part of my
mental furniture, I now recognize as not my
own but his. And the ruling idea of his
1. E. H. Johnson, who edited Robinson’s autobiography and the
supplement and critical estimates which appeared in the
memorial volume (EGR) to which Strong contributed the es-
say, "Ezekiel Gilman Robinson as a Theologian," stated in
the preface: "In the spring of 1893 Dr. Robinson was pre-
vailed upon to begin the dictation of an autobiography.
At the same time the contributors and the topics for a
memorial volume were agreed upon substantially as they now
appear" (EGR, iii).
2. Art. (1896), 168.
3. Referred to hereafter as CCEM. The second essay in this
volume, captioned "Ethical Monism," is taken from The Ex-
aminer in 1894, and the third essay, captioned "Ethical
Monism Once More," from The Examiner in 1895*
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system,—that stands out as the ruling
idea of mind; I did not realize until
now that I owed it almost wholly to him.l
For the organizing principle around which Strong now con-
structed his theological system was ethical monism, which
Strong came to champion not only as ?,the philosophy of the
future"^ but also the "hidden ground of unity"^ of diverse
creeds and theologies.
The facts so far before us are these: (1) In 1894
Strong contributed to The Examiner the first articles in a
series devoted to monism;^- (2) In 1894 he read Robinson T s
Christian Theology
,
some months prior to Robinson 1 s death
that same year; (3) In Strong’s contribution to the volume
memorializing Robinson, Strong made the striking assertion
that the ruling idea of his own system had been, quite un-
consciously, absorbed from Robinson.
The further complication is that (4) this dissertation
makes it quite clear that Robinson, in his published writings,
did not commit himself to monism, but rather, resisted it.
1. Art. (1896), 168. 2. CCEM, 22. 3. CCEM, 22.
4. Already in the opening address delivered May 26, 1893, by
Strong, as president of the American Baptist Missionary
Union, on "The Decree of God the Great Encouragement to
Missions," one finds the immanentistic emphasis on the or-
der and regularity of the universe and history, rather than
the miraculous, as especially disclosive of God: "I am
bound to see Christ in nature, executing the divine will
and revealing the divine wisdom in the unfailing regular-
ity of physical law. ..Human history is in like manner
Christ’s execution of the eternal purpose of God... All
reason and conscience, all science and philosophy, all ci-
vilization and education, all society and government, in
short, all the wheels by which the world moves forward
toward its goal have a living spirit within the wheels,
and that living spirit is Christ, declaring, unfolding,
and executing the decrees of God. Christ, the Son of man,
is the throbbing heart of humanity" (CCEM, 272-274)...
"Even now the government is upon Christ’s shoulder. He
is conducting the march of civilization. He is turning
and overturning the systems of philosophers and the
thrones of kings" (CCEM, 282).
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Strong nowhere refers, in his memorial essay, to statements
made by Robinson outside his Christian Theology , and since
his theological impression of Robinson is formed almost ex-
clusively from the latter’s writings, the question is not
inappropriately raised whether Strong did not subconsciously
infuse into Robinson’s structure a meaning which Robinson’s
words cannot be made to bear directly. The question natural-
ly arises whether Strong’s evaluation of his debt to his
teacher—
to my teacher and predecessor I owe more
than I owe to any one else outside of my
own family circle; and since this indebt-
edness must color all my judgments, it
will be best to state frankly, at the start,
what the debt was; the reader can then make
what allowance he chooses for the personal
equation^
—contained a somewhat unjustifiable element of enthusiasm
with relation to ethical monism. It is a curious circumstance,
that, in Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism
,
in replying
to critics of a monistic position, it was not to the prece-
dent of Robinson, but rather to the writings of Lotze, Ladd,
Upton and Bowne, to whom Strong appealed, and whom he most
frequently quoted in the sections of his Systematic Theology
revised in the interest of the newer vi ew.
One other clue is given, in Strong’s final literary
work, to an influential source of his thought, especially
on the doctrine of atonement, as it came to be modified in
these later years.
1. Art. (1896), 163 2. Strong, WSIB, 92
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In this connection, Strong disclosed that he had re-
sisted the federal theology from seminary days. To explain
imputation on the ground of God T s covenant with Adam and
with Christ, Strong protested, "seemed to involve God in a
merely forensic process, to make him a God of expedients,
to reduce divine justice to bookkeeping, to ignore all truth
and reality in God." Strong suspended judgment on the sub-
ject, seeking further light. ^ His view of a realistic union
between Adam and humanity, as the basis of imputation, was
encouraged by a mystical experience of union with Christ,
during his early pastoral experience.^ Strong stated:
My federalism was succeeded by a real-
istic theology. Imputation is grounded
in union
,
not union in imputation. Be-
cause I am one with Christ, and Christ’s
life has become my life, God can attri-
bute to me whatever Christ is, and what-
ever Christ has done. The relation is
biological
,
rather than forensic.-'
1. Robinson, Strong’s former pastor and theology teacher,
opposed it, as we have already seen, but Strong stated in
WSIB that "the preaching to which I listened when a child,
and the instruction of the theological seminary which I
afterward received, emphasized the doctrine of the Coven-
ants, and answered objections by referring the objector
to the unsearchable wisdom or sovereignty of God” (WSIB,
86). Strong either heard it from other seminary profes-
sors, or Robinson may have changed his viewpoint. What
makes the latter unlikely is that Strong’s criticisms of
Robinson’s view of the atonement were almost all along
the line of his endangering of its true objectivity. But
Strong reported clearly: "I entered the theological sem-
inary, and there encountered the full strain upon my faith
of the federal theology" (WSIB, 89).
2. WSIB, 86. 3. WSIB, 89. 4. WSIB, 90.
5. WSIB, 91.
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This discovery was not original, Strong explained, for
"many so called ’mystics’" had made it previously, but it
transformed "a theology of technicalities into a theology
of life."^
Strong disclosed that, in the application of a prin-
ciple of life rather than of legal figures to the relation-
ship of the race to Adam, he had been encouraged by
the reading of an old book by Baird, en-
titled ’The Elohim Revealed,’ in which
God’s imputation of Adam’s sin to all his
descendants was explained as a simple recog-
nition of their natural inheritance from
him of an enfeebled and perverse will.
To this Strong added the idea of sublimal tendencies con-
stantly striving against the good, and also that of an eter-
nal divine act which summed up and judged humanity as a
3race.^
But this left "the great problem of theology”--that of
explaining divine imputation of humanity’s sin to Christ.^
Strong disclosed that he had "privately consulted Dr. Shedd"
and that "he could only call it a mystery of God. ”5 In his
dissatisfaction, Strong "wanted to find some union of Christ
with humanity which would make this imputation also realistic
s
and biological." He added:
1 .
fc:
WSIB, 92. 2. WSIB, 92. 3. WSIB, 93.
WSIB, 93. 5. WSIB, 93.
WSIB, 93. From the beginning of his teaching of theology,
Strong propounded an "ethical theory of the atonement"
which insisted on an objective propitiation, but protested
against the formality and externality of the Anselmic view,
which Strong labelled as commercial. But until now
?
Christ’:
union with humanity had been viewed as being established
by the incarnation.
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I have found it, and have expounded it,
in my book entitled, t;Christ in Creation.”
It is my chief contribution to scientific
theology; and though I claim to have
thrown new light on the doctrine of God’s
law, and of union with Christ, it is by
my explanation of God’s imputation of all
human sin to Christ that my theology must
stand or fall. 1
It is clear then that Strong, in inquiring into the state-
ments of the new immanentism, would be attracted by a view
which grounded the union of Christ and humanity more inti-
mately than a linkage of Christ to the race and its guilt
only in terms of imputation by divine covenant and a conse-
quent incarnation. At the same time, Strong would resist
any viewpoint which destroyed human freedom and responsibi-
lity; pantheism he regarded as the enemy of all true religion.
From the motivations influential in Strong’s thought at this
period, it is clear that he would give favorable hearing to
an idealism which combined qualitative monism and numerical
pluralism, and this was the distinctive mark of personalis-
tic idealism. These terms call for precise definition, in
p
view of Strong’s use of the phrase, ethical monism.
1. WSIB
,
93.
£. The word monism designates the view that all reality is one,
whether qualitatively in kind or quantitatively in number.
The emphasis on qualitative monism, but not quantitative
monism, is common both to Strong and the persona listic
idealists: Strong used the designation of ethical monism to
guard against a quantitative monism, just as personalism
insisted on a combination of qualitative monism with numeri-
cal pluralism. The views of Strong and Bowne are monistic
only in the qualitative sense (the universe has a fundamental
unity in terms of ultimate spiritualistic reality) ; they are
not—Bowne actually, and Strong unquestionably in intent
—
monistic in the quantitative sense (the reduction of all
reality ultimately to one being or thing, rather than to a
manifold of beings). This distinction must be kept in mind
because Bowne ’s critic iaas of moniau are launched against
quantitative monism, whereas Strong’s espousal of ethical
monism repudiated, in intent, quantitative monism. The dis-
tinctive use of these teims is formulated by Calkins, PPP, 9.
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Strong appears to have originated the phrase "ethical
monism." While much of the philosophical emphasis to which
he applied the nomenclature is, in its broad outlines, har-
monious with the teaching both of Lotze and Bowne, it is
unlikely that they would have encouraged the use of such a
designation for the viewpoint. Both Lotze and Bowne doubt-
less would have avoided the word "monism" as obscuring the
pluralistic emphasis of their systems:^- Bowne, indeed,
sometimes set himself against all monisms as if the word
necessarily involves the notion of quantitative monism as
well as qualitative monism, and has been credited with in-
troducing the term "pluralism" into the United States. But
all three thinkers were aligned on the side of qualitative
monism, insisting that the fundamental nature of reality is
spiritual. This phase of his theory, as we shall see, Strong
further designated as "metaphysical monism." The failure to
qualify the metaphysical structure in terms of pluralism, at
this juncture, raises the question whether, in point of fact,
Strong’s view did not yield to more of a monistic emphasis,
whatever his intentions, than personalistic idealism permits;
the question will, at any rate, serve to heighten interest
in the relevant statements afforded by Strong’s theology.
1. The pluralistic note in Lotze, although finally winning
out, is not without compromises. Lotze had been influenced
by Leibniz, but was more impressed by the unity of the uni-
verse than by its variety, contrary to Leibniz’ multitudi-
nous, windowless monads. In some moods Lotze closely ap-
proached absolutism and a monistic view, but his unstable
tension between quantitative monism and pluralism ends
with greater, emphasis on pluralism. This ambivalence in
Lotze, however, coupled with the circumstance that Bowne
had not yet formulated his final and definitive statement
at this time, will help to explain elements in Strong’s
position which aopear to fluctuate between quantitative
monism and pluralism.
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But it was by the terra ’’ethical” that Strong intended
to safeguard the pluralistic nature of his system. The
only metaphysical monism to which he could subscribe, he
emphasized, was one which made room for "psychological dual-
ism Tt--or the relative independence and moral freedom of fi-
nite, created persons."^ By this term, he signified his re-
nunciation of pantheism, and the enthronement of a view of
man’s moral and spiritual relationship with God which would
permit a view of man’s sinfulness without involving Deity in
sin. For this ethical emphasis in his view, Strong found a-
bundant encouragement in Lotze and Bowne. Lotze had cham-
pioned the demand for human freedom as absolutely fundamental
to the religious character of his world view. 2 Bowne had de-
voted a chapter of his work on theism to ’’The World-Ground
as Ethical,” and had made the moral argument, coupled with
the unitary intelligence of experience, the central ingre-
dients of his argument for the existence of God, in such a
way as to emphasize human freedom and responsibility.-5
1. E. 3. Brightman, in a note to the writer, has pointed out
that this terminology of ’’psychological dualism” to refer
to created selves as not being parts of God is unknown to
occidental philosophy, but that* it is found in Hindu
thought. Whether Strong’s pluralism goes the entire dis-
tance of holding that there are many selves or persons in
the universe, no one of which is a part of any other, in
view of a collateral emphasis on all reality as a finite,
graded manifestation of God, remains to be seen.
2. Lotze demanded man’s formal freedom ’’because we regard it
as the conditio sine qua non for the fulfilment of^ethi-
cal commands, whose obligatory majesty we consider to be
the most absolute certainty and the one that needs no de-
rivation from any other source whatever” (OPR, 100).
3. Bowne
j POT, 211-2L0. Knudson wrote: ’’The very idea of
creation excludes... a dualistic conception of the relation
of God to the world. The only dualism permissible on the
theory of creation is an ethical one, and this would ap-
jsly only to free beings and their relation to God” (DOR,
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While the exact manner in which the influences of per-
sonalistic idealism made themselves felt in Strong’s think-
ing are not known to us, it is clear that he was familiar
with the work of Lotze,^ Ladd and Bowne. He quoted and
cited them frequently, at first invoking them, along with
many others, when their affirmations were favorable to tra-
ditional theism, or when stating his view in contrast, but
now he enlisted them as mainstays of a view similar to the
ethical monism which he himself projected. Strong ap-
3pealed frequently to Lotze, and to Ladd, but especially
1. Lotze’s Mikrokosmus first appeared from IS 56-64 . The
translation was first begun by a daughter of Sir William
Hamilton, but she did not live to complete the task, taken
up by E. E. C. Jones and completed in 1S85« George T.
Ladd of Yale was the translator or translation editor of
others of Lotze’s works, i . e . t OPR, 00M, and OPP. Bosan-
auet, who translated Lotze’s Hetaphysik in 1$84, was in-
fluenced by Lotze’s monism, ratner than by the pluralistic
elements in his thought, and declared for impersonalistic
absolutism. Royce, another of Lotze’s pupils, championed
personalistic absolutism. But Lotze clearly held that
whatever asserts itself as a self is outside God (NEGJ 229).
2. Personalistic idealism, while insisting that all reality
is of the nature of consciousness, affirms that selves are
not parts of God, but are created relatively independent,
with moral freedom and responsibilitjr. A central issue
will be the similarity or dissimilarity of the pluralism
( ’’psychological dualism’’) affirmed by Strong, and the
pluralism of personalistic idealism.
3. Strong quoted Ladd frequently as an exponent of the newer
view, but his son, John Henry Strong, has confirmed the
impression that Bowne was more influential than Ladd in
his interaction with the personalistic view. The son had
studied under Ladd at Yale, and t he father eagerly scanned
the class notes taken in Ladd’s course on Lotze’ s'^Ey, and
for that matter, the notes on the last course offered by
Noah Porter, in which the son was enrolled. But the elder
Strong read Bowne ’s writings avidly; he seldom spoke of
Ladd, frequently of Bowne. Ladd had studied under Lotze,
was as productive as Bowne, but not nearly so influential.
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his appeal to Bowne, ^ establishes the connection in his
own writings.
If the precise influences which molded Strong T s
thought are hidden from us, the effect of the newer em-
phasis on divine immanence are set forth in print, for
all to see. Since the primary interest of this study is
the ideological rather than the historical element,
which is shadowed by an element of uncertainty, it will
be appropriate now to proceed to the public utterances and
the initial articles contributed to Strong to religious
periodicals, in the interest of the newer view.
Strong’s interest in ethical monism came to inciden-
tal expression in his public addresses on special occa-
sions, but it was not until the appearance in The Examiner
on November 1, 1394, of the article on ’’Christ in Creation”
that a somewhat systematic presentation of his views was
given.
1. Bowne had dedicated to Lotze, under whom he had studied
in 1373-74, the first edition of his MSFP in 1332,
”in grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and
former teacher”, and had ventured the remark that it was
’’substantially Lotzean.” The writer has found no evi-
dence that Strong and Bowne were personally acquainted.
Bowne ’s friendships included the outstanding Methodist
systematic theologian of his day, Henry C. Sheldon, and
Bowne knew of Shedd, for he often quoted Shedd’s state-
ment that ”a system is its own best argument and de-
fense . ”
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Almost coincident with the appearance of the first
article, Strong, on May 27, lc>94, delivered his presiden-
tial address at the eightieth anniversary of the American
Baptist Missionary Union, on the theme "The Love of Christ
the Great Motive to Missions." Strong pointed out that
the doctrine of divine immanence was transforming contempo-
rary theological thought.^ "Law is only perpetual miracle,"
he affirmed, and "evolution is nothing but the method of
God. But the world has yet to learn the great truth that
the God who is so near it, who constitutes its very life,
and who is carrying forward its historic development, is
o
none other than Christ." Concerning his theme Strong em-
phasized "not simply our love to Christ, not simply Christas
love to us, but rather Christ’s love in us, going out
toward the lost."^ The law of love, he declared, is
a law of life... It is no arbitrary demand
but is grounded in the nature of things...
it is only the expression of the organic
relation which Christ sustains to humanity
and humanity sustains to Christ.^-
Strong then affirmed the organic union of Christ and human-
ity to be a Biblical truth, and proceeded to make plain
that he meant not merely a vital mystical union of believers
with Christ, but a substantial union:
1. CCEM, 291.
2. CCEM, 291-292. Strong stated: "Incarnation and atone-
ment, and resurrection and regeneration are, so to speak,
processes of artificial selection which counteract the
natural selection of sin and death by the law of the
Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" (CCEM, 293).
3. CCEM, 2B7. 4. CCEM, 287.
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I mean nothing less than this,
that all men everywhere, saints
and sinners, Jews and Gentiles,
since the incarnation and before
the incarnation, are bound to Christ,
and Christ is bound to them, by the
ties of a common life. V/e are fam-
iliar with the thought that Christ
is the Head of the church, that all
regenerate souls constitute his body,
that he lives and dwells in every
true believer. But there is a prior
union with Christ which Scripture de-
clares to us but which we have strange-
ly neglected. Christ is also the na-
tural head of universal humanity; in
him... were all things created. . .and in
him... all things, including humanity,
consist or hold together from hour to
hour... Have v/e thought of Christ’s
life as animating only believers?
That is true of Christ’s spiritual
life. But there is a natural life
of Christ also, and that life pulses
and throbs in all men everywhere...
The whole race lives, moves, and has
its being in him; for he is the soul
of its soul and the life of its life.
There is an organism of humanity as
well as an organism of the church,
and Christ is the center and life of
the one as he is the center and life
of the other.
Strong appropriated the idealistic emphasis on the objec-
tive reality of social institutions in such a way as to
identify the "larger life" or the organic unity of mankind
with the immanent Christ. The organizing principle of
mankind is Christ, as the whole in which all individual
1. CCEM, 237-288
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members participate.^ But Strong made clear, at the same
time, that he did not intend an immanentism of the Hegel-
ian type, in which all persons are parts of a divine per-
son, any more than Spencer’s emphasis on a merely physical
unity in which individual members passively execute the im-
pulses communicated to them from the inscrutable power which
2they partially manifest. The organic unity with Christ
1. CCEM, 289. That Christ is the soul and life of humanity
is an emphasis far more reflective of absolute than of
personalistic idealism, but Strong precludes taking it
fully in that sense and gives the emphasis, as we shall
see, a pluralistic turn. The vigorous monistic expres-
sions, which at times suggest numerical as well as qual-
itative monism, may reflect the influence upon Strong
of the medieval mystics, whom he read often. His inter-
est in mysticism dated back to his early preaching at
Haverford where, despairing because he feared that he
had ’’preached himself out”, Strong went for a walk in
the country. His son, John Henry Strong, told the wri-
ter the details of the experience which ensued. While
Strong was meditating, ’’the thought of his union with
Christ burst upon him” and he went back to his church
in spiritual power, and a revival spirit hovered over
the church. From then on, Strong’s interest in the mys-
tics was whetted; he owned the two-volume life of Madam
Guyon. But he resisted pantheism in the mystics as
everywhere else. The lack of significant reference to
the mystics, in affirming his espousal of ethical monism,
would suggest, however, that Strong’s major urge toward
the new view came from philosophical idealism in the
Lotze-Bowne stream. But the reference to the mystics as
having removed the mechanical aspects of the doctrine of
atonement (WSIB, 92
;
cf. supra t 174), as significant.
The fact that Strong gave the doctrine of the believer’s
union with Christ a non-pantheistic statement, however,
is equally so. And even Lotze had written that ’’Creator
and created blend in a community of life, for whose dim
profundity the noblest mysticism scarce offers adequate
expression” (M, II, 400), although he insisted, of course,
that ’’created beings” are ’’something that is not God Him-
self” and constitute a ’’more lustrous manifestation” of
the other (i.e., than nature) element in God that is more
peculiarly Himself” (M, II, 397).
2. CCEM, 289.
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is not such that it destroys free will:
though created and upheld by Christ,
every man is endowed with that price-
less heritage, free-will, and he can
use his free-will in resisting, instead
of obeying, the lav/ of holiness which
reigns supreme.^
The insistence on the immanent Christ as the organ-
izing principle and ultimate reality of all existence, fur-
nishing the natural ground of the organic union of mankind,
and yet also on the possibility of free moral and spiritual
revolt against Christ, is here clearly set forth. The more
precise outv/orking of these factors is given, in a somewhat
systematic statement, in the articles contributed by Strong
to the religious press of that day.^
1. The 1894-1895 Examiner Articles
The 1894 and 1895 issues of The Examiner carried a ser-
3ies of articles'' by Strong, setting forth what he regarded
as the meaning of the new immanentism for evangelical the-
ology.
i. "Christ in Creation"
The introductory article, titled "Christ in Creation,"^
appeared in The Examiner early in 1894. In it, Strong ex-
1. CCEM, 289-290.
2. It may not be superfluous to remind the reader that by
monism Strong intends only qualitative monism, as the com-
panion word ^ethical" is intended to emphasize. The spir-
itual nature of all reality does not mean, for him, that
reality is numerically one; rather, mankind has a created,
relative independence, which secures human freedom and
responsibility. Whether Strong was as careful as contem-
porary personalistic idealism in the statement of this
pluralism is not of concern at the moment; his overt re-
jection of absolute idealism is clear.
3. These articles form the opening chapters of CCEM.
4. CCEM, 1-15.
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pressed his conviction that the redemptive work of Christ
cannot be understood properly apart from a consideration of
Tlhis relation to the universe of which we form a part.”^
Before developing his view, Strong avows that he prem-
ises only that the doctrine of the Trinity is assumed, and
with this the peculiar office of the second person as the
revealer of God. The second person, called the Word of God
,
is intimated by Scripture as constituting
the principle of objectification, conscious-
ness, intelligence within the divine nature,
and the principle of expression, manifesta-
tion, revelation, by which God is made known
to other beings than himself. Christ, then,
is the Reason, Wisdom, and Power of God in
exercise. The Father by himself is the divine
nature latent, unexpressed, unrevealed ... In
eternity Christ, the Word, is God T s truth,
love, and holiness, as made objective and re-
vealed to himself. In time Christ, the Word,
is God’s truth, love, and holiness, as ex-
pressed, manifested, and communicated to fin-
ite creatures. ^
Strong left no doubt that his espousal of a monistic philoso-
phy in no way involved for him the rejection of belief in an
ontological Trinity.
T7 CCEM, 1. There are but two references to significant
contemporary thinkers preoccupied with this theme, one
each to Borden P. Bowne and Charles Darwin and, since in
both cases Strong expresses an element of disagreement
within a common intensified emphasis on divine immanence,
the references afford no final clue as to the direct in-
fluences at work in molding Strong’s thought. But the
disagreement with Bowne is simply by way of identifying
Christ as the Logos.
2. CCEM, 2. Strong did not intend to suggest that this can
be ascertained apart from the Scriptures, however, for
he added: r’In the divine Being there are three distinc-
tions, which are so described to us in Scripture that
we are compelled to conceive of them as persons” (CCEM, 2).
3. CCEM, 2.
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The concentration of theology on providence and re-
demption as the v/ork of Christ has obscured, Strong sug-
gested, the fact that creation is likevrise His work.^
Creation is "the externalization of the divine ideas
through the will of Christ ." 2 The universe once existed
in him, as the reason of God, as "a merely intelligible
3
and ideal world—a cosmos noetos , to use the v/ords of Philo."
But the universe became in him, as the power of God, "an
actual, real thing, perceptible to others."^ Christ is both
the creator and sustainer of the universe; His steady will
constitutes its lav/ and makes it a cosmos rather than a cha-
os.
The grounding of creation in the doctrine of the Trin-
ity avoids that "pernicious form of modern idealism"^ in
which the universe is viewed as having only a logical exis-
tence, and pantheism which regards the divine self-conscious-
ness and spiritual life as incomplete, and makes the universe
necessary to God.
Subjective idealism views God as mind or thought, but
not as will; hence it yields "a merely logical, but not real,
z:
existence ."0 It is powerless to explain the difference "be-
tween thoughts and things, between the idea and its realiza-
tion. But "there is free divine self-determination"^ and
TTCCEM, 2. 2. CCEM, 3. 3. CCEM, 3. 4. CCEM, 3.
5o CCEM, 3. 6. CCEM, 4. 7. CCEM, 4. 8. CCEM, 3.
—
Y : 'i
V
.
oldqtneb
•
:
9ricJ
c
'
t £X 1 Lfitn9 eriJ11 ei nojtJ £9*iO
p'i'yj.' i r V 9 d J riguo'ifte
,
r 8 r
<
<
. ,i bn.o
<
<
.....
'
i rjT'rHH
<J • < * < lV .
•
<
' h9*l t lEL'CtOB
.
.
,
, ; 3 r- , - o. i fi . ; * stfuctj: .tsnoo
. o
.
:i.r nc.i.;ifv. 'to j‘rfIbnuo'is-®iiT
1
„ s r : ' f{ o w
\ 3 Y
'
'
'• ‘
: !
ds er ivib ••rk! - o\v
oli f le^ctxi .q?. >rfB seen
.
j;;i c o - i V ' :c Hr ' o.i f ' r.!Or: c •*"-&
Xi-.oj
n
'
‘ r
V
.c c laoo
-x
°
•
136
it follows that
the universe is not a merely necessary
evolution of divine ideas. Christ is
the power as well as the wisdom of God...
In God there is a principle of will as
well as a principle of reason... The plan
is not the building; decrees are not the
universe. Executive volition is also
necessary ... Creation is his (Christ’s)
free and sovereign act, turning ideas
into realities, making objective what
was only subjective before. While the
plan of creation is the product of his
reason, the actual world is the product
also of his will.l
This emphasis on Christ as the principle of self-conscious-
ness and of self-determination in God precludes pantheism
2
no less than ”a will-less and soul-less idealism.” Whereas
pantheism regards God as exhaustively revealed in the uni-
verse, an adequate view affirms God’s transcendence no less
than His immanence. ^ ’’The Scriptures furnish. . .the antidote
to this systematic identification of God with nature,” Strong
wrote, ”by telling us that Christ is before all things and
that in him all things consist."^ But it is not only the
denial of divine transcendence in pantheism against which
Strong protested, but also its '’denial of any consciousness
and will in God distinct from the consciousness and will of
finite creatures. ”5 Whether pantheism holds that God comes
to consciousness only in man or that man comes to conscious-
ness only in God, they remain reverse sides of the same real-
ity, and it is impossible to save significance for the con-
cepts of human freedom, responsibility, sin and guilt in man.
1. CCEM, 3-4. 2. CCEM, 4. 3. CCEM, 4.
4. CCEM, 5. 5. CCEM, 5.
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On the contrary, Strong affirmed, "over against the per-
sonal God there are personal beings."^-
It is apparent, then, that Strong outlined his view,
before proceeding to the question of metaphysical monism,
with an insistence that (1) Christ is the principle of real-
ity of all things; (2) the physical universe has a real, not
merely a logical existence, and represents the externaliza-
tion of the divine ideas by an act of will; (3) Christ con-
tinues as the constant support of the universe, so that the
processes of nature and history are simply His will manifest-
ed; (4) the doctrine of the Trinity safeguards against pan-
theism, by insisting upon divine transcendence as well as
immanence; (5) human persons are not parts of God, but in
view of human freedom, responsibility, sin and guilt, are
created realities outside God.
Proceeding to the relation of Christ and nature,
Strong pointed out that the old conception of a world of
blind, inert matter had been rendered untenable by modern
physics and psychology. The qualities of matter "exist only
for intelligence. We do not know it except in connection
with the sensations which it causes."
Matter, therefore, is spiritual in its
nature. By this I do not mean that mat-
ter spirit, but only that it is the
living and continual manifestation of spir-
it, just as my thoughts and volitions are
a living and continual manifestation of my-
self. It does not consist simply of ideas,
for ideas, deprived of an external object
1. CCEM, 6. 2. CCEM, 6.
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and of an internal subject, are left
suspended in the air.-1-
But the external object, which affords reality to the ideas
and thus renders nature real, is not an underlying substance
in the Aristotelian-Thoraistic sense, but rather the will of
Christ
:
Matter exerts force, and is known only
by the force which it exerts. But force
is the product of will, working in ration-
al ways, and will is an attribute of spir-
it . The system of forces which we call
the physical universe is the immediate pro-
duct of the mind and will of God, and since
Christ is the mind and will of God in ex-
ercise, Christ is the Creator and Upholder
of the universe.
Nature is "a series of symbols” setting forth hidden divine
truth, and since Christ alone can reveal this truth, the
world "is virtually the thought of Christ, made intelligible
by the constant will of Christ."-^
Nature is the omnipresent Christ manifest-
ing God to creatures. . .When the storm dark-
ens the sky, the Hebrew poet can leave out
of mind all the intermediate agencies of
moisture and electricity, and can say,
T The God of glory thundereth. T 4
The interaction between individual things can be explained
only when all are embraced "within a unitary Being who con-
stitutes their underlying reality. it is Christ 1 s constant
will that "gives life and stability and order" to the uni-
verse.^
1. CCEM, 6.
2. CCEM, 6-7. Since Strong began with the Biblical assumption
that Christ is the creator and sustainer of the universe,
ought he not to have closed this statement by affirming
—consistently with his position—that "Christ is the sub-
stantial reality of the universe"?
3. CCEM, 7. 4. CCEM, 7. 5. CCEM, 8 . 6. CCEM, 9.
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Christ is the answer to the epistemological, no less
than to the ontological problem. Just as He is the prin-
ciple of cohesion, attraction and interaction in the physi-
cal universe, so He holds together the intellectual realm,
and is the assurance that sense-perceptions correspond to
objective facts, that we actually communicate with other in-
telligent beings besides ourselves, and that there is truth
apart from our individual impressions of it. Knower and
known must be connected by a being ,fwhich constitutes the
ground of their existence.”^ We know in Christ, as well as
live in Him, for He is the principle of communication be-
p
tween man and God and man and the universe. He is the prin-
ciple of induction, permitting us to argue from one part of
a system to another.-^ We can say not only that God geometri-
zes, and that nature’s laws are God’s habits, and with Bowne
that ’’the heavens are crystallized mathematics,” but ”we
may find in Christ the mathematician.”^
The universe is a thought; behind that
thought is a mighty thinker, and that think-
er is Christ, the wisdom and the power of '
God... Since he is himself the truth of God,
as well as the revealer of it, the universe
with all its law and rationality is. Christ,
just as much as your body, your face, your
speech, are you. 5
1. CCEM, 9. 2. CCEM, 10. 3. CCEM, 10. 4. CCEM, 11.
5. CCEM. 10. The words ”as much as” are here significant, and
preclude interpreting the quotation as encouraging the
identification of nature as a part of God (cf. n.l, p. 191).
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The plain implication of this, Strong held, is that
Christ is "the principle of evolution."^ Because Christ is
the "omnipresent life and law of the world, the universe
is a rational, useful, progressive evolution which combines
general uniformity with occasional unique advances.-^
Christ gives "moral unity" to the system of things.^
-
The law of love and holiness expresses the natural bond which
unites the universe to the source of its life and blessed-
ness, I am bound to love my neighbor as myself, because
"my neighbor is. myself—that is, has in him the same life
5that is in me, the life of God in Christ,"
From this it is evident that the old theistic proofs,
which led from effect to cause, have been displaced by a new
argument, which moves not from the universe to an outside Ar-
chitect, but sees God as the immanent presupposition of the
c.
present order. The universe, narrowly inspected, reveals
in its laws and arrangements only mechanism, but looked at
more broadly, yields "a marvelous impression of system, of
mind, of wisdom, of benevolence."' Nature is the constant
expression of the living God, and this living God, disclosed
in nature, is "none other than Christ."^
1. CCEM, 10. 2. CCEM, 11. 3. CCEM, 11.
4. CCEM, 12. 5. CCEM, 12.
6. CCEM, 12-13. The old argument, Strong wrote, "had the dis-
advantage of not being able to show that the universe, at
least so far as its substance is concerned, ever had a be-
ginning. . .The new argument avoids this difficulty. It
takes the analogy of the soul and its relation to the body...
I do not need to go back to the origin of nature to prove
the existence of God, any more than I need to go back to
my brother’s birth to prove that there is a soul behind
that kindly face of his" (CCEM, 12-13).
7. CCEM, 13-14. 3. CCEM, 14.
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Nature is not his body, in the sense
that he is confined to nature. Nature
is his body, in the sense that in nature
we see him who is above nature, and in
whom, at the same time, all things con
sist
.
In summarizing Strong’s view of nature, one finds, then,
the following emphases: (1) Christ is not only the logical
and moral unity of the world, but he is the principle of or-
derly evolution; (2) Nature is not non-mental stuff, but is
a force-world in view of the externalization of the divine
ideas by the constant will of Christ; (3) Nature is a par-
tial and temporary manifestation of the transcendent God;
(4) The evidence for God is found most conspicuously not in
the miraculous, but in the orderly system of nature, which
is the direct disclosure of the constant will of Christ,
the creator and sustainer of the universe.
ii. ’’Ethical Monism”
A second article appeared in The Examiner in November,
1$94, under the title of ’’Ethical Monism.”^ In it, Strong
1. CCEM, 14. Strong added: ’’Nature is an expression of the
mind and will of Christ, as my face is an expression of
my mind and will. Rhetorically, I can identify nature with
Christ, just as I identify my face with myself. But, then,
let us remember that behind and above my face is a person-
ality, of which the face is but the partial and temporary
manifestation of the Christ who is not only in all things,
but before all things and above all things” TCCEM, 14-13).
2. CCEM, 16-51. This appeared in three parts, in the Novem-
ber 1, S, 15, 1884 issues of The Examiner (Vol. 72, Nos.
44 ) 45 j 4d )
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sets forth the motivations to such a view, and also the
terms in which it is to be differentiated from pantheistic
views
.
All departments of modern thought-including physics,
literature, theology, and philosophy—were moving to monism.
^
Strong cited scholars from various fields, carefully point-
ing out that in many cases the movement was toward "a monism
without transcendence, a monism which sees no God before,
beside, and above the universe.” Not only physicists like
Thomas C. Chamberlin, the dean of the College of Science at
the newly-founded University of Chicago, but poets like
Robert Browning held to but one substance or principle of
being, viewing the universe as ,fa universe of spirits.
In theology, J. A. Dorner had declared that the great dis-
covery of the present age is the essential unity of the di-
vine and human. In science, the doctrine of evolution is an
attempt to meet the demand for unity. But primarily, the
monistic tendency is philosophical, and in various forms
"holds at present almost undisputed sway in our American uni-
versities."^- Strong cited Harvard, Yale, Brown, Cornell,
Princeton, Rochester, Ann Arbor, Boston and Chicago as cen-
ters of the new monistic philosophy.
Monism was therefore "the ruling idea" of the times,
and it is essential that the Christian movement hold the
right attitude toward it.^ Strong’s inclination was to
1. CGEM, 16
4. CCEM, 21
2. CCEM, 16.
5. CCEM, 22.
3. CCEM, 17
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"welcome the new philosophy as a most valuable helper in
interpreting the word and works of God."^ Strong urged:
"Let us tentatively accept the monistic principle and give
2
to it a Christian interpretation." He confessed that he
had come to believe this "universal tendency toward monism. .
.
a mighty movement of the Spirit of God. • .preparing the way
for the reconciliation of diverse creeds and parties by dis-
closing their hidden ground of unity. Strong ventured
the belief that his view, which "furnishes to both philoso-
phy and theology their greatest desideratum—an Ethical
Monism,"^ had been a late insight because of a providential
divine propaedeutic.^
Strong’s interest in monism did not imply by any means
a drift to pantheism. In fact, one of the specific reasons
adduced by Strong for giving a Biblical turn to the monistic
approach was that the new movement, if Christian theology
does not "capture it for Christ, we may find that material-
ism and pantheism perversely launch their craft upon the
tide and compel it to further their progress. To work out
1. CCEM, 22. 2. CCEM, 22. 3. CCEM, 22.
4. CCEM, 50.
5. "The full acknowledgment in theology of this doctrine of
one substance has been delayed, for the same reason that
the Trinity was not more clearly revealed to the Old Tes-
tament saints—preparatory doctrines needed to be taught
first*.. So the teaching of human personality, freedom,
responsibility, sin, has had to precede the teaching that
man is of one substance with God, because, otherwise, con-
substantiality would have been interpreted as pantheism’.’
(CCEM, 50).
. CCEM, 22.6
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a Christian monism appears the more necessary in view of
the fact that
there are forms of monism which do not
conserve man’s ethical interests, but on
the other hand sacrifice man’s freedom
and God’s transcendence in the effort to
secure scientific unity.
1
It was against monism of the pantheistic sort that Strong
invoked the philosophy of Lotze, as shaping the monistic ten-
dency in many quarters in a non-pantheistic direction:
no thinker of recent times has had great-
er influence in this direction than has
Lotze. He is both raonist and objective
idealist. Yet he holds with equal ten-
acity to the distinction between the di-
vine personality and the human personali-
ty, and declares that ’where two hypo-
theses are equally possible, the one agree-
ing with our moral needs and the other con-
flicting with them, nothing must induce us
to favor the latter.’ He intends his mon-
ism to be an Ethical Monism, by which I
mean simply a monism that conserves the
ethical interests of mankind.
2
If God is the source of all finite activity, Strong inquired
of pantheistic monism, what room is left ’’for freedom or
responsibility or sin or guilt in men?”^ He indicted any
view which yields ”a God without moral character,” who may
well be designated no God at all, or which regards the
1. C GEM
,
23.
.
,
~
2. CCEM, 20-21. ”An Ethical Monism recognizes all the truth
there is in pantheism, without including any of its er-
rors. It recognizes God as the all-inclusive life of the
universe, while it adds the truths which pantheism ig-
nores—God’s personality and transcendence” (CCEM, 49).
3. CCEM, 24.
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As againstuniverse as an exhaustive expression of God..^
monisms which do not seem to' be ethical, he declared:
Monism will be the philosophy of the fu-
ture, but it will be monism of another sort,
a monism which makes sin and Christ the Sa-
viour from sin starting points and funda-
mentals of the system, instead^of virtually
explaining both of these away.
Strong 1 s objections to pantheistic monism were unquali-
fied. They reduced, however, to his insistence upon a divine
transcendence over the universe and a placing of human selves
outside of God in such a way as to avoid a reduction of the
seriousness of sin.
The denial that the physical universe exhausts God, or
constitutes a complete manifestation of him, placed Strong
consciously against many contemporary expressions of the mon-
istic philosophy, even against some exponents^ to whom he had
appealed in the first place to show how widespread was the
tendency to monism in his day. To the pantheistic mood, he
opposed the Scripture emphasis that God is "above” as well
as Tt in TT and "through" all things.^4- The evolutionary prin-
ciple is irrational, affording
no guarantee of useful progress in the his-
tory of life, unless it is the method of
an intelligence and will, not only immanent
1. CCEM, 24. In such a view, Strong emphasized, "Nothing
could be but what is. It is difficult to see how anything
can be in the future but what now is; in other words, how
evolution itself can be possible. And if there be no tran-
scendent
.
element in God /how can there be any transcendent
element in man? how can man possibly be different from
what he is? how can his sin be anything more than the
necessary product of his environment?” (CCEM, 24).
2. CCEM, 24725.
3. Strong singled outHill T s Genetic Philosophy and Schurman’s
Belief in God as disclosing ' a monism which virtually ex-
cludes divine and human freedom.
4. CCEM, 17.
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4
in the system, but also transcendent,
and continually importing, into the sys-
tem new increments of energy.
1
Strong hinted that the doctrine of transcendence required
some revision, on the monistic approach, ~ but he insisted
that the only sufficient antidote to pantheism is the Bibli-
cal doctrine of creation, grounded in the doctrine of divine
triunity :
the phrases ’before the world was,! ’before
the foundation of the world,’ imply that
the universe had a beginning, and the de-
claration that God and Christ were ’before
all things’ implies that ’things’ are not
a part of God or necessary to God. To make
God dependent upon his universe is to ig-
nore the Trinity, to deny that God is sove-
reign and self-sufficient, and to put the ~
finite world in place of the eternal Word .
The denial that man is part of God Strong opposed delib-
erately to the pantheistic compromise of the freedom of man:
the Ethical Monism... for which I contend,
is not deterministic monism; it is the
monism of free-will, the monism in which
personality, both human and divine, sin
and righteousness, God and the world, re-
main—two in one and one in two--with
their antagonisms as well as their ideal
unity
1. CCEM, 20.
2. CCEM, 17: f’Now we readily grant that the transcendence
of God does not imply God’s existence in space outside the
universe—that would be to imagine a second universe which
contained the first.”
3. CCEM, 27. Apparently the statement that nature is not a
part of God, in view of the insistence that ’’there is but
one substance—God" (CCEM, 45), is intended only to stress
divine transcendence and the possibility of more than one
manifestation of the same substance.
. CCEM, 27.4
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Determinism, Strong complained, obscures the need of atone-
ment because it blunts the sense of responsibility, and it
obscures the possibility of atonement because it blunts the
sense of freedom in man and God.^ Yet Strong stressed that
he did not regard ethical monism as "contravening any ar-
ticle of the Christian faith."
2
To the contrary, he felt
that it offered a viewpoint from which Christian doctrines
3
may be studied "more broadly, profoundly, and successfully."
For illustrative purposes he singled out immortality,^ di-
r Zl
vine sovereignty and human freedom ,
'
the person of Christ,
7prayer, miracle and prophecy, the problem of the resurrec-
1. CCEM, 25. "Sin and salvation are both lost sight of.
Neither the fall nor the guilt of the fall is any longer
intelligible; neither incarnation nor resurrection is any
longer credible" (CCEM, 26).
2. CCEM, 41. 3. CCEM, 42.
4. "If Christ be the principle and life of all things, then
the immortality and value of man’s soul are comprehensi-
ble" (CCEM, 42).
5. Divine sovereignty and human freedom lose their ancient
antagonism if the divine working-in-us is held in view
(CCEM, 42).
6. On the monistic approach, Christ "in taking our humanity
only limits himself by a special and permanent assumption
of that which was never foreign to him" (CCEM, 42).
7. "The efficacy of prayer is intelligible. .. since Christ,
who is with his people always... is the connecting link
between them and the whole physical and moral universe,
which he ’upholds by the word of his power’’’ (CCEM, 42).
6 , Miracle and prophecy are relieved of difficulties "when
we remember that nature is a manifestation of the mind
and will of Christ, and that it is as plastic in his
hand as is your thought to you, the thinker of it.
Jesus can ascend into heaven from the hillside at Beth-
any, and he can come again in the clouds so that every eye
in every part of the earth can see him; for hillside and
clouds and heavens are nothing but manifestations of him"
(CCEM, 43).
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1 2
tion, Christ as universal judge. Therefore Strong ap-
pealed to the example of the poet Browning, as including
both man and nature in a monistic view, and insisting on
an identity of the human spirit with God, and yet avoiding
3
an absolute identity. Likewise the theologian Corner,
while insisting that the divine and human are connected mag-
nitudes, is no pantheist.^ Not a monism which fails to con-
serve ethical interests, but only an ethical monism, which
’’maintains both the freedom of man and the transcendence of
5
God’’ finds Strong’s endorsement.
Tl "The problem of the resurrection can no longer stumble
us; all physical things are but the expression of his
mind and will; since he is the resurrection and the life,
all that are in the tombs can hear his voice; he can raise
both just and unjust, for body and spirit alike ’consist,’
or hold together, only ’in him’” (CCEM, 43).
2. Christ can be the judge of all ’’for he has been the sus-
tainer of all human life... the observer of every human
act and of every human thought •
»
.The reaction of the na-
tural laws of man’s being, administered as they are by
the Christ to whom all creatures and things are natural-
ly united, is itself ’the wrath of the Lamb’’’ (CCEM, 43).
3. CCEM, 16. Strong added that ’’Browning does not attempt
to explain how unity of substance between God and man is
consistent with freedom, sin, and guilt in the finite
creature. Yet he believes in these last as firmly as in
the first... In other words, the poet is a monist, but an
Ethical Monist; a believer that God and man are of one
substance; but a hater of pantheism, which denies God’s
transcendence and separate personality” (CCEM, 19).
Likewise the ’’higher pantheism” of Tennyson, affirmed
Strong, ”is not pantheism at all, for it recognizes the
great truths which pantheism denies, the separate person-
ality of both man and God, and God’s infinite exaltation
above the universe which only partially manifests him;
in other words, the higher pantheism rightly understood
is only Ethical Monism” (CCEM, 49). Possibly Strong was
already gathering material for his later volume on The
Theology of the Great Poets (1697).
4. CCEM, 20. 5. CCEM, 25.
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But why should any monistic theory whatever be con-
ceded? Strong granted that the new philosophy "must
approve itself to reason, conscience, Scripture, before
it has earned a right to supplant the old."'*' But demon-
stration, either mathematical or logical, is here out of
question; the only proof admitted by the nature of the
subject is inductive evidence of a simpler, more complete
explanation. The monistic philosophy
rests its claim to acceptance upon its ability
to solve the problems of nature, of the soul,
and of the Bible, more simply and completely
than the theory of dualism ever could. The
test of truth in a theory. ..is not that it
can be itself explained, but that it is
capable of explaining other things. 3
As in his initial article Strong had endeavored to
show that a Christian monism furnishes the best solution
of the interactions of the physical and the intellectual
universes, so now in the second article he sought to show
that it also best explains the facts of the moral universe.
Browning and Dorner had merely set monism and morals side
by side, Strong held, without showing the nexus, whereas
1. CCEM, 29.
2. Strong did not make plain what relationship the appeal
to coherence has to an appeal to revelation, although
he did not oppose the two. In this same essay he
volunteered: "If it can be proved that the Scriptures,
either directly or by implication, teach the opposite
doctrine, I shall be the first to confess the vanity of
my reasoning and to return to the common view. But
prolonged examination of the Bible leads me to believe
that monian is itself the Scripture doctrine, impli-
citly if not explicitly taught, not only by John and by
Paul, and I therefore provisionally accept it" (CCEM, 47).
3. CCEM, 29-30.
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a monistic view does not preclude a realistic view of
sin. For Christ
is of the substance of God, yet he possesses
a distinct personality. If in the one sub-
stance of God there are three infinite per-
sonalities, why may there not be in that
same substance multitudinous finite per-
sonalities? No believer i n the Trinity can
consistently deny the possibility of this.-*-
The test of this doctrine, Strong confessed, ,fmust be its
ability to explain the fact of sin.’’ 2 To the question,
how can the substance of God ever become morally evil?,
he replied:
it was not morally evil at first. God has
limited and circumscribed himself in giving
life to finite personalities within the
bounds of his own being, and it is not the
fact of sin that constitutes the primary
difficulty, but the fact of finite persona-
lity . When God breathed into man’s nostrils
the breath of his own life, he communicated
freedom, and made possible the creature’s
self-chosen alientation from himself, the
giver of that life. While man could never
break the natural bond which united him to
God, he could break the spiritual bond, and
could introduce even into the life of God a
principle of discord and evil„3
Thus creation affords each intelligent and moral agent the
power to isolate himself from God spiritually, though he
is naturally joined to God. This divine permission of the
sin of finite creatures is God’s ineffable act of self-
limitation.^ But the explanation of this permission is
likewise found in Christ, for the decrees of redemption
2. CCEM, 33.1. CCEM, 30.
4. CCEM, 34.
3. CCEM, 33.
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and apostasy are equally old, so that God ordained both
sin atonement and a way 6f escape from sin.^
But the new view, that the ceaseless energy of the
physical universe actively manifests God, seemed to require
also a new statement of the doctrine of atonement, for the
once-for-all events must now find less disjunction with the
general divine activity than in the traditional theology.
Therefore Strong formulated "what has not been clearly per-
ceived in theology hitherto, that Christ’s atonement is not
made merely when he becomes incarnate and dies upon the
cross. TT^ The outward, visible union with humanity involved
in his sacrificial death
is only the culmination and manifestation
of a previous union with humanity which
was constituted by creation, and which,
from the moment of man’s first sin,
brought suffering to the Son of God.^
He was both able and obligated to bear man’s penalty. He
’’could pay man's penalty, because he constituted the essence
of man’s nature.”^ Humanity is so bound to Christ that the
whole organism must suffer together. From the very begin-
ning of man’s existence, Christ has been in natural union
with humanity, and the whole must suffer in the self-inflict-
ed injury of the part.^
The sin of finite creatures must be visited with penalty
1. CCEM, 34. 2. CCEM, 34. 3. CCEM, 34.
4. CCEM, 41.
5. Bowne, too, developed the demand for an economy of grace
from the form and nature of human development, and later
affirmed that ”God is bound to be the great Burden-bearer
of our world because of his relations to men” (SIC, 144).
But in Bowne’ s thought, the atonement as a fact of exper-
ience and life supplanted entirely any substitutionary
development of the doctrine along the lines of propitia-
tion.
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by a holy God . 1 Since God is the very life of humanity,
He must ’’take upon his own heart the burden of shame and
2
penalty that belong to his members. ” Strong quoted appro-
vingly a statement from D. W. Simon:
if the Logos is generally the Mediator
of the divine immanence in creation,
especially in man; if men are differen-
tiations of the effluent divine energy;
and if the Logos is the immanent con-
trolling principle of all differentia-
tion
—
i .
e
. ,
the principle of all form,
—
must not the self-perversion of these
human differentiations react on him who
is their constitutive principle?^
R, W. Dale likewise, Strong emphasized, held Christ respon-
sible for human sin because he is naturally one with man-
kind, as the upholder and life of all. The necessity for
the atonement is thus grounded in the creatorial relation-
ship of Christ to humanity. TTAs God’s righteousness compels
him to inflict punishment, so Christ’s union with all men
by creation compels him to bear it,”^ explained Strong.
Consequently, there is nothing arbitrary about the in-
nocent’s suffering penalty for the guilty, for the process
is simply natural law and actual fact:
1. CCEM, 35 • Hence Strong rejected Horace Bushnell’s view
that Christ suffers in and with his creatures out of mere-
ly sympathetic love. ’’The real reason and ground of suf-
fering in God’s moral antagonism to unrighteousness,”
wrote Strong, is that He is the very life of humanity
(CCEM, 35).
2. CCEM, 35.
3. D. W. Simon, The Redemption of Man, 321 (quoted in CCEM,
35). 1
CCEM, 35-36. Strong enlisted Biblical passages in support
of his view: ” f It must needs be that Christ should suffer,’
for only thus could ’God himself be just and the iustifier
of him that hath faith in Jesus’” (CCEM, 3o).
4.
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i
it is impossible that he who is the
natural life of humanity should not
be responsible for the sin committed
by his" own members. It is impossible
that he should not suffer, that he
should not make reparation, that he
should not atone. 2
But the atonement is not a momentary event in history.
The incarnation and historical atonement are object-lessons
manifesting to sense what the pre-incarnate Logos has been
doing ever since man’s first sin. 2 They are only Tfthe out-
ward and temporal exhibition of an eternal fact in the being
of God, and of a suffering for sin endured by the pre-incar-
nate Son of God ever since the fall.”^ Patriarchs and pro-
phets were redeemed not so much by the retroactive effect of
a future atonement as by the present effect of an atonement
even then in progress. The cross reveals the heart of the
eternal, summing up and expressing Christ’s very being.
Although Christ began to endure the wrath of God against sin
from the very first moral disobedience of man, the histori-
cal atonement is the conquest of sin and death, so that by
it the satisfaction of justice culminates in redemption.
1. CCEM, 37.
2. CCEM, 36. Strong added: ’’Christ ... conducts the march of
human history.. .He is the author, the subject, the end of
the Old Testament revelation, and the New Testament is
simply his emerging from behind the scenes, where he has
been invisibly managing the drama of history, to take
visible part in the play, to become the leading actor in
it, and to bring it to its denouement . The curtain has
not fallen, and it will not fall until the end of the
world. But that appearance of the incarnate, crucified,
risen and ascending God has given us the key to human
history” (CCEM, 361.
3. CCEM, 37.
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The eternal atonement is not such a conquest. The histori-
cal atonement is not merely a manifestation, but is ’’the ob-
jectification of the eternal suffering love of God, and at
the same time the actual deliverance of our nature from sin
and death by Jesus Christ.”^
If Christ’s creatorial union with the race explains
both the necessity of his atonement and its foundation in
justice, it shows also how his redemptive work inures to the
benefit of humanity. It is not difficult to see how those
who become spiritually one with him partake of the justifi-
cation he provides. But his natural union with the race fur-
nishes also an explanation of the salvation of infants and
the mentally deficient, or those who never come to moral con-
sciousness in this life. For man’s natural and unconscious
union with Christ secures him the benefit of Christ’s redemp-
tion from hereditary and unconscious sin.^ The emphasis on
the natural union of Christ and humanity avoids the usual
evangelical emphasis that men are somehow out of Christ and
need to get into relation with Him, whereas rejection of
Christ is a refusal to remain one with him.^ The divine
image which humanity shares with Christ, who is the Logos or
divine Reason indwelling humanity and constituting the prin-
ciple of its being, is never wholly lost, yet it is ’’completely
I. CCEM, 38.
_
2. CCEM, 38.
3. CCEM, 38. ’’Every other doctrine of infant salvation,”
Strong wrote, ’’fails to meet the objection that guilt, is
taken away from none but those who are in (spiritual)
union with Christ” (CCEM, 38).
4. CCEM, 39, where Strong quotes Simon approvingly in this
connection.
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restored in sinners when the Spirit of Christ secures con-
trol of their wills and leads them to merge their life in
his .
This redemptive work of Christ is world-wide. While
peculiar communications of his truth were made to the Hebrew
nation,
all truth, whether made known by reason,
conscience, or tradition, is Christ T s
communication to mankind. Heathen re-
ligions, so far as they convict of sin
and lead to trust in God’s mercy, are
Christ’s revelation. Because ’all things
consist in him,’ the heathen come already
in contact with Christ, sin against light,
have a just probation, are without excuse,
need no further trial.
' In a resumd" of his monistic doctrine, here summarized,
Strong called attention to the following features: (1) There
is but one substance—God; (2) The only complete and perfect
expression of God is the eternal Word, known in his historic
manifestation as Christ; (3) The universe is Christ’s finite
3
and temporal manifestation of God; (4) Matter is Christ’s
self-limitation under the law of cause and effect; (5) Hu-
manity is Christ’s self-limitation under the law of free-
will, with its correlate, the possibility of sin; (6) The in
1. CCEM, 40. 2. CCEM, 40-41.
3. ’’The universe is not itself God—it is only the partial
unfolding of God’s wisdom and power, adapted to the com-
prehension of finite intelligences
,
” Strong pointed out.
”It has had a beginning— the world is temporal, while
the Word is eternal. All expression or manifestation of
the infinite and eternal Word under the forms of time
and space must be a self-limitation” (CCEM, 45).
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carnation and atonement are Christ’s self-limitation under
the law of grace; (7) God is triune, and is transcendent as
well as immanent (8) Evolution is the common divine method,
with room for supernatural incarnation, resurrection and re-
2generation; (9) There are no second causes in nature;
(10) Finite spirits are the only second causes, ^ for they
have freedom, yet are related to the personality of God "some-
what as the persons of the Trinity are related to the one
all-inclusive divine personality";^ (11) The union of Christ
with all men, by creation, involves him in responsibility for
their sin, even though he is absolutely holy; (12) This na-
tural union of all men with Christ provides a just ground for
the sufferings of the innocent in behalf of the guilty
TT "My doctrine maintains," Strong explained, "the transcen-
dence of God, though it regards transcendence as not nec-
essarily outsidedness in space, but rather inexhaustible-
ness of resource within" (CCEM, 45 )•
2. "The forces and laws of nature are the habits or generic
volitions of God," Strong affirmed (CCEM, 46).
3. Of finite persons, Strong declared: "Having freedom, they
do not reproduce in particular acts a generic volition of
God; they may set their wills in opposition to God. That
these finite spirits are circumscriptions of the divine
substance and have in them the divine life shows the in-
finite value of their being; but it also shows the dread-
fulness of their sin when they morally sunder themselves
from God, .. Christian or Ethical Monism, . .maintains the
reality and guilt of sin as well as the possibility and
reality of grace" (CCEM, 46).
4. CCEM, 45. The intent of this passage is to safeguard the
reality of both divine and human personalities as against
pantheism.
5. Strong did not explicitly state this point in his resume,
but it was assumed in the comment that: "The union of all
men with Christ, by creation, shows us how certain bene-
fits of his redemption, such as justification from heredi-
tary and unconscious sin, may inure to all, while justifi-
cation from conscious and personal sin may inure only to
those who become one with Christ by faith" (CCEM, 46).
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(13) Sin constitutes a moral revolt of such magnitude that
man’s natural union with Christ is consistent with the eter-
nal punishment of those who reject the spiritual union prof-
ferred by grace.
^
In the course of this same essay, Strong had developed
incidentally the differences between ethical monism and
idealism, a theme to which he recurred in the third article
of this series contributed to religious periodicals. For
that reason, it seems advantageous to treat this aspect of
his thought as a unit, while giving a summary of the third
essay, indicating, of course, the precise source of the var-
ious emphases which Strong set forth in this connection.
mi "Ethical Monism Once More"
The third article in this series from Strong’s pen ap-
peared in The Examiner in October, 1895, and bore the cap-
o
tion, "Ethical Monism Once More."^
This essay appears to have been written in view of re-
actions to Strong’s previous articles, for he took note of
1. "That all men are naturally the offspring of God, and in
a subordinate sense partake of the divine nature in
Christ," wrote Strong, "no more proves the future annihi-
lation of all impenitent sinners or the future restoration
of all men, than it proves the present annihilation of
all sinners or the present restoration of all men. Eth-
ical Monism holds to one substance; but it also holds to
free-will, and the very dignity of man’s origin makes his
self-perversion the more awful. If he can resist God
here, he can resist him forever, and the very fact that
God breathed into man the breath of life may only result
in an immortality of misery to him who has devoted that
breath of life to the pursuit of evil" (CCEM, 46-47).
2. This appeared in three parts in the October 17, 24, 31,
1895 issues of The Examiner (Vol. 73, Nos. 42, 43, 44).
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C t
"the candid and generous treatment" accorded his essays,
and at the same time protested that he had been "somewhat
misunderstood. Consequently, this further effort was in-
tended "to remove misapprehension, while at the same time
2
applying the new principle in one or two new directions.'
1
''
The criticisms of Strong’s position which arose from a clear
understanding of his view's may be postponed, with good effect,
to the next chapter of this dissertation, but such disagree-
ments as i derive from a misunderstanding of Strong’s posi-
tion, in so far as they provoked him to a fuller statement
of it, will be dealt with at once.
Strong emphasized in this article that ethical monism
is "dualistic monism"^ and that dualism "is a permanent and
fundamental truth"^ and "the more practical, the more valu-
able"^ term. Two sorts of dualism Strong willingly accepted:
£
the dualism of matter and mind and the dualism of man and
7God. These two, since both postulate a soul distinct from
1. CCEM
,
52.
2. CCEM, 52. The "new directions" are the implications of
ethical monism for evolution and for atonement.
3. CCEM, 53. 4. CCEM, 53.
5. CCEM, 53. "Whatever else we may be... we must be dualists:
through and through, and we must never give up our dualism,
because dualism is not only the necessary condition of
ethics, but is also inseparably bound up with many, if not
all, of those great truths which constitute the essence
of the Christian scheme" (CCEM, 53).
6. CCEM, 53. "Matter and mind are two and not one; mind is
not matter, matter is not mind; the two are inconvertible"
(CCEM, 53).
7. CCEM, 53. - "God and man are two and not one; man is not
God and God is not man; the two are personally differen-
tiated from each other" (CCEM, 53-54).
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matter on one hand and God on the other, "are only aspects
of one truth, and I name that, truth psychological dualism."'*'
In an effort to distinguish his view from idealism,
Strong here developed the remarks in his previous essay, to
stress the inconvertibility of matter and mind. In the
third, as in the second essay, he insisted that
although idealism is not the whole truth,
it is a part of the truth, and it has
given us‘ a far better conception of mat-
ter than. .. (that ) of a self-subsistent
yet dead somewhat, outside of God. Mat-
. ter is not dead but living; it is soirit-
ual, in the sense of being the manifesta-
tion of spirit. • .Nature is the manifesta-
tion of God under the law of cause and ef-
fect2 .. .Matter is but the projection or
continuation of God’s regular and auto-
matic activity.-'1
This emphasis is contained also in the prior essay,
but at the same time, there as here, Strong proceeded to dif-
ferentiate his position from idealism in various forms. Dis-
avowing any intention "to favor idealism any more... than ma-
terialism,"^" he insisted that the universe is not merely
ideational, but is also of the nature of will, objectified
in terms of force. Both Berkeley and Hegel are disowned,
Berkeley because he denied substantial^ existence to the
1. GCEM, 54. 2. CGEM
,
55. 3. CCEM, 57.
4. CCEM, 28.
5. Strong’s insistence on a dualism of mind and matter, then,
was not in the interest of a non-mental view of matter,
but rather of an insistence that matter, although a mani-
festation of the divine ideas externalized by an act of
will, has substantial reality of a sort. Personalistic
idealism today has abandoned a substance philosophy.
Bowne’s rupture with a substance philosophy is attested
by his affirmation that "substance is a myth"; he repu-
diated "the substratum-notion as the product of sense-
bondage" (MSFP, 375). But in formulating the doctrine
of the soul, Bowne fluctuated still between a self-psy-
chology and a substance-psychology, declaring that the
soul is transcendent to all consciousness (M, 3&0).
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physical universe as distinct from spirits ,
1 Hegel because
he "identified being with thought, and held that thought
thinks ." 2 Strong preferred to say:
being has
,
not is
,
thought and volition;
and will may , not must, initiate a finite
universe of which extension is an attri-
bute. The universe is not necessary, but
free; it is the manifestation of an infin-
ite mind and will; it may be traced back
to a beginning; creation is a conception
not only scientific, but indispensable;
development, or evolution, is the product
of free intelligence.^
This insistence that ethical monism is "neither idealistic
nor materialistic" is found also in the third essay. While
matter is not inert stuff, but is spiritual, yet "it is not
simply the thought of God’s reason, but the product of his
will.
Materialistic idealism improved upon the
old materialism by holding that the uni-
verse consisted of force and of ideas; but
we perceive that ideas can only belong to ~
mind and force can be exerted only by will.
1. CCEM, 28: "Berkeley held that the physical universe ex-
ists only ideally; it consists of the ideas of God, made
permanent and visible by the divine will; only spirits--
the human spirit and the divine spirit—nave substantial
existence. But the modern doctrine of evolution renders
this idealism no longer tenable. The rock, the vegetable,
the brute, all shade into one another by imperceptible
gradations, and even man is acknowledged to have developed
from lower orders of being... We cannot draw the line that
Berkeley drew, between man and the brute... And since we
cannot deny that man is spirit, and has substantial exist-
ence. we must affirm that' nature is spirit, and has sub-
stantial existence also."
2. Strong commented: "Spinoza was nearer right when he called
both thought and extension opposite manifestations of being
or substance. But Spinoza was wrong in putting extension
on the same level with thought, and regarding it as equal-
ly primary and necessary. Both Hegel and Spinoza ignored
the element of will, and denied freedom. Hegel recognized
development, while Spinoza had no place for it in his sys-
tem" (CCEM, 31).
3. CCEM, 32. 4 . CCEM, 55.
5. CCEM, 08 . Pantheism agrees on this point, Strong con-
ceded, but "declares that the universe is simply immanent
p
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transcendent mind and will" (CCEM, 66).
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Matter is known to us only as force, and force is produced
by will . 1 The effects we call nature "we are compelled to
2
attribute to some producing agency analogous to our own"'
and no designation for this agency is "so simple or intel-
ligible as the will of God ."1 But the divine ideas, exter-
nalized by an act of will and constituting the space-time
universe, do not exhaust God’s thought or power, nor is the
universe co-eternal with God.^
The dualism of matter and mind is thus justified by an
appeal to the element of force, requiring the divine will,
and constituting at the same time the spiritual substan-
tiality of matter, as against a purely logical notion. But
Strong no sooner insisted upon this dualistic statement,
than he stressed with equal vigor that the dualism does not
IV CCEM
,
69 .
2 . CCEM, 69. "It does not matter that my volition is not it-
self physical force; it is enough that it is a cause. If
physical forces are causes, then I must believe that they
too are essentially exertions of will, and since they are
not exertions of my will, I must call them exertions of
the will of God" (CCEM, 69).
3 . This mode of argument indicates that Strong readily shift-
ed his theology from a revelational to an experiential base,
arguing for a transcendent God not on the basis of special
revelation, but on philosophical grounds.
4 . "Pantheism recognizes the immanence of God, but there it
stops; since it sees in God no freedom and no reserves of
power, transcendence is inconceivable and impossible,"
Strong protested. "Pantheism shuts up God in the uni-
verse; nay, the universe is his everlasting prison; for
the reason of God from eternity past has worked and could
work in no other than this dynamic way. Matter is eter-
nal, and has no more had a beginning than God himself.
It is identical with God, for matter is no more the ex-
pression of God than God is the expression of matter.
Now against this doctrine that the universe is as great
as God, as eternal as God. dualistic monism utters its con-
tinual protest" (CCEM, 63).
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preclude a more elemental monism. But, since this monism
was invoked as basic to both the dualism of matter and mind,
and also the dualism of human and divine personality, it
will be best, before examining the monistic element, to
bring into view the second kind of dualism which Strong cham-
pioned.
This second type of dualism was, as Strong made clear
also in his earlier essays, that of infinite and finite per-
sons. As against pantheism, which affirms either that God
has personality in a manner that makes human personality de-
lusive, or that man has personality in which God alone comes
to consciousness, ethical monism declared for the "separate
personality of man and the absolute transcendence of God."^
But the two sorts of dualism, of matter and mind and
of man and God, aspects of what may be termed psychological
dualism, are nonetheless "perfectly consistent with philoso-
phical or metaphysical monism."^ Such dualism and monism
are not contradictory, for they are asserted in different
respects; monism affirms that the dualistic realities of
matter and mind, man and God, "have underground connections
and a common life, because all things, humanity included,
live, move, and have their being in God."^
The duality of matter and mind is not absolute and un-
qualified, else all interrelation and interaction between
XT CCEM, 60-61. Pantheism is monism "coupled with two de-
nials: the denial of man’s separate personality and of
God’s transcendence, "• Strong wrote (CCEM, 6l).
2. CCEM, 54. 3. CCEM, 54.
..
,
C
-
<
’
’
• •
!
. ;
-
” v
'
. * • r-.i op.Lb
\
-
'
- c
c
^
L
"
. Ot
r
j '
'
-
,
.
"•
: l
!
c
"
t
w J ' .
:
j-
t
'
‘
1 C
<
. b< l • JXi • t ' t
-
' (
-s , Id-Od t ml
‘
< <
,;
.
'*
t
.,v;
<
213
them would be impossible; without a monistic reference, the
relation of the two is an insoluble mystery. ^ That matter
and mind are inconvertible does not disprove monism, for
their interaction proves that the two have Tta common ground
o
and principle of being." That God has decreed "that mind
and matter, the two manifestations of himself which consti-
tute the universe, should be eternally inconvertible," is no
disproof of monism but is a link in proving the contrary.
^
The opposition to monism grows out of an "antiquated concep-
tion" of matter which is made "the touchstone of a true phi-
losophy."^" That view
regards matter as a dead somewhat, out-
side of God, while mind is a living some-
what. outside of God, and then it wonders
how the two get on so well together. Let
these absolute dualists reflect for a mo-
ment that no dead thing can be a cause,
and that no finite living thing can come
into communication with that which is
around it, except as that communication
1. C GEM
,
54.
2. CCEM, 55 • Strong added: "The very fact that matter and
mind are inconvertible makes their interaction utterly in-
conceivable and impossible, unless they exist in a uni-
tary Being who is not only their author, but who furnish-
es the constant bond of connection between them" (CCEM,
55).
3. As soon as matter and mind are understood to be manifesta-
tions of God, explained Strong, we dispose of "the notion
that their inconvertibility is inconsistent with monism"
(CCEM, 5o).
4. CCEM. 55. The contrast between Strong and Bowne at this
point will be clear if it is remembered that Bowne insist-
ed that "a thing is to be viewed as real and substantial
not because it has a kernel of substance in itself, but
because it is able to assert itself in activitv. Things
do not have being or suhstance, but they act, and by vir-
tue of this activity they acquire the right to be consid-
ered as existing" (M3FP, 375;. Strong, however, appears
to have insisted that the reality of the physical universe
is substantial ( in addition to its status as divine idea
volitionally externalized)
,
and then to have denied that
activity constitutes the substantiality of things, yet
rejected a realistic view. Idealism he then critized
from a movable perspective--sometimes for not doing jus-
tice to the volitional manifestation of certain divine
ideas in creation, and again (as in the criticism of Ber-
keley) for including both ideational and volitional ele-
ments but not doing justice to the spiritual substan-
tiality of the universe (which is not more carefully de-
fined) .
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is mediated by a common intelligence
and life.
Nor will it do to hold that the universe is explicable by
the merely external divine governance and control, as "if
o
God made this a universe by simply watching over it."
The old materialistic and deistic explanations have been
rendered untenable by modern philosophy, which has made the
issue plain; either the bond between God and the universe
must be closer, or we cannot believe logically in a universe
3
or in God.
Nor is the duality of human and divine personality ab-
solute. While God’s personality and man’s personality "stand
over against each other, so that there is always the possi-
bility of communion on the one hand and of antagonism on the
other, yet both consciousness and conscience witness that
"we are bound to one another and to God by the ties of a
common mental and moral life."' All humanity shares a com-
mon light, which is the heritage of the race, and does not
belong to the individual alone:
1. CCEM, 55 • Strong did not hesitate to develop, in his
second essay, "Ethical Monism," the implication that since
Christ is the all-including consciousness, "our very bod-
ies are manifestations of his thought and purpose. Christ
dwells naturally' in every man’s physical frame, and in
sinning against our own bodies we are actually crucifying
Christ and putting him to an open shame" (CCEM, 32).
Earlier in the same essay he stated: "If matter, more-
over, be merely the expression of spirit, then the body,
as an object of consciousness, may well be only the re-
verse side of what we call the consciousness of the object.
Since the all-including consciousness is that of Christ,
our very bodies may be manifestations of the thought and
purpose of Christ" (CCEM, 31).
2. CCEM, 66. 3. CCEM, 66. 4. CCEM, 56.
5. CCEM, 53.
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the higher reason, the perception of
beauty, the moral ideals of mankind,
have a universal character, and are not
products of the single soul. There is
a light that lighteth every man, and
that light is none other than Christ,
the light of the world. We have a na-
tural, intellectual, and moral union
with him in whom all things, including
humanity, were created and in whom all
things consist.
The opposition to monism leaves the interaction of mind and
mind unexplained, even as it was unable to explain physical
interaction. That many human wills are capable of inde-
pendent activity does not mean that they may not have "in God
the ground of their being. Strong appealed at this point,
as in his earlier essay, to the doctrine of the Trinity for
"a hint of the possible solution" of how the insistence on
monism as to substance could be combined with an insistence
on dualism as to personality.^
1. CCEM, 60.
2. "The influence of one finite intelligence upon another fi-
nite intelligence presupposes the existence and cooperation
of an infinite Intelligence in which all finite intelligenc-
es have their being. And what are conscience and Scripture
but means by which this same Intelligence lifts us up but
of the region of our pettiness and isolation into the re-
gion of his universal and eternal truth?" (CCEM, 60).
3. CCEM, 61 .
4. "In the one divine substance there are three consciousness-
es and three wills, or in other words, three persons. And
yet we do not conceive of the Godhead as divided into three
parts. The whole of the divine essence resides in the Son
and in the Holy Spirit just as fully as it resides in the
Father. There is* an abstract possibility of severance be-
tween the will of the Father and the will of the incarnate
son, and Christ says, ’Not my will but thine be done.’
My contention is that what was only abstractly possible in
the case of the Son of God has become an actuality in the
case of sinful men, and that the actual sin of men cannot
be regarded as incompatible with a Christian monism by any
who grant that Christ had an indeoendent will while yet he
was of the same substance as the Father. And yet I do not
regard the doctrine of the Trinitv as furnishing more than
a hint of the possibility of multitudinous finite person-
alities within the bounds of God’s being... I claim only
that in the Trinity we have plural self-consciousnesses,
though the essence of God is one; while in man’s single
nature we have consciousnesses and volitions that are not
only independent but abnormal" (CCEM, 62-63).
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Psychological dualism is compatible, therefore, urged
Strong, with the existence of but
one substance, one underlying reality,
the infinite and eternal Spirit of God,
who contains within his own being the ..
ground and principle of all other being.
The logical and vital relations characterizing the universe
are impossible apart from "a rational Spirit whose omnipres-
ence unifies what otherwise would be fragments” and which
is at the same time "an Intelligence and Will who orders
their ongoings" and "an infinite Life who constitutes the
pprinciple of their existence and the ground of their being.
Strong now disowned the view that metaphysical monism
involves the pantheistic notion that nature is a part of
God. In this regard, he urged two considerations: his cri-
tics misunderstood in a realistic sense his use of the word
"substance" and, further, he did not deny the transcendent
miraculous.
The universe is a manifestation of God, emphasized Strong,
but it is not God. All things, persons, nations, worlds, are
"only the partial, temporal, graded, finite unfoldings of a
Being infinitely greater than they."^ God infinitely trans-
cends any single thing in the universe, and the whole uni-
verse put together, although it finds its principle of ex-
istence and ground of being in Him.^ When it is urged that
God is the one substance, the term should receive its mean-
2. CCEM, 67.1. CCEM, 65
4. CCEM, 64
3. CCEM, 64.
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ing not from "the old and outworn Hamiltonian philosophy"
but should be given ’’the sense which it has acquired in
to interpret my word ’substance’ after
a materialistic fashion, as if I meant
that God occupied space and divided him-
self up into parts, carving man and na-
ture out of his own physical being, i-s
to attribute to me a view against which
my whole scheme of thought is a protest.
The infinite One does not consist of
parts, nor are finite and material things
parts of the infinite One. As my voli-
tions are manifestations of my mind, but
are not parts of my mind, so the works of
but are
Strong, therefore, resisted any suggestion that the uni-
verse is a part of God, and expressed constant disapproval
of the use of such terminology. The universe represents
certain of the divine ideas objectified by the divine will,
but the whole-part conception is less true to the relation-
ship of nature and God than is the substance-manifestation
concept.
It is well to note that just as Strong’s statement of
the substantiality of the physical universe appears ambiva-
lent, so too, his account of the relationship of finite
selves to God is not wholly clear. As he distinguished
mind from matter, only to resolve the distinction in terms
of spiritual substantiality (without making clear what, if
anything, is involved in such substantiality, beyond the
Lotze and the modern idealists."1 Strong urged:
1. CCEM, 64 2. CCEM, 64-65
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externalization of certain divine ideas by an act of will),
so he distinguished finite created selves from the Creator
in the interest of human freedom and moral responsibility,
only to insist not only upon a common rationality and moral-
ity, but upon a common life and natural union. At this
point Strong appears, whatever his intentions, to have com-
promised the psychological dualism upon which he insisted.
Whereas contemporary statements of personalistic idealism
insist here upon a qualitative pluralism, Strong drew back
from pluralistic to more monistic ground.'*' It is signifi-
cant* that Strong appealed not to Bowne, but rather to Ladd,
at this juncture of his thought, quoting the Yale philoso-
pher as follows:
Dualism is not the final word, not the ul-
timate solution of the problem of body and
mind, or of nature at large in their com-
plex relations to each other. Nature and
body and mind cannot be left by the mind
itself in this condition of separateness#..
This dualism# . .must undoubtedly be dis-
solved in some ultimate monistic solution.
1. The deterministic factor here seems to be the stress as-
signed by a thinker to the unity of the universe. Not
only Josiah Royce and F. H. Bradley, who stood in the
absolutistic tradition, but Lotze, who maintained that
selves are outside of God, gave central emphasis to the
unity, whereas Bowne stated more emphatically the rela-
tion of the causality of the One and the many. Strong
is concerned to deny that the many have any proper exis-
tence in themselves, and yet to deny that they are modes
of the One (against Spinoza, Bradley, Royce). Lotze
held that the One and the many selves are ontologically
distinct yet coordinated, along the lines of organic
pluralism; Strong shared this insistence on the indepen-
dence of selves, but within a more fundamental insis-
tence on monism.
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The Being of the world, of which all par-
ticular beings are but parts, must then
be so conceived of as that in it can be
found the one ground of all inter-related
existences and activities.
In the Immediate context, however, Strong singled out Lotze
as providing the incentive for the recent statements of
dualistic monism, and suggested that Ladd’s view was in
essential harmony with the German thinker’s philosophy.
But the pluralistic turn found in Lotze
,
and developed by
Bowne, appears to have been missed in the return from psy-
chological dualism to a basic monism. The identification
of humanity, no less than of the physical universe, as a
finite, graded manifestation of God, would appear to take
back much of the pluralistic emphasis. 2 Despite this,
however, Strong left no doubt that human freedom and moral
responsibility were not in any way to be compromised.
In applying monism to the regularity of nature, Strong
emphasized further that he believed in a divine transcendence
which does not preclude the benevolent miraculous, and there-
fore did not hold a pantheistic view of the physical universe.
The laws of nature are, indeed, the habitual methods by which
Christ manifests himself, 3 and what we call second causes
1. dCELl
,
57. The source of the quotation from Ladd is not
given.
2. Some contemporary personalistic idealists identify nature
as a part of G0d, while insisting upon a radical pluralism;
Brightman is the outstanding example. Strong denied that
nature, as well as that man, is a part of God, but identi-
fied both the physical universe and humanity as finite,
graded manifestations of God.
.
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are but "secondary workings of the great First Cause.
Evolution from lower to higher is the rule of this habitual
method.^ But this does not preclude the miraculous:
There are two methods in the exercise
of his will: first, the absolute,
unique, initiatory method; secondly,
the relative, regular, automatic method.
Strong affirmed belief in a God who is in the evolutionary
process, and manifests himself through it, and who is none-
theless unexhausted by the process, and reinforces it at
times in a miraculous manner, contrary to Darwinianism and
materialistic evolution.^" But miracle, he emphasized, is
"no more than divine than is law, and the ordinary opera-
tions of nature are workings of God just as much as is the
raising of the dead."^ In view of this, Strong urged that
1. CCEM, 71. "It is a great gain to religion," Strong com-
mented, "to learn that second causes are but secondary
workings of the great First Cause. Ethical Monism finds
this Cause in Christ—it is he alone who makes this a uni-
verse" (CCEM, 73).
2. "The transcendent God is working through Christ in the
whole creation and revealing himself according to an ever-
unfolding plan. Creation is just as much his act as it
was before, but it is creation from within
,
if I may use
a spatial term of that which has no relation to space.
Why can we not believe in a God who creates from within
as well as in a God who creates only from without?"
(CCEM, 71).
3. CCEM, 70. "God’s habitual actions. . .are not a bar to
unique and exceptional action. As nature was due in the
beginning to an act of absolute origination, so the God
who originated nature is not shut up to nature; he can
transcend nature; he can substitute new beginnings for
old regularities; he can transcend nature by miracle, and
law by grace. Incarnation and resurrection are perfectly
possible and credible, if we once grant that God’s will
is capable of a two-fold activity analogous to our own"
(CCEM, 70).
4. CCEM, 71. 5. CCEM, 71.
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the so-called discontinuities in history and nature be
viewed divine activities from within, rather than from with-
out, though nonetheless miraculous:
Let us look upon the breaks in the or-
derly progress of the world, such as the
introduction of vegetable life, of ani-
mal life, of man, of Christ, together
with conversions like that of Paul, and
reformations like that of Luther, simply
as movements of the Spirit of God from
within.
1
In this ntanner, God’s transcendence is still insisted upon,
but it is viewed as '’inexhaustibleness of resource rather
than as mere outsidedness in space," even though the suc-
cessive creative acts are interpreted from the standpoint of
divine immanence.
It is clear that in Strong’s application of monism to
evolution, there is frequent appeal to the regular as fur-
nishing a clue to the interpretation of the novel. The prin-
ciple of evolution sheds light on the development of the
race in its renewal by divine grace, no less than in its
apostasy. "The regularities of natural law are teaching us
something of the solemn uniformity of moral lav;," Strong
1. CCEM, 71-72.
2. CCEM, 72. Strong affirmed: "I do not deny creation;
I believe in it with all my heart. The world has had a
beginning, and it is the work of God’s sovereign power
in Christ. But I no longer conceive of the successive
acts of creation as the bringing into being out of noth-
ing of new substances that are outside of and different
from God. I believe in creation, but I have a new con-
ception of the method of creation. I interpret it from
the point of view of God’s immanence, and I regard tran-
scendence as inexhaustibleness of resource rather than
as mere outsidedness in space" (CCEM, 72).
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explained. The overall plan required by the heightened
irnmanentism removes a radical discontinuity between man and
the animals;^ if the divine element in man is recognized,
a divine element may also be discerned in the brute beasts.
"The animal nature in man is a good thing,” Strong affirmed,
/ -
and ”it becomes evil only when it rebels against the higher
nature and subjects that higher nature to its control.
Strong insisted, however, that he accepted ethical
monism not ”for the sake of its Christian explanation of
evolution” but rather "because of the light which it throws
upon the atonement.”^" For it provided an answer to the ques-
tion, how Christ could justly bear the sins of mankind, which
was at the same time an alternative to the theory of ”an
external and mechanical transfer of guilt” in view of the
emphasis on a natural union of Christ and humanity which
XT "Darwin acknowledged that natural selection might lead down<
ward as well as upward, and so we have human history wit-
nessing to a gradual deterioration of early religions and
and of early morality. Huxley declared that the moral and
religious development of the race requires the bringing in
of principles that antagonize and reverse its natural ten-
dencies, and this is precisely what is made known by reve-
lation as the method of Christ. The law of the Spirit of
life in Christ Jesus frees us from tire law of sin and death,
and a new and holy evolution begins, the power and prin-
ciple of which is the Son of God. Why should we regret
the publication and acceptance of the doctrine of evolu-
tion, if it reveals to us the method of Christ’s working
both in nature and in grace?” (CCEM, 74).
2. CCEM, 77. "It is no more beneath God’s dignity thus to
manifest himself in nature and in the brute than it was on
the old theory for him to create nature and the brute. In
fact the difference between the old theory and the new is
not a difference in facts, but a difference in the inter-
pretation of the facts” (CCEM, 73).
3. CCEM, 77. 4. CCEM, 73.
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obligated him v to make atonement.'1' Strong did not add any-
thing new, in this application of monism to the atonement,
) " O
to his expressions in the previous essays, in which he
had already insisted that the historical atonement was the
reflection of a super-historical divine suffering, although
Strong concluded this third essay with a discussion of the
objections which had been offered to his explanation of the
atonement. It will avoid unnecessary duplication, however,
to postpone consideration of these objections in the subse-
quent chapter, devoted to the evaluation of Strong 1 s monism.
The emphases of Strong 1 s third article may be summar-
ized as ‘follows: (1) essential to the Christian view is a
psychological dualism which insists on the inconvertibility
of (a) mind and matter, and (b) divine and human personality;
{2) matter, while spiritual, is not reducible to idea,
but to the divine thought externalized by an act of will;
(3) created human persons stand over against divine person-
ality: with the capacity for fellowship or for moral revolt;
1. CCEM, 7$: "It was a great day for me when I first saw
that there was a natural union of Christ with all men
which preceded the fncarnation--that all men in fact were
created and had their being in him, and that therefore he
who was the ground and principle of their life, though
personally pure, must bear their sins and iniquities.”
2. There, as here, Strong urged that "the incarnation and
suffering of the Son of God in history were only the mani-
festation and visible setting forth in time and space of
a great atonement by the Lamb who was slain from the foun-
dation of the world. It was through the eternal Spirit
that he offered himself without spot to God, and his his
torical suffering redeemed the race only because it was
the manifestation of an everlasting fact in the being of
God" (CCEM, 79).
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(4) psychological dualism does not preclude a more funda-
mental metaphysical monism, so that the infinite and eter-
nal Spirit of God is the substance of all things, which are
graded and finite manifestations; (5) the regularity of na-
ture, according to the method of evolution, is the habitual
volition of Christ, but this does not preclude special rein-
forcement, viewed as a novel activity within the process by
the transcendent (inexhaustible) God; (6) the regularity of
the process of nature furnishes illumination for the under-
standing of the process of grace; (7) the atonement by Christ
is just because it comes from him, although innocent, as
from one obligated to make it in view of his natural union
with humanity.
2. Address to the 1$95 Graduating Class
That Strong personally viewed ethical monism as some-
thing more than TTa series of guesses at truth" is seen from
his remarks to the 1S95 graduating class:
It is quite possible to confound our
present conceptions of the truth with
the truth itself, and to cherish an at-
titude of hostility to every new inter-
pretation and di scovery .
.
.1 counsel you
rather to bring forth things new as well
as oldo . .Without openness of mind you will
see little that is new, and when you do
see it you will be prejudiced against it.
You will regard all science and philosophy
and literature and art as anti-Christian,
and your narrowness will prevent the ac-
ceptance of Christianity by those whom
you would most desire to influence...
When the new challenges your attention I
would have you ask, not "What is there
here that I can contradict and oppose?"
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but rather "-..'hat is there here that I
can accept and utilize?" I would have
you ready tc recognize and welcome truth,
iron whatsoever source it cones.-
That Strong’s thoughts were motivated by his commitment to
the new -immanentism is clear from the references to Christ
as the ultimate principle of philosophy and science.
"Science, philosophy, and history. . .are themselves Christ’s
subordinate methods of teaching the world,"' he affirmed.
"Christ is larger than all our conceptions of him. He em-
braces in himself all the truth of nature as well as all the
truth of special revelation."^ Again,
he who limits his view of Christ to the
work of Christ incarnate, and refuses
to believe in him as the pre-incarnate
Logos, will necessarily be prejudiced
against a large portion of Christ’s
truth. He who sees Christ in redemption. .
.
but fails to recognise Christ in creation
...will be apt to shut the book of nature
because at some points it seems at first
sight hard to reconcile with the book of
Scripture^-. . .Evolution _is but the method
of the immanent Christ ~ .. .The world, with
its misery and sin, is larger to us than
it was to our fathers. But then we have
a larger view of Christ than they ever
had... John Calvin thought of nature and
history as under control of the Zvil One,
and to be delivered only at Christ’s sec-
ond coming, while we know that Christ is
now swaying the sceptre of universal em-
pire. c
One discerns here the implications for Strong’s theology of
the immanentistic emphasis, lodging the case for the divine
1. CCEK, 476-477. 2. CCEK, 477.
3. CCllI, 477-4?o. Strong refers also to "the occasional trains
of truth that are hidden in the chaff of heathen teaching"
(CCEM, 478).
4. CCEM, 476. 5. CCEK, 479. 6 . CCEM, 479-460.
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origin, support and goal of the universe not so much in
special revelation as in monistic metaphysics, which Strong
felt made rooni)at the same time for special revelation.
Strong’s remarks to the 1S95 graduates, however, were
mainly the reflection of a new note which had come to the
fore in his many public addresses, often given at strategic
Baptist occasions to which he was invited as the Rochester
president.^" Now in one direction and now in another, he
sought as opportunities presented, to outline the implications
of monism for evangelical theology. For this reason, the
chronological interest in his formulations must yield to the
broader effort to formulate the effect of monism on the whole
of systematic theology, which came to its fullest expression
a decade later with the final revision of Strong’s magnum
opus . Before that, however, the fifth edition and revision
of his 16B6 lectures made its appearance in 1396.^ In view
1. Strong’s address on "Christ and the Truth," delivered
November 15, 1$95» at the inauguration of B. L. Whitman,
D.D., as president of Columbian University, Washington,
D. C.. emphasized that "we cannot limit the teachings of
Christ to' Christendom. . .Even before Christ came in the flesh,
every ray of conscience or aspiration that ever illuminated
mankind proceeded from him.
.
.Special revelation brings us
in contact with the personal source of truth, and so opens
our eyes to see the living essence of truth... All truth in
physics, psychology, ethics, history, is a part of his re-
velation of God... No single truth is rightly understood
except in its relation to Christ" (CCEM, 104--105).
2. Referred to hereafter as ST(1$96). B. B. Warfield comment-
ed that "a particular interest attaches. . .to this new edi-
tion... from a surprising vote face which has been executed
by its author, in the interval between the issues of the
fourth and fifth editions, on one of the most fundamental
questions which can underlie a system of theology. We re-
fer to his adoption of the theory of the universe which he
calls ’ ethical monism, ’ as announced by him in a series of
articles in The Examiner.
. .Hitherto riot only had Dr. Strong
not betrayed any sympathy with a monistic conception of
things, but he had strongly opposed it, as well' in the ap-
propriate passages of his Systematic Theology as in a clear
and one would think conclusive article "entitled ’Modern
Idealism’ .printed in The Bibliotheca Sacra so late as Jan-
uary, 168B" (Warfield,' Rev. £189*71
,
357).
'll
•
•
.Cfl 33CS ‘TO ffliv
* <
. O CO J ' f.
. '.C*3 1 B : Dll:
-Yg V <: V C i-i'l -v
t
J ; li ; ©no
‘Mil o ©'iq
t
i. : j !3 'T .
'
. •
.. W
ct
'
i
r*
o : iT:
:
1
r.r:o
no.'
r
'X‘.)
'
I f.J»l - ' c.‘ "CO J ; • t
t
.
o'l^c;
r jtvr f : C ,
Vtf© ! i ©bain
<
$ri$ bj iB 1 ...
i
:tijc
le a Il9l
xesTa
,iiV9 'i iinom lo
OilCi 91 c lo
.
>&©'ibbc T
.
c <
v
’
'•* <
* *
; t
* •
. .
.
,
'
: i -
* •
1
«
.
' '
i i
...
'I'
'
.<
j • ; . t - 1 • - r ' 1 1 ;
1
?
: j
?-' :u v'lc* n , i 1 o
.
•
.
:
J
:
t
•
.
c ...
.
. ,
‘
lo Xi - '• ' c (*! 1 v _• 1 • • 11 !
t
•
;
1 •
'
'
'
,
- • v - v ’-1
r n e
of the fact that Strong T s Christ in Creation and Ethical Mo -
nism
,
which appeared in 1699, included not only the 1694 and
1695 articles contributed to The Examiner , but a number of
other essays and addresses in which, as we shall see, some
application of monism to cardinal problems of theology was
made, it is curious that the 1896 revision of Strong’s sys-
tematic theology lectures restricted the application of the
principle Ttto the explanation of the doctrines of Preserva-
tion and of the Atonement."^-
3. The 1696 Lectures
The preface to Strong’s fifth revised edition of his
• 1
theology lectures called attention to four instances
—
T,on
pages 51, 203, 203, and 413, where the principle of Ethical
Monism is adopted” —which mode of statement hardly discloses
the theological inversion involved in his new position.
The first of these references involved merely the list-
ing of ethical monism as the only satisfactory alternate to
1. 3T(1696), x. Between 1694 and 1696 Strong delivered the
following addresses, subsequently included in CGEM, deal-
ing somewhat with monism and theology: May 27, 1694,
’’The Love of Christ the Great Motive in Missions,” opening
presidential address at the 60th anniversary of the Ameri-
can Baptist Missionary Union, Saratoga, N. Y.
,
(CCEM, 264-
296); May 26, 1695, ’’The Holy Spirit the One and Only
Power in Missions," opening presidential address at the
6lst anniversary of the American Baptist Missionary Union,
Saratoga, N. Y.
,
(CCEM, 297-313); November 15, 1695,
"Christ and the Truth," address at the inauguration of
B. L. Whitman, D. D., as president of Columbian Universi-
ty, Washington, D. C. (CCEM, 102-112);
2. ST(1696), x.
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the attempts to explain the universe made by materialism,
materialistic idealism, and pantheism. Only a two-sentence
summary of the view was given,'1' with no detailed develop-
ment of the position. But the definition of materialism
was now revised in the interest of monism. Whereas, in for-
mer editions, it was explained that the element of truth in
materialism ,T is the reality of second causes” and that its
error n is in mistaking these second causes for first caus-
es, now Strong wrote that the truth in materialism is the
reality ,Tof the external world” and its error is in regard-
ing the external world "as having original and independent
existence, and in regarding mind as its product."^ Sentences
approving the ontology of monists like Herschel, Wallace and
Bowne appeared -^ in introducing quotations from their works,
and replaced the refutation of monistic views which had ap-
peared in the fourth edition.
1. Strong explained that according to this view, the universe
is a "finite, partial, graded manifestation of the divine
Life; Matter being God’s self-limitation under the law of
necessity, Humanity being God’s self-limitation under the
law of freedom, Incarnation and Atonement being God’s self-
limitations under the law of grace. Metaphysical Monism,
or the doctrine of one Substance, Principle, or Ground of
Being, is consistent with Psychological Dualism, or the
doctrine that the soul is personally distinct from matter
on the one hand and from God on the other" (ST ([1896], 51).
2. Class notes which were written in an inter-leaved copy of
ST (1896) a few years later, probably in 1901, show that
Strong supplemented the brief statements in the 1896 re-
vision with extensive comment along the line of the three
articles contributed to The Examiner (ST fl396]CN, 55).
3. LOT, 28. 4 . 3T(1896), 51. 5. ST(lB96), 55.
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Two of the remaining references were to minor changes
made in the treatment of the doctrine of preservation. The
first of these deals with the nature of so-called secondary-
causation, and the second with the relation of Strong’s view
to that of continuous creation.
Second causes in nature, Strong affirmed, may be regard-
ed as ’’only secondary, regular and automatic workings of the
great first cause."^ His argument takes the following form:
Form implies a will which, directly or indirectly, it ex-
presses. We know of force only through exercising our own
wills. Since we have direct knowledge only of will as a
causal agency, the causes of nature may be traced only to
2
the divine will. The circumstances that our will is often
powerless does not deny that force is to be identified with
will, but only that it cannot be identified with human will;
in God, will and force are one.
In developing the doctrine of preservation, Strong ac-
cepted the view, rejected by him in the earlier editions,
that the forces of the universe and the will of God are to
1." ST (1696)
,
203.
2. ST (1896), 203, where Strong referred to Herschel, Murphy,
the Duke of Argyll, Wallace, Bowen and Martineau for mo-
dern theories identifying force with divine will.
3. Strong deliberately placed his view over against that of
Hodge, the Princeton theologian, who wrote: "Because we
get our own idea of force from mind, it does not follow
that mind is the only force. That mind is a cause is no
proof that electricity may not be a cause. If matter is
force and nothing but force, then matter is nothing, and
the external world is simply God. In spite of such argu-
ment, men will believe that the external world is a real-
ity—that matter is, and that it is the cause of the ef-
fects we attribute to its agency" (Hodge, ST, I, 596).
.:ii r 0 • •- - -i Ditfiioabrc
.j
.
• 0- fjb 1.
r. '
,
.
f
, a*i ;!c 'io xio/c^Blst »'J •;
’K'J’se'i.t 9i-3 nJt £
<
iSJJBO
.
t ,
%
'
• J
Qd^.'lrie bi-nsU scf vjsh s ll'-j 1 n 7.9 8 • "o jfk; t x~ r,! '
.
tisx .
:
" : > LI r ' o* IJ- " > doi; £:
•'
c 1
:
.
'
{
-o£ gno'idS t rrcioiY'i9 .••••..* lo snlTtfoob siitf ^niqolsvsb nl
•
•'
'
: c
v i ijjqco
ocJ 9iB bof *io * li'W f ritf bus 68*I9V l.au trfo 890*10 0 ^
, ;
.
. .
•• 7 < . <
•
: < <
'
-
'
*
’
1 1
' i <
;
.
.
’
•
'
% ,
-
t I ,
230
be identified, although divine transcendence is not denied.^
Preservation requires a God who is beyond nature as well
as in nature. It steers a middle course between the error
of continuous creation, which denies that "the Substances of
the universe have a real existence and a relative indepen-
dence,"^ and the error of deism, which denies that "these
substances retain their being and their powers only as they
are upheld by God."^ Nature, like the human will, both has
its being in God and yet is at the same time independent in
its dependence.^ Strong pointed out that Jonathan Edwards
held to God as the only cause of all natural effects, but
combined this with belief in continuous creation. "The ele-
ment of truth" in the latter doctrine, Strong remarked,
is its assumption that all force is will.
Its error is in maintaining that all force
is divine will, and divine will in direct
exercise. But the human will is a force
as well as the divine will, and the forces
of nature are God’s secondary and automatic,
not his primary and immediate, workings.
5
Strong emphasized that we cannot see the dividing line be-
tween the action of the first cause and the action of second
causes, but "both are real, and each is distinct from the
I'. ST (1896), 204. 2. ST(1396), 204. 3. ST(lS96), 204.
4. "If God can disjoin from himself a certain portion of
force which we call man’s will, while yet that will is de-
pendent upon God for its continued existence, then God
can also disjoin from himself a certain inferior portion
of force which we call magnetism, while yet that magnetism
is dependent upon him for its continued existence. The
same principle which leads to the confounding of natural
forces with divine will would logically require the con-
founding of human will with divine will" (ST£l$96J, 204).
5. ST(1896), 205.
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other, though the method of God’s concurrence is inscruta-
ble. Tfl
The other revision made by Strong in this volume came
in the application of monism to the doctrine of atonement.
Here the statement of Christ’s creational union with humani-
ty as obliging him to make provision of atonement reflects
the tenor of The Examiner articles already considered:
If it be asked whether this is not simply
a suffering for his own sin, or rather
for his own share of the sin of the race,
we reply that his own share in the sin of
the race is not the sole reason why he
suffers; it furnishes only the subjective
reason and ground for the proper laying
upon him of the sin of all. Christ’s union
with the race in his incarnation is only
the outward and visible expression of a
prior union with the race which began when
he created the race. As ’in him were all
things created,’ and as ’in him all things
consist,’ or hold together (Col. 1:16, 17),
it follows that he who is the life of hu-
manity must, though personally pure, be in-
volved in responsibility for all human sin,
and ’it was necessary that the Christ
should suffer’ (Acts 17:3). This suffering
was an enduring of the reaction of the di-
vine holiness against sin and so was a bear-
ing of penalty (Is. 53:6; Gal. 3:13), but
it was also the voluntary execution of a
plan that antedated creation (Phil. 2:6, 7),
and Christ’s sacrifice in time showed what
had been in the heart of God from eter-
nity (Heb. 9:14; Rev. 13:3). 2
By this transition of thought, Strong discarded the pas-
sage found in the earlier edition of his theology lectures
1. 3T(1896), 207. The force of this is to deny that God’s
action in second causes supersedes these second causes,
possibly in such a way as to make room for supernatural
events which are irregular and of the nature of miracle.
2. ST(1S96)
,
413.
'.
.
o i' )lc89* ~xo eZiii iv t.:i£ t. ouo - rtv
.
;
-j
.
. -obi sr.j tfiv, .ir ini/ noiiq
< t :
.
3 c otf nc-
T
<
J l-.n n
k. nv/c
r '
•:
. /
c. ;»
f
1
-
_
< .
: •
’
:
~
j
’
.
OV 0 ::J Ocls 3 BV/ J’.'
'
•
'
-« 7« r\ - 7 » \ C"
:
.
*
• J si
? • bo bn^pes. r cy J
t
_ ^ r r, , r -t A r
3*3 Son qi/e COBUBO bflOOOE ill flCX{!0>j
.
-
a » i / r > nA
232
which found the ?,link of connection between Christ’s per-
sonal innocence and the bearing of the sins of the world"
in the doctrine of imputation, and substituted a view which
involved Christ in the guilt of the race. Strong declared
that this treatment is intended "to meet the chief modern
objection to the atonement,"^ that God is so just that he
must punish sin, and yet so unjust that he could punish it
in the person of the innocent.
Christ’s submission to John’s baptism was not alone a
consecration to death, Strong explained, but "also a recog-
nition and confession of his implication in that guilt of the
race for which death was the appointed and inevitable penal-
ty."-^ This guilt itself needed atonement. Through the re-
troactive efficiency of Christ’s atonement and upon the ground
of it, "human nature in him was purged of its depravity from
the moment that he took that nature,"^ so that Christ jus-
tified himself as well as others; upon the ground of His atone-
ment, believers before and after his advent were justified.
That Christ had guilt, however, did not involve him in deprav-
ity, for both in civil law and in the justification of the
IV ST (1896)
,
413.
2. As Greg had put it, in Creed of Christendom
, 243.
3. ST(l896), 416. "If it be asked whether Jesus, then, be-
fore his death, was an unjustified person, we answer that,
while personally pure and well-pleasing to God (Mat. 3:17),
he himself was conscious of a race-responsibility and a
race-guilt which must be atoned for...; and that guilty
human nature in him endured at the last the separation
from God which constitutes the essence of death, sin’s
penalty... As Christ was man, the penalty due to human
guilt belonged to him to bear; but, as he was God, he
could exhaust that penalty, and could be a proper sub-
stitute for others" (STfl896], 416).
4. ST(1896), 416.
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sinner the two are distinguished. Consequently, "Christ
takes guilt without depravity, in order that we may have de-
pravity without guilt." 1 Had Christ been born by ordinary
2generation, he would have had depravity and penalty as well.
But in his supernatural birth, the human nature which he as-
sumed was purged from its depravity, but this purging "did
not take away guilt, or penalty." 1
At this point, an unreconciled element appears in
Strong’s presentation. Whereas, in his application of monism
to the atonement, he held that Christ as the creator of hu-
manity was involved in a natural race guilt, and that in this
respect the atonement came in some respect as something due
from him, yet Strong—orobably in an effort to retain the
emphasis on the atonement as a provision of divine grace
—
emphasized still in this fifth revision that Christ "might
have declined to join himself to humanity, and then he need
not to have suffered."1" But in his articles in The Examiner
he had stressed that Christ suffered from the time of the
first human sin. Furthermore, although Strong had empha-
sized that even humanity in sin has its ground of being in
the Logos, yet here he affirmed that Christ "might have
sundered his connection with the race, and then he need not
1. ST (1896), 416. 2. ST (1896)
,
412.
3. ST
(
1696 ) , 416. 4. ST(1896), 412.
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have suffered . By the union with humanity in the incarna-
2
tion, Christ took upon himself the guilt of Adam’s sin,
which belongs, prior to personal transgression and apart
from inherited depravity, to every member of the human race
deriving his life from Adam. Christ can justly bear penalty,
because he inherits guilt which is not personal, but rather
the guilt of the common transgression of the race in Adam,
and so, being personally pure, he can vicariously bear the
penalty due to the sin of mankind.-^
What then are the emphases found in the 1696 theology
lectures, not already noted in connection with articles in
The Examiner ? For one thing, one is impressed with the fact
that, in applying monism to his systematic theology, the
changes were not much more sweeping. The circumstances con-
tributory to this, however, cannot now be reconstructed be-
1. ST
(
1896 ) , 412. The context here, however, makes it quite
clear that Strong wrote these words not from the viewpoint
of monism, but from the viewpoint of the incarnation as in^
volving a specific identification with the race, but that
he did not revise this in accord with his later views.
Whether the failure to revise was merely an oversight or,
as suggested above, a failure to work out the relation be-
tween an atonement viewed at the same time as in some
sense an obligation on his part and yet also an act of di-
vine grace, is uncertain. Strong added to the words quot-
ed: "But once born of the Virgin, once possessed of the
human nature that was under the curse, he was bound to
suffer. The whole mass and weight of God’s displeasure
fell on him, when once he became a member of the race"
(STfl8?6J, 412). On the following page, in the interest
of monism, Strong urged that Christ’s mcarnational union
with the race is only an outward, visible expression of
a prior creatorial union (STCl89c>3, 413).
2. The suggestion of the monistic view, elsewhere applied,
was that Christ assumed this guilt automatically, as the
Creator who is substantially one with humanity, at the
moment of the Fall.
3. ST(1S96), 412.
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yond question. Could it have been a matter of convenience,
so that the demand for a new edition of his theology was
so pressing that he felt it better to make minimal changes,
in the hope of adequate reconstruction at a later date?
Or were there still areas of Christian theology for which
the implications of monism were not yet fully apparent to
him? It will be seen that, in the final revision of his
theology lectures a decade later, he frequently left the
old and the new approaches side by side, sometimes unrecon-
ciled, sometimes declaring the new to be clearly preferable,
and usually affirming the new to be advantageously inclusive
of the old. But in the IB96 lectures, monism was applied
only to the doctrines of preservation and atonement. And
the significant elements, not found in the The Examiner ar-
ticles, appear to be
: ( 1 ) a readiness to speak of the laws
of nature as "second" or "secondary" causes, but in the sense
that they are regular and automatic workings of the first
cause; ( 2 ) the retention of the notion of "substances" in
the universe, although this is possibly due to a failure to
make sufficient revision in the context of the presentation
of the monistic view; ( 3 ) the coupling of the insistence on
Christ’s creatorial union with the race as furnishing the
subjective reason and ground for his atonement for the sin
of the race, in which he is guilty, though personally pure,
with the insistence that (a) this guilt was itself atoned
for on the cross; (b) Christ experienced guilt and penalty
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but not depravity; (4) the joint insistence on Christ T s
guilt in virtue of a creatorial union with sinful humanity
as furnishing a ground of obligation for atonement, though
he is personally pure, and on the atonement as a gracious
divine provision, which Christ might have withheld were it
not for the redemptive plan of God.
4. The 1$96 Essay on Robinson’s Theology
Before considering essays which appeared subsequently
to the fifth revision of his theology, and contained in the
1899 volume on Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism , it
will be necessary to consider briefly an article not con-
tained therein, but which appeared likewise after the 1896
theology, and to which reference has already been made in an
earlier chapter of this dissertation.
When the Robinson memorial volume appeared in 1896
,
con-
taining Strong’s contribution on ’’Ezekiel Gilman Robinson as
a Theologian," it contained numerous references made by Strong
to tensions in his former teacher’s theology which, to Strong’s
mind, could be removed best along the lines of the ethical
monism now so prominent in Strong’s thinking.^ In taking
exception to Robinson’s treatment of the doctrine of the
Trinity, of imputation, and of atonement, Strong appealed to
the monistic view for the resolution of dissatisfactions
with Robinson’s statements.
1. This factor might itself suggest that the monistic prin-
ciple as Strong applied it does not have its precedent
in Robinson.
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In criticism of Robinson’s view of the Trinity, which
while not denying an ontological significance yet tended to
be preoccupied with the exonomic aspect, Strong took as a
point of departure an emphasis in accord with the influence
of idealistic thought. "There is a ’larger Christ’ whom
I
recent theology is coming to discover, and this ’larger
Christ’ is enabling us better to understand the work of the
Christ incarnate,"-*- he remarked, in pleading for a fuller
statement of the essential nature of God. At the same time,
by emphasizing against Robinson that genuine revelation must
carry us to knowledge "of what God is in himself , not simply
2
what he is to us ," Strong suggested that here too, Robinson
was overinfluenced in the direction of metaphysical reserve
by concessions in the Kantian direction. But what is impor-
tant is that Strong’s overcoming of that reserve comes by
the invocation, atainst Kant, of the spirit of modern philo-
sophical idealism. It is to the "larger Christ" which the
theology contemporary with Strong had invoked, that he looked
now for a more satisfactory doctrine of the Trinity.
While Strong criticized Robinson’s treatment of the
Trinity "not... in its ordinary place immediately after his
account of the attributes of God, but (after ).. .the doctrine
of sin and the person of Christ”-^ as reflecting an inadequate
T.~ Art. (1896), 194. 2. Art. (1896), 195»
3. Art. ( 1896 ), 195. Robinson’s method, Strong complained,
seemed to imply "that the Trinity is not so much the foun-
dation as it is the result of the later doctrines of the-
ology" (195).
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concern with an ontological statement of divine being, the
very fact that Strong suggests that the doctrine is rightly
treated "immediately after" the statement of divine attri-
butes—as he himself does consider the theme--is itself dis-
closive of a theological trend with which he finds himself
in sympathy, and according to which the divine attributes ap-
parently may be sufficiently established without a consider-
ation of a divine self-disclosure of triunity.
Strong also fastened upon Robinson’s fluctuation be-
tween objective and subjective statements of the doctrine of
atonement as evidence of a grasping for a clarifying princi-
ple which Robinson had not attained, and which the doctrine
of immanence supplied.
Go^fe in Christ is immanent in humanity. If
all good in man is the work of Christ, then
a seemingly subjective theory of the atone-
ment may have an objective side or aspect.
What before appeared to be simply man’s work
is God’s work, now that we see all but sin
to come from God. Unless some such principle
be assumed, I find it difficult to acquit
Dr. Robinson of inconsistency, and impossible
to deny that the Old School doctrine with
which his theology began evaporated, as he
went on, in the fire of criticism. I am un-
willing to grant that he was conscious of in-
consistency. I prefer to say, therefore,
that... he unconsciously admitted to his sys-
tem ideas which he did not himself work out
to their logical conclusions .. .Was Dr. Robin-
son. . .building better than he knew, and pre-
paring the way for a more modern theology?^
Consequently, Strong even suggests in that Robinson’s mind
"there was some principle of reconciliation which was con-
1. Art. (1896), 197.
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sciously or unconsciously working, though it was unex-
pressed.’^ That principle, for Strong, was included in and
best stated by ethical monism.
It will be recalled that Robinson objected to forensic
substitution and especially the notion of ”an absolute jus-
tice in God, which his mercy could satisfy or not” and con-
sequently took issue with Shedd’s theory of the atonement.
Strong, however, refused to eliminate the element of divine
propitiation, and contended that Shedd’s view can be made ten-
able, but only by introducing a further principle, that of
the union of all men with Christ by creation,, This principle
alone can make Christ’s substitution consistent with justice,
he affirmed.^
If Kbbinson had denied that the guilt and penalty of
human sin were imputed to Christ, and insisted that the Christ
endured penalty but neither depravity nor guilt, Strong, in-
sisted on both an imputed and imparted guilt, as well as pen-
alty. Both theologians denied that the incarnation involved
Him in depravity, in view of his supernatural conception.
But Strong sought a principle to justify the imputation of
penalty to Christ, and found it in a natural union of the
Logos and humanity.-^ He quoted:
As, in the case of hereditary depravity,
God’s procedure in charging upon us guilt
can be justified only upon the Scriptural
ground that we were seminally and organic-
lV Art. (1396), 197 . 2. Art. (1396)196-197.
3. Art. (1396), 190.
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ally one with our first father in the trans-
gression; so the visiting of the penalties
of the race upon Christ our Lord can be jus-
tified only upon the ground that he, too, was
heir with us to the same guilt and condemna-
tion, even though depravity was cut off by
his immaculate conception in the womb of the
Virgin. And if any ask how thus becoming one
of the race can load him with anything more
than his portion of the common guilt of the
fall, I answer that he was ’the root,’ as
well as 'the offspring, of David,' and that
since all men, as well as all things, were
created and upheld by him, there naturally
and inevitably rested upon him who was their
life the burden and responsibility of the
sins of his members. -*
5. The 1899 Volume of Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism
Strong wrote the preface for the fifth revision of his
1886 theology on January 1, 1896. Between that date and the
appearance in 1899 of Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism ,
pthe opening chapters of which are a reprint of the articles
in The Examiner
,
he delivered a number of addresses-^ involv-
1. Art. (1896), 193-194.
2. The Presbyterian and Reformed Review singled out the ap-
pearance of CCEM as affording additional background against
which the changes in Strong’s thought could be discerned
more intelligently. An anonymous reviewer commented:
"As was pointed out in our notice of the fifth edition of
the Systematic Theology, Dr. Strong had experienced since
the issue of the fourth edition a somewhat radical change
of fundamental conceptions, marked in the fifth edition'
only by a few alterations in the text that did not much
signify. The present volume puts in permanently accessible
form the more extended discussions in' which he had announced
and defended his change of view: and naturally enough
these important essays, as they give character, are al-
lowed to give title also to the volume... The accession of
so winning a writer to the ranks of the ethical monists is
a circumstance of first-rate importance to them” (Anon.,
Rev. £1901]
,
325-326).
3 . These include not only the addresses to the successive
graduating classes, but the following: "Modern Tendencies
in Theological Thought” (CCEM. 137-162); "The Fall and the
Redemption of Man in the Light of Evolution," (CCEM, 163-
180); "Fifty Years of Theology" (CCEM, 181-208).
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ing the application of monism to theology which are also
included in the volume, along with similar addresses al-
ready referred to,'5' delivered prior to 1896, and several
chanters apparently prepared specifically for inclusion in
this volume. c Also contained in the volume are a number of
sermons preached on distinguished occasions and Strong’s ad-
dresses to graduating classes from 1888 to 1899, none of which
bear in any essential way on the specialized interest of this
study, except in the case of one commencement address to
3
which reference has already been nade.^
The essays in Christ in Treat! on and _tr.ical Monism
which bear on the application of monism to theology will now
be considered briefly.
i. Address on "Modern Tendencies in Theological Thought"
Strong delivered the address at the convocation of the
University of Chicago on October 1, 1896, on the theme,
"Modern Tendencies in Theological Thought." Here he employed
the widely-invoked theological formula "back to Christ" in a
"larger and deeper sense," urging a return
to Christ as to that which is original
in thought, archetypal in creation, im-
manent in history; to the Logos of Cod,
who is not only the omniscient reason,
but also the personal conscience and will,
at the heart of the universe.
4
1. Cf. supra, 47-48,
2. These are: "God’s Self-Limitations," (CCEM, 87-101);
"The Authority of Scripture," (CCEM, 113-13o)
;
"The Scrip-
tural Doctrine of Sternal Punishment," (CCEM, 422-439).
3. Cf. surra, 49-
4. CCEM, 141.
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Back to Christ as Logos, back to the ante-mundane life of
the Son of God, for an understanding of reality, was Strong’s
emphasis.
Evolution is the divine method, and only discloses the
nature of the involution which preceded it • ^ But the regu-
larity of nature does not preclude surprising and unique di-
vine acts. 2 Human knowledge enlightened by love both recog-
nizes and defends the rationality of a divine incarnation in
Christ and an atonement for man’s- sin by the ’’original au-
3thor and the continuous upholder” of human life.
As against deism, Strong upheld ’’Christ, the Life of
Nature.”^ The pattern of argument was not new. Since energy
dissipates, force must be viewed as an exercise of will.
The system of things, or universe, requires the postulation
of an omnipresent reason and will. In identifying this omni-
present reason and will with the Redeemer, the Christian but
follows the lead of the Scripture, where he, upholding God,
is identified with Jesus Christ. The recognition of Christ
as the life of nature provides the ’’guarantee that theology
and science will come to complete accord. TT>
1. CCEM, 142. 2. CCEM, 143. 3. CCEM, 143.
4. CCEM, 14S.
5. CCEM, 150. Theology narrates the why
,
science the how
,
affirmed Strong. But evolution as the common method of
Christ ’’does not fetter him, because his immanence in na-
ture is qualified by his transcendence above nature”
(CCEM, 150).
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As against atomism, which disregards the organic unity
of mankind and its connection with God, and regards men only
as individuals, Strong upheld ’’Christ, the Life of Humani-
ty.”" Evolution, sociology and political ethics concur in
the organic emphasis. But modern thought erroneously lays
the blame for sin upon the Creator, instead of regarding it
as self-perversion, when sin is confounded with weakness or
disease or ignorance. Christ is the soul’s true life, phy-
sically and naturally, as well as spiritually, but sin is
not a manifestation of Christ, but of the individual will.^
As against externalism, Strong emphasized ’’Christ, the
Life of the Church. In developing this phase of his ad-
dress, he spoke against both the realistic view of substance,^
and against the prevailing evangelical view of the Scrip-
7ture. Current evangelical theory faultily treats Scripture
”as the original source of truth, instead of regarding it as
the mere expression of Christ, who alone is the truth.”
This results in a double standard, whereby Christ and the
Scripture are played against each other. But the appeal
1. CCEM, 131* Strong viewed the creationist theory of the
soul’s origin as a sign of this view.
2. CCEM, 152. 3. CCEM, 155. 4. CCEM, 155.
5. CCEM, 158.
6. ”1 would have you notice,” Strong urged, ’’that I have not
used the word substance, but the word life. It is a mark
of progress in philosophy that it has outgrown the old
scholastic terminology of substance and qualities, essence
and accidents, and has gone back to the far simpler and
more scriptural category of life and its powers. It is
good to get back to Christ, for he is the Life” (CCEM,
158).
. CCEM, 159-161. 8. CCEM, 159.7
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must always be to Christ, whether from creed, or from con-
science, or from Scripture. 1 Christ is not shut up to Scrip-
ture, for self-expression; philosophy and science also dis-
close him, although sin rThas curtailed and perverted these
sources of truth, and therefore Scripture furnishes a recti-
fying principle, so that our conclusions are tested by com-
paring them with the Scripture. But that does not make
Scripture ”the only and the perfect source of doctrine TT for
it is an incomplete manifestation of Christ who alone is di-
vine wisdom and truth. The truth is a personal Being.
The significant emphasis found in this address then,
which may be taken as supplementary of that in the articles
of The Examiner
,
is that (1) Scripture is corrective of the
truths of philosophy and science, which are distorted be-
cause of the noetic effects of sin; (2) Scripture is not
,Tthe only and the perfect source of doctrine,” but the liv-
ing Christ alone is the original source of truth.
ii. Address on T,The Fall and the Redemption
of Man in the Light of Evolution”
Strong read a paper before the Baptist Congress in
Buffalo, New York, on November 15, 189#, on the theme,
rrcCEM, 160. 2. CCEM, 160. 3. CCEM, 160.
4. CCEM, loO. Strong added: "Not first doctrine and then
Christ; nor first creed and then Christ: not first inspi-
ration and then Christ; not first Scripture and then
Christ; but first Christ and then Scripture, inspiration,
doctrine, creed; this is both the order of logic and the
order of experience. Only Christ in us, a principle of
life, makes Scripture, inspiration, doctrine, creed, in-
telligible; only the Truth within enables us to under-
stand the truth without” (CCEM, 161).
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"The Fall and the Redemption of Man in the Light of Evo-
lution. "
In this, Strong reiterated the conviction that evolu-
tion is the method of the immanent God, yet in view of di-
vine transcendence, the evolutionary method imposes no ul-
timate limitation. Lotze had underwritten just such a view,
Strong emphasized. ^ Absolute continuity is inconsistent
with progress, which presupposes new force or new combina-
tions of force, or intelligent will. Miracle is not pre-
J
eluded, but may serve the divine purpose in a Aoral universe.
The biological view of man does not exclude the theo-
logical, Strong affirmed, for the resident forces which
produced man are only the manifestation of divine mind and
will.-' Simultaneously, Strong invoked ethical monism in be-
half of theistic evolution, in such a way as to oppose fiat
%
creation. The fault of many advocates of the development
1. "This conception of evolution is that of Lotze," wrote
Strong. "That great philosopher, whose influence is
more potent than any other in present thought, does not
regard the universe as a plenum to which nothing can
be added in the way of force" (CCEM, 163).
2. "Regeneration and answers to prayer are possible for
the very reason that these are the objects for which
the universe was built. . .Since we believe in a dynamical
universe, of which the personal and living God is the
inner source of energy, evolution is but the basis,
foundation, and background of Christianity, the silent
and regular working of him, who, in the fullness of time,
utters his voice in Christ and the cross" (CCEM, 165).
3. CCEM, 167-16S. Here Strong made one of his strongest
statements on nature as a part of God: "To all intents
and purposes, these (resident) forces are God; for the
will of God is the only real force in nature" (CCEM,
16S ).
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theory, he complained, is their assumption "that matter is
something impersonal and dead, and out of it they try to
get a personal and living being called man,” 1 whereas
matter is conceivable "only as the energizing of an intel-
ligent and personal will.” 2 That the evolutionary process
manifests the upward struggle of an intelligence and will
through lower forms toward rationality and freedom is
another way of remarking that "the preincarnate Logos was
exhibiting the divine wisdom and power in successive ap-
proximations toward humanity” until psychical man was the
3
result.
Strong’s doubts about man’s animal ancestry were now
a thing of the past:
The dust^from which the body of Adam was made
was animate dust; lower forms of life were
taken as the foundation upon which to build
man’s physical frame and man’s rational powers;
into some animal germ came the breath of a
new intellectual and moral life. 1-
But an evolutionary origin is compatible with a proper
doctrine of man’s fall, he held. 5 The degradation witnessed
in human history necessitates the empirical judgment of a
primal, voluntary fall of humanity from God and his law.
Sin must be explained in terms of free personality, or it
loses its significance; to refer sin to lower animal impul-
ses, rather than to the will, is to deny its existence. 2
TTCCEM, 168. 2. CCEM, 168. 3. CCEM, 175-176.
4. CCEM, 169. 5. CCEM, 169. 6. CCEM, 170.
7. CCEM, 170.
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The tendency of man to transmit acquired characters sheds
light on inherited corruption. 1
The moral self-centeredness of man, however, could not
destroy his natural connection with the indwelling Christ,
2
who is the ground of all being. Since Christ is the
source of the life of the spiritually impenitent, Christ
has been afflicted, as the natural life of the race, in the
affliction of humanity, and has suffered for human sin. 1
Calvary was the historical manifestation and concrete pro-
I
clamation of "the age-long suffering of the Son of God. ” f
This natural suffering of Christ is at the same time an
atoning suffering:
This suffering has been an atoning suffering,
since it has been due to righteousness. If
God had not been holy, if God had not made
all nature express the holiness of his being,
if God had not made pain and loss the neces-
sary consequences of sin, then Christ would
not have suffered. But since these things
are sin’s penalty and Christ is the life of
the sinful race, it must needs be that Christ
should suffer. There is nothing arbitrary in
the laying upon him of the iniquities of us
all. There is an original grace as well as
an original sin. The fact that Christ is our
life makes it inevitable that we should
derive from him many an impulse and influence
that does not belong to our sinful nature. 5
Thus Strong here repeated the thesis that Christ’s natural
union with the race involved him inevitably in both suffer-
ing and gracious atonement. Strong emphasized that all
IV CCEM, 171. 2. CCEM, 172. 3. CCEM, 173.
4o CCEM, 177* Strong added: "Not late in human history
did he vicariously take our sins upon him, but fran the
very instant of tne fall. The imputation of our sins to
him is the result of his natural union with us" (CCEM.
17S ).
5. CCEM, 173.
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suffering is penal, and not that of Christ alone, " but
that because Christ was personally pure, he was made a
curse for us.^
Strong T s tendency, in this address, as to refer as
much of experience as possible to the operation of the im-
manent Logos. Not only did he affirm that Christ emerged
from a prepared nation as Adam had emerged out of the
highest forms of pre-existing life, but the virgin birth
is viewed as no more unique than the bringing of man out of
a race of apelike progenitors. The new science, Strong
declared,
recognizes more than one method of propaga-
tion even in one and the same species, and
it is no wonder that in the introduction of
him who was the crown and summit of the whole
system we ^should see a return to the original
method of parthenogenesis .
3
The emphases found in this address, and not noted pre-
viously, are: (1) Since monism views matter as intrinsi-
cally mental and volitional, it is not difficult for this
view to derive human life by evolutionary development;
(2) man had an animal ancestry, endowed in his case with
intellectual and moral life; (3) the empirical observation
of human degradation requires the view of a primal, volun-
tary fall of humanity from a proper moral and spiritual
1. "This suffering for sin which Christ endured is the
suffering of penal inflictions in our stead, for all
suffering is penal in the sense that its existence is
due to sin, and that it is the expression of God’s moral
revulsion from iniquity, the revelation of his self-
vindicating holiness" (CCEM, 179).
2. CCEM, lBO. 3. CCEM, 177.
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relation with God; (4) Christ’s natural, age-long suffering
is at the same time atoning suffering; (5) All suffering is
penal, hut Christ’s is substitutionary because he is per-
sonally pure; (6) Christ’s suffering is not arbitrary but,
since it flows from his natural union with the race, is of
the nature of original grace; (7) The virgin birth of Christ
constitutes a return of the parthe nogene tic method of pro-
ducing life,
iii. Address on "Fifty Years of Theology"
On June 7, 1899, Strong delivered an -address on the
subject "Fifty Years of Theology" at the fiftieth anniver-
sary of Dr. Alvah Hovey’s connection with Newton Theological
Institution as professor. In it, Strong stressed some of
the elements which composed the reaction against deiaa which
he labeled as the "innermost substance and meaning" of the
^ 1previous half-century of theology.
The recovery of divine immanence, Strong declared, dis-
placed the mechanical with a dynamical interpretation of
2
nature. Nature’s laws are but God’s generic, regular,
and automatic volitions, but no less free on that account.
God’s immanence in the soul, as well as in nature, was now
1. Strong’s visit to Newton on this occasion has a double
interest, in view of HOvey's sharp disagreements with
ethical monism. These differences will be treated in
the subsequent chapter.
2. The symbol of nature is now Darwin’s flower, not Paley’s
watch, Strong pointed out. "God does not create a uni-
verse which goes of itself without his presence or con-
trol, but the universe is full of his life and is the
constant expression of his mind and will" (CCEM, 187).
3. CCEM
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being recognized, so that humanity is seen to have its
being in God.
The rediscovery of the immanent God has involved
also the discovery that this immanent God is Christ."^
Modern theology sees Christ both as Redeemer and as TTthe
one and only principle of divine expression, the one out-
going and revealing agency in the nature of God."^ This
omnipresent living Christ is the answer to Ritschl’s ex-
clusively historical Christ and Pfleiderer’s exclusively
ideal Christ, the two rallying points of German Christo-
logy. ^
Modern theology has rescued from neglect, Strong af-
firmed, the view that the immanent Christ’s method is
evolutionary. This view does not impinge upon divine
freedom. If every natural operation is due to supernatu-
ral Will, the power to work miracle is not lacking.^
The events and sequences of nature are viewed spiritually
by faith.
That evolution is predominantly ethical is a fourth
characteristic of modern theology. ,fThe world is not
simply a lost world given over to the evil one," Strong
asserted, but moral forces are at work in it, and "the
1. "Our later theology has, as never before since the
times of the apostles," Strong remarked, "identified
the Christ of the incarnation with the Logos of God,
through whom and unto whom all things were made and in
whom all things consist" (CCEM, 190].
2. CCEM, 190. Strong reaffirmed that "while the transcen-
dent and unknowable God is the Father, the immanent and
revealed God is Christ" (CCEM, 190).
3. CCEM, 191. 4. CCEM, 193-194.
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i mmanent Christ is progressively transforming it . Tfl There
is an evolutionary preparation for both righteousness and
love. Humanity discloses a conjugal, paternal and filial
affection which is underivable from fallen man, and which
must be attributed to the Christ of God
whose original grace is counteracting the
effects of original sin, and who is thus
preparing the way for the publication and
reception of his finished redemption .
^
A fifth, all-inclusive truth attained by the previous
half-century of theology, Strong affirmed, is that the
ethical meaning of the universe is summed up in the histo-
rical Jesus. Christ is not merely the crown of evolution,
but its animating spirit, whose mind and heart and will
3
are expressed in all its processes.
Recent theology also had come to see the cross as the
revelation of God’s eternal suffering for sin, Strong said.^
By its new discovery of Christ's world-relations, it had
reached a profounder view of "that redeeming work of which
the whole universe is but the theatre and illustration. "5
Theology has been gravitating toward T,the supremacy of
1. CCEM, 195. 2. CCEM, 195-196.
3. "The historical Jesus is not only God manifest in the
flesh, in whom is all the fullness of the Godhead in
bodily form and manif estation
^
but he is also the
gathering up and disclosure or all the ethical meaning
of the creation. In other words, Jesus is the immanent
Christ of evolution, coming out like a painter from be-
hind his own picture and interpreting to us his work"
(CCEM, 197).
4. Strong criticized the governmental and moral influence
theories
}
the former for conceiving law externally and
arbitrarily, and the latter for regarding happiness in-
stead of righteousness as the end of creation' (CCEM,
198).
5. CCEM, 199.
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righteousness in the nature of God.’’^ God T s self-love is
righteousness, which conditions all other love, and He
cannot make the universe happy without first making it
holy.^ God’s suffering is not a matter of choice, but dis-
closes his nature.^ The reproaches of those who resist
God fall upon Christ, whose life is the imnost principle of
their being .
^
The final step of progress in recent theology, Strong
noted, was r,its application of the principle of development
to Holy Scripture . The communication of revelation to
the Biblical writers was not as disjunctive with other noe-
tic activity as once thought:
The Spirit of Christ v:hich was in them
was the Spirit of the immanent Christ
working after his common evolutionary
fashion. It was not the sudden impact
of a power from without but the move-
ment of a power from within, which only
in thought was distinguishable from the
activity of their own minds and hearts
and wills. And inspiration was like
grace; it was not infallible nor impec-
cable. 6
Christianity requires no particular theory of inspiration,
for it had a vigorous existence before the composition of
7
any New Testament book. Nor is the concession to higher
criticism of a different form of the manuscripts destruc-
1. CCEM, 199. 2. CCEM, 200. 3. CCEM, 200.
4. CCEM, 200. 5. CCEM, 203- 6. CCEM, 203.
7. CCEM, 204.
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tive.
1
The application of evolutionary principles to
Scripture serves not to disprove inspiration, but to make
it more evident:
the more composite the authorship of
Scripture, the more apparent is the
proof of one superintending Mind that
combines the scattered biblia into one
Bible .
^
The modern view sees in Scripture an inspiration
which, while it does not guarantee the
inerrancy of Scripture in every histor-
ical and scientific detail, does yet
make it, when taken together and when
rightly interpreted, infallible for its
purpose of communicating moral and re-
ligious truth, and able to make us wise
unto salvation.
3
It is clear from these quotations that Strong combined im-
manentism, evolution, and higher criticism in such a way
as to restrict the message of Scripture to moral and redemp-
tive truth. At the same time, the merger of these elements
could not help but diminish the view of the essential unique
ness, in qualitative terms, of the Biblical view. This is
clear, both from the readiness to sacrifice an infallible
inspiration, and the affirmation that
we have no need to doubt the superna-
tural element either in the world or
1. "A book may go by the name of its chief writer, and Isaiah
or Zechariah may have a double authorship. The Pentateuch
may be Mosaic only for substance; the laws of Leviticus
may be later additions in the spirit of what Moses wrote;
the speeches in Deuteronomy may be representations by one
of Moses’ successors on the west of Jordan of instructions
by the great lawgiver on the east of Jordan which had been
traditionally handed down” (CCEM, 204).
2. CCEM, 205. 3. CCEM, 205.
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in the Bible, so long as he (Christ)
is recognized as the animating and
controlling force in both.^
Strong did not intend hereby to lessen the exclusive
claim for the Biblical message on the sinfulness of man
and the divine provision of atonement, but, without working
out its implications, he had in principle lessened the gap
between Christianity and the non-Christian religions.
The emphases found in this address, not previously
noted, are: (1) Directed by the immanent Christ, the ethi-
cal evolutionary process results in the progressive victory
of moral forces; (2) Christ’s natural union with humanity
issues in an original grace, whereby holy impulses are im-
parted even to sinful humanity; (3) Holiness is the funda-
mental divine attribute; ( 4 ) Biblical inspiration is not
infallible, but (a) admits of error in historical and scien-
tific detail, (b) is organically infallible for moral and re-
ligious truth necessary to salvation; ( 5 ) Biblical inspira-
tion is to be referred not to a transcendent, but to an im-
manent divine activity, and (a) does not preclude a higher
critical view of authorship and composition, (b) is not
supernaturally disjunctive with universal divine activity,
iv. Essay on TTThe Authority of Scripture”
Of the essays which appear to be included for the first
time in Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism is one on
1. CCEM, 206.
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"The Authority of Scripture."1 Because the human con-
science is "warped and perverted by sin," Strong declared,
it is bound to submit to divine authority above individual
reason and conscience.
2
The question is not one of author-
ity versus truth, for "authority is as much God’s appointed
way to truth as reason is."1 Mankind inevitably chooses an
authority, and the individual’s choice of the particular
authority reveals his character, whether he prefers the
authority of self or of God.^
Although conscience has its original source in God, it
modifies the divine voice. 1 Yet it is a subordinate and
limited echo of an infinite righteousness "and in the sphere
and for the purposes for which it was given it is sufficient
to guide our moral action."^
The church represents the collective conscience of re-
deemed humanity, but -its authority is likewise delegated,
7
subordinate and limited, contrary to Roman Catholicism.
1. The circumstance which suggests that even this essay may
have appeared previously in some journal, although there
is no indication of this in CGEM, is the fact that
Strong’s article on "Ethical Monism" quotes a paragraph
credited to an "Essay on the Authority of Scripture,"
which is not further identified, yet which consists of
200 words which appear also in the essay now in view
(cf. CGEM, 36). In either event since the essay pre-
viously considered deals in part with Strong’s attitude
toward the Scripture, this essay is appropriately con-
sidered here.
2. "It is not only rational for us in our present intellec-
tual and moral state to recognize an authority above that
of individual reason and conscience, but this is the only
reasonable and conscientious thing for us to do" (GGEM,
114).
3. CGEM, 115. 4. CCEM, 115-116. 5. CCEM, 119.
6. CCEM, 119. 7. GGEM, 120.
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It is Christ who is the revelation of God, and who
sums up all that is meant by God and by revelation.
^
Christ alone is the Truth, and ,Tall the lights of conscience,
as well as of science, all the truths hid amid the chaff of
paganism, as well as all the discoveries made to the chosen
people” were his communications. Christ and revelation
are one and the same thing from two different points of
view, one being the personal author of truth, and the other
the truth of God communicated and made an objective possess-
3ion of mankind.
Christ is the ultimate source of all religious author-
ity, but in the Scripture his works and words are "most per-
fectly set forth. The Bible has an authority which is di-
vine, but its authority is delegated, subordinate and "lim-
ited to the sphere in which it was meant to move and to the
purposes for which it was designed. This purpose was to
teach not mathematics and astronomy, but "all religious
truth... as it is in Jesus. The divine revelation in
7Christ may have been given without any written record.
Though the facts of Christianity had never been recorded,
1. CCEM, 121. "Christ is nothing less than Deity revealed,
God brought down to our human comprehension and engaged
in the work of our salve tion. Christ is the Word of God,
the divine reason in expression. All outgoing, communi-
cation, manifestation oi the Godhead, is the work of
Christ. God never thought anything, said anything, did
anything, except through Christ" (CCEM, 121)".
2. CCEM, 122. The word "discoveries" is curious.
3. CCEM, 122. A. CCEM, 123. 5. CCEM, 123.
6. CCEM, 123.
7. Strong pointed out that tradition served in the days of
the patriarchs no less than in the primitive church be-
fore the writing of the first gospel narrative (CCEM,
123-124).
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tradition might still be authoritative, without the safety
of the church or the authority of the truth depending upon
Scripture.'1' Even a written record might be authoritative
without special inspiration. Consequently,
if Christianity could conceivably be
authenticated to the world without in-
spiration, and even without a written
record, it is much more true that Chris-
tianity does not stand or fall with any
particular theory of . inspiration . 2
Inspiration is the qualifying of man to put revealed truth
into permanent and written form, and its denial does not
imperil the reality of divine revelation.^ Nevertheless,
Strong affirmed his belief "in the inspiration of the Scrip-
tures and of every part of the Scriptures. The Bible not
only contains, but it is, the word of God."^" Yet the Scrip-
ture is not the original, but rather the witness to Christ,
and is to be reverenced as an organic and progressive ac-
count of Christ T s historical work and teaching under both
old and new dispensations . ^
To the truly scientific mind, with active conscience
and affection as well as merely logical understanding, the
1. CCEM, 124.
2. CCEM, 124. "The facts of Christ’s life and teaching are
greater than any written record of them, and... the sub-
stantial truth of the Scripture history may be vindicated
just as the truth of many secular narratives has been"
( CCEM, 125).
3. CCEM, 125. 4. CCEM, 125.
5. CCEM, 132-133. "The supremacy of Christ, and not any
theory of inspiration, is the citadel of our faith. We
refuse to confound the citadel with any of those tempo-
rary outworks which past ages have constructed to defend
it, and with which our modern artillery enables us in
some cases to dispense" (CCEM, 126).
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Scripture will be "self-evidencing. The Bible, taken
organically, is "a complete and sufficient guide to Christ
and salvation.” 2 But infallible historical, literary, and
scientific perfection are beside the purpose of revelation,
and ”the very humanity of the Bible is the best proof of its
divinity."-^ Yet Strong denied the presence of errors of
historical detail, translation, exegesis or logic in the
original autographs.^" He refused, however, "to impose on
students for the ministry the dogma of absolute inerrancy"
in matters which affect neither the substance of Bible his-
tory nor Bible doctrine. ^ The question of inerrant origin-
al autographs is not sufficiently important to exclude any-
one from Christian fellowship who professes to find such
error. The fallibility of Scripture in historical and
scientific detail would not necessarily involve its falli-
1. ',/hen these conditior^b are met, Strong suggested, "the
law and the prophets and the Psalms will speak of Christ;
minor obscurities and difficulties will be forgotten in
the overpowering impression that this revelation is from
God" ( CCEM, 126).
2. CCEM, 126. 3. CCEM, 127.
4. T, I do not myself feel compelled to recognize such errors
as existing in the original autographs. I have careful-
ly examined one after another of the so-called contra-
dictions between different historical books of the Bible,
and I have yet to find one where some reasonable hypo-
thesis will not furnish a reconciliation. The so-called
errors of translation, exegesis, logic, seem to me, in
almost every case, to be the figments of a shallow cri-
ticism or an unbelieving spirit" (CCEM, 127).
5. CCEM, 127. 6. CCEM, 129.
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bility in matters of faith and doctrine.
1 The Scripture
is "an absolute authority in matters pertaining to salva-
tion.”^ It is necessary both to be cauticus in identifying
seeming discrepancies with real errors, and in affirming an
a priori theory of what the Bible must be.^ T;/hile it may
be necessary to concede "literary, historical, and scienti-
fic imperfections to some small extent,” Strong affirmed,
”we can never admit that there are imperfections in Christ.”^
Strong’s emphases in this essay, not yet recorded in
other summaries, are: (1) Mankind, as finite and sinful,
requires authority; (2) The authority preferred by an indi-
vidual discloses his attitude toward God; (3) Conscience,
while not wholly trustworthy in view of man’s sinfulness, is
a limited echo of the righteous God; (4) The church has but
subordinate and limited authority; (5) The Scripture has
subordinate authority-, Ignited to matters of faith and mor-
als, which (a) is self-evidencing when approached by the
meeting of specific moral and spiritual conditions for knowl-
edge; (b) is not to be identified with a view of infallible
inspiration; (6) Christ is the original and infallible rev-
elation, of whom no imperfection is to be predicated.
1. CCEM, 129. "If any one says that the most natural explan-
ation of certain apparent discrepancies is that each of
the differing authors used the material ready to his hand,
and that the Spirit of inspiration did not regard it as
worth the while to correct the unimportant variation, I
cannot prove that his • view is incorrect. It would only
enlarge a little my conception of the amount of human
imperfection which the Holy Spirit may leave in inspired
Scripture. It would only make the Scripture histories a
little more !J.ike secular histories, two of which may vary
in slight details, while both of them in all essentials
are perfectly harmonious” (CCEM, 130-131).
2. CCEM, 130. 3. CCEM, 131. 4. CCEM, 134.
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v. Essay on "God’s Self-Limitations"
The implications of ethical monism for Christo logy
are most clearly foreshadowed in Strong’s essay on "God’s
Self-Limitations .
"
After emphasizing that God exists in no necessary re-
lations with the universe, although furnishing in himself the
cause and ground of the finite. Strong treated the divine
attributes, showing how God is limited by his intrinsic
perfections,'1*
But Christ’s humiliation discloses a divine self-
plimitation to stagger human wonder. Christ’s person in-
volved a self-limitation affecting God’s natural attributes,
and his work involved a self-limitation affecting God’s moral
attributes. 3 The humiliation involved a surrender by Christ
of the "independent exercise of his divine attributes.”4
As a babe he was not omniscient. What is most "like
God,” Strong asserted, isvfthis self-limitation of deity to
i
the narrow bounds of humanity, that our humanity might be
addressed on its own level and in its own language.” 6 But
this cloaks the incarnation with mystery.
1. CCiEM, 88-95. 2. CCEM, 95-96.
3. ’’During his earthly life the God in him was veiled and
subject. He voluntarily put his deity under control.
God by himself could never be born or suffer or die—but
God united to humanity could do all these” (CCSM, 96).
4. CCIEM
,
96.
5. "The Godhead in Christ commonly manifested itself in pro-
portion to the capacity of Christ’s humanity—only a little
when the humanity was infantile and weak, more and more
fully as the humanity became older and more developed.
Jesus when a babe was not omniscient: indeed, even in his
later years there were some things hid from him" (CCM,
96-97)
.
6 • CCEM
,
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How can there be divine attributes
that are not used? Fortunately we
are not without analogies which help
us to comprehend the possibility of
it. There is more of resource in us
than we use; we know more than we can
tell; there is more in the memory of
every man than he can at this moment
recall; every one of us has more pow-
er than he now knows of--only the
exigency calls it forth.
^
Strong did not further develop this suggestion, that the
latent divine in humanity may furnish a key to the veiled
deity involved in the incarnation.
Turning from the divine self-limitation involved in
the person of Christ to that involved in the work of Christ,
Strong emphasized the moral self-limitation involved in
Christ’s assumption of human guilt. * The development is
similar to that set forth in Strong’s other essays dealing
with this subject.
Strong’s emphases of which special note should be taken
in this essay are: (1) The incarnation involved a surren-
der by Christ of the independent exercise of divine attri-
butes; (2) The manifestation of divine attributes by the in-
carnate Christ was so proportioned to the progressive de-
velopment of Christ’s humanity that (a) he was not omni-
scient as a child, (b) he lacked omniscience at times even
in his later years; (3) The veiled deity of the incarnate
Christ has an analogy in the unappropriated resources of
human life generally.
1. CCEM, 97.
2. ’’Calvary was the actual paying of the debt which not he
personally, but the human nature of which he had become
a part, owed to the law and the holiness of God” (CCEM,
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6. The 1901 Class Notes in Theology
Before proceeding to the final revision of 3trong T s
theology, which appeared in 1907, it may be well, for the
sake of completeness, to refer to a few relevant lecture
notes made by a student, in 1901, in an inter-leaved copy
4'
of the I896 theology.
In those lectures, Strong set his view of imputation
over against the Princeton theology, according to which the
imputation of Adam’s sin to humanity precedes an actual un-
ion, as also with the imputation of human guilt to Christ.
Strong stressed that imputation is based upon a previous vi-
tal union, and considered the outwork of this thesis, in re-
lationship to Christ’s atonement, to be his significant the-
ological contribution. His class remarks were summarized:
Previous to Dr. Strong’s work at Roch-
ester there had been no attempt to ex-
plain the imputation of the sin of the
race to Christ. Dr. Strong says if he
has contributed anything to theology it
is the teaching of a vital union of
Christ with the race. From this union
we have the imputation of the sin of
the race to Christ.
1
At the same time, Strong defended his view that the race
existed seminally in Adam against the objection that it was
simply an extension of medieval realism, ^ although he con-
IV' ST
(
1896 )CN( 1901)
,
309.
2. ”We do not hold the idea that there is a human nature
above and apart from the individual. We do not hold that
the individual existed in Adam. We simply hold that the
individual is closely related and bound up in the race”
( ST 0-8963 CN C1901 J , 409 )
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ceded that the Augustinian theory of Adam’s natural head-
ship is an inference from, rather than the specific teach-
ing of, Scripture.
Dr. Strong also told his class that he had arrived at
his view of the atonement by a long and gradual process."''
Strong dictated to his classes a statement of the atonement,
the essence of which has already been summarized in connec-
tion with various essays which appeared in Christ in Creation
and Ethical Monism
,
which more nearly represented his views
than the brief changes made in the 1896 revision. This con-
tained the statement that
while Christ’s love explains his will-
ingness to endure suffering for us, only
His holiness furnishes his reason for
that constitution of the universe and of
human nature which makes that suffering
necessary. As respects us, his sufferings
are substitutionary since his divinity and
his sinlessness enabled Him to do for us
what we could never do for ourselves. Yet
this substitution is al%o a sharing—not
the work of one external to us, but of one
who is the life of humanity—the soul of
our soul and the life of our life, and so
responsible with us for the sins of our
race. 2
At the same time, Strong emphasized that ’’the historical
work of the Incarnate Christ is not itself the atonement,
and spoke both of an ’’eternal suffering” and of an ’’age
1. ”Dr Strong says it is amazing how his view of the atone-
ment has grown, little by little, by piece-meal. (We
cannot hurry ourselves in the gaining of our views—
they come slowly. ) Ten or twenty years ago he had no
such views as he now has of atonement” ( ST( 1396) CN( 1901 )
,
409).
2. ST(1396)CN(1901)
,
410.
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)
long suffering” of God. 1 Strong emphasized further that
the penalty borne by Christ does not reflect on divine jus-
tice:
Is it necessary to conceive of God as
being unjust in punishing one wholly
innocent—when that one voluntarily of-
fers himself; when God sees that the one
thus offering himself is able to bear
the penalty of sin, as the sinner him-
self is not, and especially when the re-
sult of this transfer will be the salva-
tion through the - faith and new life of
the one who could not have been saved in
any other way?2
The other emphasis in the 1901 notes refers to eternal
punishment, which Strong pres-sed vigorously against the view
of a ”second chance." He declared in this connection that,
since all light comes from the cosmic Christ, all moral dis-
obedience is essentially a rejection of him, 3 whereas faith-
ful fulfillment of moral obligation is virtually an accept-
ance of him.
7. The 1907 Final Theology Revision
Strong considered his 1907 theology, which appeared in
one and three volume editions running 1166 pages, including
1. The historical work, Strong stated, "is rather the reve-
lation of the atonement. This suffering of the Incar-
nate Christ is a manifestation in space and time of the
eternal suffering of God on account of human sin. Yet
without the historical work which was finished on Cal-
vary, the age long suffering of God could never have
been made comprehensible to man" (STC1896J CNC1901] , 411).
2. ST(1396)CN(1901), 413.
3. "This question of second probation is not so prominently
in the front as it was even 10 years ago. The reason...
is the fuller grasp of the Cosmic Christ .. .Even those
who have never heard the name of Christ, come in touch
with Christ .. .Every man--those in heathen darkness, in
the slums of great cities—has a moral chance. His faith-
ful acceptance of his moral obligation is virtually ac-
cepting Christ. His failure to be true to his moral
obligation is rejection of Christ" (STCl696JCNtl901}
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107 index pages, as a revision and enlargement of his
18S6 work, of which seven previous editions had appeared,
each embodying "successive corrections and supposed im-
provements."
1
In his final revision, Strong pointed out in a pre-
face written on his seventieth birthday, his perspective
disclosed modifications made in the intervening twenty
years:
My philosophical and critical point of view
meantime has .. .somewhat changed. While I
still hold to the old doctrines, I interpret
them differently and expound them more clear-
ly, because I seem to have reached a funda-
mental truth which throws new light upon
them all. This truth I have tried to set
forth in my book entitled "Christ in Creation,"
and to that book I refer the reader for fur-
ther information. 2
But, while affirming ethical monism, Strong also expressed
distress over some "cornmpn theological tendencies" of the
day which implied a movement away from the deity of Christ,
his substitutionary atonement, and a miraculous view of the
universe
:
How men who have ever felt themselves
to be lost sinners and who have once
received pardon from their crucified
Lord and Savior can thereafter seek to
pare down his attributes, deny his de-
ity and atonement, tear from his brow
the crown of miracle and sovereignty,
relegate him to the place of a merely
moral teacher who influences us as does
Socrates by words spoken across a stretch
1. ST (190 7), vii.
2. Strong summarized his view as implying "a monistic and
idealistic conception of the world, together with an evo-
lutionary idea as to its origin and progress. But it is
the very antidote to
.
pantheism" ( ST f190/3 , vii).
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of ages, passes ray comprehension. Here
is my test of orthodoxy: Do we pray to
Jesus?. • .What think ye of the Christ?
is still the critical question, and none
are entitled to the name of Christian
who, in the face of the evidence he has
furnished us, cannot answer the question
aright.
1
Strong warned of a "second Unitarian defection" worse in
its divisive consequences for the churches than that of
Channing and Ware a century earlier, from which American
Christianity had recovered "only by vigorously asserting
the authority of Christ and the inspiration of the Scrip-
tures." 2
A half century of Christian experience and reflection
had confirmed his belief, Strong stated, in the doctrines
of holiness as the fundamental divine attribute, of a di-
vine preparation in Hebrew history for rain’s redemption, of
the deity, pre-existence,, virgin birth, vicarious atonement
and bodily resurrection of Christ, and of his future return
in judgment. ^ Strong offered his treatment of ethical mo-
nism, inspiration, the divine attributes, and the trinity,
as "an antidote to most of the false doctrine which now
threatens the safety of the church."^ He protested that
"the recent merging of Holiness in Love, and the practical
denial that Righteousness is fundamental in God T s nature"
1. S'T (190<7), viii-ix. 2. ST(1907), ix.
3. ”1 believe that these are truths of science, as well as
truths of revelation; that the supernatural will yet be
seen to be most truly natural; and that not the open-
minded theologian but the narrow-minded scientist will
be obliged to hide his head at Christ’s coming" (STfl907j,
x).
4. ST (1907), x.
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were responsible for utilitarian views of law and super-
ficial views of sin, and precluded proper doctrines of
atonement and retribution. 1 Aware that contemporary at-
tacks on Christianity assaulted its central beliefs, Strong
urged upon his readers the uniqueness and finality of Bib-
lical theism:
Not only the outworks are assaulted, but
the very citadel itself. We are asked to
give up all belief in special revelation.
Jesus Christ, it is said, has come in the
flesh precisely as each one of us has
come, and he was before Abraham only in
the same sense that we were. Christian
experience knows how to characterize such
doctrine so soon as it is clearly stated.
It is clear, therefore, that in the final statement of
what he conceived to be a Biblical ethical monism, Strong
refused to move to personalistic idealism as, for example,
Borden P. Borne, whom Strong quoted in the 1907 revision,
was fashioning it at Boston University. His sympathies
were clearly with evangelical Christianity in such way that,
v/ere he convinced that a consistent application of his fun-
damental stress on ethical monism would require an abandon-
ment of traditional doctrines—as the trinity, creation,
special revelation in the Hebrew-Christian movement, an ex-
clusive divine incarnation in Jesus Christ, his vicarious
atonement, his bodily resurrection, his personal return and
future judgment of the race, the eternal bliss of the re-
deemed and the eternal punishment of the lost—he would
1. ST (1907), x. 2. ST(1907), xi.
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>
doubtless have sacrificed ethical monism to Biblical the-
ology. But Strong rather viewed ethical monism and spec-
ial revelation not only as congruous, but as supporting
each other, so that the view of Christ as ’’the one and only
Revealer of God, in nature, in humanity, in history, in sci-
ence, in Scripture,” interpreted by a context of ethical
monism, was in his judgment ”the key to theology.”^
But the influence of personalistic idealism upon as-
pects of Strong’s thought in the 1907 revision is clearly
discernible by an alert glance at the forty-one columns of
references in the extensive index to persons. The largest
number of references are to I. A. Corner, 127, and William
G. T. Shedd, 127; James Martineau, 102; and E. G. Robinson,
101. Dorner, the eminent German theologian, was appealed to
both for representative Lutheran doctrinal formulations, and
for his appreciation of the new immanentism. The influence
of Robinson, Strong’s teacher, and of Shedd, neither of whom
was interested in qualitative monism, has already been men-
tioned; Martineau, the Unitarian, was significant for Strong
because of his ethical theism. It is significant that, al-
though about eighteen hundred persons were quoted or re-
ferred to by Strong in the 1907 revision, Mme. Guyon is men-
tioned twice; Hegel gets 14 references; Lotze receives 26;
John Caird and G. T. Ladd are mentioned 35 times; and Bowne
1. 3T( 1907 ) , vii
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is mentioned 59 times. The only writers not already indi-
cated, who are referred to more frequently than Bowne, and
that quite understandably in a reference work on systematic
theology, were Julius Miller, 62 times; Charles Hodge, 63
times; Alvah Hovey, 67 times; and Jonathan Edwards, 79
times. In Strong’s references, Bowne appeared more fre-
quently than Augustine and Calvin.
The number of references to Bowne, however, is not
necessarily important in itself; what is of greater con-
cern is the interaction of these references with Strong’s
theological views and the 'revisions undertaken by him. The
great majority of references, again, are of such a nature
that they might equally well have come from a non-personal-
ist holding similar views.
Thus Strong endorsed Bowne ’s insistence that the nou-
menal is known in our knowledge of phenomena (6,^ referring
to Bowne ’s RHS, 47, 207ff.);^ his complaint that Spencer’s
view that God is already involves a knowledge of God (6,
referring to RHS, 30ff<); his contention that the infinite
is not the all (10, to POT, 135); his protest against Kant’
limitation of knowledge to phenomena (11, to RHS, 76); his
definition of philosophy as involving a study of both epis-
temology and metaphysics (43, to TTK, 3ff»); his anti-sen-
sationalist emphasis that thinking involves a system of
1. All such references will be understood to be to ST(1907)
2. The page references to Bowne ’s works are as given by
Strong.
.• v «•.
1
c . ; h ' Oil’: t f J f o
.
t
.
L*:.bi ; :
.
.I
<
r
-
"
<
.
J Jn. up
:<
t
*I9V‘ C
t
0i. 2--r . ’ 0 00 1< *19' iTJJH SfiT
*»nO0 'I9d£9T*' •
'
.
,
•
. {
•’ O'
.. d’Eilc?
.
,
P d€ £
-uon ^n3 f&rl.t 9on?^3icni e' nu i bi E'icac j a< *id& axjrlT
fcsi
^
% c.) sneston? : ions®
'
-
; <
'
,
no id • • ;
cib'A dsniBgB d89do*3 : •
,
aJt
. t
:o lo noist;
io iioidinll»fc
- •
. <
:
.
I
.J.OG'ldl
)270
mental principles (52f., to TTK, 60) and that sensation
discloses immanent laws of thought (54, to POE, 5); his
insistence that sub-normal instances do not jeopardize
the case for the universality of rationality and morality
(56, to POE, 154) and that human intercourse is possible
only because of a common rationality (60, to TTK, 276);
his declaration that those who invoke evolution to dispute
the positive deliverances of mature consciousness ought to
apply the principle to evolution as well (64, to RHS, 163 f • )
;
his support for the reality of rational intuition (68, to
SIT, 79); bis contention, in connection with the cosmologi-
•
T
" >
cal argument, that a cause is demanded only for changing
phenomena (73, to MSFP, 107); his assertion of the illogi-
cality of eternal process (74, to RH^, 36); his view of the
disciplinary value of imperfections in the universe (78, to
RHS, 364f.); his criticisms of Hamilton’s epistemology
(96, to IPT, 257f . )
;
his contention that pure sensational-
ism cannot attain to knowledge of a real world (97, to
MSFP, 432); his disagreement with the nominalistic view of
divine simplicity (244, to POT, 141); his assertion that
the true ethical aim is not happiness but the realization of
the good (300, to POE, 96); his affirmation that God’s pure
self-activity creates objects without dependence on anything
beyond itself (381, to TTK, 36); his assertion of the com-
patibility of imperfection in the universe with God’s per-
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fection (402, to POT, 224ff»); his contention that chance
does not involve the absence of all causal connection
(426, to TTK, 197); his claim that there exists a univer-
sal feeling of moral obligation and a very general agree-
ment on formal principles of action and virtues (499, to
POE, 156
,
188); his warning of the inexplicability of man T s
moral nature on an appeal to determinism (507, to POE, 135);
his contention that freedom is the power of acting in view
of ends, rather than apart from motives (507, to MSFP, 169);
his view that the prime object of punishment is not deter-
rent nor preventative (655, to POE, 186, 274); his claim
that God’s dealings with man involve a complex interaction
of the whole universe (MSFP, 794).
Strong’s references to Bowne included, at the same
time, points of difference, but on elements which did not
centrally concern the issue of personalistic idealism.
Thus Strong took exception in the interest of traducianism
to Bowne ’s view that the similarity of children to parents
is to be explained solely by the inner consistency of the
divine nature, and not by heredity (493, to MSFP, 500)
^
to Bowne ’s view that sin is a relic of animal sensuousness
(559, to A, 69 ) and to Bowne ’s contention, as against the
lT Bowne did not deny the importance of heredity, but in-
sisted that it is but a divinely chosen method. It is
curious that Strong, with his emphasis upon God’s pres-
ent creative activity, was not drawn by personalistic
considerations to the view of the creationist rather
than t raducianist theory of the origin of the human
soul.
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view of racial guilt in Adam, that general notions are
non-existent except as revealed in individuals (625, to
TTK, 134); to Bowne’s rejection of the forensic imputa-
tion of divine righteousness to repentant sinners (722,
to A, 74);^ to Bowne’s assertion of the possibility of
brute immortality (9^5, IPT, 315ff*)»
But when such agreements and differences, which do
not turn specifically upon personalistic idealism, are
waved aside, there remain at least two dozen references
in which, by way of concurrence or exception, the issue
involves more distinctly a personalistic view.
Thus Strong referred favorably to Bowne’s statement
that objective knowledge of the finite rests on ethical
trust in the infinite (61, to M3FP^472) and that theism
is the absolute postulate of all knowledge (61, to MSFP,
4^0); to Bowne’s assertion that belief is pragmatically
more rewarding than doubt (71f., to POT, llff.) and that
life is broader than the certainties of logic (72, to POT,
31f
. ) ; to the view that law is not cause, but simply divine
method (76, to RHS, 231ff.), that both laws and effects are
exercises of the divine will (125, to POT, 210), that pre-
servation is God’s continuous volition (413, to IPT, 305),^
that all force is will (416, to POT, 202), ^ that the cosmic
1. Strong complained that Bowne made righteousness a mere
formof benevolence and the atonement but a means to the
utilitarian end of the creature’s restoration and happi-
ness •
2. Strong liked Bowne’s reference to Ma kind of wholesale
willing.
”
3. Strong mentioned Bowne’s comparison of force to a musical
note, which must be incessantly reproduced to exist.
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uniformities are but "God’s methods in freedom" (536, to
TTX, ), that no single cosmic law is ultimately neces-
sary (536, to POT, 536) and that law is mere method, rather
than agent (539, to POT, 161). Equally as significant was
Strong’s invocation of Bowne against pantheism (103, to
POT, 245) and to make the point that a heightened divine
immanence does not cancel moral distinctions nor minimize
retribution (108, to IG, 130ff
.
) ; his references to Bowne
along with Josiah Royce, Edward Caird and James Ward for
the relation of monism and Christian doctrine (110, to
TTK, 297-301, 311-317, and to IG, 5-32, 116-153); his view
that authority is not in Scripture alone, but is internal
(219, IG, 109f . ) ; his view that grace is somewhat of a
moral necessity for God in view op creation ( 267
,
756, to
A, 101) his belief that immortality is the demand of our
intellectual, moral and religious nature (9$7, to POT, 254).
But the most significant references remain to be men-
tioned. Strong accepted Bowne’ s view that space is a form
of intuition and not a mode of existence (279, to MSFP, 127,
137, 143) but, although he referred to Bowne ’s contention
that the ideality of time solves the problem of divine fore-
knowledge ( 285
,
to POT, 159), he did not commit himself to
this view. He stressed also Bowne ’s emphasis on the neces-
sity of regarding the world ground as conscious and intel-
1. Bowne wrote: "The work of Christ, so far as it was a
historical event, must be viewed not merely as a piece
of history, but also as a manifestation of that cross
which was hidden in the divine love from the foundation
of the world, and which is involved in the existence of
the human world at all."
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ligent spirit, and not merely as will (405, to POT, 124).
The remaining references deal with the crucial issue of
the nature of substance, and the relationship of things
and persons to God.
The first of the passages to be studied deals with
Bowne’s vi ew that personality alone is real. The summary
of Bowne’s view makes it clear that Strong at this time
not only understood personalistic idealism to involve qual-
itative monism and quantitative pluralism, but that his
own sympathies lay in this precise direction. Borne, he
wrote
,
regards only personality as real. Matter
is phenomenal, although it is an activity
of the divine will outside of us. Bowne’s
phenomenalism is therefore an objective
idealism, greatly preferable to that of
Berkeley who held to God’s energizing in-
deed, but only within the soul. This
idealism of Bowne is not pantheism, for
it holds that, while there are no second
causes in nature, man is a second cause,
with a personality distinct from that of
God, and lifted above nature by his pow-
ers of free willo^
At the same time, Strong called attention to the apparent
retention by Bowne, in contrast with his view of the
1. 3T(1907), 99. Strong proceeded to contrast Bowne’s
view with that of Royce, as follows: frRoyce. . .makes
man’s consciousness a part or aspect of a universal con-
sciousness, and so, instead of making God come to con-
sciousness in man, makes man come to consciousness in
God. While this scheme seems, in one view, to s ave
God’s personality, it may be doubted whether it equally
guarantees man’s personality or leaves room for man’s
freedom, responsibility, sin and guilt.” This should
leave no doubt that the tendencies toward qualitative
monism in Strong were intended by him as subordinate to
the prior claims of qualitative pluralism.
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physical universe, of a substance view of the self:
Bowne claims that the impersonal finite
has only such otherness as thought or act
has to its subject. There is no substan-
tial existence except in persons.
1
In the immediate context, Strong relentlessly opposed
both Hegel and Spinoza, and the pantheistic idealism con-
temporary with his own day. To Hegel’s doctrine, desig-
nated as the view that ’’there is thought without a think-
er”, Strong opposed Lotze’s remarks:
We cannot make mind the equivalent of
the infinitive to think ,
—
we feel that
it must be that which thinks; the essence
of things cannot be either existence or
activity,—it must be that which exists
and that which acts. Thinking means noth-
ing, if it is not the thinking of a think-
er; acting and working mean nothing, if we
leave out the conception of a subject dis-
tinguishable from them and from which they
proceed.
^
Strong’s own formula, in which he set forth the distinc-
tion between being and activity, in contrast with the pan-
theistic schools, was expressed as follows:
To Hegel, Being is Thought; to Spinoza,
Being has Thought + Extension; the truth
seems to be that Being has Thought +
Will, and may reveal itself in Extension
and Evolution (Creation).
3
The appeal to Lotze, rather than Bowne, in order to
maintain a sharp distinction between the self and its
thoughts and activity, is curious.^- It has already been
1. ST(19Q7) , *99. 2. 3T(1907), 100.
3. ST(1907), 190-101. Strong conceded that Hegel was other-
wise interpreted by many philosophers, who hold that
thinking, not thought, was Hegel’s fundamental idea.
4- The question raised by later personalistic idealism was,
if this sharp distinction is maintained, how can the
self be coherent?
o T D .. f
. 1
•" o l ! • ' iq
lOS'IOQBli 3 -;;.r ' i.
—
<
'
—
(
.
- 3 i
'
,
-ait 3oe{,3ua a 1o noxtfcsonoo srfd 9v >9x
XsrfJ rfol v; moil bn.s or •; 01 -
-nBq arid' ridiw JCB'iJ’nc t
'
: .
.
: -
rf^trrJ eriJ ;nox f
t jrfguorlT
noieiiQ^xS ni zTezci £ Yftm bn£ t IIi:Wi" "*:*
'isdctc sbw I939H 3 Brief • 101- < •
djsrid blofl
<
- xw
.
‘
< <
. .
-•
x r:
3o rioua x^no 8JBf^
i5i c ’os^oJ bseoqqo 2,no‘ <,
.
:
,
- •
:
-
'o£n t 3SdoJ O3 XS9C[C
aJs bns 'ilae &d3 nss j3sd nol3onl3al : qi.iris £ niBonifin
.
'
,8 t \'3lv 13 0 r . I
. '
;
:
'lodoo 9Cf 1192
276
mentioned that Bowne attacked the soul-substance idea as
a myth, and held that activity is the essential element,
so that the unity of consciousness is the essence of the
self, although in other passages he did not consistently
apply this principle that there is no substance behind the
subject and outside of knowledge. But Lotze, too, as
Strong was aware, had refused to make a sharp distinction
between being and activity. For, in his contention that
"the passive logically precedes the active; being comes be-
fore willing; God jls pure before he wills purity," so that
"holy being logically precedes holy willing," Strong con-
sciously took exception to Lotze’ s view.^ Against Lotze
and Bowne, Strong maintained that "as truth of being logi-
cally precedes truth of knowing, ^and as a loving nature
precedes loving emotions, so purity of substance precedes
purity of will." Elsewhere in his theology, Strong re-
ferred to Bowne in support of the view that immutability is
the constancy and continuity of divine nature as the law
and source of divine acts (257, to POT, 146).
Before proceeding to the reflection of the new imma-
nentism in the specific areas of theological inquiry, it
will be well to note an additional reference made by Strong
1. ST(1907), 273, referring to the statement of Lotze that
"such will of God no more follows from his nature as
secondary to it, or precedes it as primary to it than,
in motion, direction can be antecedent or subsequent to
velocity" (POR, 139) and of Bowne that God’s nature is
a fixed law of activity or mode of manifestation (POT,
16 ).
2. ST(1907), 273.
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to Bowne. In treating the divine omnipresence, Strong
quoted Bowne f s view that ’’the- infinite must be present in
its unity and completeness in every finite thing, just as
the entire soul is present in all its acts” (2&0, to MSFP,
136), and commented that ,lthis idealistic conception of the
entire mind as present in all its thoughts must be regarded
as the best analogue to God’s omnipresence in the universe.”
In Bowne, this emphasis was safeguarded against any panthe-
istic inclusion of selves in God, although it will be re-
called that Strong viewed selves as well as the physical
universe as finite, graded manifestations of God, despite
his insistence that they are relatively independent .
^
Whether ethical monism was indeed as harmonious with
Biblical theology as Strong thought, is a subject reserved
for study in the next chapter of this dissertation. What
comes now into view in Strong’s final theology is the influ-
ence of ethical monism, whether large or small, in the re-
formulation of Christian tenets. In what way did ethical
monism color Strong’s formulation, within a determination
not to sacrifice Biblical, redemptive theism, of such as-
pects of his theology as religious epistemology, and the doc
trines of God, both as to his nature and works, and man,
as regards his origin, predicament, salvation, and future
state?
1. There is a monistic passage in Lotze in which, although
stressing the separateness of minds, he emphasized that
’’nothing is fully actual but the one reality which is
in eternal motion” (MET, 293)*
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i. Religious Epistemology
Strong insisted throughout his life that the relig-
ious and scientific world-views must not be opposed or di-
vorced in thought, although he strenuously opposed the
right to limit the word "science" to non-spiritual, non-
noumenal data.^ The possibility of theology he found now,
as thirty years earlier, in a God who has relations with
the universe, in the capacity of the human mind for knowing
God and certain of his relations, and in the provision of
a revelation linking God and man.
Faith is knowledge conditioned upon holy affection.
But revelation must not be limited to the Scriptures. ^ Ex-
ternal revelation in nature and history precedes and condi-
tions internal revelation. ^ sj£nce Christ is the eternal
Word and universal Logos, all theology is Christian theolo-
gy.^ Christ is the organ of external, the Holy Spirit of
internal revelation. ^ Wherever the marks of true religion
appear, whether in Unitarians, Romanists, Jews or Buddhists,
1. As against Kant, Strong protested that T,when our primi-
tive beliefs are found to be simply regulative, they will
cease to regulate" (ST (19071, 10). Strong’s emphasis on
transcendental knowledge came in opposition also to the
metaphysical reserve of Robinson, his former teacher.
2. ST (1907), 13. 3. ST (1907), 13.
4. ST(1907), 14. "Christianity is absolutely exclusive, be-
cause it is absolutely inclusive. It is not an amalgama-
tion of other religions, but it has in it all that is
best and truest in other religions. . .God may have made
disclosures of truth outside of Judaism, and did so in
Balaam and Melchisedek, in Confucius and Socrates. But
while other religions have a relative excellence, Chris-
tianity is the absolute religion that contains all excel-
lencies" (STfl907j, 23).
5. ST (1907), 13.
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a demand for religious (though not specifically Christian)
fellowship must be recognized.^"
God is disclosed in nature, but supremely in the Scrip-
tures.
2
The statement of the 1886 lectures, that the Scrip-
tures are the ultimate standard of appeal, Strong not only
retained, but expanded:
Because of our finiteness and sin, the
total record in Scripture of God’s past
communications is a more trustworthy source
of theology than are our conclusions from
nature or our private impressions of the
teaching of the Spirit. Theology there-
fore looks to the Scripture itself as its
chief source of material and its final stan-
dard of appeal. 3 ,
Christian experience is not an original source of religious
truth.
But Biblical truth supplements, rather than contra-
dicts or corrects, natural theology, which prepares the way
for Biblical theology.^" Man’s intellectual and moral nature,
however, furnishes by its needs an a priori reason for ex-
pecting a special, authoritative revelation, 3 but one can
rise only to hope, and not to assurance, of its provision. 0
1. These marks of true religion, attributed to ,Tthe inwork-
ing of the omnipresent Christ,” Strong listed as a rudi-
mentary knowledge of the God of righteousness, some sense
of sin and dependence upon divine mercy and a divine way
of salvation, and some positive practical moral effort.
2. ST (1907 )
,
25. 3. ST (1907
)
,
27. 4. ST (1907), 28-29.
5° ST (1907), 112-113 . Strong urged such factors as man’s
necessary conviction of God’s wisdom, the actual though
complete revelation in nature, the general connection
which prevails between our needs and their supply, and
the analogies in nature and history of a reparative good-
ness.
6. ST (1907), 113.
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But the natural revelation affords certain presumptions
with regard to a revelation of grace, such as (1) contin-
uous historical development, (2) original delivery to a
single nation by which communication is to be made to all
mankind, and (3) preservation in written, accessible, and
transmissible documents.
Strong appealed still to miracle and to prophecy as
attesting special revelation, but his restatement of mir-
acle issued now in an "alternative and preferable defini-
tion" which he considered alongside of that contained in
the earlier editions:
A miracle is an event in nature, so extra-
ordinary in itself and so coinciding with
the prophecy or command of a religious
teacher or leader, as fully to warrant the
conviction, on the part of those who wit-
ness it, that God has wrought it with the
design of certifying that this teacher or
leader has been commissioned by him. 4-
Strong singled out, as marked advantages of this later def-
inition, the following features: (1) recognition of di-
vine immanence and immediate divine agency in nature, as
against the assumption of an antithesis between natural
law and the divine will; (2) recognition of miracle as sim-
ply an extraordinary act of that same God already present
in all natural operations; (3) recognition that natural law,
as the method of regular divine activity, does not preclude
unique exertions of purposive divine power; (4) room for
1 . ST (1907), 114-116. 2. ST(1907), 116.
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the possibility that "all miracles may have their natural
explanations, and may hereafter be traced to natural causes,
while both miracles and their natural causes may be only
names for the one and self-same will of God; H (5) reconcili-
ation of the claims of both science and religion, by permit-
ting any possible or probably physical antecedents of mir-
acle, and by maintaining that these antecedents together with
the miracle are to be interpreted as divine signs of a spe-
cial commission.'*'
Since all natural processes, as well as miracles, are
also immediate divine operations, it is unnecessary to deny
the use of natural processes, as far as they reach, in mir-
acle.^ If all miracle should have its natural side, the
Christian argument would remalh unweakened, for miracle would
evidence still "the extraordinary working of the immanent God
and the impartation of his knowledge to the prophet or apostle
who was his instrument • The possibility of miracle, in
fact, becomes "doubly sure" to those who see in Christ the
immanent God manifested to creatures, for since Christ is the
1. 3T ( 1907 ) , 118-119.
2. "Such Wonders of the Old Testament as the overthrow of
Sodom and Gomorrah, the partings of the Red Sea and of
the Jordan, the calling down of fire from heaven by Elijah
and the destruction of the army of Sennacherib, are none
the less works of God when regarded as wrought by the use
of natural means. In the New Testament Christ took water
to make wine, and took the five loaves to make bread,
just as in ten thousand vineyards to-day he is turning
the moisture of the earth into the juice of the grape, and
in ten thousand fields is turning carbon into corn. The
virgin-birth of Christ may be an extreme instance of par-
thenogenesis" (STC1907J, 119).
3 o ST (1907 ) , 120.
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only source of energy and life, the whole history of crea-
tion witnesses to the possibility of miracle.^ The con-
tinuity of events, Strong emphasized, is a continuity "not
2
of forces, but of plan." Yet Strong designated as "breaks
in the uniformity of nature" the coming of Christ and the
3
regeneration of a human soul.
Strong referred to Lotze’s position for support for
a view which makes the possibility of miracle depend upon
the closest intimacy between the world and the personal Ab-
solute, so that natural movements are carried on only
through the Absolute, with the possibility of variation in
view of divine transcendence.^
From the treatment thus far, the question naturally
arises when a monistic theism is necessary to underwrite
miracle, or whether miracle underwrites theism. Before
handling this question directly, Strong stressed that mir-
acles do not occur uniformly in Biblical history, but only
at the great epochs of revelation, when they draw attention
1. 3T(1907), 123. T,From the point of view of ethical monism
the probability of miracle becomes even greater. Since
God is not merely the intellectual but the moral Reason
of the word, the disturbances of the world-order which
are due to sin are the matters which most deeply affect
him. Christ, the life of the whole system and of humani-
ty as well, must suffer; and, since we have evidence
that he is merciful as well as just, it is probably that
he will rectify the evil by extraordinary means, when
merely ordinary means do not avail" (ST
(
1907 ) , 126).
2. ST (1907), 123.
3. ST (1907), 125. Curiously, Strong elsewhere affirmed that
a miracle "is not a matter of internal experience, like
regeneration or illumination: but is an event palpable
to the senses" (ST (1907)
,
117).
4. The reference is to Lotze’s Microcosmos
,
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to new truth. 1 Miracles do not certify to the truth of
doctrine directly, but only indirectly; directly, they cer-
tify to the divine commission and authority of a religious
teacher. 2 But purity of life and doctrine must accompany
the miracle, in order to prove a divine commission; miracle
and doctrine mutually support each other, forming parts of
a single whole. 3 While internal evidence may be more in-
fluential with certain minds and ages than external, yet
Christian miracles retain their value as evidence . lJr Christ Ts
authority as a teacher of supernatural truth rests upon his
miracles, especially that of his bodily resurrection.-'
As with miracle, so with prophecy, Strong affirmed that
our faith in an immanent God, who is none
other than the Logos or larger Christ,
gives us a point of view from which we
may reconcile the contentions of the na-
turalists and supernaturalists. Prophecy
is an immediate act of God; but, since
all natural genius is also due to God’s
energizing, we do not need to deny the
employment of man’s natural gifts in pro-
phecy. The instances of telepathy, pre-
sentiment, and second sight which the So-
ciety for Psychical Research has demon-
strated to be facts show that prediction,
in the history of divine revelation, may
be only an intensification, under the
extraordinary impulse of the divine Spir-
it, of a power that is in some degree
latent in all men.°
The human mind ’’even in its ordinary and secular working
gives occasional signs of transcending the limitations of
1. ST (1907), 128. 2. ST (1907), 129.
3. ST ( 1907 ), 129 . 4. ST(1907), 129-130 .
5. ST (1907 ) , 130 . 6. ST
(
1907 ) , 134.
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the present, " Strong urged . 1 Belief in the continual ac-
tivity of the divine Reason in human reason encourages the
possibility of an extraordinary insight into the future
such as is heeded at great epochs of spiritual history."
Yet, Strong urged, to be genuine prophecy, nothing must
exist to suggest the event to merely natural prescience.^
Revelation thus has a two-fold attestation, that of
miracle, which proceeds from divine power, and that of pro-
phecy, which proceeds from divine knowledge. 1" The testimony
of the Holy Spirit terminates upon the evidence, for convic-
tion is in terms of truth, J the discernment of which has its
moral and spiritual conditions. ^ The evidence need not be
demonstrative, in matters of morals and religion, for "even
a slight balance of probability, when nothing more certain
is attainable, may suffice to constitute rational proof and
to bind our moral action.”
In developing his treatment of the origin of man’s
idea of God, Strong argued that upon occasion of our cog-
nizing our finiteness, dependence, and responsibility, the
mind "directly cognizes the existence of an Infinite and
To" 'ST (1907), 135.
2. ST (1907), 135. There are many indications of Strong r s
increasing tendency to explain Biblical revelation as a
heightened manifestation of general revelation, e. g.,
"As the life of God the Logos lies at the basis of uni-
versal humanity and interpenetrates it in every part,
so out of this universal humanity grows Israel in gen-
eral; out of Israel as a nation springs the spiritual
Israel, and out of spiritual Israel, Christ according
to the flesh" (STfl907j, 137).
3. ST (1907), 135. 4. 3T(1907), 142.
5. ST (1907), 142. 6 . ST (1907), 142.
.<
•
. .. u ' < t
<
r;
-
,
•
t
t
t
' 1 ^
<
c 'to " o;». „ XI« b
1 <
.
7
'
>
.
c
t
\ ' x
,
t
' n
. 0 ' 0 1 . - -T.'T -i£ • -ciO? • Xt -.'Iad*
. ^
.
• i
•
•
•
t I
'
^
r J ji . . 1 • . * . j
v
Xi
J 1
'
•
"
.
2&5
Absolute and to whom we are responsible . But this in-
/ -
tuitive knowledge of God, while logically prior, may be
expected, in view of human depravity, to be developed
p
last of all. The conflicting ideas of God are misinter-
pretations and perversions of a common intuitive convic-
tion. It is not possible to prove that God exists, but
it can be shown that he is the presupposition of the exis-
tence of knowledge, thought, reason, and conscience.^
This rational intuition of God enables men to receive and
to interpret their presentative intuitions of God. Thus
man’s knowledge of God Is more basic than reasoning can
demonstrate.^ The a priori argument proves only an ab-
stract and ideal proposition, but not a real Being, yet
that Being is presupposed all reasoning. ? The a pos -
teriori arguments cannot lead from finite premises to the
infinite. But the Scripture assumes that God has inlaid
1 . ST (1907 ) , 52. Experience inevitably suggests an infin-
ite and unconditioned Being as its correlative, Strong
urged (STU907J, 53).
2 . ST ( 1907
)
,
55. 3. ST (1907)
,
57.
4. ST (1907), 6l. Against Spencer’s view that the intuition
is really derived from accumulated sensations and con-
temporary teaching, Strong pointed out that man’s ear-
liest experience as well as his latest presupposes this
intuition, but he added that Spencer’s theory cannot set
aside the contention that ”if the evolution of ideas is
toward truth instead of falsehood, it is the part of wis
dom to act upon the hypothesis that our primitive belief
is veracious” (ST C1907J , 64 ). •
5. ST(1907), 65 . 6 . ST(1907), 66 .
7. ST (1907)
,
66 . g. ST(1907), 66 .
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the knowledge of him in every man.
1
The arguments from
the universe and from abstract ideas of the human mind,
however, explicate the confirm the intuitive knowledge
of God. 2
Strong retained his earlier evaluation of the theis-
tic proofs as yielding probability rather than demonstra-
tion, and as possessing cumulative worth. The empirical
arguments may explicate an intuition which is obscure for
lack of reflection.^ But the teleological argument was
now stated in such a way as to regard evolution as a new
and higher illustration-' of purpose and design, with an ap-
propriation by Strong of the views of Bowne and others.
5
Design must be sought in the system as a whole, which jus-
tifies imperfection and suffering in the initial stages ofI - 6 P .development, and which must be viewed as a concomitant of
sin. The moral argument is treated as leading to the
ideas of divine personality and righteous lordship, and
1. ST(1907), 68. Strong closed the section on the intuitive
knowledge of God with a brief account of George John Ro-
manes’ defection from and return to faith: TT IIis later
thought recognized that God and nature are not mutually
exclusive. So he came to find no difficulty even in mir-
acles and inspiration; for the God who is in man and of
whose mind and will nature is only the expression, can re
veal himself, if need be, in special ways. So George
John Romanes cane back to prayer, to Christ, to the
church" (STC1907J, 70). This is significant, since Roman
es T return to faith came in the pattern of a heightened
divine immanence.
,
71.
,
7o-77.
2. ST 1907
5. ST (1907
n ttq- --7 .
4 . ST (1907), 72.3 . ST ( 1907 ). 71.
6. STU907) , 78.
Co long as we cannot with John Stuart Mill explain the
imperfections of the universe by any limitations in the
Intelligence which contrived it', we are shut up to re-
garding them as intended to correspond with the moral
state and probation of sinners which God foresaw and pro-
vided for at the creation. Evil things in the universe
are the symbols of sin, and helps to its overthrow"
(ST [19073
,
78).
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hence must be assigned chief place
,
1 and yet Strong
granted that the argument has weight '’only upon the sup-
position that a wise, truthful, holy and benevolent God
exists, who has so constituted our minds that their think-
ing and their affections correspond to truth and to him-
p
self,” so that the argument is really a development and ex-
pression of the intuitive idea of God.^ The ontological ar-
gument Strong dismissed still as of little value, because it
’’confounds ideal existence with real existence.” 1' To the
first three arguments, Strong applied, as in previous edi-
tions, the law of parsimony in the interest of one Being,
possessing infinity and perfection, ’’not because they are
demonstrably his, but because our mental constitution will
5
not allow us to think otherwise.”
Scripture records a special revelation of God, which
serves as a corrective of man’s other ideas, and is neces-
sary in view of man’s finiteness and sin. It must not be
forgotten, Strong urged, that "all real knowledge has in it
a divine element, and that we are possessed of complete con-
sciousness only as we live, move and have our being in God.”^
1 . ST (1907 )
,
84 . 2. ST (1907), 84. 3 . ST ( 19C7 ) , 84.
4. ST (1907), 86. Strong remarked that Dorner had given
’’the best statement of the Ontological Argument: ’Reason
thinks of God as existing. Reason would not be reason,
if it did not think of God as existing. Reason only, is,
upon the assumption that God is.’ But this is evidently
not an argument, but only vivid statement of the neces-
sary assumption of the existence of an absolute Reason
which conditions and gives validity to ours” (ST(1907^,
87).
5. 3T ( 1907 )
,
87. 6. ST (1907), 197.
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Inspiration is the result of a special influence of the
Logos who lights all men.'
1
' But for sin, all men would ex-
2perience moral and spiritual inspiration.
It is a reasonable supposition that God, in giving a
revelation, will secure a permanent record of it essential-
ly trustworthy and sufficient for its religious purpose.-'
The facts are accounts for best on the view that inspira-
tion is "characteristically neither natural, partial, nor
mechanical, but supernatural, plenary, and dynamical."^
But no one theory of inspiration is necessary to the Chris-
tian faith, although whatever theory is framed "should be
the result of a strict induction of the Scripture facts,
and not an a priori scheme to which Scripture must be con-
formed . ^
The divine-human character of Scripture has analogies
in the "interpenetration of human powers by the divine ef-
ficiency in regeneration and sanctification, and in the un-
ion of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus
Christ."0 Divine action in inspiration is "in general a
work within man’s soul rather than a communication to him
1. 3T(19C7), 197. 2. ST(1907), 193.
3. ST(19C'7), 193. 4. ST(1907), 211.
5. ST(1907), 211. "Perhaps the best theory is to have no
theory," Strong added.
6. ST (1907), 212.
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from without. 1 The divine-human union in inspiration is
not to be conceived "as one of external impartation and
reception.’’^ The divine agents "spoke and wrote the words
of God... not as from without, but as from within, and that
not passively, but in the most conscious possession and the
most exalted exercise" of their personal powers. 1 While
inspiration uses man’s natural powers, those powers do not
explain inspiration. 1"
Inspiration may retain every imperfection consistent
with truth in a human composition, for it presents divine
truth in human forms. All literary methods, even myth
and legend, may be used for the divine communication of
truth, and we are left to determine in each case the nature
of the form of composition.*1 The early sections of Genesis
_ _ - /
1. ST (1907). 211. Strong commented: "Even when inspiration
is but tne exaltation djhd intensification of man’s natur-
al powers, it must be considered the work of God as well
as of man. God can work from within as well as from with-
out. As creation and regeneration are works of the imma-
nent rather than of the transcendent God, so inspiration
is in general a work within man’s soul ... Prophecy may be
natural to perfect humanity. .. The insight of ' the Scripture
writers into truth so far beyond their mental and moral
powers is inexplicable except by a supernatural influence
upon their minds^; in other words, except as they were
lifted up into _the divine Reason and endowed with the wis-
dom of God" (ST [19073 , 211).
2. 5T( 1907 )
,
212.
3. ST(1907), 212. Strong illustrated the experience of the
Scripture writers by that of the preacher who "under the
influence of God’s spirit is carried beyond himself, and
is conscious of a clearer apprehension of truth and of a
greater ability to utter it than belong to his unaided
nature, yet knows himself to be no passive vehicle of a
divine communication, but to be as never before in possess-
ion and exercise of his own powers" (ST[19C7j, 212). But
he added: "The inspiration of the Scripture writers, how-
ever, goes far beyond the illumination granted to the
preacher, in that it qualifies them to put the truth,
without error, into permanent and written form" (3T[1907J }
4.
• ST (190 7) , 213. 5. ST(19C7), 213. 6. ST(1907), 214.
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"may be of the nature of myth" in which the historical
germ, though not denied, cannot be distinguished by us. 1
Inspiration guarantees inerrancy only in things essen-
tial to the main purpose of the Scripture, and can accom-
plish its purpose through writings in some respects imper-
2feet. It did not generally involve "a direct communication
3
...of the words." The writers appear to have been
so influenced by the Holy Spirit that
they perceived and felt even the new
truths they were to publish, as discov-
eries of their own minds, and were left
to the action of their own minds in the
expression of these truths, with the
single exception that they were super-
naturallv held back from the selection
of wrong words, and when needful were
provided with right ones. A-
Inspiration therefore was not verbal except when "the mere
communication of ideas or the direction to proper material
would not suffice to secures a correct utterance.
As an organic whole, the Scriptures exhibit the work
of one divine mind, notwithstanding the ever-present human
element. Despite imperfections in non-essential matters,
the Bible furnishes "a safe and sufficient guide to truth
and to salvation."''
7
The presence of historical and scienti-
fic errors does not involve the necessity of error in moral-
es
ity and religion. For "as in creation and in Christ, so
in Scripture, God humbles himself to adopt human and imperfect
1. ST(19G7), 214.
4. ST (1907), 216.
7. ST (1907), 218.
2. ST (1907), 215. 3. ST (1907), 216.
5. ST(1907
,
216. 6. ST (1907), 217.
8. ST (1907), 218.
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methods of self-revelation .’’ 1 The unity and authority of
the Bible are "entirely consistent with its gradual evolu-
tion and with great imperfection in its non-essential
2parts . "
In considering objections to the doctrine of inspira-
tion, Strong curiously argued two ways on the matter of
historical and scientific errors in the Bible. On the one
hand, in view of his recent concessions, he contended that
the undermining of the scientific trustworthiness of the
Bible is not destructive of Christianity, because the Bib-
lical religion, contrary to that of the Indian Vedas, is
not dependent upon its physical science, for the Scriptures
"aim only to declare the creatorship and lordship of the
personal God."^ On the other, he retained the statements
of his earlier edition, that "science has not yet shown any
fairly interpreted passage? of Scripture to be untrue."^
Similarly, while he sought to defend the Bible against the
charge of historical errors, he insisted that inspiration
is "consistent with much imperfection in historical detail
and its narratives T do not seem to be exempted from possi-
bilities of error’ ,'T> Even if the apostles wrongly em-
ployed Rabbinical methods of argument, inspiration would
not be disproved, for truth may be made known in such a
1. 3T(1907), 219. This is significant for its anticipation
of Strong’s later Christology.
2. 3T(1907), 220. 3. ST(1907), 222.
4. ST (1907)
,
224. 5. ST(1907), 223.
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manner as to leave its expression to human dialectic and
rhetoric.^- Nor does the composite character of Biblical
books thought to have been written by other authors in-
validate inspiration.^ Job could not have been written in
patriarchal times, Jonah and Daniel may be dramatic compo-
sitions of later date, Isaiah is the work of an exilic as
well as a pre-exilic author, but such concessions do not
3invalidate inspiration.
Scripture has but a mediate and relative authority,
"though human and imperfect records, and needing a supple-
mentary and divine teaching to interpret them,^ and the liv-
ing Christ alone is the ultimate authority.
^
f
ii. The Nature and Decrees of God
In discussing the divine attributes, Strong retained
the distinction between substance and attributes, although
he insisted that they ,fare^correlates
,
--neither one is pos-
sible without the other. ,T The divine essence is revealed
only through the attributes, however, and is unknowable
apart from the attributes.^ At the same time, Strong op-
posed both nominalistic and realistic views of the attri-
butes, holding that the attributes inhere in the divine es-
6
sence.
1. ST (1907), 233. 2. ST(19C7), 236.
3. ST (1907 ) , 236-241. 4. ST (1907) , 220.
'5. ST (I907), 219.
6. ST(1907)
,
243. The application to God of the categories
of substance and attributes is, he said, a necessity of
rational thought (3T(l907J, 243).
7. ST (1907 )
,
246. 6. ST (1907), 245.
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Strong continued to subordinate the rational to the
Biblical method of knowing the attributes.^ He retained
the classification of attributes presented in the 1886 edi-
tion of his theology. The treatment of the attributes
likewise is largely unchanged, except in details.
There is a tendency to quote extensively from philoso-
phical theists, and to employ their material on divine at-
tributes in such a way as to minimize the necessity for
special revelation in arriving at a specifically Christian
concept of God. The treatment of divine personality is de-
veloped not by an exclusive appeal to special redemptive
disclosure, but rather the integral elements of personality
self-consciousness and self-determination, are championed
o
alternately by Biblical and philosophical appeals. The
treatment of divine infinity is developed in opposition to
pantheism; God exists in^no necessary relation to the fi-
nite.*^ But at the same time, God’s infinite is viewed as
infinite energy of spiritual life, so that the transcendent
element in God is not exhausted either in creation or re-
demption.^4" The immutability of God is established by an
1. ST (1907), 247. The Biblical method he defined as the
inductive study of the facts revealed about God in the
Scripture .
2. ST(1907), 252-253. 3. ST (1907)
,
255.
4. "Transcendence is not mere out sidedness ,
—
it is rather
boundless supply within... The former conception of infin
ity is simply supra-cosmic
,
the latter alone is properly
transcendent" (STCI9O7]
,
255).
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appeal both to Scripture and reason.'
1
' The unity of God
likewise is referred to special revelation and to philoso-
phy. 2
Strong’s treatment of divine love and holiness was ex-
panded, in accordance with the preface, to emphasize that
love is not the all-inclusive ethical attribute of God,^
and that holiness is the fundamental divine attribute and
therefore God requires propitiation/ 1 ' If the concept of
God which Strong defended was in almost all points orthodox,
including the divine infinity, triunity and transcendence,
he did modify the statement of divine love to stress that it
"involves also the possibility of divine suffering, and the
suffering of sin which holiness necessitates on the part of
God is itself the atonement. At the same time, Strong re-
sisted the view that holiness is a form of love as involving
the denial of the existence of holiness, and with this the
IT)
denial that any atonement is necessary for man’s salvation. 0
He emphasized that mercy is optional with God, whereas holi-
7
ness is invariable. As against Lotze and Bowne, however,
Strong urged that holy being logically precedes holy willing.
"To make holiness a matter of mere will," Strong protested,
1/ ST (1907
)
,
257. 2. ST (1907
)
,
259.
3. ST (1907 5, 263. 4. ST (1907), 295.
5. ST(19C'7), 266. Strong supported this with appeals to the
writings of Bowne and Royce, among others.
6. ST (1907
)
,
272. *7. ST (1907), 272.
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"instead of regarding it as a characteristic of God T s be-
ing, is to deny that anything is holy in itself. But he
emphasized that God T s holiness is not passive purity, but
2
"purity willing."
Strong’s vindication of the doctrine of the trinity is
discussed in this, as in previous volumes, after the section
on divine attributes is concluded,^ as if the Biblical re-
demptive disclosure of divine triunity is not important for
establishing the divine nature with regard to attributes.
The case for divine triunity is established in terms of
Biblical revelation. The Scripture teaches that the Father,
the Son and the Spirit are divine, 1^ are personal, and are
r
'
one in essence.-'1 Strong maintained that "Scripture reveals
to us a social Trinity and an intercourse of love apart from
and before the existence of the universe." But simultaneous-
ly he argued philosophically that
Love before tiibe implies distinctions of
personality before time. There are three
eternal consciousnesses and three eternal
wills within the divine nature. ..The two
varying systems (i. e., Sabellianism and
Arianism) which ignore this tripersonali-
ty are unscriptural and at the same time
exposed to philosophical objection. 0
Curiously, however, Strong replied to Arianism in part on
the ground that "Arius appealed chiefly to logic, not to
1. Strong’s objection to Lotze and Bowne appears to derive
from a failure to grasp that, for those thinkers, an ac-
tivistic view of substance as being willing replaces that
of the older view of substance. Strong maintained that
"as truth of being logically precedes truth of knowing,
and as a living nature precedes loving emotions, so puri-
ty of substance precedes purity of will" (3T[1907J
,
273).
2. ST (1907), 263-275
.
3. 3T(1907), 304-352.
4. ST (1907), 305-326. 5. ST (1907), 313.
6. ST (1907), 326.
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Scripture .”
1
But he also found in the modern organic
2
views of society hn encouragement to trinitarian thought.
The psychic phenomenon of dual personality in a single hu-
man consciousness should give hesitancy to a denial that
3
three consciousnesses may exist in one God.
Christ is the only revealer of God, the T,only outgo-
ing principle in the Godhead,” Strong affirmed. The whole
creation and its forces and laws are the work and manifesta-
tion of the immanent Christ, who is the life of nature, of
humanity, and of the church, and the principle of progress
and improvement in history. Evolution is his method, and
the laws of nature his habits, for nature is. but the steady
and constant will of Christ, J He is the principle of in-
duction and the medium of intercommunication between minds,
7
as well as the medium of interaction between things.
1. ST (190?), 329.
2. "Humanity at large is also an organism, and this fact
lends new confirmation to the Pauline statement of organic
interdependence. Modern sociology is the doctrine of one
life constituted by the union of man... No man can have a
conscience to himself. All men moreover live, move and
have their being in God. Within the bounds of the one
universal and divine consciousness there are multitudin-
ous finite consciousnesses. Why then should it be thought
incredible that in the nature of this one God there should
be three infinite consciousnesses?” (STCL9073, 332).
3. 3T(1907), 332, 346. 4. ST (1907), 332.
3. ST(1907), 332. Strong added that ”the intellectual and
moral impulses of man, so far as they are normal and up-
lifting. are due to Christ” (ST[1907j, 332).
6. ST(1907;j, 311. In his prior treatment of the divine at-
tributes, Strong wrote: "The uniformity of nature and
the reign of law are nothing but the steady will of the
omnipresent God. Gravitation is God’s omnipresence in
space, as evolution is God’s omnipresence in time”
(STfl907), 232).
7. ST(1907), 311.
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Although Strong reserved Christology for special
treatment, this section on divine triunity affords some ad-
vance indications of concessions made to higher criticism
and bearing upon this subject. The deity of Christ is
clearly affirmed on Scriptural ground, and it is said that
the constant recognition of his divinity in Christian ex-
perience is not an independent witness to his claims 7, since
it only tests the truth already made known in the Bible.
Strong conceded occasions of ignorance during the humilia-
tion of Christ, but denied that he was involved in error
or false teaching, even in the assignment of writings to
Moses and David in contradiction to higher critical assump-
tions, for "it is possible that he intended only to locate
the passages referred to, and if so, his words cannot be
used to exclude critical conclusions as to their authorship
But the main discussion is specifically referred to the la-
ter treatment of Christology.
The statement of the doctrine of divine decrees^ re-
mained substantially unchanged. Strong reemphasized that
the divine thoughts are not automatically creative.^ He re
affirmed his conviction that the decrees render events cer-
tain, but not necessary, and that God’s foreknowledge is
based on this foreordination. ^ He stressed also that this
certainty of man’s actions is consistent with human freedom
T7“3T(1907), 313. 2. 3T(W), 314.
3. ST (1907)
,
333-370. A. ST(190?), 354.
3. 3T(1907), 356. 6. 3T(190?), 360.
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iii. The Works of God
Strong’s treatment of creation reflects the same
disturbing presence of his older and newer views, side by-
side and unreconciled, because his method of revision of-
ten included the addition of supplementary notes, in small
type, to the earlier material. Consequently, the newly
added notes must be taken as reflective of his latest po-
sition.
Creation, he defined, as previously, as "designed ori-
gination, by a transcendent and personal God, of that which
itself is not God. But this was not to be taken as im-
plying duality of substance. Just as man creates ideas
and volitions without the use of pre-existing material,
and these volitions "are riot ourselves, and we are greater
2than they," so the universe is related to God. Creation
is
not simply the idea of God, or even the
plan of God, Sut it is the idea external-
ized, the plan executed; in other words,
it implies an exercise, not only of in-
tellect, but also of will, and this will
is not an instinctive and unconscious
will, but a will that is personal and
free. Such exercise of will seems to in-
volve, not self-development
,
but self-
limitation, on the part of God; the trans-
formation of energy into force, and so a
beginning of time, with its finite success-
ions.
3
This view of creation, Strong acknowledged
,
"is so nearly
that of Lotze"--for whom the only real creation was that of
1. ST (1907), 371. 2. ST(1907)
,
371.
3. ST (1907), 371.
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finite personalities, matter being only a mode of the di-
vine activity—that Strong included a condensation of Ten
Broeke’s statement of the Lotzean view.^ This summary, al-
though Strong, did not comment upon these specific points,
included the statement that space is merely a form of dy-
namic appearance, and that physical phenomena are activities
of the Infinite to whi ch man gives a substantive character
because he thinks under the form of substance and attribute.
Strong denied that the doctrine of creation is bound
to the phrase "creation out of nothing," and contended that
"the phrase is a philosophical one, for which we have no
Scriptural warrant."^ Its intention can be expressed bet-
ter, he insisted, in the phrase "without use of preexisting
o 1
materials."^ Creation is not "an emanation from the sub-
stance of Deity, but is a making of that to exist which
once did not exist, either in form or substance."^ But
Strong hastened to explain that "substance is not necessar-
ily material," but is to be conceived rather after the an-
alogy of our ideas and volitions, as a manifestation of
spirit.-' But "nature is not God nor a part of God, any
1. ST(1907), 372. Strong commented: "Bowne, in his Meta-
physics and his Philosophy of Theism, is the best expo-
sitor of Lotze’s system" (3T£1907], 372). This state-
ment, more than the frequent quotations from Bowne and
other idealists, suggests how influential Bowne may
have been in bringing the personalist ic view to Strong’s
attention.
2. ST (1907), 372. 4. ST (190$), 372.
4* ST (1907), 372o "There is nothing divine in creation
but the origination of substance," Strong added
(3Tri907], 373).
5. ST (1907), 373.
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more than our ideas and volitions are ourselves or a part
of ourselves,' 1 Strong urged. ^ Although a "partial mani-
o
festation" of God, nature does not exhaust him.
All persons of the Trinity have a part in the work
of creation, the Father being the originating, the Son
the mediating, and the Holy Spirit the realizing cause.
3
All creative activity is exercised through Christ. 4 The
Spirit is "the principle of our natural self-conscious-
ness, uniting subject and object in a subject-object" and
"may be regarded as the perfecting and realizing agent in
the externalization of the divine ideas.
Proof of the doctrine of creation rests upon Scrip-
ture. ^ But our own creation of ideas and volitions fur-
nishes a remote analogy for divine creation without pre-
existing materials. ^ Creation is not simply God’s
thought, but also God’s will. It is
thought in expression, reason externalized.
Will is creation out of nothing, in the
sense that there is no use of preexisting
material. In man’s exercise of the creative
imagipati on there is will, as well as intel-
lect. 0
The new conception of "nature as the expression of the di-
1. 3T(190$), 373. Creation differs in kind from the eter-
nal process of the divine nature in virtue of which
theologians speak of generation and procession, Strong
added, for it is not an instinctive or necessary pro-
cess of the divine nature, but the free act of a ration-
al will. But elsewhere he stated that "Christ’s crea-
tion of man may be like his own begetting by the Father"
(3T[1907J, 3 Si).
2. ST (1907), 373. 3. ST(1907), 373. 4. ST(1907)
,
373.
5. ST (1907), 373. 6. ST(1907), 374. 7. ST( 1907
)
,
3S0.
So ST (1907 ) , 3 SO.
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vine mind and will” should make creation more comprehend-
able, Strong urged, than the old conception of the "world
as substance capable of existing apart from God.
The Biblical doctrine is to be distinguished from
that of emanation, which holds that "the universe is of
the same substance with God, and is the product of suc-
cessive evolutions from his being." Such a view contra-
dicts the divine holiness, since "man, who by the theory
is of the substance of God, is nevertheless morally evil,"
and logically leads to pantheism.^ The doctrine of ema-
nation is "distinctly materialistic," Strong protested,
whereas he viewed the universe as "an expression of God,
but not an emanation from God."^ Emanation holds that
"some stuff has proceeded from the nature of God, and that
God lias formed this stuff into the universe," he continued,
whereas matter is "not composed of stuff at all" but is
"merely an activity o^- God. "5 Creation involves an act of
divine will, whereas emanation views the world as neces-
sary or inevitable. 0 The true view is not the materialis-
1. 3T(19C7), 3S1. 2. ST (1907), 333. 3. ST(1907), 333.
4. ST(19C7), 334. 5. ST(19C7)
,
335.
6. Strong appealed to Lotze for the distinction: "Lotze,
Philos. Religion, xlviii, li, distinguishes creation
from emanation by saying that creation necessitates a
divine Will, while emanation flows by natural conse-
quence from the being of God. God’s motive in creation
is love, which urges him to communicate his holiness to
other beings. God creates individual finite spirits,
and then permits the thought, which at first was only
his, to become the thought of these other spirits.
This transference of his thought by will is the creation
of the world" (STtl90?l, 335).
7. ST (1907), 336.
.'
'
, t <
.
i
<
<
_
n
* ^nxs
;
•
-
. E
,
- .
; 3 - : • • ‘ *•'
.
c
'
‘
t
[
: e i
"•
•
;
—
.
- c
_
•
v tc : .v
.
:
.. .. i
) . .
C; J. - -> ; -
.
1
^
_
.
-
-
•' • <
:
302
tic emanation imagined by Swedenborg, but rather
divine energizing in space and time. The
universe is God T s system of graded self-
limitation, from matter up to mind. It has
had a beginning, and God has instituted it.
It is a finite and partial manifestation of
the infinite Spirit. Matter is an expres-
sion of spirit, but not an emanation from
spirit, any more than our thoughts and voli-
tions are. Finite spirits, on the other
hand, are differentiations within the being
of God himself, and so are not emanations
from him.l
This act of divine will, required for creation, is not
eternally active; a distinction must be made between the
plan and its execution. ^ "A God existing in necessary
relations to the universe, if different in substance from
the universe, must be the God of dualism,” Strong af-
firmed, and if he is "of the same substance with the uni-
verse, must be the God of pantheism."-^
As against the theory of creation from eternity,
Scripture requires the view that the universe had a be-
ginning, and "reason itself is better satisfied" with
this view.^ Eternity is not merely a prolongation of time
into the endless past, but rather, is superiority to the
law of time. ^
Strong introduced his appraisal of the Mosaic account
of creation by affirming that evolutionary schemes which
1. 3T(1907), 336. The reference to finite spirits here is
ambiguous on the question, whether they are parts of
God or not. The subject is postponed to Strong T s sub-
sequent treatment, which leaves this beyond doubt.
2o ST (1907
)
,
333. 3. ST(1907), 339.
4. ST (1907), 3 &7. 3. ST (1907), 337.
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ignore the freedom of God ’’are pantheistic in their tenden-
cies, for they practically deny both God’s transcendence
and his personality.”^ The error of many statements of the
doctrine is that evolution is regarded as an eternal or
2
self-originated process. The Mosaic account recognizes
3
original creation, unlike the heathen cosmoganies, and
also subsequent development.^ Strong granted the "proba-
bility that the great majority of what we call species were
produced” by natural descent from a "few original germs,”
and held that if all present species of living creatures
were derived thus, and the original germs were themselves
evolved from inorganic forces and materials, it would not
follow that the Mosaic account has been proved untrue. ^
The interpretation of the word bara need only be revised to
give it the meaning of mediate creation, or creation by
y
law, he affirmed.
The influence _of the new immanentism upon Strong’s
statement of beginnings is reflected in the suggestion that
1. ST (1907), 390. ”God is not bound by law or to law,”
Strong emphasized. ’’Wisdom does not imply monotony or
uniformity. God can do a thing once that is never done
again. Circumstances are never twice alike. Here is
the basis not only of creation but of new creation, in-
cluding miracle, incarnation, resurrection, regenera-
tion, redemption. . .Law i s only a methodj it presupposes
a lawgiver and requires an agent. Gravitation and' evo-
lution are but the habitual operations of God. If spon-
taneous generation should be proved true, it would be
only God’s way of originating" lif e” (STfl907), 390).'
2. ST (1907), 391. 3 . ST (1907 ) , 391. 4. ST (1907 ) , 392.
5. ST (1907), 392.
6. ST(1907), 392. The meaning of mediate creation, Strong
added, ’’might almost seem to be favored” by the mode of
statement in Genesis 1:11, 1:20, 2:7 and 2:9*
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"we may even speak of an immanent transcendence of God--
an unexhausted vitality which at times makes great move-
ments forward,"-*- since both higher and lower forms of
energy are constantly dependent upon God.
Strong declared agpiin for the pictorial-summary
interpretation of Genesis, remarking that the narrative’s
general correspondence with scientific teaching and "its
power to adapt itself to every advance in human knowledge"
differentiate it from all other cosmoganies. Strong re-
tained his scheme of geologic ages, which assumed f or its
background the substantial truth of the nebular hypothesis
and the scientific conclusions of Dana and Guyot
,
although
he acknowledged that "any such scheme of reconciliation
may be speedily outgrown."-^
Physical pain and imperfection are embraced in the
universe as forseen consequences of sin and constitute, in
part, a means of future discipline and redemption, Strong
held.^ Bushnell’s idea of "anticipative consequences" was
accepted. At the same time Strong rejected the view that
evil is the indispensable condition of the good, and that
sin is a direct product of God’s will; rather, in spite of
itself, sin is made by an overruling providence to contri-
bute to the highest good.° The present universe, viewed
TT"3T(1907), 393 o 2. ST(1907
)
,
394. 3. ST (1907), 395.
4. ST (1907 ) , 402. 5. ST ( 1907 ) , 403. 6. ST (1907), 404.
7. ST (1907), 404.
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as a partial realization of a developing divine plan, is
the best possible for this specific moment.
-
1
-
Strong’s treatment of the doctrine of preservation
emphasized that preservation is a positive divine agency,
not a mere refraining to destroy, and that it implies a
natural concurrence of God in all operations of matter and
2
mind. Although personal wills not reducible to God’s
will exist, yet no person or force could exist without
divine concurrence.
Force implies a will which it expresses directly or
indirectly. ^ We know of force only through our own voli-
tions. "Since will is the only cause of which we have
direct knowledge," Strong repeated from his earlier essays,
"second causes in nature may be regarded as only secondary,
regular, and automatic workings of the great first Cause.
Strong therefore adopted "the view of Maine de Biran, that
5
causation pertains only to spirit."
1. ST (1907), 404. 2. ST(1907), 411. 3 .ST(1907), 412.
4. ST(1907) } 412. "It is often objected that we cannot
thus identify force with will, because in many causes
the effort of our will is fruitless for the reason that
nervous and muscular force is lacking. But this proves
only that force cannot be identified with human will,
not that it cannot be identified with the divine will.
To the divine will no force is lacking; in God will and
force are one" (STC1907], 412).
5. ST (1907), 412. Strong criticized Hodge’s theology on
this ground, as well as the objection of his former
teacher at Yale, Noah Porter, who had written that
"because we derive our notion of cause from will, it
does not follow that the causal relation always involves
will; it would follow that the universe, so far as it is
not intelligent, is impossible" ( Human Intellect , 5&B).
Strong replied that "no dead thing can act" '(ST£l907j,
412
,
413 )
•
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Preservation is therefore God’s "continuous willing,"
which leaves room for human freedom, responsibility, sin and
guilt. 1 The physical universe is in no sense independent of
God, for its forces are only his constant willing and its
laws are the divine habits. Finite personal beings have
"a real existence and a relative independence" but "retain
their being and their powers only as they are upheld by
God." 3
Even on the monistic approach, Strong held,
we may speak of second causes in nature, since
God’s regular and habitual action is a second
and subsequential thing, while his act of
initiation and organization is the first.
Neither the universe nor any part of it is to
be identified with God, any more than my .
thoughts and acts are to be identified with me.^
The doctrine of continuous creation maintains a true insis-
tence that all force is will, but erroneously maintains that
"all force is divine: will, and divine will in direct exer-
cise," whereas the forces of nature are "secondary and auto-
matic, not primary and immediate, workings of God." 3 Pre-
servation takes a mean position between the denial of first
cause and the denial of second causes.
Since Christ sustains all creation, preservation in-
volves his suffering, and "this suffering is his atonement,
1. ST (1907), 413. 2. ST(1907), 413-414.
3. ST (1907), 414. 4. ST (1907), 416-417-
5- ST (1907), 416. 6. ST (1907)
,
418.
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of which the culmination and demonstration are seen in the
cross of Calvary."'*'
Providence explains the evolution and progress of the
universe, as preservation explains its continuance, and
creation its existence, Strong pointed out.^ As the only
revealer of God, Christ is the medium of providence, as well
3
as of every other divine activity. The Hebrew writers "saw
in second causes the operation of the great first Caused
and, because even the acts of wicked men entered into the
divine plan, they sometimes represented God as doing what
5finite spirits were permitted to do.
Special providence is not to be distinguished from
general providence in terms of miracle, Strong added, but
only in terms of the impression produced upon men.^
Miracles and wd rks of grace like regeneration
are not to be regarded as belonging to a dif-
ferent orcfer of things from God’s special pro-
vidences. They too, like special providences,
may have their natural connections and antece-
dents, although they more readily suggest
their divine authorship. Nature and God are
not mutually exclusive,—nature is rather
God’s method of working. Since nature is only
the manifestation of God, special providence,
miracle, and regeneration are simply different
degrees of extraordinary nature. Certain of
the wonders of Scripture, such as the destruc-
tion of Sennacherib’s army and the dividing of
the Red Sea, the plagues of Egypt, the flight
of quails, and the draught of fishes, can be
counted as exaggerations of natural forces,
while at the same time they are operations of
the wonder-working God.
7
1. ST (1907), 419. 2. 3T(1907), 419. 3. ST( 1907 ), 419.
4* ST (1907), 424. Strong illustrated with the words of
Psalm 29:3, "the God of glory thundereth.”
5. ST (1907), 424. 6. STU907), 432. 7. ST(1907), 432.
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Strong declared the "line between the natural and the super-
natural, between special providence and miracle" to be arbi-
trary, and insisted that "the same event may often be re-
garded either as special providence or as miracle" according-
ly as one adopts the viewpoint of its relation to other
events or that of its relation to God.”*-
Divine answer to prayer may come, even when a change of
the sequences of nature is involved, by new combinations of
natural forces but without suspension or violation of law,
or by the operation of divinely prearranged natural agen-
cies. In view of God’s immanence, an answer to prayer by
natural means is as much a revelation of personal divine
care as a suspension of the laws of nature.-^
Strong’s treatment of the doctrine of angels, including
Satanology
,
was substantially unchanged.^ He emphasized,
however, that "good angels are not to be considered as the
mediating agents of God’s regular and common providence, but
as the ministers of his special revelation in the affairs of
the church. "5 Their power is dependent and derived, and is
exercised "in accordance with the laws of the spiritual and
£
natural world" and hence is non-miraculous .
"
Strong defended the doctrine of heaven against the ob-
jection that it is precluded by modern belief i n an infinite
1. ST(1907), 432. Jesus’ healings likewise "may be suscep-
tible of natural explanation, while yet they show that
Christ is absolute Lord of nature" (STC1907J, 432-433)*
2. ST (1907), 434, 435* 3* ST(1907), 436.
4. ST 1907
,
443-464.
5. ST(1907), 452. Their intervention is occasional and ex-
ceptional, Stro rg added, by divine permission or command.
6. ST (1907)
,
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space peopled with worlds, on the ground that the notion of
an infinite universe is unwarranted. But simultaneously he
affirmed that the notions of "heaven as a definite place"
and of "spirits as confined to fixed locality" are likewise
without certain warrant in Scripture and in philosophy. 1
"We know nothing," he wrote, "of the modes of existence of
pure spirits.”^ Heaven and hell, therefore, he viewed as
essentially conditions corresponding to spiritual character.
Angels may be free from the laws of time and space. The
existence and working of good and evil angels Strong ac-
cepted "as a matter of faith, without professing to under-
stand their relations to space. "3
Angels, like men, were created in Christ and are sus-
4tained by him, so that he "must suffer in their sin."
5God, if he consistently could, would save them. One reason
no redemption may be provided for fallen angels is that
S'-
their incorporeal being afforded "no opportunity for Christ
to objectify his grace and visibly to join himself to them.
But the silence of Scripture does not prove that no salva-
tion is provided for them, for their present judgment is
temporary, and their final state remains to be revealed.
^
iv. Anthropology
The origin of man, even more than the evolution of
lower creatures, requires a reference to a divine originating
£
agency, Strong insisted. But the Scriptures do not dis-
1. ST (1907 ) , 459. 2. ST(1907), 459. 3. ST (1907), 460.
4. ST (1907), 464. 5. ST (1907), 464. 6. ST (1907), 464.
7. ST (1907), 464. 6. ST(1907), 465 .
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close the method of his creation, so that mediate creation,
whereby man’s physical system is derived by natural descent
from the lower animals, is not precluded.^" Since evolution
is but the divine method, it does not make a Creator super-
fluous. 2 But a doctrine of man’s emergence ”at the proper
time, governed by different laws from the brute creation
yet growing out of the brute” is perfectly consistent with
the Scriptures.^ Theistic evolution recognizes the whole
process of human creation as ’’equally the work of nature and
the work of God.”^
But what chiefly constitutes man as essentially distinct
from the brute ’’could not have been derived, by any natural
process of development, from the inferior creatures.”^
Psychology attests this radical difference between human and
animal intelligence, ’’especially man’s possession of self-
consciousness, general ideas, the moral sense, and the power
of self-determination. While the divine inbreathing was
a mediate creation in that it presupposed ’’existing material
in the shape of animal forms,” it was nonetheless an imme-
diate creation in that ”only a divine reinforcement of the
process of life turned the animal into man.”' Man came not
from, but through, the brute, by an activity of the immanent
1. ST (1907), 465 . God may have breathed into ’’animated dust,
using natural means ”as far as they would go,” Strong
urged. Thus ’’man sustained to the highest preceding brute
the same relation which the multiplied bread and fish sus-
tained to the five loaves and two fishes... or which the
wine sustained to the water which was transformed at Cana”
(ST 0-907], 465).
2. STCL907), 466. 3. ST (1907)
,
466. 4 . ST (1907), 466.
5. ST (1907), 466. 6. ST(1907), 466. 7. ST(1907), 466.
t fl.-
j 3 :.!£• --i • dt c* , ;cxJ. . i:-
rio iiori. 9 01 arid aeolo
'
.
.
:/ij6 ID -Jjnd SHJ 3Wf.i 3r.ois11.i fasxnsvog
d $uo :gnxwoig
: •
. ~c». ' : ' ei ,^o nxrnuii lo eesoo^
. O . ‘to 5 'lOW -I.
iqexb \IIr i^n9 E 59 SB hbc eeJvJttsn cc
.
.
;,n£ fl.3£!iiri naew^ad &Da9\:o'. ib laoxb.-i " s TQOi.Oi'io^E-
-
.
•
« j=. gfiXjLXX,S» Jb9 BOO f$Af ^ S'XCj. C£ 3 iffit XI £ CIO j -J E-
"
) 0do£.3&fn £
«
.si sbbp juK ’ ,! • r.r/>.- odni IcrcJtaB c-:io ba'^vc tc io esBoo'iq
t t
:
/' •'xri-d' di/cf
*
’ I owd bns eevBoi e
- L • J <-)
.
)T8 * - •
.
«(TO?I)
Comparative physiology has adducedGod who created both.^
no single instance of the transforms. tion of one animal spe-
cies into another, nor has it demonstrated the development
2
of an animal body into that of a man. All evolution is
unintelligible apart from new impulses to the process by the
3direct activity of the immanent God. The soul was an imme-
diate creation of God, but the body, too, was "in this sense
an immediate creation also."^" Darwin was right, that man
has evolved by gradual change and improvement of lower into
higher forms of life, but his theory is only partially true.
For the laws of man’s organic development are but divine
methods and proofs of divine creatorship, and man appeared
on the scene as no longer brute, but as a self-conscious,
self-determining image of the Creator, capable of free moral
decision.^
1. 3T(1907 ) , 467* "While we grant, then, that man is the
last stage in the development of life and that he has a
brute ancestry, we regard him also as the offspring of
God. The same God who was the author of the brute became
in due time the creator of man. Though man came throug
h
the brute, he did not come from the brute, but from God,
the Father of spirits and the author of all life"
( ST (1907)
,
469) '.
2. ST (1907), 470. 3. ST (1907), 470. 4. ST (1907), 470.
5. 5T(1907), 470. "It was not Darwin, but disciples like
Haeckel, who put forward the theory as making the hypo-
thesis of a Creator superfluous. We grant the principle
of evolution, but we regard it as only the method of di-
vine intelligence, and must moreover consider it as pre-
ceded by an original creative act, introducing vegetable
and animal life, and as supplemented by other creative
acts, at the introduction of man and at the incarnation
of Christ" (STC1907], 473).
6. ST (1907 ) , 472.
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In the same discussion, Strong applied the new immanence
by anticipation to the doctrine of regeneration. "Both man’s
original creation and his new creation in regeneration,"
Strong wrote, "are creations from within, rather than from
without. In both cases, God builds the new upon the basis
of the old."^
Since man is a personal being in the divine image, di-
vinely originated and sustained, he is related naturally to
2
God as Father. This natural sonship "underlies the history
of the fall, and qualifies the doctrine of sin," and also
prepares the way "for the spiritual sonship of those who join
themselves to him by faith. God is physically and natural-
ly the Father of all mankind, but morally and spiritually the
Father only of those renewed by his Spirit.^4” The descent of
humanity from^a single pair underlies the organic unity of
mankind in the fall, the provision of salvation for the race
in Christ, and "constitutes the ground of man’s obligation
of natural brotherhood to every member of the race."^
Strong retained his dichotomous view of man, emphasizing
that man’s spiritual nature possesses duality of powers,
^
T7“ST(1907), 472. 2. ST (1907), 474. 3. ST(1907), 474.
4. ST (1907 ) , 475. 5. ST(1907), 476.
6. ST (1907), 466. Strong added this curious comment to the
discussion of dichotomy: "Man is different in kind,
though possessed of certain powers which the brute has...
The animal is different in kind from the vegetable,
though he has some of the same powers which the vegetable
has. God’s powers include man’s; but man is not of the
same substance with God, nor could man be enlarged or
developed into God. So man’s powers include those of the
brute, but the brute is not of the same substance with
man, nor could he be enlarged or developed into man"
( ST [ 19073
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but unity of substance. He supported his earlier traducian
view of the origin of the soul with the insistence that the
Biblical passages cited by creationists "may with equal pro-
priety be regarded as expressing God’s mediate agency."^
Strong opposed creationism as involving "endless m irac le ,
”
p
whereas "God works in nature through second causes." The
individuality of human personality is shaped by environment
and heredity, but also by a law of variation impressed upon
the human species by the immanent God.^ Traducianism "admits
a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of the
human species" whereby a superintending Providence supervises
"special improvements in type at the birth of marked men,
similar to those which we may suppose to have occurred in the
introduction of new varieties in the animal creation."^
1. 3T(1907 ) , 491. "We do not hesitate to interpret these...
passages as-expressive of mediate, not immediate, creator-
ship, --God works through natural laws of generation and
development so far as the production of man’s body is con-
cerned. None of the passages .. .forbid us to suppose that
he works through these same natural laws in the production
of the soul. The truth in creatianism is the presence and
operation of God in all natural processes. A transcendent
God manifests himself in all physical begetting" (STtl907]>
492).
2. ST(1907), 495. God does not "create a new vital principle
at the beginning of each separate apple, and of each
separate dog. Each of these is the result of a self-
multiplying force, implanted once for all in the first of
the race. To say.. .that God is the immediate author of
each new individual, is to deny second causes, and to merge
nature in God. The whole tendency of modern science is in
the opposite direction. Nor is there any good reason for
making the origin of the individual human soul an exception
to the general rule" (ST(l907j, 495).
3. Genius is "often another name for Providence," Strong wrote
(3Ttl907], 492).
4. ST(1907), 496.
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The striking thing about Strong 1 s treatment of the
soul is the almost complete absence of any reference to
the self-psychology
,
as against the traditional soul-sub-
stance view. Man’s nature, as noted, he viewed as two-
fold, material^- and immaterial, and he supported dichotomy
as against trichotomy. There occurs, however, an incidental
comment of Strong’s, to the effect that ” substance does not
necessarily imply either extension or figure . Substantia
is simply that which stands under, underlies, supports,”
he wrote, ”or in other words that which is the ground of
phenomena. Therefore the mind, while created, did not
come into being, Strong urged, by any ’’dividing up, or
splitting off, as if the mind were a material mass.”^ In
this connection, Strong referred to Ladd, and to Lotze whom
Ladd quoted^ as repudiating the idea that the mind is sus-
ceptible of division. In the quotation from Ladd^ occurs
the statement: ’’The child’s mind does not exist before it
acts. Its activities are its existence.” Strong’s only
comment on the quotation was:
So we might say that a flame has no exis-
tence before it acts. Yet it may owe its
existence to a preceding flame. The Indian
proverb is: ’No lotus without a stem. ’5
That appears to be the sum-total of Strong’s interaction
with the newer self-psychology. Elsewhere, it should be
recalled, he insisted on the distinction between being
and activity.
^
1. Strong nowhere discussed the relationship of the human
body to the physical universe in idealistic terms.
2. ST (1907 ) , 495. 3. ST (1907), 495.
4. Ladd, Philosophy of Mind
. 206, 259-366.
5. ST (1907), 495. 6. Supra
. 294.*
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Strong retained the insistence that the moral reason is
depraved by sin, so that conscience "has only a perverse
standard by which to judge. Conscience is the echo of
God T s voice, but only the echo.
2
The soul has will-power to choose between motives,
Strong claimed, consistently with his essays taking excep-
tion to Edwards* view of the will. But, as against Arminian-
ism, Strong contended that the soul always acts in view of
motives. Motives are internal as well as external, but they
are not causal, as natural law is.^ Man has a conditional
and limited freedom.^ Man has the power of contrary choice,
limited by his permanent moral state, although the latter
can be overruled in divine regeneration. ^ Man is totally de-
praved, so that the sinful bent of his affections is constant
and inveterate but he is not as bad as he might be.
Man’s present state contrasts with that of his origin,
which was holy and childlike. ^ But man possessed a likeness
to God in terms both of personality and holiness. The Logos
so indwells and constitutes the principle of humanity’s
being that mankind "shares with Christ in the image of God."^
This divine element in man takes away all right "to use a
human being merely for our own pleasure or profit. "9 This
1. ST (1907), 501. 2. ST (1907 ) , 504, 3. ST( 1907 ) , 506.
4. ST (1907), 507. 5. ST(1907), 507. 6. ST(1907), 510.
7. ST (1907 ) , 514. S. ST(1907), 515.
9. ST(1907), 516. In receiving man, Strong added, "we re-
ceive Christ, and in receiving Christ we receive him who
sent Christ ... Chri st is the vine and all men are his
natural branches, cutting themselves off only when they
refuse to bear fruit, and condemning themselves to th«
burning only because they destroy, so far as they can
destroy, God’s image in them, all that makes them worth
preserving" (ST [1907], 516).
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leads also to "kind and reverent treatment” of the lower
animals in which tT so many human characteristics are fore-
shadowed.” 1 In view of the fall, however, the dignity of
human nature consists not so much in man’s actual state, as
in the divine intention for him, looking to the restoration
of the lost image by the soul’s union with Christ. ^
Strong’s statement of divine law did not differ essen-
tially from the earlier development. The phrasing is not
reconciled, at times, with a one- sub stance theory of reality,
as when, having defined God’s law as ”a general expression
of the divine will enforced by power” and existing under the
two forms of elemental law and positive enactment, Strong
described the former as ’’law inwrought into the elements,
substances, and forces of the rational and irrational crea-
tion.”-^ Morantr law is a revelation of eternal reality, not
simply a test of obedience.^ By positive enactment Strong
intended published expressions of the divine will.-* Such
are general moral precepts, as written summaries of elemental
law or authorized applications of it to human conditions, and
ceremonial or special injunctions.^
IT'ST(1907), 517.
2. ’’Because of his future possibilities, the meanest of man-
kind is sacred" (STC19073, 517).
3. ST(1907), 536.
4. "God’s nature is reflected in the laws of our nature.
Since law is inwrought into man’s nature, man is a law
unto himself. To conform to his own nature, in which con-
science is supreme, is to conform to the nature of God.
The law isonly the revelation of theconstitutive princi-
ples of being, the declaration of v:hat must be, so long as
man is man and God is God” (STC1907J, 539).
5. ST(1907), 544. 6. ST(1907), 545.
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The treatment of sin remained quite solidly on the
orthodox side.'1' But there are significant changes looking
to immanentism. Strong retained the emphasis, against the
New School tendency to limit sin to mere act, that sin is
coextensive with activity rather than state; sin is "not
passive impurity but is impurity willing." But alongside
the evil bent of human will a perpetual immanent divine pow-
er operates so as to counteract greatly the force of evil
"and if not resisted leads the individual soul— even when
resisted leads the race at large—toward truth and salva-
tion."-^ This divine principle in man strives against the
selfish will, furnishing an original grace even more power-
ful than original sin.^ The essential principle of sin is
selfishness.^ Although man is derived from a brute ancestry,
he is under no necessity to violate the law of his being,
and retains power to recognize and realize moral ideals . 0
While the Augustinian estimate of heathen virtues as "splen-
did vices" must be rejected, for they "were relatively good
and useful,—they still, except in possible instances where
God’s Spirit wrought upon the heart, were illustrations of a
morality divorced from love to God" and consequently lacked
the main element demanded by the law, and as such were infect-
ed with sin. ^ The law "judges all action by the heart from
1. 3T(1907), 549-5^2.
2. ST (1907), 550. The same tendency to an activistic view,
found in the insistence that divine holiness is "purity
willing" rather than passive purity, is seen in this for-
mulation of sin. But in both cases, Strong retained the
notion of an underlying state, along with the activity.
3. ST(1907
,
551.
6. ST (1907), 560.
4. ST(1907
7. ST ( 1907
552.
570.
5. ST (1907 ) , 559.
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which it springs," and therefore "no action of the unregen-
erate can be other than sin ." 1 Biblical passages which seem
on the surface to ascribe a goodness to certain man which
renders them divinely acceptable actually involve "a merely
imperfect and fancied goodness, a goodness of mere aspira-
tion and impulse due to preliminary workings of God 1 s Spir-
it," or a goodness resulting from conscious faith in divine
salvation. The noble impulses of unregenerate men must be
attributed to Christ, not to unaided human nature, and these
influences of grace, "if resisted, leave the soul in more
than its original darkness."-^
The origin of human sin is traced to the personal act
of Adam.^ The general character of the story of the fall is
historical, and its particular features are "incidents suit-
able to manors- condition of innocent but untried childhood.
Man fell by "wilful resistance to the inworking God," Strong
held. "Christ is in all men as he was in Adam, and all good
impulses are due to him."^
Adam’s sin is "the cause and ground of the depravity,
guilt, and condemnation of all his posterity" because "in
virtue of their organic unity, the sin of Adam is the sin of
the race."' Strong defended his view of imputation against
"the arbitrary and mechanical charging to a man of that for
TTST(1907), 570. 2. ST (1907 ) , 574. 3. ST(1907), 574.
4. ST(1907), 582 . 5 . ST(1907), 5^3. 6 . ST(1907), 5^7.
7. ST (1907), 593.
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which he is not naturally responsible.” Rather, it is
"the reckoning to a man of a guilt which is properly his
own, whether by virtue of his individual acts, or by vir-
tue of his connection with the race."^ It i s clear from
this latter statement how Strong had shaped a principle of
imputation which would involve Christ in guilt, on ethical
3
monist assumptions.-'
Strong affirmed the doctrine of original sin to be
"only the ethical interpretation of biological facts—the
facts of heredity and of universal congenital ills, which
demand an ethical ground and explanation."^ He therefore
viewed the doctrine rather as an inference from Scripture,
5than as a matter of direct Biblical teaching. But the
"final test of every theory... is its conformity to Scrip-
ture," String affirmed.
The doctrine of original sin "has for its correlate,"
Strong held,
the idea of original grace, or the abiding
presence and operation of Christ, the imma-
rr3T(1907), 594. 2. ST(1907), 594.
3. Strong asserted that a real union furnishes the realistic
basis for imputation between Adam and his descendants,
Christ and the race, and believers and Christ.
4. ST ( 1907 ) , 596.
3. The Augustin ian theory of Adam’s natural headship, that
Adam and his descendants are naturally and organically
one, "explains the largest number of facts, is least open
to objection, and is most accordant with Scripture,"
Strong wrote (ST£l907j, 597).
6. The lower views, Strong complained, have "no proper idea
of the union of the believer with Christ, and so they
have no proper idea of the union of the race with Adam...
To make Christ’s death the mere oc casion of the death of
the believer, and Adam’s sin the mere occasion of the
sins of men, is to ignore the central truths of Paul’s
teaching—the vital union of the believer with Christ,^
and the vital union of the race with Adam" (ST[19073> 609).
..
.
Jc.XrtOM
.
; < 5 . rp, l'i(, -O v... •sSoob *t:3 bx r 'M i..iO-z$Z
..
,
'
. .
(
.
<
:
,
TIG? c v *1 '?'.'. ' - ‘IXS •••; iP . > i Ov. •
<
~
•
'O X i
.r ; . .
,
•? . - ii is i^o ' o : > -
-
'.t.xnoSi' lx br»r . £ ftei • - .1 rroi?;.. o:.-: '.oi d.s ;«o
i
.o,\
,
, . ;
.
*
no
'
•
# (V^ ,C; K '<;
. t
*
"
•
•
o •J'l. i. f.-iS ' - v'\ J
' bA OiTB
,
*X©V
:
.
f
•.
'u7 ~ T~ o'j ifci. '.so Slid
-
o-K n; . ( : , ner. ;
r '
-
"
'
320
nent God, in every member of the race, in
spite of his sin, to counteract the evil
and to prepare the way, so far as man will
permit, for individual and collective sal-
vation . 1
But this activity of the Holy Spirit does not of itself re-
move the depravity or condemnation derived from the fall of
Adam.
^
Strong continued to oppose his view of Adam’s natural
headship to the representative view involved in the theory
3
of federal headship. ’’Imputation of sin cannot precede
and account for corruption,” he protested; rather, ’’corrup-
tion must precede and account for imputation.”^ Adam’s sin
is imputed to mankind immediately, not as something foreign,
but ’’because it is ours--we and all other men have existed
5
as one moral person or one moral whole in him.” -' The recent
conceptions of the reign of law and of the principle of
heredity, Strong held, tended to support such an anthro-
pology. ’’The doctrine of Adam’s Natural Headship,” he
wrote, ”is only a doctrine of the hereditary transmission
of character from the first father of the race to his des-
cendants.” In view of this, he added, "we use the word
’imputation’ in its proper sense—that of reckoning or
6
charging to us of that which is truly and properly ours.”
rr“ST(1907), 596.
2. This influence of the immanent God "mitigates the ef-
fects of this Fall and strives to prepare men for salva-
tion” but it does not remove human depravity or condem-
nation; rather, it "only puts side by side with that de-
pravity and condemnation influences and impulses which
counteract the evil and urge the sinner to repentance”
(STfl907j, 603).
3. ST (1907), 612-616. 4. ST(1907), 616.
5. ST (1907), 620 . 6. ST (1907), 621 .
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The hypothesis of r,a determination of the will of
each member of the race prior to his individual conscious-
ness rf furnishes the key to "many more difficulties than it
suggests," for it throws light on the problem of "our ac-
countability for a sinful nature which we have not personal-
ly and consciously originated."^ The Augustinian view of
man’s guilt in Adam, therefore, affords the best solution of
2
the facts of inborn depravity and our accountability for it.
But the theory of the method of racial union with Adam is,
Strong stressed again, "merely a valuable hypothesis" to ex-
plain facts by Scripture, "that the sin of Adam is the imme-
diate cause and ground of inborn depravity, guilt and condem-
nation to the whole human race."^
Anticipating the later treatment of the imputation of
the sins of humanity to Christ, Strong urged that there is
"a physical and natural union with Christ which antedates
the fall and which is incident to man’s creation."^ Christ’s
immanence in humanity "guarantees a continuous divine effort
to remedy the disaster caused by man’s free will," Strong
stated, "and to restore the moral union with God which the
5
race has lost by the fall."
The Biblical testimony makes plain that "Christ submit-
ted to physical death as the penalty of sin, and by his
1. ST (1907), 624. 2. ST(1907), 624. 3. ST (1907), 625.
4. ST (1907 ) , 635. 5. ST (1907), 635.
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resurrection from the grave gave proof that the penalty of
sin was exhausted and that humanity in him was justified.
Human guilt is removed only for those "who come into vital
union with Christ”; the salvation of infants, however, does
2
not require personal faith on their part.
v. Soteriology
Heathenism afforded a preparation for the coming of
Christ Mnot wholly negative."-^ God had a part in the heathen
religions; Confucius, Buddha and Zoroaster were "at least re-
formers, raised up in God T s providence."^ This "positive
preparation" in non-Biblical religion "receives greater atten-
tion when we conceive of Christ as the immanent God, reveal-
ing himself in conscience and history. "5 Christ as "the
great educator of the race" exerted as preincarnate lord an
influence upon heathen conscience. But this positive ele-
ment in paganism was slight, contrasted with Biblical reve-
7lation .
'
Biblical revelation promises redemption of mankind
through a Mediator, who united both a divine and a human na-
d
ture to reconcile God to man and man to God. The Trinitar-
TT"3T(1907), 657.
2. The reference to vital union with Christ is here not clear-
ly reconciled to Strong’s monism.
3. ST (1907), 665 . 4. §T(1907), 665 . 5. ST(1907), 665 .
0. ST(1907
)
t
600.
7. "Heathenism’s altars and sacrifices, her philosophy and
art, roused cravings which she was powerless to satisfy.
Her religious systems became sources of deeper corruption.
There was no hope and no progress ... Classical nations be-
came more despairing, as they became more cultivated...
The convictions of Heathen reformers with regard to divine
inspiration were dim and intangible, compared with the
consciousness of proohets and apostles that, God was speak-
ing through them to his people" (ST 119073, 666 ).
6 . ST (1907), 669 .
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ian "sometimes declares himself as believing that Christ
is God and man," Strong protested, "thus implying the exis-
tence of two substances. Better say that Christ is the God-
man," he added, "who manifests all the divine powers and qual-
ities of which all men and all nature are partial embodi-
ments."^ But on the very next page of his theology, Strong
proposed to defend "the reality and integrity of the two na-
2tures" and the "union of the two natures in one person."
The supernatural birth of Jesus may receive light from
the scientific possibility of parthenogenesis in the highest
orders of life.^ The creation of a new humanity in Christ
is scientifically quite as possible as its first creation in
Adam; and in both cases there may have been no violation of
natural law, but only a unique revelation of its possibili-
4ties." A new impulse from the Creator could save the Re-
deemer from the "long accruing fatalities of human genera-
tion.
Strong committed himself to a modified kenosis Christol-
ogy. He contended that Jesus appeared "first to become fully
conscious that he is the Sent of God, the Son of God" at his
twelfth year. 0 He was ignorant in certain respects not
1. ST (1907), 672 . Strong shrank, he admitted, from views
which seem to imply a partition of the divine nature" by
the suggestion that all finite existence is a part of God,
yet he recognized the truth "of the essential oneness of
all life, and of God in Christ as the source and giver
of it," (3T{l907l, 700 ) and also affirmed that "we know
?ST^1907jf
e
^99 f
r"^^n^ su^stance anc* ground of being'.*
2 . ST(1907),
,
673. * 3. ST (1907), 676 . 4 . ST (1907), 676 .
5. ST(1907), 676 . 6 . ST (1907), 675.
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Hisonly as a babe, and as a child, but also as a man.^
activity must be referred to the one person in whom both
natures were united. 2 "To say that, although in his capa-
city as man he was ignorant, yet at the same moment in his
capacity as God he was omniscient," Strong urged, "is to ac-
cuse Christ of unveracity . "^ The state of humiliation meant
that
Omniscience gives up all knowledge but
that of the child, the infant, the em-
bryo, the infinitesimal germ of humanity.
Omnipotence gives up all power but that
of the impregnated ovum in the womb of
the Virgin. The Godhead narrows itself
down to a point that is next to absolute
extinction.
^
"The divine in Christ, during most of his earthly life,"
Strong added, "is latent, or only now and then present to
his consciousness or manifested to others. "5
The moderate kenosis view on which Strong insisted took
middle ground between an insistence on the extinction of the
Logos and Docetism—but which insisted on "no limit to his
descent, except that arising from his sinlessness . "^ The
union of deity and humanity was complete in him from the mo-
ment of conception, but the human nature, as it developed,
appropriated increasingly to its conscious use the latent
7fulness of the divine . 1
Strong defended the view that Christ’s human nature
found its personality only in union with the divine nature,
1. ST (1907), 675. 2. ST (1907)
,
695. 3. ST (1907), 695
4. ST (1907 ) , 703. 5. ST (1907 ) , 705. 6. ST (1907), 705
7. ST (1907), 705.
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so that his humanity was inpersonalized by the deity.
^
The two natures are bound together by a unioAue and inscru-
table bond which constitutes them ,Tone person with a single
consciousness and will—this consciousness and will includ-
ing within their possible range both the human nature and
the divine."^ The two natures are "organically and indis-
solubly united in a single person" so that attributes and
3powers of both natures are ascribed to the one Christ.
Strong took momentary note of the Lutheran view, that
the attributes of the one person are imparted to each of
the constituent natures—which position might have been ser-
viceable in the application of a monistic position—but he
did not commit himself definitely to it.^ In a passage
curiously unreconciled with the monistic approach, however,
\
1. ST (1907 ) , 679.
2. 3T(1907), 634. Whereas John Henry Newrnan, the Baptist
church historian, held with most orthodox theology to
the view that will belgons to nature rather than to per-
son, Strong held that .will belgons to personality. On
Strong 1 s approach, the view of dual consciousness and
will became a subtle form of Nestorianism (ST(1907J,
639, 690). "Self-consciousness and self-determination
do not belong to nature as such," Strong wrote, "but
only to personality. For this reason, Christ has not
two consciousnesses and two wills, but a single con-
sciousness and a single will. This consciousness and
will, moreover, is never simply human, but is always
theanthropic—an activity of the one personality which
unites in itself the human and the divine" (STtl907j,
69 5 ) • Strong did not deny, he made clear, that Chrises
. human nature has a wall, but only that it had a will
before its union with the divine nature, and separately
from "the one will which was made up of the human and
the divine united" (STC1907J, 695)*
3. ST (1907 ) , 634. 4. ST(1907), 636.
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Strong urged against the view that the divine Logos in the
incarnation reduced himself to the condition and limits of
human nature, the contention that tT since attributes and sub-
stance are correlative terms, it is impossible to hold that
the substance of God is in Christ, so long as he does not
possess divine attributes . Strong held, to the contrary,
that Christ possessed divine attributes, but surrendered
2their independent exercise during his humiliation.
Elsewhere, however, Strong contended that Christ’s
union of divine and human natures "makes the latter possess-
ed of powers belonging to the former. "3 But "the attributes
of the divine nature," Strong insisted, "are imparted to the
4human without passing over into its essence." The humilia-
tion of the God-man, however, involved but rare manifesta-
tion of this divine power. The communication of the contents
of the divine nature to the human nature of Christ was
mediated by the Holy Spirit, so that the God-man knew, taught
and performed "only what the Spirit permitted and directed.
But when thus permitted, he taught not by an externally com-
municated power, as in the case of the prophets, but "by
virtue of his own inner energy."
Similarly, the union had an effect upon the divine
7
nature.' While "the divine nature in itself is incapable of
ignorance, weakness, temptation, suffering or death, the one
1 . ST( 1907 ) , 687. 2 . ST (1907) , 687, 703.
3. ST (1907 ) , 696 . 4. ST (1907 ) , 696 . 5. ST (1907 ) , 696 .
6 . ST (1907 ) , 696 . 7. 3T(1907), 697.
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person Jesus Christ was capable of these” as a consequence of
the union, so that the divine Saviour suffered, and was ig-
norant, "not in his divine nature, but derivatively, by vir-
tue of his possession of a human nature.”'*' Although in his
divine nature he was impassible, the God-man was capable,
through union with humanity, of "absolutely infinite suf-
2fering.” The humiliation involved the "continuous surren-
der, on the part of the God-man, so far as his human nature
was concerned, of the exercise of those divine powers with
which it was endowed by virtue of its union with the divine.
Strong appealed to the New Testament to New Testament
as justifying the view of a consubstantiality of mankind and
Christ, the manifested God.^ The ground of possibility of the
union of deity and humanity in a single person is grounded,
Strong explained, in man’s original creation in the divine
image. Brutes are incapable of union with God, Strong urged,
but
human nature is capable of the divine, in the
sense not only that it lives, moves, and has
its being in God, but that God may unite him-
self indissolubly to it and endue it with
divine powers, while yet it remains all the
more truly human. Since the moral image of
God in human nature lias been lost by sin,
Christ, the perfect image of God after which
man was originally made, restores that lost
image by uniting himself to humanity and fill-
ing it with his divine life and love. 5
1. ST (1907 ) , 697. 2. ST (1907 ) , 697. 3. ST(1907), 703.
4. 3T(1907), 692. Strong cited Hebrews 2:11 and Acts 17:26.
5. 3T,(1907)
?
693. The last limit of divine indwelling is
not furnished by creation and providence, Strong pointed
out, for beyond these "there is the spiritual union be-
tween the believer and Christ, and even beyond this,
there is the unity of God and man in the person of J<
Christ" (STC19073, 693).
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But Strong maintained "not merely an indwelling of God in
Christ, but an organic and essential union" so that Christ
is "not the God-man by virtue of his possessing a larger
measure of the divine than we, but rather by being the ori-
ginal source of all life, both human and divine." Christ
is qualitatively different from all men, in that "he is
himself God, self-revealing and self-communicating, as men
are not."^
Christ’s exaltation consisted in the resumption by
the Logos of the independent exercise of divine attributes,
the withdrawal by the Logos of all limitation in the commu-
nication of the divine fulness to the human nature, and the
corresponding exercise by the human nature of those powers
3belonging to it by virtue of union with the divine. The
ascension proclaimed him as "the reinstated God, the pos-
sessor of universal dominion."^ The Christ present with us
today, when we pray, Strong held, "is not simply the Logos,
or the divine nature of Christ," as if his humanity were
5
separated from his divinity and localized in heaven. For
deity and humanity are inseparably united; the manhood is
ubiquitous by virtue of union with the Godhead.^ But
Christ’s human body is not omnipresent, for it exists in
n
spatial relations; his human soul, however, is ubiquitous.
1. 5T(1907), 694. Christ’s humanity differs from his deity
"not merely in degree, but also m kind" and this dif-
ference is that "between the infinite original and the
finite derivative, so that Christ is the source of life,
both physical and spiritual, for all men" (ST|1907j,
699).
2. ST (1907), 699. 3. ST(1907), 706. 4. ST (1907), 70S.
5. ST (1907), 709. 6. ST (1907), 709. 7. ST(1907), 709.
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Almost by way of afterthought, Strong added his conviction
that
the modem conception of the merely relative
nature of space, and the idealistic view of
matter as only the expression of mind and
will, have relieved this subject of many of
its former difficulties. If Christ is omni-
present and if his body is simply the manifes-
tation of his soul, then every soul may feel
the presence of his humanity even now and
1 every eye’ may ’see him’ at his second com-
ing, even though believers may be separated
as far as is Boston from Pekin. The body
from which his glory flashes forth may be
visible in ten thousand places at the same
t ime . 1
Strong did not apply the monistic principle more directly,
however o
Christ’s work has prophetic, priestly and kingly
aspects. All preliminary religious knowledge, outside as
well as within the Biblical movement, must be traced to the
ppreparatory work of the Logos.
Christ’s priestly office involves his sacrifice and
intercession, Strong outlined, in the traditional manner.
The vicarious sacrifice, Strong insisted, now as at
the outset of his teaching, satisfied ”an immanent demand of
the divine holiness” by removing ”an obstacle in the divine
3
mind to the pardon and restoration of the guilty.” God
sent his Son ”to expiate sin by his sacrificial death.
IV ST (1907), 709-710.
2. 3T(1907), 711. ”A11 the natural light of conscience,
science, philosophy, art, civilization, is the light of
Christ, the Reveal er of God,” Strong wrote (ST[1907j,
711).
3. ST (1907), 713. 4. ST(1907), 714.
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Yet "whatever God did in condemning sin," Strong added,
"he did through Christ," so that "Christ was the condemner,
as well as the condemned. Human personality is not self-
contained, having its being and completeness only in Christ
the Logos; he is "generic humanity, of which we are the off-
2
shoots." Christ 1 s righteousness must condemn sin by visit-
ing it with penalty.
^
In Strong T s statement of Christ’s assumption of penalty,
one finds revisions of his earlier theology which intensify
the stress upon the necessity for atonement in virtue of his
pre-incamate union with humanity. The emphasis falls upon
Christ’s voluntary endurance of the suffering which is the
penalty of sin, along with the emphasis that "as the Life of
humanity, he must endure the reaction of God’s holiness
against sin which constitutes that penalty."^ At the same
time, Strong emphasized that Christ’s holiness alone "fur-
nishes the reason for that constitution of the universe and
of human nature which makes this suffering necessary.
Christ is therefore obligated to make atonement not because
of some external standard of holiness to which he is answer-
able, but is himself the source of that standard which
1. "Conscience in us, which unites the accuser and the ac-
cused," Strong wrote, "shows us how Christ could be both
the Judge and the Sin-bearer" (ST[19073, 714).
2. ST ( 1907 ) , 714. 3. ST (1907 ) , 714. 4. ST (1907 ) , 714.
5. ST(1907), 714. Strong added: "Scripture declares the
ultimate aim of the Atonement to be that God ’might him-
self be just ’...and no theory of the atonement will meet
the demands of reason or conscience that does not ground
its necessity in God’s righteousness, rather than in his
love" (ST [19073, 715).
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implicates him in the guilt of humanity.
^
Developing his view of atonement on monistic premises,
Strong now tended to place the emphasis on substitution
alongside that of sharing. Christ’s sufferings are substi-
tutionary, Strong urged, "since his divinity and his sin-
lessness enable him to do for us what we could never do for
ourselves," but at the same time
this substitution is also a sharing—not the
work of one external to us, but of one who
is the life of humanity, the soul of our
soul and the life of our life, and so respon-
sible with us for the sins of the race.-
Strong frankly acknowledged that his conception of the
atonement had "suffered some change" from the older view of
the atonement as a "mere historical fact" accomplished in
"a few brief hours upon the Cross" and involving "a literal
substitution of Christ’s suffering for ours, the payment of
our debt by another," so that "upon the ground of that pay-
3
ment we are to go free." Strong insisted that his new
theory retained this element of substitution, but that it
made room for an equally true aspect, providing a permanent
as well as a once-for-all application of the atonement.
Of a finished redemption he declared:
All this is true. But it is only a part of
the truth. The atonement, like every other
doctrine of Christianity, is a fact of life;
T~, The reason for Christ’s suffering "is to be found only in
that holiness of Cod which expresses itself in the very
constitution of the universe. Not love but holiness has
made suffering invariably to follow sin, so that penalty
falls not only upon the transgressor but upon him who is
the life and sponsor of the transgressor" (STC1907J, 736).
2. ST (1907), 715. 3. ST(1907), 715.
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and such facts of life cannot be crowded
into our definitions, because they are
greater than any definitions that we can
frame . We must add to the idea of substi -
tution the idea of sharing. Christ’s doing
and suffering is not that of one external
and foreign to us. He is bone of our bone,
and flesh of our flesh; the bearer of our^
humanity; yes, the very life of the race.
The historical work of Christ T,is not itself the atone-
ment,” Strong contended, ’’but rather is "the revelation of
2
the atonement.” It is a time-space manifestation by the
incarnate Christ "of the eternal suffering of God on account
3
of human sin.” But the age-long divine suffering "could
never have been made comprehensible to men” were it not for
the historical suffering on Calvary.^- Christ’s historical
sacrifice is both "the final revelation of the heart of God”
and "the manifestation of the law of universal life... that
sin brings suffering. . .and that we can overcome sin in our-
selves and in the world .. .only by union with him through
5faith.” But Christ’s sufferings do not terminate with the
cross.
^
17 ST (1907), 715. 2. ST(1907), 715.
3. ST(1907), 715. The incarnation revealed "a union with
mankind which antedated the Fall. Being thus joined to
us from the beginning, he has suffered in all human sin
...The Cross was the concrete exhibition of the holiness
that required, and of the love that provided, man’s re-
demption. . .The imputation of our sins to him is the
result of his natural union with us. He has been our
substitute from the beginning. We cannot quarrel with
the doctrine of substitution when we see that this sub-
stitution is but the sharing of our griefs and sorrows
b^him whose very life pulsates in our veins” (STtl907l,
4. 3T(1907), 715. Christ became incarnate "in order to re-
veal the Atonement” (ST[19073, 719). "The eternal love
of God suffering the necessary reaction of his own Holi-
ness against the sin of his creatures and with a view to
their salvation—this is the essence of the Atonement”
(ST[1907J, 762 ).
5. ST
(
1907 ), 716 . 6. ST
(
1907 ), 768 .
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Strong developed the summary of Biblical representa-
tions of the atonement essentially in harmony with his
earlier theology
,
in which the main stress fell on the view
of a vicarious, expiatory sacrifice. He granted that "the
idea of substitution needs to be supplemented by the idea
of sharing, and so relieved of its external and mechanical
implications,” but insisted that "to abandon the conception
itself is to abandon faith in the evangelists and in Jesus
himself."^ The doctrine of satisfaction, Strong emphasized,
means "simply that there is a principle in God’s being which
not simply refuses sin passively, but also opposes it
actively."^ The almost universal prevalence of sacrifice,
together with its bloody nature which apparently precludes
man’s institution of it, supports the Biblical view of di-
vine establishment. 3 Against the Bushnellian or moral
influence theory of atonement, Strong protested that
while it embraces a valuable element of truth,
namely, the moral influence upon men of the
sufferings of the God-man, it is false by
defect, in that it substitutes a subordinate
effect of the atonement for its chief aim,-
and yet unfairly appropriates the name of .
’vicarious,’ which belongs only to the latter.
1." ST ( 1907 ) , 721. 2. ST (1907 ) , 724. 3. ST (1907 ) , 726.
4. ST(1907), 735* Strong added: "If Christ is a ’vicari-
ous sacrifice,’ then he makes atonement to God in the
place and stead of sinners. Christ’s suffering in and
with sinners, though it is a most important and alTect-
ing fact, is not the suffering in their stead in which
the atonement consists. Though suffering in and with
sinners may be in part the medium through which Christ
was enabled to endure God’s wrath against sin, it is
not to be confounded with the reason why God lays this
suffering upon him; nor should it blind us to the fact
that this reason is his standing in the sinner’s place
to answer for sin to the retributive holiness of God"
( STfl907j
,
735).
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Against the Irvingian theory of a gradually extirpated de-
pravity by Christ’s progressive purification of a corrupted
human nature which he presumably assumed, Strong protested
that on this view ’’men are saved, not by any objective pro-
pitiation, but only by becoming through faith partakers of
Christ’s new humanity.”^
While insisting that the atonement satisfies a prin-
ciple of the divine nature, Strong voiced dissatisfaction
over views, such as the Anselmic ’’cornmerical theory” and the
Princeton theology of federal headship, which conceive the
principle in too formal and external a manner, as he put
it. The external merit of the transfer of Christ’s work
requires an internal ground, to be found in the believer’s
3
union with Christ. ’’Salvation is by substitution,”
Strong declared, and ’’the substitution is by incorporation.”
Consequently, ’’substitution, representation, reconciliation,
propitiation, satisfaction, are only different aspects of
the work which Christ does for us,” he commented, ”by virtue
of the fact that he is the immanent God, the Life of humani-
ty, priest and victim, condemning and condemned, atoning
5
and atoned.”
The atonement ”is a satisfaction of the ethical demand
of the divine nature, by the substitution of Christ’s
penal sufferings for the punishment of the guilty.”^
1. ST ( 1907 ) , 744. 2. 3T(1907), 74S. 3. 3T(1907), 750.
4. ST (1907 ) , 750. 5. ST (1907 ) , 755. 6. ST (1907 ) , 752.
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While this substitution is a matter of grace, it does not
as such "violate or suspend law, but takes it up into it-
self and fulfills it . What maintains the righteousness
of the law is that
the source of all law, the judge and pun-
isher, himself voluntarily submits to bear
the penalty, and bears it in the human na-
ture that has sinned.
2
The atonement is not made by a third party, but God himself
provides it.^ Yet Christ stands in such relation to human-
ity
that what God T s holiness demands Christ
is under obligation to pay, inevitably
does pay, and pays so fully, in virtue of
his two-fold nature, that every claim of
justice is satisfied, and the sinner who
accepts what Christ has done in his be-
half is saved.
^
Christ, as the immanent God, as "the Life of humanity" is
laden with responsibility for human sin,
while yet he personally knows no sin. Of
this race-responsibility and race-guilt
which Christ assumed, and for which he suf-
fered so soon as man had sinned, Christ’s
obedience and suffering in the flesh were
the visible reflection and revelation.
Only in Christ’s organic union with the
race can we find the vital relation which
will make his vicarious atonement either
possible or just. Only when we regard Cal-
vary as revealing eternal principles of the
divine nature, can we see how the sufferings
of those few hours upon the Cross could suf-
fice to save the millions of mankind.
5
IV ST (1907), 752. 2. ST(1907), 752.
3. The atonement has its ground on God’s part in (1) divine
holiness which must condemn sin and (2) divine love
"which itself provides the sacrifice, by suffering in
and with (the) Son for the sins of men" and "through that
suffering opening a way and means of salvation" (ST 119073,
761 ).
4. ST (1907), 754. 5. ST(1907), 754.
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Being "one with the race," Christ’s union with humanity
was such that he "had a share in the responsibility of the
race to the law and the justice of God."^ He so shared
man’s life as the immanent God that he was "justly and in-
evitably sub jected. . .to man’s exposures and liabilities,
2
and especially to God’s condemnation on account of sin."
Christ’s "share in the responsibility of the race" to
divine law and justice "was not destroyed by his incarnation,
nor by his purification in the womb of the virgin, Strong
wrote. But, whereas all men born by ordinary generation in-
herit depravity, guilt and penalty, in consequence of Adam-
ic sin, the human nature which Christ assumed was superna-
turaliy purged of its depravity, but neither guilt nor pen-
alty was taken away. Strong added:
There was still left the just exposure to
the penalty of violated law. Although
Christ’s nature was purified, his obliga-
tion to suffer yet remained. He might
have declined to join himself to humanity,
and then he need not have suffered. He
might have sundered his connection with the
race, and then he need not have suffered.
But once born of the Virgin, once possessed
of the human nature that was under the
curse, he was bound to suffer. The whole
mass and weight of God’s displeasure against
1. 3T(1907), 755. "Christ’s union with the race in his in-
carnation is only the outward and visible expression of
a prior union with the race which began when he created
the race... He who is the life of humanity must, though
personally pure, be i nvolved in responsibility for all
human sin" ‘(STC1907}, 756).
2. 3T(1907), 755. 3. ST(1907), 756.
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the race fell on him, when once he be-
came a member of the race.-
Strong appears to have taught that Christ’s obligation to
suffer, in view of his immanent, organic relation to the
race as its creator and sustainer, was transmuted into an
inevitability of suffering by his incarnation. For he
affirmed
:
With Christ T s obligation to suffer, there
were connected two other, though minor, results
of his assumption of humanity: first, the
longing to suffer; and secondly, the inevi-
tableness of his suffering. 3
Christ as the life of humanity is nits representative and
surety” and "justly yet voluntarily” bears its guilt and
shame and condemnation as his own.^ Had the Son borne
1. ST (1907)
,
757. Such a passage appears obviously unre-
conciled with other statements
,
which do not condition
the divine suffering upon incarnation, but regard it as
unavoidable, in view of Christ’s organic connection with
the race. Even in this passage, indeed, Strong wrote of
Christ’s "obligation to suffer” as remaining
,
after his
supernatural birth. Since Christ is "essentially huma-
nity, the universal man, the life of the race,” Strong
added, "he must bear in his own person all the burdens
of humanity, and must be” the redemptive agent (STC1907],
757).
ST (1907), 759.
3. Strong added: "He felt the longing to suffer which per-
fect love to God must feel, in view of the demands upon
the race, of that holiness of God which he loved more than
he loved the race itself
;
which perfect love to man must
feel, in view of the fact that bearing the penalty of
man’s sin was the only way to save him... The second minor
consequence of Christ’s assumption of humanity was, that,
being such as he was, he could not help suffering; in
other words, the obligatory and the desired were also the
inevitable. Since he was a being of perfect purity, con-
tact with the sin of the race, of which he was a member,
necessarily involved an actual suffering, of an intenser
kind than we can imagine. . .Because Christ was pure, yet
had united himself to a sinful and guilty race, therefore
’it must needs be that Christ should suffer’” (STfl907j,
759-760).
4. ST (1907), 761.
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the penalty of our sins !,not voluntarily, but compulso-
rily,” the suffering of the innocent for the guilty would
have been ”an act of manifest injustice.”^
The guilt which Christ "took upon himself” by his
union with humanity, Strong pointed out, was not the guilt
of personal sin, nor that of inherited depravity (which was
removed by supernatural purification of the human nature
he assumed), but ”solely the guilt of Adam T s sin, which
belongs, prior to personal transgression, and apart from
2inherited depravity, to every member of the race.”
Christ assumed this "original sin and inherited guilt,' but
without the depravity that ordinarily accompanies them.”^
The emphasis in Strong’s thought which gives the key
to these statements is that Christ’s guilt was, in virtue
of his organic union with humanity, ’’not only an imputed,
but also an imparted guilt. Strong was troubled by the
objection that the doctrine of atonement involves God in
5injustice by the punishing of the innocent, and sought to
show hov/ ”a sharing of our guilt on the part of Christ was
possible.” Christ was "conscious of innocence in his per-
sonal relations,” Strong wrote, in formulating his position,
”but not in his race relations. Regarding Christ’s suf-
fering:
if it be asked whether this is not simply a
suffering for his own sin, or rather for
1. 3T'(1907), 763. 2. 3T(1907), 757. 3. ST (1907), 757.
4. ST (1907), 759. 5. ST(1907), 753. 6. ST (1907), 759.
7. ST (1907), 753.
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his own share of the sin of the race, we
reply that his own share in the sin of the
race is not the sole reason why he suffers;
it furnishes only the subjective reason and
ground for the proper laying upon him of
the sin of all... He who is the life of hu-
manity must, though personally pure, be in-
volved in responsibility for all human sin
...This suffering was an enduring of the
reaction of the divine holiness against sin
and so was a bearing of penalty..., but it
was also the voluntary execution of a plan
that antedated creation..., and Christ’s
sacrifice in time showed what had been in
the heart of God from eternity. -L
Since Christ’s humanity was derived from Adam, he was in
Adam so far as his humanity was concerned "just as we were,
2
and had the same race-responsibility with ourselves.
"
Christ was not only punished for sinful humanity, but was
"under obligation to suffer punishment ; --in other words,
Christ is ’made sin,’ not only in the sense of being put
under renalty
,
but also in the sense of being put under
guilt . The guilt which Christ bore is not simply his
by imputation; guilt was imparted, no less than imputed,
to him.^ By his natural union with the race he was made
"a sinful person; a condemned person; (and) put under
guilt, or obligation to suffer. "5
rrST(1907), 758.
2. "As Adam’s descendant, he was responsible for Adam’s
sin," Strong affirmed, "like every other member of the
race; the chief difference being, that while we inherit
from .'idam both guilt and depravity, he whom the Holy
Spirit purified, inherited not the depravity, but only
the guilt. Christ took to himself, not sin (depravity),
but the consequences of sin. In him there was abolition
of sin, without abolition of obligation to suffer for
sin; while in the believer, there is abolition of obli-
f
ation to suffer, without abolition of sin itself"
ST(1907), 759).
3. ST
(
1907 )
,
761 . 4 . ST(1907), 761. 5. 3T(1907), 761 .
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The penalty which rested upon Christ was not borne
only on Calvary, for "his whole life of suffering was pro-
pitiatory, so (that) penalty rested upon him from the
very beginning of his life.”'*- But penalty and guilt cannot
be separated, Strong maintained. Therefore "if Christ in-
herited penalty, it must have been because he inherited
2guilt." Consistently with this, Christ’ human nature it-
self required atonement because of his participation in
race guilt:
If it be asked whether Jesus, then, before
his death, was an unjustified person, we
answer that
,
while personally pure and well-
pleasing to God..., he himself was conscious
of a race-responsibility and a race-guilt
which must be atoned for...; and that guilty
human nature in him endured at last the sepa-
ration from God which constitutes the essence
of death, sin’s penalty.
3
To the view that Christ assumed a human nature proleptically
redeemed, Strong replied:
If it be asked whether he, who from the mo-
ment of the conception ’sanctified himself’
..., did not from that moment also justify
hirnself, we reply that although, through the
retroactive efficacy of his atonement and upon
the ground of it
,
human nature in him was
purged of its depravity from the moment that
he took that nature; and although, upon the
ground of that atonement, believers before
his advent were both sanctified and justified;
yet his own justification could not have pro-
ceeded upon the ground of his atonement, and
1. "This penalty was inherited," Strong held, "and was the
consequence of Christ’s taking human nature" (ST[1907j,
761 ).
2. Strong found intimations of Jesus’ "subjection to the
common guilt of the race" in his circumcision, ritual
purification, and baptism (3TC1907J, 761). These af-
forded "a recognition and confession of his implication
in that guilt of the race for which death was the ap-
pointed and inevitable penalty" (3T[l907j
,
762).
3. ST (1907), 762.
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also his atonement have proceeded upon the
ground of his justification. This would be
a vicious circle; somewhere we must have a
beginning. That beginning was in the cross,
where guilt was first purged.
1
As against the insistence that depravity is the correlative
of guilt, Strong urged that the two are distinguished in
civil life. 2
Strong contended that his rT ethical theory" of the
atonement, as he denominated it, ,fmost fully meets the re-
quirement of Scripture," especially in holding that the
necessity of the atonement is absolute, being demanded by
3the immanent holiness of God. At the same time, it showed
"most satisfactorily" how the demand of the divine holiness
was met, by "the propitiatory offering of one who is per-
sonally pure, but who by union with the human race has in-
herited its guilt and penalty."^ If one who is personally
innocent "can in no way become involved in the guilt and
penalty of others," then innocent suffering for the guilty
is an act of injustice, but this hypothesis is contrary to
both Scripture and fact. 5
1. 3T(1907), 762.
2. "If it be said that guilt and depravity are practically
inseprable, and that, if Christ had guilt, he must have
had depravity also, we reply that in civil law we dis-
tinguish between them,—the conversion of a murderer
would not remove his obligation to suffer upon the gal-
lows; and we reply further, that in justification we dis-
tinguish between them,—depravity still remaining,
though guilt is removed. So we may say that Christ
takes guilt without depravity, in order that we may have
depravity without guilt" (ST(1907), 762).
3. ST( 1907 ) , 764. 4. ST(1907), 765. 5. ST (1907), 763.
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Strong asserted that patriarchs and heathen who had
never heard the name of Christ, but who had cast themselves
as helpless sinners upon the divine mercy, had '’doubtless
been saved through Christ’s atonement.”^
The. treatment of the intercessory aspect of Christ’s
priestly office, and also of his kingly office, were not
substantially changed. In fact, Strong seems to have con-
cluded any extended revision of his theology, in terms of
ethical monism, with the detailed changes and additions to
the doctrine of atonement, which comes almost at the end of
the second of the three volumes which comprise the 1907
2theology
.
The doctrine of election is stated in the same spirit
as in earlier editions, with apparently but one comment in
the interest of monism. It i s an important one, however,
although part of a paragraph unimpressively inserted into a
fifteen-page discussion. Divine election, Strong observed,
is only the ethical side and interpretation
of natural selection. In the latter God
chooses certain forms of the vegetable and
animal kingdom without merit of theirs.
They are preserved while others die. In the
matter of individual health, talent, pro-
perty, one is taken and the other left.
If we call all this the result of system,
the reply is that God chose the system, know-
ing precisely what would come of it .3
1. ST (1907), 772.
2. The records of The American Baptist Publication Society
indicate that volumes one and two were published in 1907,
volume three in 1909, and the three volumes later pro-
duced as a single volume in 1912, but for convenience and
elimination of unnecessary confusion the reference
ST(1907) is retained. C» W. Hodge commented on ’’the ap-
parent absence” of ethical monism in the third volume,
in which, he remarked, "there appears to be little, if
an^j of this monistic philosophy” (C. W. Hodge, Rev. [1910]
,
3. ST (1907)
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In this statement the doctrine of election appears to be
reduced to the foreordination of the specific created
order which God elected to create. Strong did not, how-
ever, develop the statement in such a way as to set aside
the prevailing emphasis of the section, on a divine elec-
tion of certain sinful men to be made voluntary partakers
of Christ’s salvation.'*'
The section on the believer’s union with Christ was
expanded, but in such a way as to preclude the mystical
doctrine of absorption which involves a suspension of in-
dividual personality. Strong emphasized, however, that
it is easier to-day than at any other pre-
vious period of history to believe in the
union of the believer with Christ. That
God is immanent in the universe, and that
there is a divine element in man, is familiar
to our generation. All men are naturally
one with Christ, the immanent God, and this
natural union prepares the way for that
spiritual union in which Christ joins him-
self to our faith.
He protested against the misconstruction of this doctrine
as "a union of essence, which destroys the distinct per-
sonality and subsistence of either Christ or the human
spirit,—as held by many of the mystics.” The union is a
vital one, Strong declared, but ’’Christ’s life is not cor-
rupted by the corruption of his m embers . Christ’s satis
1. ST (1907), 779. 2. ST(1907), 793. 3. 3T(1907), 799
4. ST (1907 ) , 801.
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faction to divine justice removed all external obstacles to
man’s return to God, but evil affections and will, and con-
sequent guilt, remain as internal obstacles which he removes
by uniting himself to believers T, in a closer and more perfect
manner than that in which he is united to humanity at
large
.
The logical consequences of this union—regeneration,
conversion, justification, sanctification and perseverance,
as Strong enumerated them--are treated with little reference
to the monistic principle. In expanding regeneration, Strong
urged that the experience does not add anything to the soul,
as though its substance were changed. The change effected
in regeneration is exclusively moral, he affirmed. ’’There
is indeed a new entrance of Christ into the soul, or a new
exercise of his spiritual power within a soul,” he commented,
"but the effect of Christ’s working is not to add any new
faculty or substance, but only to give new direction to al-
ready existing powers.” Strong retained the earlier empha-
sis that regeneration is an instantaneous change ”in a region
1. ST(1907), 602. ”As Christ’s union with the race secures
the objective reconciliation of the race to God, so
Christ’s union with believers secures the subjective re-
conciliation of believers to God” (ST(1907J, 602).
2. ”We have given over talking of vitality, as if it were a
substance or faculty. We regard it merely a mode of
action. Evolution, moreover, uses what already exists,
so far as it will go
,
instead of creating new; as in the
miracle of the loaves, and as in the original creation
of man, so in his recreation or regeneration” (STtl907j,
825).
3. ST(1907), 825.
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of the soul below consciousness 11 and consequently is known
only in its results.
^
The new iramanentism is applied in the development of
the section on conversion. The operations of grace, Strong
declared, are not to be restricted "to the preaching of the
p
incarnate Christ." Heathen wTho have no knowledge of a per-
sonal Christ may be saved "by casting themselves as helpless
sinners upon God’s plan of mercy, dimly shadowed forth in
nature and providence."^ For Christ is everywhere present,
guiding the operations of the material world and in the minds
of men as the Spirit of truth and goodness.
In formulating the doctrine of justification, Strong con-
ceded that a statement of justification which emphasizes its
vital side is necessary, but that "the forensic conception
of justification furnishes its complement and has its rights
also
.
Union with Christ is indissoluble, Strong urged: "Re-
generation is the beginning of a work of new creation, which
is declared in justification, and completed in sanctifica-
tion," so that the believer’s experience is part of one whole
which would be negated if the union could be severed. ^ This
emphasis, although lending itself to explication in terms of
Christ’s natural as well as spiritual union of the race,
1 . ST (1907 ) , 826 . 2 . ST (1907 ) , 843.
3. ST (1907), $42. Although they know nothing of the cross,
such faith is implicitly a faith in Christ, Strong affirmed,
and in consequence of this they may receive salvation from
the Crucified One (ST£l907], 842
,
843 ).
4. ST (1907 ) , 851. 5. ST( 1907 ) , 8S 2 , 883.
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Strong did not develop further in that setting; the state-
ment of perseverance proceeds along the line of Strong T s
earlier editions.
vi. Ecclesiology
Strong developed the Baptist view of the nature, or-
ganization, government and ordinances of the church without
any clear allusion to his monistic presuppositions.-^- The
discussion of baptism made reference to the baptism of Jesus
in such a way as to recall Strong’s view, already stated,
that Christ’s assumption of human nature involved him in he-
reditary guilt apart from hereditary corruption, which he
p
presumably acknowledged by submitting to baptism, but no
other revision in the interest of later views was discovered.
vii. Eschatology
The changes which Strong made in the section devoted to
eschatology supplemented, in the main, his emphasis in pre-
vious statements of his theology, without significant change
of viewpoint. The ethical argument, that the divine moral
administration required a vindication in a future life, he
held as probably having had more power over humanity than
any other. But while the argument "proves life and punish-
ment for the wicked after death," he affirmed, "it leaves us
dependent on revelation for our knowledge how long that life
and punishment will be."^ Later, however, he acknowledged
that the rational proofs themselves rest upon the presupposi-
IV ST (1907), SB7-9S0. 2. ST(1907), 943.
3. ST (1907), 98S.
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tion of a rational, moral God who had made man in his im-
age, so that they yield T,not an absolute demonstration,
but only a balance of probability, in favor of man’s immor-
tality .”1 The final appeal, as in his previous volumes,
was to Scripture, which furnishes ”clear revelation” of a
fact for which reason provides "little more than a presump-
tion.” The most impressive and conclusive proof is Christ’s
resurrection.
Although rejecting any doctrine of a second probation,
on the ground that Scripture regards the decisions of this
life as final and character as fixed for eternity, Strong
held that the reaction against the notion of purgatory
should not obliterate a proper doctrine of the intermediate
state. ”In that state there is gradual purification, and
must be,”, he insisted, "since not all impurity and sinful-
ness are removed at death.”1"
The main features of Strong’s previous eschatology are
elsewhere retained, including his post-millennial view that
the kingdom of Christ steadily enlarges its boundaries
through the proclamation of the Gospel until the millennium
shall be introduced with Christianity’s general prevalence
throughout the earth. ^ As against the view of his former
1. ST (1907 ) , 990. 2. ST (1907 ) , 990. 3. ST( 1907 ) , 997.
4. ST(1907), 1002. Strong added: "The purging of the will
requires time” (ST[1907j, 1002).
5. ST(1907), 1008. Strong objected to premillenialism that
it supposes "that for the principle of development under
the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, God will substitute
a reign of mere power and violence” (STfl907], 1012).
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teacher, Robinson, that a finite act cannot have infinite
qualities, ^ Strong replied that "sin as a finite act de-
mands finite punishment, but as endlessly persisted in
demands an endless, and in that sense, an infinite punish-
ment."^ But the section on eschatology appears not to
have been changed in the specific interest of ethical mo-
nism.
8. The 1922 Primer, What Shall I Believe ?
It is apparent from this study how extensively Strong
revised his evangelical theology in the interest of ethical
monism, while at the same time retaining a basic insistence
on the necessity of special revelation, the authority of
Scripture for faith and morals, and such historic doctrines
as the Trinity, the deity of Christ, his propitiatory atone-
ment, his bodily resurrection, his personal and visible re-
turn, a future judgement of all men turning upon their rela-
tionship to Christ, and the eternal bliss of the righteous
and eternal punishment of the wicked. Whether the appeals
to ethical monism and to Biblical authority were thus com-
patible, or whether the dual appeal meant that neither was
efficaciously invoked, remains as an inquiry to be pursued
in the subsequent chapter.
The publication of Strong T s transition to the new imma-
nentism apparently began in 1894. The application of the
principle to the various doctrines was not made, in the mea-
sure to which Strong applied it. most fully, until the final
1. Robinson, CT, 292. 2. ST(1907), 1051.
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1907 revision of his theology. Since that revision, like
previous revisions of Strong’s earlier theologies, frequent-
ly involved supplementary inserts into the running exposi-
tion, rather than complete rewriting, one often finds the
earlier and later views side by side, with the suggestion
that the earlier view must not be set aside, but that it
also must be supplemented by the monistic approach. It is
a matter of pure speculation, whether the monistic principle
would have come to greater expression, had Strong’s theology
gone through the process of a disciplined rewriting, rather
than extended supplementation. It is clear that the essays
and addresses which were devoted to specific subjects to
which the principle of monism was applied frequently dis-
close a more organized and thorough application of the new
immanence than the somewhat spotty revisions to the system-
atic theology. One circumstance, however, precludes the view
that only a failure completely to rewrite his theology pre-
vented a more thorough monistic statement. That is the vale-
dictory volume which came from Strong’s pen, titled What Shall
I Believe ?, written just before, published a year after, his
death in 1921.^
I
The main thrust of that volume made it clear that Strong
had no interest in a monism that would require the setting
1. In the introduction John Henry Strong, a son, wrote:
"This little ’ Primer ’ is his valedictory. Its last words
were dictated the day before the horses and chariots of
fire descended. It is a charge also to all believers that
remain" (WSIB, 6).
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aside of special revelation, the noetic significance of the
Bible, redemption through Jesus Christ alone, and other ar-
ticles of the Christian faith which he had championed in the
final revision of his theology.'*' At the same time, he held
that truth was to be found in evolutionary and higher criti-
cal views." Methods of composition which are unhistorical are
yet well fitted to convey essential truth, and may have been
used in the composition of the Old Testament, he added.
But Strong did not, in these convictions, waver about
the truth of monism. Indeed, he held it possible for both
higher critics and fundamentalists, between whom he claimed
middle ground,
to reconcile their differences by a larger
view of the deity and omnipresence of Christ
...It is with the hope of doing something to
bring about such a reconciliation, that I
print this new statement of doctrine. 3
And, as in earlier statements of his position Strong affirmed
the priority of special revelation and yet frequently formu-
lated his position as though Biblical conclusions could be
reached on independent philosophical grounds, so in this final
volume the two approaches are often to be found.
XT In the preface, the author stated: ”1 wish, however, to
say at the very start that the truth which I present is not
derived from either philosophy or literature, although I
use these to throw light on it. Before I knew much of phi-
losophy or literature I had learned that truth, from Scrip-
ture and from my own experience” (WSIB, 7)
•
2 . Strong insisted that "there is a downward as well as an up-
ward evolution, and that the higher criticism is not the
supreme arbiter in the interpretation of Scripture, but
that it must be accompanied and qualified by the insight
furnished by the Spirit of God” (WSIB, S),
3. WSIB, 9.
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Contemporary philosophy, as well as science, T,now sees
the world to be psychic, TT Strong affirmed. ?TBut a psychic
world demands a Psyche,” he added, "for 'psychic 1 means
'possessed by, or manifesting a psyche or a soul'.”'*' The
Psyche which accounts for the universe must be
a mighty will, creating, upholding, ener-
gizing all material things; material things
indeed are only the forms of his volition,
while he, as spirit, is the invisible cause
of all.
2
Human beings are capable of relatively independent action,
since they are created wills, although human bodies are pro-
ducts of God's constant volition.
^
Strong developed the doctrine of God in the interest of
divine triunity by an appeal to non-revelational factors.
Consciousness implies duality, or an object known as well as
a subject knowing.'*4' Human experience affords instances of
triple consciousness within the same human personality. But
no analogy suffices, for
Three persons in one Personality constitute
a union so unique that earthly analogies are
only imperfect pointers toward its absolute
perfection,—they simply suggest that there
is nothing irrational, but rather the high-
est reason, in the conception that an eter-
nal Spirit completes the self-knowledge and
voluntary activity of Deity. 3
Trinitarian theology, Strong asserted, is necessary to belief
1. WSIB, 16. 2. WSIB, 17. 3. WSIB, lB.
4. WSIB, IB. 5. WSIB, 19.
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in a living, loving and self-sufficient God.
Strong stressed the natural activity of the Word in
all human consciousness and morality. Christ is the univer-
sal principle of science, law, benevolence, progress, and
p
the Holy Spirit the principle of unity and fellowship.
Christ is the agent in the creation both of "what we
call matter" and of intelligent beings. ^ This is "not a cre-
ation out of nothing" but rather "the differentiation of his
one infinite Will into myriads of finite wills. Christ’s
mighty Will discloses its power "in myriads of finite wills,
some intelligent, some unintelligent, some spiritual, some
material. "5 The whole physical universe is alive, and its
/•
life is Christ. To explain it, a "correlating Intelligence
and Will must be assumed."^
7
The creation of matter is
but the beginning of Christ’s volitions in time and space,
1. WSIB, 20. "The Father is God unexpressed, and independent
of space and time. The Son is his* one and only medium of
expression, his eternal object of knowledge and end in
volition, nis only word of communication to creatures.
The Holy Spirit is the organ of fellowship; making the
Trinity an infinite society of communion and love", even
without the existence of creation" (WSIB, 19) • Strong re-
iterated that "God never thinks, speaks, or acts, except
through Christ" (WSIB, 20).
2. WSIB, 26. The Spirit is "the persuader of social, nation-
al, and universal peace, and real author of all unity, or-
ganization and law” (WSIB, 27).
3. WSIB, 23.
4. WSIB, 23. The emphasis of this section is clearly much
more reflective of personalistic absolutism, than of per-
sonalistic pluralism. The monistic element in Lotze, with
which thinkers like F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, Rudolf Eu-
cken, R. B. Haldane, Henry Jones', Josiah Royce, and Mary
Whiton Calkins aligned themselves, seems here to predominate.
But it should not be forgotten that Strong, at any rate, ap-
parently intended this emphasis to be understood as corre-*
lative to and harmonious with the insistence that neither
nature nor man is a part of God.
5. WSIB, 23.
6. Modern science is concluding, Strong held, "that what we
call matter is only centres' of force ; and that force is
simply will in action" (WSIB, 2ZTJM
7. WSIB, 2l+l "The atom... is the expression of the mind and
will of an immanent God," Strong^ stressed (WSIB, 25).
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under the law of cause and effect; the creation of mind
is his addition to bodies of a freedom of intelligent con-
trol which gives them a relative independence and makes
them "capable of virtue, and therefore responsible."^
Christ is "the ground of all individual existence.
All natural life is derived from and shared by him except
3the will to do evil. The subliminal consciousness may be
"the peculiar element of Christ’s activity and control."^
Since Jesus- was the only-begotten Son of God, subliminal
and conscious activity "become practically one" in him. 5
His life is the source of all other lives, and in him alone
is the divine fulness. This possession of the divine ful-
ness in the subliminal consciousness of Christ may be used
in explanation both of his absolute authority and of his
earthly limitations, if a pantheistic implication is avoided
by stressing that Christ is transcendent as well as imma-
nent, and if it be recalled that humanity at large has "so
infected this subliminal source of good that it has become
instead a constant source of evil, to be counteracted by
providence and t o be overcome by regeneration."?
I. WSIB, 25. 2. WSIB, 29.
3. WSIB, 29. "AH appearances of God in the Old Testament
from Abraham to Isaiah were appearances of Christ"...
"Every voice of conscience that has ever spoken to us was
his voice" (WSIB, 26).
4. WSIB, 29. 5. WSIB, 29.
6. WSIB, 30. "Common men are only sparks from the divine
flame," Strong declared, by way of contrast (WSIB, 30).
7. WSIB, 30, 31.
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Strong emphasized anew that God’s fundamental attri-
bute is holiness, and that this is self-affirming purity,
rather than self-communicating love.^ Christ was the Re-
deemer because "even from the beginning he suffered for hu-
man sin.” God hates sin not mainly for its dreadful con-
sequences, but because "it is the opposite of his nature. ""^
The one object of the divine self-revelation in creation is
the restoration of man to sonship in union with Christ.^
God’s plan from eternity included the permission of sin and
the provision of grace.
^
£
The first man was not a savage, but he was a child. 0
The first chapter of Romans tells the story of primitive man
7
and his declension. But human history is "God’s evolution
of his plan for man’s redemption through the work of Christ
and of the Holy Spirit, which culminated in the suffering of
' $the cross and the founding of the church." Special revela-
tion came to a chosen people, but God had witnesses in every
land; Confucius, Buddha and Zoroaster "were his partial agents"
but their teachings were "mixed with error. "9 Christ incar-
nate summed up all partial revelations, adding his personal
I. WSIB, 34. 2. WSIB, 39. 3. WSIB, 39.
4. WSIB, 41. 5. WSIB, 43.
6. "He was undeveloped, but he had right intuitions and in-
clinations, and he was free to choose between good and
evil," Strong wrote (WSIB, 43).
7. WSIB, 45. 8. WSIB, 45.
9. WSIB, 46. Strong added significantly: "The coin they
furnished had more of lead in it than silver; and the
washing of silver that gave it currency did not prevent
it from being a counterfeit of the true, nor from making
its authors ’thieves and robbers,’ when their doctrine
stole the hearts of men away from Christ" (WSIB, 46).
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testimony and example.'*' Human history therefore exhibits
a downward evolution in view of sin, and an upward evolu-
2tion due to the presence of Christ as the life of humanity.
The written word expresses the eternal Word, but it
came through ,fweak and halting methods of human composition. ”3
Evolution i s the ordinary method of Christ’s working, but this
does not exclude absolute creation, incarnation, miracle and
resurrection as preceding, explaining or supplementing the
evolutionary process.^" The composition of Scripture may
include an evolutionary element, involving any method of
literary composition consistent with truth. ^ Christ may
work from within as well as from without. Inspiration may
be ’’only the reinforcement of a faculty normal to sinless
man, but which he has lost by transgression.” Christ’s
revelation may be progressive, requiring his final and per-
sonal appearing to disclose its organic connection and mean-
ing. But because the whole process issues from the one
mighty Spirit of Christ, Christian experience recognizes the
written word, received organically and rightly interpreted,
c>
as the supreme rule of faith and practice.
Higher criticism has thrown valuable light on methods
of Scripture composition, but cannot set aside the fact,
attested by confessions of faith, that the great majority
TTwsTB, 46. 2. WSIB, 47. 3. WSIB, 48. 4. WSIB, 49.
5. WSIB, 49-50. 6. WSIB, 46. 7- WSIB, 50. 8. WSIB, 50.
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of believers have found the Bible to teach Christ’s deity,
pre-existence, incarnation, virgin birth, miracles, vica-
rious atonement, physical resurrection, omnipresence, and
final coming as judge of all."1' But the Bible is not all
divine dictation, but rather, is mostly human utterance.
The divine word made human is limited by many imperfections.
3Scripture must be taken as a whole. Christ is the suffi-
4
cient guarantor of Scripture. His superintendence makes
the written word, "with all its literary and human short-
comings, an expression of the eternal Word, and gives it
unity, sufficiency, and authority, as a rule of faith and
5practice.
The Scripture may be properly interpreted only by one
in union with Christ. For he is the key to the under-
7
standing of the Bible. The written word is so pervaded
by the divine Spirit that it is superior to merely human
d
teachings. 0 The Bible provides its own demonstration of
ggenuineness and authority. But Christ is the sole ulti-
mate authority."^
Strong appealed for a new surrender to a larger view
of Christ, as the only means of reconciling literalists and
1. WSIB
,
51. 2. WSIB, 52.
3. "Shall we doubt the death of Christ," Strong asked,
"because the evangelists do not precisely agree as to
the superscription on his cross?" (WSIB, 53).
4. WSIB, 54. 5. WSIB, 55. 6. WSIB, 56 . 7. WSIB, 57
5. WSIB, 5#. 9. WSIB, 59.
10. WSIB, 62. The precise relationship of the authority of
the Bible to Christ’s ultimate authority was not more
carefully worked out.
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higher critics, with both of whom he found complaint.^"
Christ’s natural union with humanity prepared the way for
his spiritual union with believers; he is the life of the
p
universe and of humanity. In Christ, God fully gives him-
3
self to us, when our life is interpenetrated with his.
He not only gives himself to us, but ,T so identifies him-
self with us in love as to share all our burdens and sins
.
In this final statement of ’’the Christian doctrine of the
Atonement,” the emphasis on expiatory substitution and on
forensic justification seem in the introductory treatment
almost to have disappeared, in the interest of justifica-
tion by incorporation. ”If critics had only seen the
Atonement as a fact of life, all their objections to its
vicarious element, as a matter of book-keeping, would have
vanished,” Strong declared. He added:
If Christ is our life, if all we have and
are is derived from him, and if he is God
manifest in the flesh, but essentially in-
dependent of space and time, then the Atone-
ment is a biological necessity .
^
But Christ’s atonement also provided satisfaction to the
divine holiness, Strong urged. The atonement has a necessity
related to the fundamental holiness of God.^ As self-
_
affirming righteousness, God attaches suffering to sin as
7its penalty. Christ’s earthly suffering disclosed the age-
1." V/SIB, 63. 2. WSIB, 64-65. 3. WSIB, 65.
4. WSIB, 66. 5. WSIB, 67. 6. V/SIB
,
69.
7. wsip, ' 69.
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long suffering of God and "rather revealed the Atonement,
than made it . For it exhibited the atonement made both
before ard after the incarnation by the extra-mundane Logos.
That Strong found it difficult to reconcile this in-
sistence on propitiation, however, within the broader empha
sis on incorporation, is seen in his affirmation that the
placing of humanity’s sin and guilt upon Christ "is no ex-
ternal transfer of guilt and penalty, but the voluntary suf
2fering of God himself in the person of his Son." Strong,
while seeking to retain the emphasis on imputation, sought
for an inner principle which would make it a natural conse-
quence of Christ’s relation to humanity. God’s eternal suf
3fering for sin makes objective atonement for mankind.
Christ’s atonement is accomplished through his solidarity
with the race "of which he is the life, and so is its repre-
senative and surety, justly yet voluntarily bearing its
guilt and shame and condemnation as his own."^
Strong reserved for special treatment a discussion of
imputation, holding that it is "the point in theology which
most needs explanation, and which I conceive that I have
5been the first to explain." The three imputations which
are set forth in Scripture as essential to evangelical doc-
trine—that of Adam’s sin, to humanity; that of all human
sin, to Christ; and that of Christ’s merits and righteous-
ly WSIB
,
70. 2. WSIB, 70. 3. WSIB, 71. 4. WSIB, 70
5. WSIB, B5.
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ness, to the believer--seon "at first sight to involve a
sort of legal fiction," he affirmed. 1 Apparently the impu-
tations involve "the crediting to one part of what belongs
exclusively to another; an arbitrary treatment of wholly
moral issues; an external transfer, either of guilt or of
righteousness. " But the reason and necessity of the atone-
ment are grounded in the fact that Christ is the one and
only manifestation of God in nature and humanity:
He who gives himself to a sinful humanity,
if he be holy, must suffer; and the suffer-
ing of the holy God on account of sin is
the essence of the Atonement.
3
But while this removes the atonement from criticisms of an
external and legal statement, there is no reason for reject-
ing the truth of "blood-atonement." But the blood of the
cross is "the symbol of Christ’s life- -the life with which
he had endowed us at our creation, --but which by regeneration
and sanctification he has charged into moral life and
power
.
Christian redemption is delivered from the charge of
"an unmoral reliance upon the work of another" by insisting
that it is the surrender of our life to one who is the only
source of moral life, in order to be conformed to his image .
5
Faith is primarily an act of will, in which one commits him-
1. 'A3 IB, 85 . 2. WSIB, 85 . 3. WSIB, 95.
4. WSIB, 95-96. 5. WSIB, 68.
—.*!(
. t or. cMfie fv.yi ai sE-r-^fiVrlxod o3 ,r:9a
•;,.
x
nh*ml‘lTtA ad • f.--v •- • ; •-: 00
. s f *
.
.
lo ?iiq no ed $iii difcaas k * ff evXovnl LXt: u t
-
-
-
»*f' 0‘ P.r Si >3 K9'> «.'J i i -*>«:: '< 3*1 - £ns...
t v.ti IR
'
'[ lu'if - 15 • S 1l~ £'i l.i-1 j.t/VX ' C;Iw C I*
b T.. • '
,
.
.•
•' 0 ; - :
t
<
’ 1 3 •
.
"»• c? - -
' 3 3 gfli
nox
J'j&'x©fleas'! \'c? doiriK Jud-
'i&woq
;
©rid cl oriw anc od alii iuo 'io "Xdbaa^'iiie add dr d£rld
,
.
,
..... .
.
360
self to Christ as Lord and Saviour. Man’s first duty is
2
to merge himself in Christ. Thus he receives peace, pur-
ity and power. The continuously transforming and assimi-
lating power of Christ’s life is secured to the believer,
for both soul and body, looking ultimately to glorification.
^
The doctrine of sanctification is not only consistent
with belief in evolution but, Strong contended, "is the only
logical conclusion from the theory of theistic evolution .
It is as consistent that the moral and spiritual life of
the race should be derived from a single source, as that its
physical and natural life should be so derived. Evolution
has required but one Adam, so that it is useless to protest
that "evolution should give us many Christs."
Rejection of Christ results in progressive deteriora-
tion of the whole man, Strong stressed. ^ Scripture warrants
neither annihilation nor "external and positive inflictions"
upon the lost, but the principle of evolution as applied to
d
the wicked suggests an endless reversion to animal type. u
1. Strong’s treatment of union with Christ placed less em-
phasis on the cognitive aspect of faith than his earlier
studies. He did not rule out the intellectual aspect, but
he used such strong language as that "Faith in Christ is
...a leap in the dark" (WSIB, 7$). Yet he defended it as
"the most rational act of one’s life" (WSIB, 73). Else-
where he stated that the believer’s mystical union with
Christ is inscrutable "not in the sense of being unintel-
ligible to the Christian or beyond the reach of his ex-
perience, but only in the sense of surpassing in its inti -
macy and value any other union of souls that we know"
(WSIB, 83).
2. WSIB, 79. 3. WSIB, 30. 4. WSIB, 31.
5. WSIB, 32. 6. WSIB, 32. 7. WSIB, 97.
3. WSIB, 93. "Refusing Christ, the sinner may himself become
the refuse of the universe, scrapped and cast off for-
ever," Strong commented (WSIB, 99)
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The essence of hell is the sinner’s own memory, conscience
and character, and not necessarily any positive inflic-
tions.'*' This furnishes a cue to the nature of heaven, for
2
acceptance of Christ gives promise of upward evolution.
The prospect of "an eternal growth in the wisdom, favor and
lordship of the infinite God” is held out.''
As to the consummation of history, Strong claimed to
find elements of truth in both premillennial and post-mil-
lennial views. ^ The spiritual triumph of Christ in history
may well be followed by a physically impressive manifesta-
5 f)
tion. The return of Christ will be literal and visible.
Redeemed humanity looks forward to a future glorification
7
which will involve also a resurrection body.
Strong supplemented his primer with what presumes to
be a brief statement of ethical implications of evangelical
Christianity. Actually, however, it is more of the nature
of Strong’s personal appeal to his readers for a living com-
mitment to Christ. In the spirit of ethical monism, he asked:
Will you say that you have never seen
God? The answer will be that you have
never seen anything else, for every atom
in the universe has been a manifestation
of him.
°
These words were part of the conclusion, dictated, as Strong’s
son commented in the introduction, the day before Strong’s
death.
1. i/SIB, 99. 2. WSIB, 100. 3. WSIB, 100.
4. WSIB, 102. 5. WSIB, 103. 6. WSIB, 107.
7. WSIB, 104. 8. WSIB, 116.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EVALUATION OF STRONG’S FINAL POSITION
The outworking of Strong’s ethical monism resulted in
dissatisfactions at home and afield.
"In correcting the proofs of my father’s work on theo-
logy," wrote C. A. Strong, "I was so repelled by the unnatu-
ralness of the suppositions which theologians made in order
to reconcile the conflicting stories in the Gospels, that the
foundations of my belief in Christianity began to crumble and
I could not become a minister myself as I had intended.
The tensions which the elder Strong’s final theology
set in motion were not alone a family affair. C. A. Strong
became an ardent pan-psychist
,
2 but ethical monism had re-
1. C . A. Strong, Art. (1930), 313.
2. "I had the good fortune to study under William James,"
C. A. Strong wrote. "The questions debated in his classes,
beginning with that of the infinity of time and space, in-
terested me so much that, free at last from a false posi-
tion and able to follow my natural bent, I chose philosophy
as a calling" (Art.Cl930l, 313). George Santayana tells or
young Strong’s year of study at Harvard, in transition from
the ministry to the teaching of philosophy: "He had lost
his faith in revelation. Modernist compromises and ambi-
guities were abhorrent to his strict honesty and love of
precision" (Santayana, Persons and Places
,
21+9 ) • The cen-
tral philosophic difficulty to which he dedicated himself
was bequeathed by ethical monism: "The relation of mind
and body became my especial problem” (Art. [1930], 314).
Note the titles of some of his books: Why the Mind Has a
Body
,
The Origin of Consciousness
,
A Theory of KnowledgeT
and Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind . Another son,
John Henry Strong, resisted his father’s philosophical
views and remained in the evangelical tradition. His books
include Jesus: The Man of Prayer and A Man Can Know God.
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percussions throughout the American theological world.
From the side of evangelicalism and from the side of lib-
eralism came vigorous attack.
Curiously enough, the complaints from both the con-
servative and the liberal forces often struck a common
note. The concessions which Strong had made to the new
philosophy, it was held, would involve him, if consistently
applied, in far greater compromise of his evangelical con-
vications than he stood ready to concede. Ethical monism
as Strong formulated it, the critics suggested, was a half-
way house. Either a consistent appeal to special revelation,
grounded scripturally, and authoritatively and objectively
given to man, or a consistent development of the new imma-
nentism, with its insistence upon a doctrinal development
which would in no way set aside the essentially creative
function of human reason. To profess belief, as Strong did,
both in a unique, once-for-all divine revelation necessitated
because of the noetic effect of human sin, with a simul-
taneous commitment to such doctrines as the trinity, the
primal perfection and fall of man, the divine institution of
sacrifice, the incarnation, virgin birth, substitutionary
atonement, bodily resurrection and future return of Jesus
Christ viewed as essentially divine, and also in an inward,
spiritual view of God’s relationship to humanity as implied
by the new immanence indicated, it was declared, a failure
to apply either principle whole-heartedly.
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1. Dissatisfactions from the Side of Evangelicalism
The idealistic philosophies, at the beginning of the
twentieth century, were in almost all the alert academic
centers vigorous competitors with historic Christianity
in offering a supernaturalisti c answer to the threat of the
rising naturalism. In almost every denomination, theolo-
gians were called upon, in their studies and lectures, to
decide whether in the last analysis philosophical theism
was to be regarded as the friend or foe of Biblical theism.
Strong’s answer, as an outstanding Baptist theologian, was
not without parallels in other communions, and especially
the Methodists, whose theology was being conditioned by the
influence of personalistic idealists like Borden P. Bowne,
and then Albert C. Knudson.
The conservative Presbyterian theology of the day was
uncompromisingly hostile to the idealisms, and Strong’s
final revision was quick to draw fire from Princeton’s
Caspar Wistar Hodge, whose father had penned the standard
Presbyterian theology of that day, approached only by
Shedd’s theology for its influence in Presbyterian circles.
The younger Hodge reviewed Strong’s final 1907 revision and
also the 1922 primer, and the fifteen year interval disclosed
no development on Hodge’s part to view with favor an
idealistic statement of Christianity. ’’What Dr. Strong has
done,” Hodge wrote, ”is simply to superimpose his monism
upon his previous and more adequate views, without ever
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really having effected a reconciliation between them.”''
Those words were written of the first two of the three
1907 volumes. In reviewing the last volume, Hodge com-
plained again that Strong’s ethical monism and Christian
supernaturalism "stood often side by side, unharmonized
and incapable of being harmonized. And in his review of
Strong’s parting work, What Shall I Believe? , Hodge wrote:
It is August inianism combined with idealis-
tic monism. It is our opinion. . .that monism
and Augustinianism do not combine very well.
We think that Dr. Strong maintained his firm
evangelicalism because of his deep religious
and Christian experience and his endeavour
to be loyal to the Scriptures, and in spite
of rather than because of his philosophy.
3
Hodge did concede that nobody, in his opinion, had excelled
Strong TTin the attempt to work out and state clearly a
theistic monism and to combine it with evangelical Christian
truth,” and added the wish that ’’all idealistic monists were
like Dr. Strong,” but the words were not intended to modify
a fundamental conviction on the part of the Princeton Pres-
byterian that Biblical theism and philosophical theism were
not as harmonious as Strong would make them out to be.^
The Princeton theologians, in fact, had observed in
Strong’s writings the increasing concession to monism in
1. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 338.
2. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1910), 335.
3. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1922), 681. ”We can agree with Dr.
Strong that monism may be either theistic or pantheis-
tic,” Hodge wrote, ’’but we find it easier to conceive
on a pantheistic rather than on a theistic basis”
(Rev. C1922J , 681).
4. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1922), 681.
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a theology which, when the 1886 edition appeared, had been
heartily recommended to Presbyterian divinit}*- students,
especially for its high views of inspiration and imputation
B. B. Warfield commented on the 1896 revision:
The reader will naturally wish to know what
effect this radical change of view has had
on the fabric and expositions of his Syste -
matic Theology . The answer must be, Much
less as yet than could have been expected
...Dr. Strong’s ’ethical monism’ is pan-
theizing idealism saved from its worst ex-
tremes by the force of old habits of thought
;
and, of course, it must eat deeper into the
system or again recede from it
.
When Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism appeared, an
anonymous reviewer for The Presbyterian and Reformed Review
the Princeton journal, added that
fortunately the new (and as we think mis-
taken) views have not as yet eaten very
deeply into the substance of Dr. Strong’s
thought .2
But the appearance of the 1907 revision, with its extensive
concessions., was the signal for sterner reactions. By that
time it had become clear that Strong’s monistic affinities
promised to be permanent, and that evangelical convictions,
whatever loyalty Strong professed to them, had to fight for
survival within the monistic context.
In Methodist fundamentalist circles too the opposition
to Strong’s newer outlook was evident. Strong’s articles
contributed to The Examiner on ethical monism provoked a
1. Warfield, Rev. (1897), 357, 358.
2. Anonymous, Rev. (1901), 32o.
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prompt reply from A. J. Behrends in The Methodist Review .
Behrends wrote:
Baptists have not, thus far in their reli-
gious history, disclosed any disposition to
court the alliance of philosophical pantheism;
but if these articles represent or secure any
considerable following a theological revolu-
tion among the Baptists is impending. It is
not likely that such will be their effect;
and they are more apt to find sympathetic
readers in other denominations than in the
one to which their author belongs.
^
The incompatibility of monism and evangelicalism was also
urged by Behrends. Strong’s monistic "language does not
fit his thoughts," he affirmed, and "his irenico n is the
2disintegration and the death of all Christian faith."
Strong was charged with making "unguarded and fatal con-
cessions" in his desire for theological harmony. ^ The
Rochester theologian would "disclose the deeper unity of
the creeds," complained Behrends, "by destroying every one
of them."^
Behrends wrote as a Methodist pastor who had earlier
been a Baptist, but evangelical scholars in the latter de-
1. Behrends, Art. (1895), 357. "The articles are startling
in their significance," Behrends commented, "as coming
from one who is not a novice, but a mature man, a man
of disciplined intellect, who is not given to careless
and hasty composition, who weighs his words, and whose
judgment commands wide respect among his brethren. That
they have been read with incredulous amazement is very
plain; and that their influence is regarded with alarm,
as likely to be injurious, is evident from the criticism
which they have already received" (Art. [13953 > 357).
2. Behrends, Art. (1895), 361.
3. Behrends, Art. (1895), 369.
4. Behrends, Art. (1895), 369.
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nomination were not hesitant to speak for themselves. For
Alvah Hovey contributed to the December, 1894, issues of
The Watchman a series of three articles titled TfDr. Strong’s
Ethical Monism" in which the Newton Theological Institution
president found himself unable to share Strong’s "expecta-
tion of success" in finding a monistic philosophy useful as
an ultimate framework for Christianity. The third of these
articles was devoted to an examination of the Biblical evi-
dence for monism, and concluded with the judgment that "no
single passage of the Bible appears to us really favorable
to monism, while there are hundreds that discountenance
it."^ Hovey especially disputed the appeal to Bible verses
like John 1:3-4 and Colossians 1:16-17 in the interest of
the monistic hypothesis. 2
2. Dissatisfactions from the Side of Liberalism
If evangelical theologians were thankful for Strong’s
retention3 of fundamental Biblical doctrines despite his
T7 Hovey, Art. (1894)3, 12.
2. He protested also against the interpretation of John
15:3-6 in monistic terms, contending that the passage is
but a strong warning against apostasy. Hovey referred
to Acts 27:22-24 and 27:31 as somewhat parallel. Monism
is unnecessary for understanding such verses, Hovey af-
firmed, and serves only to introduce new difficulties
(Hovey, Art. [1894] 3, 12).
3. Prof. Jesse B. Thomas, in an article on Strong’s CCEM
titled "Dr. Strong’s Last Work," wrote: "It is notice-
able that Dr. Strong has not allowed his new views to
obliterate or dislocate the older and fundamental theo-
logical doctrines, of which he has been so long a repre-
sentative and champion. He is still a dualist and an
Augustinian. He has, apparently, added monism as a
hypothetical periphery, within which his theology may
dwell peaceably with current physical and metaphysical
dogma" (Thomas, Art. [1900], 12).
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commitment to ethical monism, those who had made the tran-
sition to a liberal theology or philosophy of religion were
quite disappointed with what seemed to them to involve an
unreconcilable merger. Strong’s views won only a partial
acceptance;-*- on the whole, they were received with equal
caution by conservative and liberal alike. Although
Strong’s announced intention had been the reconciliation of
the two Protestant viewpoints, neither appeared to be pla-
cated by his statement, and liberals whose sympathies were
both for and against an idealistic interpretation of reality
aligned against him, on the ground that he retained still
an authoritarian view of revelation which did violence to
the emphasis on human creativity involved in a theology
loyal to the heightened emphasis on divine immanence.
The reaction of William Adams Brown may be taken as
illustrative of those who, from the liberal side, shared
the evangelical protests, that the traditional doctrines and
a thorough application of a heightened divine immanence
could not be maintained simultaneously. Concerning the re-
1. The central point of reserve varied from circle to
circle. Sometimes it was Strong’s metaphysical monism,
again his view of the Scriptures or of the atonement.
As often as not, it was his commitment to theistic evo-
lution. The December 27, 1900, issue of The Watchman
commented that ’’the battle between evolution and the
older type of orthodoxy is still on. No American
thinker of established repute has done more than our
own President Strong, of Rochester, to reconcile the
two tendencies, but his views have only won a partial
recognition” (The Watchman, Vol. Si, No. 52 fDec. 27,
1900J, 8).
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visions made by Strong, Brown wrote:
These changes .. .are far-reaching in impor-
tance, involving the entire shifting of the
basis of authority from an external and dog-
matic basis to one which is spiritual and
inherent. It is the more to be regretted
that the insight so clearly expressed...
should not have been allowed to determine
the treatment in other parts of the volume.
Had this been done we cannot help believing
that structural changes would have taken
place more radical than any which we have
discovered in our survey.
^
r
3. Dissatisfactions Over Basic Assumptions
The basic issue involved in Strong’s change of view
was, as his liberal critics frequently were more quick to
see than his evangelical disputants, his subscription to a
post-Kantian theory of knowledge which, when consistently
applied, meant that prophets and apostles did not, any more
than other human instruments, passively receive and transmit
their divine messages unchanged, but were creative mediators,
who conveyed their views, however advanced, through fallible
and errant human personalities. For the liberal school, the
emphasis on a heightened divine immanence involved also,
among idealists, a special approach to the problem of epis-
temology, whereby divine and human consciousness were brought
into such close intimacy that the authoritarian emphasis on
a divinely imparted revelation could not be retained without
1. Brown added: ,T It is one of the misfortunes of theology
as of all philosophical disciplines, that one cannot make
a change at any point of his system without being logi-
cally committed to corresponding changes in all. We can-
not but feel that more is involved in Dr. Strong’s prin-
ciple of the immanent Christ than has yet received full
expression even in his revised system” (Brown, Art.[l£$97j,
154, 155).
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a companion emphasis on man’s creative contribution to its
reception. The question was not whether man was totally
passive in the reception of revelation, or whether persona-
lity or stylistic peculiarities in any way colored or modi-
fied its expression--for e vangel ical no less than liberal
theologians insisted on this--but whether the new approach
to divine-human relationships did not require an intensified
inwardness according to which the notion of an objectively
imparted disclosure, the definitive content of which man
could not in any way attain because of the noetic effect of
sin, and which was thus conveyed to chosai instruments in
such a way as to safeguard them from error, had to be aban-
doned in the interest of a formula according to which reve-
lation was viewed as less continuous with the ordinary
creative activities of human reason. If the physical uni-
verse is the divine thought objectified, by an act of will,
and if the all-embracing divine consciousness integrates
human consciousness in such a manner that prophecy and spe-
cial revelation are viewed as intensified expressions of
universal noetic experiences, a principle is introduced
which, while removing on one side the objective, authoritarian
nature of revelation, eliminates at the same time any con-
sistent appeal for infallibility of Biblical doctrine.
The reaction of evangelicals to Strong’s modified view-
point discerned this compromise of Biblical authority more
clearly at the level of specific doctrines, which Strong
'.
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reformulated to their dislike in the application of the
monistic theory. Their customary protests were that the
reformulations were not Biblical, and that they involved
further compromise despite Strong’s determination to
avoid that course. The liberal reaction, essentially, did
not disagree with these complaints. Liberalism had broken
with an authoritarian, inscripturated revelation, and con-
sequently was not particularly concerned with the first
protest; and, with reference to the second, it concurred
vigorously, and traced Strong’s reserve and hesitancy
about further modification to the lingering influence of
traditional ways of thought, at the expense of maturing to
the transfer from an outer, authoritarian to an inner, so-
called spiritual view of revelation. Where Strong hesita-
ted, liberal theologians, whether of monistic metaphysical
leanings or not, proceeded to complete the transition in
the modernistic seminaries of the Northern Baptist Conven-
tion; in time, Strong's own seminary, known today as the
Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, made the transition also
In personalistic idealistic circles, the theological impli-
cations of what was considered a self-consistent personalis
tic idealism were carried out far to the left of Strong’s
position by the writings of Borden P. Bowne, and later by
Albert C. Knudson in theology and by Edgar 3. Brightman in
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philosophy of religion.^
Strong had been influenced by a reference to ethical
monism in his statements of revelation, of inspiration, of
Chris tology, of imputation and of atonement; why should he
hesitate there, rather than to apply the principle to his
whole system, and that in a more coherent and less reserved
manner? That was a question which, in different rhetorical
dress, was being asked both in conservative and liberal
schools, the former in the interest of Biblical authority,
and the latter in the interest of a consistent compromise
of that principle.
The Princeton theologians most clearly discerned the
shift in Strong’s principle of authority, however haltingly
applied by him. When Strong’s 1$£6 edition was commended
to Princeton students, F. L. Patton had declared its defense
of inspiration and the exhibition of the various theories of
it to be ’’the best that we have seen in a work of this
2kind.” The later judgment pronounced on Strong’s writings,
however, found the younger Hodge and Warfield assigning a
1. Two comments are necessary here, however. In a sense,
Bowne
,
Knudson and Brightman, by their radical pluralism,
which escapes all suggestion of quantitative monism, may
be considered—in this regard, at least—a movement to
the right, although in terms of application, they mark
more of a rupture with evangelical Christianity than
Strong’s overt development did, as will be seen. Again,
it should be mentioned that, within personalitic plural-
ism, the thinkers indicated here are not without their
serious differences: Bowne, with his incomplete and
Knudson and Brightman with their complete break with a
soul-psychology for a self-psychology
;
Bowne and Knudson
with their absolute 2 nd Brightman with his finite God.
2. Patton, Rev.(l$$7), 365.
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large share of credit for Strong’s remaining evangelical
convictions respectively to "his deep religious and Christian
experi ence, and to "the force of old habits of thought. ”2
There was a reason, however, for the failure of evan-
gelical thinkers to criticize Strong’s views basically in
terms of the compromise of an objective principle of autho-
rity. For another basic criticism seemed equally obvious,
/"v
and appeared not as difficult to define, in view of Strong’s
continued insistence, along with a new concept of authority,
on the great evangelical doctrines. This other charge was
the countenancing of pantheism. The suspicion was widely
shared, rightly or wrongly, that Strong’s ethical monism
was reducible to an essential variety of pantheism, with its
elimination of moral distinctions by regarding all of reality
as a self-manifestation of God. It was from this vantage
point that Behrends declared that Strong’s evangelical doc-
trinal affirmations
appear as qualifications in a monistic theory
of being, with which they cannot be made to
agree. Consistency demands either the repudi-
ation of the theory or the surrender of the
qualifications. Theological outcome of the
theory is pantheism.'5
In the same mood, Warfield complained of Strong’s new view
that
it is serious enough, however, that it has
already led him to identify all things with
1. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1922), 681.
2. Warfield, Rev. (1897), 353.
3. Behrends, Art. (1895), 360.
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’self-limitations of God, T and to involve
Christ from and by virtue of creation it-
self in human life and human sin, and to
make His sufferings the inevitable effect
of this: a construction that cannot but
work injuriously upon the doctrines of the
Incarnation and Substitutive Expiation
.
In fact, the tendency to identify Strong’s ethical monism
with pantheism was so widespread that he prepared an articl
2devoted in the main to differentiating the two views.
Strong’s demurrer emphasized that in his view, as in
that of Lotze, God must be conceived as transcendent to
creation, rather than as exhaustively revealed in it; that
the physical universe and man are to be regarded as
creations rather than as emanations; and that human spirits
are not parts of God, but are dependent free agents.
These emphases, which became central elements in the meta-
physics of personali stic idealism developed from Lotze by
the Boston personalists
,
especially by Bowne, Knudson and
Brightman, had not yet, at the turn of the century, won a
sufficient following in America so that personalism and
3pantheism were immediately distinguished.
1. Warfield, Rev. (1897), 35^.
2 . See the earlier summary of his article, ’’Ethical Monism
Once More” (CCEM, 51-86).
3. J. Oliver Buswell Jr. has reported that while during his
seminary studies he was not conscious of Strong’s com-
promises of the evangelical view, when in the pastorate
he became more and more dissatisfied with Strong’s
formulation. ”1 was confirmed in my opinion by remarks
made to me by Professor A. T. Robertson of Louisville
Seminary just a year or two before his death,” Buswell
writes. ’’Robertson had openly accused Strong of pan-
theism. I asked him personally about the matter. His
reply was characteristically sharp. ’Yes,’ he said,
’according to Strong, the end of my little finger is a
piece of God!”’ (The Bible Today, Vol. 42 , No. 5 fFeb.
,
1949J, 157). It is clear from this that Strong was
suspected through the years of teaching both qualitative
and quantitative monism.
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But apart from this circumstance, 3trong T s language
had encouraged, at times the suspicion of pantheism, des-
pite his repudiation of that view. For the charge of pan-
theistic leanings came not only where the identification
was hastily made,-*- but also where Lotze’s writings were
known. The younger Hodge, for example, disputed Strong’s
right to the Lotzean tradition. Strong’s exposition of
monism was held to preclude the psychological dualism or
qualitative pluralism which he affirmed:
The question is whether, when God cre-
ated the world, He created a something
which was not part of Himself and which
has some principle of relative persis-
tence. By affirming that the whole of
finite existence is a ’self-limitation’
of God, Dr. Strong really leaves no room
for asserting the creation of finite per-
sons, so that his view cannot consistent-
ly be made to harmonize with that of
Lotze, which latter view Dr. Strong af-
firms to be very like his own.
The difficulty, therefore, derived from Strong’s insistence
that all reality is a manifestation of God, humanity being
designated specifically as ’’God’s self-limitation under the
law of freedom. ”3 Such a view, Hodge contended, precluded
psychological dualism:
1. As by Behrends, who rejected the claim that Strong’s
viewpoint was new, and held that this could be said only
of its ’’rhetorical garment.” Behrends contended: ’’The
leading philosophical concepts, and even much of the
phraseology, may be found in the writings of Descartes,
Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Malebranche; and the theological
representative of the system is Schleiermacher
,
who, to
say the least, is fearlessly consistent in accepting
the results of his pantheistic scheme” (Behrends, Art.
flS95], 362 ).
2. C. W. Hodge, Rev.(l90$J, 33$.
3. Strong, ST (1907), 90.
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If, as Dr. Strong seems to hold, the
whole external world is force and that
force the divine will energizing, and
if humanity is also a ’self-limitation’
of God, it would seem to follow that
there is no place left for any real dis-
tinction between either the body and
soul or humanity and God... If the uni-
verse and humanity are each God’s ’self-
limitations’, it is difficult to see how
any doctrine of Creation can be main-
tained or how idealistic pantheism, with
its destruction of Christian doctrine,
can be avoided. f
The hesitancy to grant that Strong viewed finite personali-
ties as outside of God, therefore, derived from his overall
insistence that every aspect of the created universe, hu-
manity included, is a self-limited manifestation of God.
It is not sufficient, at this point, to think it an
adequate defense of Strong that he thought the quantita-
tively monistic and pluralistic passages to be reconcila-
ble, for the two create, at times, an insuperable tension.
On the one hand, Strong insisted that the physical universe
and selves are not parts of God; on the other hand, that
all reality is a finite, graded differentiation of one un-
derlying substance and ground of being. If the attempt is
made to relieve this surface tension by affirming that the
monistic element is to be understood against the background
of the prior claim of the pluralistic element, passages are
not wanting in Strong to make it clear that the monistic
1. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1906), 336.
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emphasis is treated no less centrally than the pluralistic.
If then, one is ready on this ground to classify Strong as
a personalistic absolutist rather than as a personalistic
pluralist, and thus to assign to him the view of quantita-
tive as well as qualitative monism, passages are abundant
in which Strong insisted that pantheism is destructive of
any worthwhile religion, and that, at all costs, the physi-
cal universe and selves must not be viewed as parts of God.
It appears necessary, therefore, to hold that the pluralis-
tic intention of Strong’s ethical monism was not clearly
not satisfactorily worked out and that, while anti-panthe-
istic in spirit, it did not demonstrate how the freedom of
finite individuals could be maintained without serious com-
promise
Side by side, therefore, and without that detailed out-
working of the relationship of the two emphases, one finds
in Strong two insistences. There is the mood of qualitative
monism: Christ is the soul and life of humanity, ^ Christ’s
will is differentiated into myriads of finite wills, ^ finite
spirits are differentiations within the being of God him-
1. The struggle to keep the self metaphysically independent
failed in all post-Hegelian personalistic absolutism,
whether in the efforts of Bosanquet, Bradley, Pringle-
Pattison
,
Hocking, Royce, Calkins, and others,. It was
successfully carried through by the personalistic
pluralists (Bowne, Brightman, Howison, Schiller, Ward,
and others), but in radical competition with Biblical
anthropology at many points.
2. CCEM, 223. 3. WSIB, 23.
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self,'1' God is the one underlying substance and ground of
all being . 2 There is another mood, in which all varieties
of pantheism are indicted,-^ in which Lotze is championed
against pantheism and Bowne heralded as the best exponent
of Lotze’s views, ^ in which man’s free will is insisted
upon so that humanity can resist as well as obey Christ,
^
in which it is affirmed that nature is no more a part of
God than our ideas and volitions are a part of ourselves . 0
But of Strong’s intentions, and of the possibility of
affirming coordinately a metaphysical monism and a psycho-
logical dualism, there can be no doubt. The vindication,
by Bowne, Knudson, Brightman and others, of the claim of
personalistic idealism to represent a viewpoint competi-
tive with pantheistic idealism, has been firmly established
during the past generation. And it is clear, from Strong 1 s
own writings, that he would have been among the first to
abandon the newer imnanentism, were he not satisfied that
he could retain a relatively independent existence for fi-
nite personalities, so that the reality of moral distinc-
1. ST( 1907 ) , 366 .
2. ST(1907), 700. It is not difficult to see how, given
such terminology, Charles Hodge might have applied his
criticisms against quantitative monism to Strong’s view,
i.e., that such a theory ’’supposes that the substance
of God admits of partition or division; that the attri-
butes of God can be separated from his substance: and
that the divine substance can become degraded and pol-
luted’’ (ST, I, 555).
3. CCEM, 3. 4. ST( 1907 ) , 372. 5. CCEM, 28S-289.
6. ST(1907), 373. The distinction here depends for its
significance upon a substance theory of reality. If
being is equated with activity, as contemporary person-
alism maintains
f
then man’s ideas and volitions are not
only parts of himself, but are the self, for there is
then no self beyond conscious experience. Strong broke
with a realistic view of substance, but hesitated to
appropriate a self-psychology.
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tions could be preserved, and the holiness of God and the
freedom of man’s will sustained.
^
It was therefore along the line of the other basic
criticism, of the substitution of an inner for an outer
principle of revelational authority, that the issues of
Strong’s new position were to be determined ultimately.
^
Thus william Adams Brown, speaking for the liberal wing,
called attention to a change in Strong’s attitude toward
"the place of the religious experience itself as a source
of theology. Strong had revised his definition of in-
spiration, from 1896 to 1907, so as to remove the emphasis
on a divine influence which secured the inerrant production
of a permanent and written form of divine truth, in the in-
terest of conceding scientific and historical inaccuracy
while insisting on spiritual efficaciousness when the wri-
tings are "taken together and interpreted by that same
1. The recognition of a theistic rather than pantheistic
monism is found in Hodge’s review of Strong’s parting
work, WSIB: We do not think that the Scripture teaches
that ’matter is Christ’s self-limitation under the law
of necessity,’ or that ’humanity is Christ’s self-limi
-
tation under the law of freedom’ •• .We can agree with
Dr. Strong that monism may be either theistic or panthe-
istic, but we find it easier to conceive on a pantheis-
tic, rather than on a theistic basis" (C. W. Hodge,
Rev. C1922J
,
681).
2. It is curious that the younger Hodge, in his review of
ST(1907) declared only that "Dr. Strong upholds the au-
thority of the Scripture, and bases his theology upon
the Bible" and then proceeded to criticism in terms of
pantheism and the modification by Strong of individual
doctrines (C. W. Hodge, Rev. fl908J
,
335).
3. Brown, Art. (1908), 154. It will be recalled that Bowne,
too, in his youth, held the traditional view of the Scrip-
tures (McConnell, BPB, 153), but later rejected Biblical
inerrancy and infallibility for practical certainty, and
insisted that revelation must be tested by human moral
and spiritual insight (McConnell, BPB, 186).
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Spirit who inspired them.”^ The principles which Strong
set forth, which tended to replace an objective by an in-
ternal authority, despite his affirmation of the supreme
authority of the living Christ, were as follows:
The human mind can be inhabited and
energized by God while yet attaining
and retaining its own highest intelli-
gence and freedom. The Scriptures be-
ing the work of the one God, as well as
of the men in whom God moved and dwelt,
constitute an articulated and organic
unity. The unity and authority of Scrip-
ture as a whole are entirely consistent
with its gradual evolution and with
great imperfection in its non-essential
parts .2
That God accomplishes his purpose through imperfect writings
by virtue of inner enlightenment by the Holy Spirit,-^ in-
volved a transfer of external for internal authority. For
the principle of a scriptureabased divine revelation, au-
thoritative and infallible, to provide a permanent, writ-
ten disclosure of supernatural truth, had now been dis-
carded.
1. ST (1907 ) , 196.
2. ST(1907), 220. Bowne, too, refused to separate the au-
thority of the Bible irom that of the church and of the
Christian consciousness, when in 1904 he was tried for
heresy by the New York East Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal church (McConnell, BPB, 196). But Bowne’ s
rupture with traditional doctrine was far greater, as
will be indicated, than Strong 1 s. Revelation, for Bowne,
was not objectively given, but came through tne moral
life of the community through the insight of godly men;
therefore he refused to conceive of
,
revelation in terms
of once-for-all Biblical disclosure (McConnell, BPB,
195-197).
3. Strong wrote that ,Twe know what parts are of most value
and what is the teaching of the whole” because ”the same
Spirit who inspired the Bible is promised to take of the
things of Christ, and, by showing them to us, to lead us
progressively into all the truth” (ST[1907j
,
221).
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Doubtless the significance of the transition involved
in this change was obscured for many evangelical critics
of Strong 1 s position, even as it was for Strong himself.
For, under the pressure of higher criticism, and an evolu-
tionary view of origins and of primitive and comparative
religions, numerous evangelicals, both in the British Isles
and in America, made the transition both to theistic evolu-
tion and a higher critical view of the Bible, limiting the
infallibility of the latter to its moral and spiritual teach-
ing, without any deep-seated awareness that a genuinely ob-
jective authority had actually been sacrificed in the pro-
cess. The fact that so many mediating conservatives, at
the turn of the century, combined their higher critical and
evolutionary views of the Bible with an uncompromised insis-
tence on traditional doctrinal affirmations served to con-
ceal, in evangelical circles, the far-reaching result
involved in a consistent break with an infallible, bible-
grounded revelation, discerned more clearly by liberal
thinkers. The reconstruction of Christian doctrine by. a
consistent appeal to an inner principle of inspiration alone
did not lead, for liberal spokesmen, beyond a unipersonal
God, a special revelation distinguishable only in terms of
a higher degree of general revelation and not as qualita-
tively different in kind, the superiority of Christ con-
ceived in ethical rather than in metaphysical terms, a
rejection of the miraculous, and the discard of any doctrine
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of expiatory atonement. 1 Strong made it clear in the pre-
face to his 1907 theology, and in his valedictory volume
written in 1921, that the sacrifice of these doctrines
involved also the sacrifice of the total Christian view of
things. But he did not think that his modification of the
traditional Protestant view of revelation and inspiration
endangered the central doctrines. Had he thought so, he
would have preferred the received tradition to any of the
reconstructions in the interest of ethical monism—for
this much he said repeatedly. But the fact is that he
revised the traditional view in such a way as to vitiate,
in the eyes of liberal critics like William Adams Brown,
a genuinely objective authority in the Reformation sense.
Whereas the liberal attack concentrated rather on the
broad epistemological issue, along with a concern to show
that the greater stress on divine immanence than affirmed
in traditional theology required a further modification of
2inherited theology than Strong had been willing to make.
1. Bowne had substituted for the traditional view of inspi-
ration "the conception of a historical and gradual un-
folding in accordance with God’s general laws in life
and history and humanity" (Bowne, IG, 104), and had af-
firmed that "we need no infallible authority, whether
of book or church. . .'What we need, and what we have, is
a truth that carries practical conviction with it" (IG,
112 )
.
2. A. C. Knudson, in response to the writer’s inquiry, re-
called having spoken once to Bowne concerning Strong,
and having received a response which may be noted ap-
propriately here. "The impression Bowne’ s response
left with me," Knudson wrote, "was that he did not
think that he had thought his way through the per-
sonalistic system and seen its full theological impli-
cations. The impression, however, is general and I
do not recall any specific statement that he made."
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the evangelical criticism of Strong included an evaluation
of changes involved in the statement of the specific doc-
trines, and an endeavor to show that Strong T s views now
were inconsistent with the Scriptures, or involved him in
inner contradiction, or both.
4. Dissatisfactions With Specific Doctrines
The difficulties which Strong’s newer conception of
revelation and inspiration involved have already been dis-
cussed in their main issues. Before proceeding to a survey
of the effect of ethical monism upon other doctrines, how-
ever, it is well to observe additional elements of tension
in the religious epistemology at which Strong finally
arrived.
Strong held that God’s use of human nature involved a
compromise of Christ’s omniscience in the incarnation, as
well as the fallibility of the written word. 1 This raised
the question not only of the objectivity of revelation, but
also of the significance of the historical element in reve-
lation, especially the relationship of the immanent Christ
to Jesus of Nazareth. It is clear that at this point a more
radical criticism, under bhe impulse of the new immanentisra,
would have lessened the exclusive nature of the revelation
in Jesus Christ. Strong had conceded, in his later revision,
1. ”Our modern theology has immensely gained in candor and
insight,” he wrote, ”by acknowledging that the same
method of human growth which was adopted by the incarnate
Word was also adopted in the production of the written
word, and that both these manifestations of the immanent
Christ consist with and throw light upon one another”
( CCEM, 206).
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that a more positive preparation for Christianity than he
had thought earlier must be granted to the non-Biblical
religions.^ Furthermore, he had granted that no theory of
inspiration is necessary to Christianity, in view of the
spiritual authority of the living Christ and of the "self-
evidencing" nature of Scripture. The monistic view of the
universe enabled one to establish the supremacy of Christ
without any necessary reference to inspiration, he con-
tended.-^ But the question remained whether monistic theo-
logy, if it involved a divine immanence which precluded a
superintendence of human consciousness such as to safeguard
it from error in the recording of divine teaching, did not
at the same time involve a compromise, on the same ground,
of the traditional view of an imparted revelation, even if
only the infallibility of spiritual and moral, as distin-
guished from scientific and historical, factors, is in view.^
One of the disturbing features of this question is that
Strong, not in intent but in method, depreciated the prin-
ciple of special revelation at numerous points in the deve-
lopment of his final system. While uncompromisingly pro-
1. ST(1907), 665 . In his earlier editions Strong had, of
course, insisted upon a general revelation elsewhere,
but gave the vitiating effect of sin a heightened role.
2. CCEM, 126.
3. "The supremacy of Christ, and not any theory of inspi-
ration, is the citadel of our faith," Strong wrote.
"We refuse to confound the citadel with any of those
temporary outworks which past ages have constructed to
defend it, and with which our modern artillery enables
us in some cases to dispense" (CCEM, 126).
4. The movement of personali Stic idealism to an autonomous
morality is here significant.
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fessing the priority of revelation, he nonetheless ap-
pealed to philosophy, side by side with the Scriptures,
as if to imply what he elsewhere denied, that philosophy
would independently lead to revelational conclusions.^
An example of this fluctuating appeal, which involves in
practice a minimizing of the significance of special revela-
tion in the interest of general revelation, is found in the
affirmation that T, the system of things cannot be conceived
as a universe without postulating an omnipresent reason
and will" which the Christian believer "instinctively iden-
tifies with him from whom he receives the forgiveness of sins,
who dwells as a living presence in his soul, and before
whom he bows in unlimited worship and adoration." Strong'
added: "In all this he only follows the lead of Scripture,
for the Scripture too identifies the omnipresent, living,
p
and upholding God with Jesus Christ."
Since Strong had weakened the objective authority of
Scripture in the interest of the supreme authority of the
living Christ, and since by a kenosis Christology he had
raised the question of the relationship of the immanent
1. While Strong affirmed that "the new philosophy must ap-
prove itself to reason, conscience, Scripture, before
it has earned a right to supplant the old," he declared
also that "the test of truth in a theory. . .is. . .that it
is capable of explaining other things" (CCEM, 29, 30).
The appeal to coherence and to revelation are carried
on side by side in such a way as to suggest at times
that an adequate coherence is to be found only in a re-
velational setting, and again, that philosophical coher
ence pursued independently of a revelational appeal
leads to the revelational setting.
2. CCEM, 149.
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Logos and the historical Jesus, it is not surprising that
William Adams Brown should have expressed disappointment
that, in view of the concessions to an inner, spiritual
principle of revelation, Strong nonetheless retained the
conventional order of approach to the study of revelation,
discussing first the inspiration of the Scriptures and then
the doctrine of the trinity, rather than consistently invok-
ing the significance of religious experience in view of the
universal activity of the divine Spirit.^ On such an ap-
proach, the appeal to special, objective revelation would
be displaced entirely by an appeal to philosophical coher-
ence of a type which begins with a far greater confidence
in the competence of human reason to attain metaphysical
knowledge, apart from supernatural regeneration, than did
the Protestant tradition.
^
i. The Nature of God
The application of Strong’s religious epistemology
to the doctrine of God involved him in some curious ten-
sions .
1 . Brown
,
Art. (1906), 155.
2. Bowne had suggested, in this spirit, that special revela-
tion is admissible only as absorbed to general revela-
tion: ’’Assuming that God was revealing himself in Jewish
history and in the lives and thoughts of holy men, it is
still permitted to inquire whether this revelation breaks
with all known historical and psychological laws, or wheth-
er we can trace even in revelation laws with which we are
elsewhere familiar” (IG, 69).
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It was protested that the monistic merging of nature
in God compromised the divine unity, for it allegedly in-
volved nthe notion of a being infinitely complex and inter-
nally discordant.”^ Those who lodged this complaint, how-
ever, had to acknowledge that the world of nature was under-
stood on the traditional approach by reference to a divine
plan. Consequently, to explain the real world as ,Tmade of
various combinations of the divine volitions” did not neces-
sarily involve a compromise of divine unity. That all move-
ment in nature is "God’s direction of himself” need not
have been destructive of ”t’ne simplicity of the essential
life of God” and ”its infinite and holy harmony,” BehrendS’
protest to the contrary.^ But the traditional view also
made sin, usually with a reference to anticipative conse-
quences, a factor in the explanation of the interpretation
of the behavior of nature. And that there is deep insight
in the complaint that the "inclusion of the whole universe
in the idea of God, robs that idea of clearness, simplicity
and self-consistency , is evident from the movement of one
wing of recent personalistic idealistic thought in the di-
rection of a finite God, in whom the principle of evil is
regarded as a given, in order to account for that aspect of
the behavior of nature, such as destructive physical calam-
1 . Hovey, Art.(l£94)l, 10 . 2. Behrends, Art. (1895), 365.
3. Hovey, Art.(l£94)l, 10 . In the same article Hovey added:
"Strong’s view throws back into the very nature of God
the multiple conflicts that can be observed in the uni-
verse” ( 11 ). Behrends took the same attitude: Strong’s
view "may seem to bring unity and order into the cosmos,
but it carries eternal chaos into the being of God”
(Behrends, Art.[lS95], 365).
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ities and diseases, the presence of which is held to be
irreconcilable with the purpose of a sovereign God in a
normal world.
Strong’s argument to an objectively real God on phi-
losophical grounds, and the subsequent appeal to revelation
for the affirmation of divine tripersonality, had in it all
the difficulties of a Thomistic epistemology, which affirms
the partial competency of the human reason in such a way as
to raise the possibility of its total competency.^ From
the argument that we know matter only as force, and that
force is a product of will, Strong reasoned that matter
—
since physical force is not an exertion of human will—must
be an exertion of divine will. He granted the possibility
of developing this by reference to a unipersonal God.^ But
he protested, against such a view, that tfthe only God whom
the New Testament knows as active and manifested is Jesus
Christ,” and that the Biblical revelation therefore involves
1. Since man is assumed to be able to get philosophical cer-
tainty in metaphysical truth up to a certain point, can
that competency consistently be denied mid-way? Cr.
A. E. Burtt, Types of Religious Philosophy
,
401-472.
2. CCEM, 69 . "Instead of being agnostics, we are bound to
see God in everything; instead of finding no design in
the universe, it is more true to say that there is nothing
but design” (CCEM, 32}
.
3. It may be recalled that, in his earliest treatments of the
theistic evidences, Strong argued along idealistic lines
that God is the presupposition of all reasoning, without
making clear just how much of a natural theology he in-
tended thereby to imply. To that pre-monistic type of
argument, Patton had" already replied that Strong’s ”de-
fence of the intuitive nature of belief in God is at least
questionable, especially when the author affirms that ’he
who denies God ’ s" existence must tacitly assume that exis-
tence in his own argument by employing logical processes
whose validity rests upon the facet' of God ’ s existence.’
This would be a strong' position if it could be maintained,
and perhaps it can be maintained to the extent of saying
that we must choose between Theism and Agnosticism”
(Patton, Rev. C18873
^
3o5). The issue that might have
been raised, is whether it is obvious that reason is given
in rather than to God apart from a revelational appeal.
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an identification of the triune God with the deity re-
quired by ethical monism.^
It has already been noted that, in developing the
doctrine of divine tripersonality, Strong fluctuated be-
tween revelational and philosophical appeals, despite his
clear proclamation of revelational priority. The type of
argument varied from such psychological abnormalities as
dual personality, and the usual idealistic arguments that
consciousness, knowledge and love each reauire an object--
the consistent development of which can hardly issue in
more than a binitarianism. But two further difficulties
1. CCEM, 32, 69 . Bowne went beyond Lotze in the affirmation
of transcendental empiricism, which also marks an impor-
tant distinction from Strong 1 s view. Lotze and Bowne both
emphasized the constitutive activity of the self, the nec-
essary unit of the mental subject, in Kantian fashion, but
without Kant’s ding-an-sich (MSFP, 375 )• They assigned
more importance to the self than to the process of thought
(i. e.
,
the operation of the categories); the thinking
self now displaced the former significance of the ding-an-
sich as well. The conscious nature of experience in-
volved for Bowne a transcendental self, or a unitary in-
telligence, through whom the categories alone can be un-
derstood. Strong referred this to the Logos, and at this
point merged Biblical revelation and personalistic philo-
sophy; for Strong, an ontological trinity was a central
article for Christian faith, and special revelation an
integral element in arriving at a satisfactory world
view. Whereas Bowne moved to theism via transcendental
empiricism, Strong moved there with the assurance of spec-
ial revelation. Bowne’ s decisive argument for theism was
the intelligibility of the universe coupled with the de-
mand of our aesthetic and moral natures. Bowne avoided
the word "personality” in M, possibly because it gave of-
fense to trinitarians
;
later he used it more and more,
and in 1905 he decided to call his system "personalism"
(McConnell, BPB, 131). Bowne preferred this term to per-
sonal idealism because of its emphasis on the mil as
well as the idea factor in reality.
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ensued for trinitarianism, on Strong 1 s approach. For one
*
thing, the argument that since ”within the bounds of the
one universal and divine consciousness there are multitu-
dinous finite consciousnesses” and consequently there may
be ,Tin the nature of this one God three infinite conscious-
nesses”'*' was actually double-edged, for, given a kenotic
Christology, what was to prevent the explanation of the his-
torical Jesus in terms only of another finite consciousness
within one infinite consciousness?^ The very monistic im-
pulse which had encouraged Strong T s sympathy toward the new
metaphysics, it might be argued, would press vigorously
against the notion of three ultimate, infinite, self-
consciousnesses. For another thing, Strong may have cut
himself off from a revelational appeal which would have
precluded this development of his argument. For he em-
phasized repeatedly that ”God never thought anything, said
3
anything, did anything except through Christ.” This con-
viction he carried so far as to stress that ”the transcen-
dent and unknowable God is the Father, the immanent and
4
revealed God is the Christ.” He added that ”all outgoing,
communication, manifestation of the Godhead is the work of
1. 3T(1907), 332.
2. Behrends replied to Strong that the view ”that finite
personalities share in the substance of God, as do
Father, Son and Holy Ghost in the one divine essence
...is a two-edged sword... It reduces the Trinity to the
category of speculations and assumptions for which not
a particle of solid evidence can be offered” (Behrends,
Art. [1395]
,
368)
.
3. CCEM, 121. 4. CCEM, 190.
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Christ."'1' "Christ and revelation," he affirmed, "are one
2
and the same thing from different points of view." Now
it is clear that such passages would preclude a merely
human Jesus. But at the same time they appear to commit
one definitely to a Sabellian view of an economic trinity
or an agnosticism concerning the Father which has all the
atmosphere of the Spencerian "unknowable."-' In his affir-
mation that all reality and revelation are the work of the
immanent or transcendent Christ, Strong had lost the evan-
gelical emphasis that the redemptive and creative centra-
lity of Christ is not such as to preclude a genuinely ob-
jective disclosure of the transcendent and immanent triune
God. He had moved more and more to a philosophical, and
away from a revelational
,
justification for trinitarianism,
despite the overt affirmation that priority must be assigned
to revelation.^- In coming by this route to identify the
1. CCEM, 121.
2. CCEM, 122. Christ is "the divine Word, God revealing
himself, and, since we can never known an unrevealed God,
the only God with whom we have to do or with whom we
shall ever have to do" (CCEM, 122).
3. T,We can know God only so far as he has revealed himself,"
Strong commented. "The immanent God is known, but the
transcendent God we do not know any more than we know the
side of the moon that is turned away from us" (ST£l907j,
25). "Christ is practically, and so far as we are con-
cerned, all there is of God and of the universe" (CCEM,
41).
4.
tendency in this direction. The defence of the Trinity
should rest squarely on the vindication of the deity of
Christ, not upon a priori reasons, he complained. The
doctrine may be "essential." to any proper theism" but
Strong "does not make it clear that it is, and we do not
believe that the man who gives up the Trinity is logi-
cally bound to give up Theism" (Patton, Rev. £18874
>
366)
.
It is curious how revelational trinitarians and philo-
sophical Unitarians often stood side by side against
philosophical trinitarians.
Patton
prior to
had already complained, in reviewing 3T(l£86),
Strong’s commitment to ethical monism, of trn
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universal divine manifestation with the Christ of Biblical
revelation, he seriously jeopardized his argument for
divine triunity.
^
ii. The Works of God
Strong 1 s theological revision in the interest of ethi-
cal monism had important consequences for his view of God’s
relationship to nature. The points of controversy concern
especially the doctrines of creation and of miracle, in
view of an intensified stress on divine immanence.
Strong had indicted Biblical theism, as championed by
those who denied metaphysical monism, as yielding too much
ground to deism, and as involving a now-antiquated view
of matter.
Curiously enough, in his pre-monistic statements,
Strong had carefully differentiated Biblical theism from
deism. In his 1888 essay stating his objections to philo-
sophical . idealism, Strong emphasized that the Biblical
teaching that T,in Him we live and move and have our being”
maintains a proper immanence, with a wholesome protest
against both deism and monistic idealism. But after his
espousal of ethical monism, Strong created a constant
1. Bowne’s 1904 heresy trial marked not so much an affir-
mation on his part of trinitarianism, as a denial that
the quotations' attributed to him involved unitarianism;
his 1909 Studies in Christianity quite cautiously treat
the issuel But the movement oi personalistic idealism
away from trinitarianism is seen in Knudson’s readiness
to find the central significance of the doctrine in its
affirmation of the Christlikeness of God (Knudson, DOG,
426-428 ).
2. PAR
?
58-74. In that essay Strong had lumped together
”Caird, Green and Seth in Great Britain” and "Harris,
Bowne and Royce in America” as able advocates of ”the
system of Hegel” and of the evolutionary hypothesis in
opposition to agnostic materialism (PAR, 61 )
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sympathy for his new view by identifying the older repre-
sentation of divine immanence as a species of deism,
T,A universe that manifests God is more intelligible than
a universe that is forsaken by God,' T he urged. ~ Strong
designated the new immanentism as "a practical rediscovery
p
of God in the universe and in the soul.”
But supporters of the traditional theism replied to
followers of Lotze that the issue was between two types of
immanence, and not between a forsaken and a manifested God.
Alvah Hovey opposed the new immanentism, but insisted on
”an intimate and perpetual union between God and nature”
delineated by the Scriptures in terms of universal divine
presence, universal dependence on God, and the existence of
all things in Him.^ All things are bound to God by the
three-fold tie of origin, control and destination, he in-
sisted.^" In stressing an intimate relationship with God,
necessary to the preservation of nature, he used words
which one might expect rather in the newer views:
The regularity and force of nature are
signs of his steadfast will. We ought
to think of Him as revealed by gravita-
tion, by cohesion, by crystallization,
1. CCEM, 73. The Christian church has been ”far too great-
ly influenced” by deism. Strong held (CCEM, 143). Bowne,
too, at times opposed the "instructed theist,” who holds
that "nature is but the form and product” of God’s cease-
less activity, with "the self-running nature and the ab-
sentee God,” as if there were no middle ground (Bowne,
IG, 24). But he also wrote, in contrasting deism and
perpetual creation, of "two extreme views and an indef-
inite number of intermediate ones” (T f , 226-227 )
•
2 , CCEM, 137. "The theology of fifty years ago,” Strong
conceded, "did not so much deny God’s immanence as it
forgot God’s immanence” (CCEM, 139). But the fact re-
mained that the standard evangelical theologies of
Strong’s day^ and Strong’s earlier writings also,
stressed botn divine immanence and transcendence, clear-
ly repudiating deism, and idealism also.
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by the color of every cloud and shell,
by the symmetry of every plant and ani-
mal, by the miracle of growth in every
living thing, by the orderly sweep of
the planets, the faithful return of the
seasons, and the onward march of the
human race ."1
But at the same time, there was no sympathy for any concep-
tion of nature as immediate divine activity and being,
whereby reciprocal individual activities are included in
2God as the universal life by virtue of substantial unity.
For "the Scriptures also teach," wrote Hovey, "the existence
of a world of things, animate and inanimate, in distinction
from God."-^
Strong also stated this issue, at times, in terms of
a dynamical as against a mechanical view of nature. The
traditional formulation of divine immanence protested
against the view of nature as a self-sustained mechanism,
but it refused to identify matter in terms of metaphysical
monism. . The resistance to the new view did not come, how-
ever, from traditional realists alone. It is true that,
some evangelicals, like Behrends, took that line of attack.^-
1. Hovey, 3ER, 62.
2. Alvan Hovey struck back at the new immanentism: "The
view which we defend rejects deism on the one hand and
pantheism on the other- but asserts a Constant relation
of God to every part of nature, and 'of every part of na-
ture to God. In particular, it asserts the dependence
of nature upon God for the continuance as well as for
the origin of its powers" (SER, 53).
3. Hovey, SER, 57.
4. Against the monistic view that there is an original and
essential identity of matter and mind, Behrends held that
consciousness refuses to identify the two, and that a true
view finds their unity in the creative ana causative en-
ergy of the Primal Will, without obliterating an essen-
tial difference between matter and mind (Behrends, Art.
[1895], 358-359).
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But opposition cane also from those who affirmed, like the
younger Hodge, "no desire to maintain an ’atcmic’ rather than
a ’dynamic* conception of natter" as long as the finite,
created and non-divine character of matter was preserved."
It appeared, indeed, that Strong had stopped mid -way in
his rupture with a substance philosophy.
2
He insisted firmly
upon metaphysical monism; the physical universe is a finite,
graded manifestation of deity, the divine thought being exter-
nalized thus by an act of will. Yet he wrote that the regular
forces of nature are "not divine will in direct exercise."
The forces of nature. Strong stated, are "secondary and auto-
3
matic, not primary and immediate, workings of God." In the
same mood, Strong held that second causes are admissible in
nature, since the universe is no more identifiable with God
4than an individual’s thoughts and will with the individual.
1. The issue of dynamic as against atomic matter is, Hodge
commented, "a question for physical science" (C. W. Hodge,
Rev.[1908J, 336).
2. It will be recalled that Bowne
,
although revolting against
a substantialist view, frequently retained the vocabulary
of substance in his writings. But the passages in which
Strong insists upon one substance, of which all reality is
a graded manifestation, and in which there are three infi-
nite and a multitude of finite persons, appear to the modern
personalist as scmewhat Spinozistic . Strong’s refusal to
equate being and activity, and his insistence that being has
activity, is quite congruous with Spinoza’s view of sub-
stance manifested under the attributes of thought and exten-
sion. But, in fairness to Strong, it must be mentioned that
he had no affection for Spinozism; that he regarded pantheisa
as the enemy of true religion; that he opposed his insistence
on divine transcendence and human freedom and responsibility
to Spinoza. Strong’s treatment of essence and attribute has
more affinities with the Scholastic than the Spinozistic
tradition. But whereas Strong refused to equate being and
personality or self, treating personality as an attribute
of God, e\en after his espousal of ethical monism, the Lotze-
Bowne tradition has placed a central emphasis on personality
as the divine essence.
3. ST(1907 ) , 416. 4. ST(1907 ) ,416, 417.
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This distinction, between the activity of the self and
the self itself, was one which personalistic idealism did not
sustain. The insistence by Brightman, that the soul or agent
is not to be distinguished from states of consciousness, but
rather consists of the total unity of consciousness, is the
prime motivation in his contention that nature is a part of God.
Strong’s admission of second causes, and his suggestion
that the habitual workings of God do not represent the divine
will in direct exercise, no less than his insistence that the
divine attributes inhere in a divine substance which is known
in knowing the attributes, and his retention of a soul-psycho-
logy* 1 were concessions to a substantia list view which later
exponents and developers of Lotze’s personalism, such as
Brightman, 2 were reluctant to make. The "ghost" of the older
substance theory must be banished, they declared unhesitating-
ly, in the interest of the ultimate and exclusive activity
1. Bowne fluctuated, it will be recalled, between a soul-
psychology and a self -psychology
,
and in some passages
regarded the soul as transcendent to consciousness. But
Bowne ’s emphasis that being is activity required a far
closer relationship of thinker and thought than Strong’s
distinction between being and activity. If nature is
God’s thought volitionally externalized, then it would
appear for Bowne to be a part of God, except as the
creative activity of human thought contributes to its
phenomenal appearance. Bowne, in insisting that a funda-
mental moniaa underlies the plurality of spontaneous thought,
affirmed that "the interaction of the many is possible only
through the unity of an all-embracing 0ne , which either co-
ordinates and mediates their interaction, or of which they
are in some sense phases or modifications" (Bowne, T, 59).
But he opposed speaking of the world as a "mode of God"
(T, 201). He did not object, however, to calling the world
a mode of the divine activity (T, 203). At the same time
he insisted that the world is not a part of God, contending
that thought is mental activity, and not a mode of mind
(T 207 )
*
2. Brightman, POR, 216-218.
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of mind and will.
It is true that not all persona listic idealists have
followed Brightman in the identification of nature as a part
of God. 1 The determinative factor, in the refusal of numer-
ous persona lists to identify nature in this manner is due
largely to the important value assigned by thinkers like
Knudson^to the Kantian critique. Nature as known by man, it
is emphasized, is a joint product both of God’s activity
and of the creative activity of the knowing human mind
as it operates at the levels of perception, understanding
m’hree more or less representative personalistic viewpoints
appear to have emerged; (1) Charles Hartshorne , from the
pan-psychistic perspective, distinguisnes nature from God
more than other personalists. For him, nature is the
activity of myriads of cells, yet all the monads belong,
on the psychic side, to God, although nature as a whole is
not a part of God. (2) For Bowne
,
Knudson and L. Harold
DeWolf, the distinction between phenomenal nature and God
is maintained because of the creative activity of the
human mind. (3) Brightman’s identification of nature as
a part of God derives from his insistence that the self
consists of the unity of consciousness, and that the
divine activity manifested in nature is therefore part of
the divine person. Whereas the second view refuses to
identify nature as a part of God largely because the im-
portance of human creativity in the knowledge situation,
Brightman attributes human experience of color, etc., to
the elements of the non-rational Given in God.
2. The Biblical idea of creation, Knudson declared, "implies
that the world is distinct from God. However dependent
it may be upon him, however much it may be an object of
affection to him, it is not identical with him. The
wrld is not itself God, nor is it his body, nor is it
in any other sense a part of him. It is the product of
his will, of his energizing; and as such it stands apart
from him as his work, as his deed. . .Creation implies the
objectivity of the world, its otherness to God.. .The
material world is an effect of the divine activity...
It has an existence distinct from that of God so that it
cannot in itself or in any of its parts properly be
identified with him" (DOR, 27-28).
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and reason.-1- It is significant, however, that this dis-
tinction between nature and God, on this approach, grows
out of epistemological considerations and not, as in the
case of Strong, out of concessions apparently made to a
semi-substantialist view of the physical universe. That
nature is not a part of God does not imply for these
thinkers, that it involves any reality other than the
divine activity and the human knower.
But the identification of nature as part of God,
which conservative thinkers regarded as the consistent
implication of ethical monism despite Strong 1 s repudiation
of the view, encouraged the hostility of evangelical
o
thinkers. They condemned it both as unbiblical and as
justifying idolatry. ^ The theory’s lack of Biblical
support, Hovey wrote, "would not be altogether deadly
since some truths are not found in Scripture, but at
least true teaching must be consistent with Scripture."
To the sacred writers, he contended, "the difference be-
tween God and nature is the difference between the Infinite
and the finite, th$ original and the originated, the Creator
1.
L. Harold DeWolf follows Knudson in this insistence that
nature is the appearance to human experience of a part of
the activity of God, or that nature is a part of God’s
activity as that activity appears to man. DeWolf holds
that nature is not to man what it is to God, i. e., what
it is in and for itself, not only because or the peculiar
forms of human experience (which Kant pointed out)
,
but
also because of the meanings derived from the interaction
of that activity with our own emotional and volitional
psychological "sets." On DeWolf’s approach, sin and
f
uilt are contributory factors in making nature as we
now it what it is.
2.
That nature is a finite, graded manifestation of God, or
a self-limitation of Goa, seemed flatly to contradict
the affirmation that nature is other than God.
3.
Hovey, Art. (1694)2, 11.
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and the created. ffl Hovey might have strengthened his
case by contending that while the Scripture frequently
assigns directly to God the activity which has customarily
been referred to second causes, nowhere is it affirmed
that nature is God, or that any natural elanents are a
part of God. Yet all this, Strong doubtless would have
conceded, despite a terminology which at times would seem
to imply a pantheistic view of the physical universe.
And, it might have been asked, if the Biblical expressions
assigning second causes to God are to be taken literally,
why are not those passages assigning the acts of wicked
men to God’s foreordination to be explained in terms of
3
efficient divine causation? Hovey proceeded, instead,
to emphasize r,the excuse” which a monistic view of nature
’’might furnish for idolatry.”^ The first chapter of Romans
sharply indicts the confusing of the creation with the
Creator, and pronounces judgment upon the worship of the
created universe and its parts as if divine. The effect
1. Hovey, Art.(l&94)3, 12.
2. Strong commended "Bishop Berkeley’s noble words, ’God’s
ceaseless conversation with his creatures’” as aptly
descriptive of nature. "The Scriptures do not content
themselves with past tenses,” he pointed out. "The
heavens declare the glory of God and the God of glory
thundereth,—nature, in other words, is the manifestation
of a present God” (CCEM, 187).
3. Strong remarked in his treatment of permissive providence
that "as the Hebrew writers saw in second causes the
operation of the great first Cause... so, because even the
acts of the wicked entered into God’s plan, the Hebrew
writers sometimes represented God as doing what ha merely
permitted finite spirits to do” (ST [1907], 424) • Curious-
ly, he added that in some of these instances
}
God’s pro-
vidence "may be directive as well as permissive,” but he
did not work out the possible implications of this for the
problem of evil (STtl907D, 424).*
4. Hovey, Art. (1894)1, 10.
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of a monistic view, Hovey thought, would be to encourage
the conclusion "that idolatry is a valid folly.
But for many evangelicals the central issue was, as
the younger Hodge put it, "whether, when God created the
• /*
world, He created a something which was not part of Himself
2
and which has some principle of relative persistence."
The doctrine of creation, therefore, served as the touch-
stone of the controversy. Lotze had already specified that
the terminology of creation by God intends "not to desig-
nate a deed of his so much as the absolute dependence of
the world upon his will in contradistinction to its involun-
tary emanation from his nature. The main question was,
did not the new view involve the retention of creation in a
verbal sense only, merely as an acoomnodat-ion to traditional
ways of thought, whereas in fact the relationship of God
and nature was now conceived in a quite different fashion?
It was not merely Strong’s designation of all reality
as "a self-limitation of God", and his suggestion that
nature is a finite, graded manifestation of deity, which
raised the question of his right to the terminology of
creation, although this seemed already to preclude the possi-
bility of any existent characterized by even relative inde-
pendence.^- Nor was the difficulty alone the newer emphasis
T7 Hovey, Art. (1394 )1> 10. Hovey added: "A philosopher may
perhaps entertain the opinion that God is the only sub-
stance, without peril to his Christian faith, but a common
Christian will be in great danger of inferring from it
that all finite beings and things are Darts of deity or
mere illusions. He will probably conclude that the uni-
verse is God... It may certainly be doubted whether any
monistic philosophy would have suggested to us the Christian
idea of God" (10).
2. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1906), 333.
3. Lotze, POR, 74.
4. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1903), 333.
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on God as the divine ground of existence, rather than
its cause in the sense stressed by the older statements
of the cosmological argument, although this emphasis
tended already to set aside the notion of a once-for-all
divine creative act in the interest of a constant creative
process.'1' The main difficulty was with the broad notion
of the externalization of the divine thought in such a
2
manner as not to involve the origin of a new substance.
Strong wrote, of course, of a substantial character of
the physical universe, but in contrast with realism,
3because he refused to equate being and activity. But
the precise reality of this being, involved in the exter-
nalization of the divine thought by an act of will, Strong
did not elaborate. The distinction of nature as involving
the indirect exercise of God’s will because of the regu-
larity of the divine activity, hardly shed light on the
question, how the professed non-realist substantiality cf
nature, as involving something more than divine activity,
was to fit in with a qualitative monism?
The problem may be best focussed by a brief reference
to divine transcendence, the treatment of which it has
1. This was already to confuse the dependency of nature
with creation, Hovey urged, for there is no reference to
the origination of real being or substance (Hovey, SER,
24 ) •
2. The Biblical teaching regarding creation is more natural-
ly understood of the origin of^both substance and form,
Hovey wrote, "than of the mere shaping and ordering of
things in nature, or of any states* in the divine spirit
,
however conscious and real” (Hovey, SER, 51).
3. CCEM, 23.
A
,V. ?i: ‘: c ; , < . no
.
r • f.. xx < J u: -• -i • - loj
— C
' f ' i -
wfct riJxw erw v 5
i
.
lo rts$0£?Bdo . • , < • '''*?£
«
; " -•
-
'• rfs
li
<
: - -- -
.
.
- . ... bib
;
t
f
- r; \ : V ? - -- H
.
t o w . oci
• \ -
.
.
t • <
-
•
•
'
'
.
403
seemed best to postpone until this point. Strong defined
God’s transcendence in terms of the incomplete manifes-
tation of his nature which the universe affords. Nature is
both dependent on him and not fully disclosive of him, for
his habitual actions do not preclude miraculous acts.-1- True,
nothing in the universe is not in God; everything in the
universe, in its limited form, is a divine self-limitation . ^
But God’s thoughts are not creative, for the divine self-
manifestation requires an act of volition to secure exter-
nalization of the divine thought. God’s thought, conse-
quently, is not limited to the regular, nor irregular,
activities of the created universe. He has, if one may use
the terminology of modern personalistic idealism, imagina-
tive no less than creative thoughts, and the difference
between the latter and the former is that the externaliza-
tion of divine thought requires an act of volition. But
now, surely God’s imaginative thoughts cannot be conceived
as being involuntary thoughts, for they too must be in a
sense actively willed. Is there any distinction between a
purely imaginative universe in the divine volition, and the
1. In view of Strong’s modified statement of miracle, to
be examined shortly, it will be seen that divine trans-
cendence must be understood mainly in terms of the fact
that nature is not an exhaustive divine manifestation.
2. The transcendence of God, in traditional theology, spe-
cified that God’s personal life exists absolutely inde-
pendently of the universe, and is independent of space
and time. Strong now referred to creation as the work
”of the immanent rather than of the transcendent God”
(STC1907], 211).
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divine thought volitionally rf externalized”
,
since the
origination of real being or substance is ruled out on
the monistic approach, except in terms of the duration of
the divine idea? If all divine ideas are voluntary—the
denial of which would seem to require the view of an in-
voluntary^- divine b ehavior--what essential difference can
there be between voluntary imaginative ideas and other
ideas, since both have the element of volition and idea,
and reality is defined in terms of the se two elements?
The critics of Strong, while they appear not to have become
explicit about this difficulty, which may have been the
factor which drove Strong to halt mid-way in his discard
of a substance philosophy, nevertheless insisted that any
view of creation which stopped short of the origination of
new substance was artificially truncated.
If the ”externalization” of divine thought involves
the presence of something more than that same volition
present also in divine imaginative activity, then already
a world of nature as a relatively independent reality
appears as a necessary conception; Strong had suggested
that the distinction between God’s habitual and miraculous
activity permits viewing the former under the category of
secondary causation. If the word "externalization” desig-
1. The word suggests, of course, the essential element in
the view of divine emanation, in which the appearance
of the universe is not referred to a voluntary divine
act.
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nates anything more than the divine making of the world of
nature to appear to finite minds as objectively real,"*"
there would seem to be no a prior i objection to a dynamic
concept of matter which involves some sort of creation not
reducible to divine substance or activity. And why may
not a certain relative independence or reality, it was
asked, belong to matter as well as to mind—since Strong
insisted on the relative freedom of finite spirits? If
God can make an agent, declared Hovey, he can make an
instrument. 2
There were hints in Strong’s final theology, in fact,
in which the force of the latter type of argument appears
to be circumvented by what may be interpreted as a movement
on his part, doubtless unguardedly, in the pantheistic
direction. For the creation of man is compared with the
eternal divine begetting of the three personal distinctions
in the Godhead. Although Strong carefully emphasized that
the divine begetting is eternal and necessary, whereas
3
creation is temporal and free, he added that "Christ’s
creation of man may be like his own begetting by the
Father,"^ apparently intending to suggest that there is no
division of the divine essence in the production of multi-
tudinous finite personalities within the single divine
1. Hovey led the way for the evangelical realists, affirm-
ing that it impeaches the veracity of God to suggest that
he compels us by our mental constitution to look upon the
unreal" as real, for it represents him as producing" illu-
sions in the minds of men" (Hovey, 3ER, 33-34).
2. Hovey, 3ER, 27, 28. 3. ST (1907), 373.
4. ST (1907), 3S1.
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essence. Consequently, as Strong insisted on finite selves
with a relative independence, he opened the door to the
possibility of matter which was not simply divine thought
externalized, but externalized in such a way as to grant
to matter a relative independence; as Strong minimized the
outsidedness of finite selves, he veered toward the pan-
theism for which he professed such deep antipathy.
Since Strong’s problems in the area of anthropology
are to be treated later, it will be well at this point to
concentrate attention on that second center of controversy
raised by Strong’s new view of the relation of God to
nature, i.e., the problem of miracle. It will be recalled
that in his final 1907 theology revision Strong retained
side by side the older definition of miracle set forth in
the earlier fifth edition, and a ’’preferable definition”
reflective of the later monistic assumptions. The newer
definition discards the reference to miracle as an event
inexplicable in terms of the laws of nature^ and substitutes
an emphasis on natural cause s,^ since Christ is the immanent
God whose constant will is manifested in nature. 3
Evangelical theologians were quick to comment on the
1. ST (1907), 11S.
2. ST (1907), 119. The thesis of ’’the supernatural natural
and the natural supernatural” had found frequent ex-
pression in Bowne’s writings.
3. ST (1907)
,
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imolications of the newer definition. - ''Does the distin-
guishing mark of a miracle, then, lie simply in its purpose,
or merely in the subjective conviction that God has wrought
it?," inquired the younger Hodge. - He appealed to Strong’s
destruction of the distinction between the natural and the
supernatural as "an explicit avowal that there is no warrant
for distinguishing a miracle from any other event in the
external world, so far as the question of its cause is
concerned. "3 Such a view, Hodge affirmed, meant the loss
of Christian supernaturalism. He wrote:
This view, which if carried out would be
fatal to evangelical Christianity, is simply
the result of Dr. Strong’s ’ethical Monism 1 *.
It is no more consistent with the Christian-
ity of the New Testament -writers than any
other form of monism which breaks down the
essential distinction between the Infinite
and the finite.
4
Others, like Behrends, attacked the assumption that the
forces of nature are to be identified with divine will.
Granting that nature cannot be identified with human
willing, since the universe is given to man rather than
willed by him, the fact is, Behrends insisted, that omni-
potence of will is not a substitute for energy.' Energy
1. Strong’s "’preliminary definition’ is not so,bad,"
Hodge^commehted (C. V.'. Hod^re, Rev. [19087
,
33o-33?).
2. C. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 337.
3. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 337.
4. C. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 337. This absorption of nature
to God. in strong ’s thought, clearly encouraged the
evangelicals to suspect that ethical monism also in-
volved the absorption of humanity to God, and focussed
attention, as we‘ shall see, upon’ passages which seemed
to suggest it.
5. Force and personal will are erroneously assumed to be
convertible, Behrends held. Cases of human paralysis
demonstrate that willing can be impotent apart from
physical and moral agencies at human command. The will
to force is not the same as force (Behrends, Art. [1895.3,
364). k
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of nature, Behrends countered, is either posited by a
peculiar act of creative divine power, or is another name
for that power itself which the divine will directs.^
Such a view, it was felt, was not as destructive of the
Biblical miraculous as that involved in monistic assump-
tions .
But liberal thinkers were no more satisfied with
Strong f s statement of miracle than were evangelicals.
Brown protested that, while Strong evidenced by the new
definition the effect of monism upon a scheme of doctrine
originally forged under quite different presuppositions,
he nonetheless retained traces of a discarded position,
by retaining the older statement and labelling the newer
as "preferable." 2 But this was not so serious as the mid-
way position in which Strong seemed to lag, by affirming
on the one hand that all nature is to be referred to
immediate divine volition, while attemption on the other
hand to distinguish between habitual and special volitions
in such a way as to distinguish miraculous from other acts.
This latter attempt involved curious tensions, for Strong
' /
insisted, with regard both to prophecy and miracle, that
the two are but heightened expressions of what is every-
1. Behrends, Art. (1895), 364.
2. "The extent of the distance traversed between this
point of view and that which is marked by the earlier
definition is apparent to all. The only question which
suggests itself is why, since Professor Strong has so
firmly planted himself upon the new ground, he should
any longer retain in his text evidence of the dis-
carded position" (Brown, Rev. [1908]
,
152).
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where latent, and yet sought to give them some unique
reference in terms of supernatural activity. This was
doubtless a factor in the suggestion that the termino-
logy of secondary causation could be retained, provided
the only distinction intended is that between regular and
unusual divine volitions. But if the inconsistency in
Strong’s thought at this point was not evident to contem-
porary liberals, it could not escape more recent persona-
listic idealists. For it has been pointed out that, if
the world of nature is but the externalized thought of
God, this contrast between the habitual and the irregular
can be maintained only at the expense of the divine
omniscience, since it involves the divine mind in "after-
thoughts” not included in the original plan of the uni-
verse. If, to the contrary, it be insisted that the one
eternal divine plan involved all acts, so that the divine
mind embraces at once both habitual and unique acts—an
element upon which Strong insisted in his formulation of
the divine decrees--then the distinction between the two
would seem to be removed in all but a verbal manner.
For, on Strong’s monistic assumptions, the divine volition
is no less^ involved in the accomplishment of the so-called
habitual activities, than in the non-habit ual
.
1. Bowne had insisted that "even when we come to the dis-
tinctly miraculous, we cannot suppose it to break with
all law" (Bowne, IG, 88).
2. Strong’s distinction between the direct and indirect
exercise of the divine will should be recalled, but the
difficulty remains nonetheless.
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iii. Anthropology
It has already been noted that the immediate reaction
of evangelical theologians to Strong 1 s view was a concern
lest, by concessions to pantheism, he had blurred the
reality of moral distinctions and made God the author of
sin.
The changes which the new view involved for Strong’s
treatment of human origins are apparent. Wholly apart
from the question of an evolutionary view of origins,
thouching which comment will be made shortly, it is clear
that the new immanence had left its mark. One evidence of
this is the new emphasis on human moral experience as
affording a key to theological constructions, and espe-
cially with regard to the doctrine of a primal fall:
The long course of depravity and degrada-
tion that has been universal in human
history points back to a fall of humanity,
and this fall is no natural development,
but rather a willful departure of the very
first representatives of the race from God
and from his law.l
The movement from Biblical authority to experience, in the
reconstruction of man’s initial moral predicament, could
not stop with a joint insistence on theistic evolution and
man’s original holiness, despite Strong’s view. For the
1. CCEM, 170.
2. It is noteworthy that contemporary neo -supernaturalism,
as projected by Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr,
rejects the conviction of the primal righteousness of
man in the sense in which Strong retained it, and sub-
stitutes a symbolical for a historical view of the
fall of man.
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new immanent ism suggested more continuity of divine acti-
vity than was involved in such a view. Strong had, in
fact, made concessions to this continuity at certain
points. He declared that Christ is in all men as he was
in Adam, 1 who fell by wilful resistance to the inworking
God, in such a way as to suggest that the immanent Logos
minimized the noetic effect of sin more than traditional
theology would have suggested. Strong’s view that ori-
ginal grace is more powerful than original sin might well
raise the question whether man is after all, as he had
contended, ’’dead in trespasses and sin.” It was this
emphasis on the immanent Christ as the source of all truth,
with a somewhat lessened stress on the negating influence
of sin upon the thought and volition of man, which made it
possible to find, outside the Hebrew-Chri stian tradition,
positive anticipations of the Biblical revelation. But,
for all this, Strong had applied the new principle hesi-
tatingly, in the opinion of subsequent personalists . For
the acceptance of evolutionary origin meant, for subse-
quent monistic theology, that man did not fall from an
original righteousness; man’s moral conformity to God came
to be viewed as a gradual acquirement, through a normal
process of moral trial and error. 1 Since on this approach
1. ST (1907), 537. 2. ST (1907), 552.
3. The evolutionary view was held to give a better expla-
nation than traditional theology of the development of
man’s moral nature, both individual and racial, by re-
ference to a gradual growth of ethical ideas and the
mutual significance of the inner sense of ought arising
from man’s social conditions and necessities.
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man’s moral discontinuity with the divine does not involve
a defection from original righteousness, so that the notion
of the imputation of Adamic guilt to his posterity falls
away, the effect of sin is no longer such as to require a
special soter iological revelation, and more competence is
assigned to human reason than on the traditional approach.
It is not merely an accident, but in the interest of theo-
logical consistency within modern personalistic assumptions,
that the disparity between general and special revelation
is eliminated, except in terms of a higher degree of the
same divine movement.
The intensified continuity involved in the monistic
approach left its impression also on Strong’s reformulation
of the doctrine of regeneration, although again in such a
way that others who applied the approach more consistently
felt compelled to go beyond his concessions. Strong had
affirmed, it will be recalled, that the principles of evo-
lution and immanence should be applied both to man’s
original creation and to his spiritual recreation:
Both man’s original creation and his new
creation are creations from within, rather
than from without. In both cases. God
builds upon the basis of the old.-^
Evolution reveals the divine method, he contended elsewhere,
in grace as well as in nature. 2 At the same time, Strong
1. ST (1907)
,
472.
2. CCEM, 77. Bowne too had contended, practically from his
college days when Darwin’s books had already been in
circulation for almost a decade, that if we know the
Cause behind evolution, the method is harmless (McConnell,
BPB, 26, 182).
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retained the emphasis of traditional theology upon a super-
natural regeneration of the elect, by a divine act, where-
by the natural tendency of enmity toward God in view of
Adamic corruption, is reversed in the interest of a bent
towards divine holiness. Now, from the standpoint of mo-
nistic theology, it was this emphasis on a divine reversal—
upon a "crucifixion" of the natural man and the sudden,
radical "birth" of a new man—which had to be set aside in
the interest of a theology within which perfection was pre-
sumed to b e attained by the slow, gradual improvement of
the "old nature." And evangelical theologians had seen,
what apparently Strong had not, that a consistent appeal
to evolution and monism could not escape a rejection of
the supernaturalistic interpretation of regeneration to be
found in Biblical theology.^
But, when all this is said, the prime difficulty which
evangelical theologians found with Strong T s anthropology
was an uneasiness that, for all his insistence on man’s
moral freedom, the dangers of pantheism were not averted.
This problem was not as acutely felt by non-evangelical
thinkers, who assumed man’s moral continuity with the di-
vine, and did not retain the Biblical view of man as a sin-
ner by nature, although they, no less than the evangelicals,
were concerned that the s ignificance of moral freedom not
be destroyed.
1. John Roach Straton, in his article on "Evolution" contri-
buted to International Standard Bible Encyclopedia wrote
that "it is inconceivable that tnere should come about in
Ev. by ’resident forces' and 'fixed laws’ an automatic re-
versal of process which changes the whole nature of the
one in whom it occurs."
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It will be recalled that, while Strong insisted on
man’s moral freedom, he yet declared that there might be
multitudinous finite consciousnesses, just as there are
three infinite consciousnesses, within the bounds of the
one universal and divine consciousness Strong therefore
did not appropriate every opportunity, as later personalis-
tic idealists do, to stress that selves are not parts of
God, but are outside of God, although this appears to have
been his intention. Evangelical scholars like the younger
Hodge protested that once humanity, as well as the physical
universe, is regarded as "a self-limitation of God,” there
2is no room for a doctrine of creation. Strong had empha-
sized, of course, that humanity is a divine self-limitation
nunder the law of freedom,” but other factors encouraged
evangelicals to fear that pantheism was evaded in word only.
Hovey replied that although ’’the divine life circumscribed
and acting as finite spirits is free,” yet this at the same
time ’’brings strife and sin into the life of God.”^ Strong
intends to safeguard freedom of the will and human responsi-
bility, Hovey added, but ’’the logical tendency of monism is
to deny human responsibility by referring it to God, the
only real being. Behrends sought to show that Strong’s
1. 3T(1907), 332. 2. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1903), 337.
3. Hovey, Art. (1394)2, 10. ’’This may be the coming philo-
sophy,” Hovey added, ’’but we submit that it does not
exalt or clarify one’s inception of God, nor does it
help one to solve the problem of sin” (10).
4. Hovey, Art. (1394)2, 10.
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view yielded to this tendency, despite his contrary pro-
fession. His first argument was that the freedom of finite
spirits is known only in consciousness, but "ethical monism
discredits consciousness in its interpretation of nature"
on non-realist lines. ^ The monists, of course, replied
that no non-mental world is given in experience. Behrends
contended, further, that if the all-embracing consciousness
of God integrates finite consciousnesses as Strong insist-
ed, human freedom is lost, for self-consciousness is "sep-
arateness in consciousness, which refuses to be eliminated
or sublimated. "* The monists here replied that, apart
from man’s implication in a transcendental rational and
moral God, all meaning evaporates from human experience.
Behrends pointed out also that, on the monistic approach,
the aches and pains of suffering human bodies are convert-
ed into the divine habits of thought,-^ and that to regard
finite spirits as "circumscriptions of the divine essence"
includes Satan no less than mankind among the divine self-
limitations.^ It has already been noted that the problem
involved in the former point has encouraged, in part, a mo-
dern personalistic movement toward the doctrine of a finite
god. The latter point was not distressing to monistic
1. Behrends, Art. (1894), 366. Behrends added: "There is
no better evidence that man is free than that fishes and
birds are second causes" (366).
2. Behrends, Art. (1894), 367. 3. Behrends, Art .( 1894 ), 366.
4. Behrends, Art. (1894), 366.
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thought in so far as it insisted, along with Strong,
upon a psychological dualism or quantitative pluralism;
the moral freedom allowable to finite spirits outside
of God represented various grades of depravity. It is
quite clear, from this discussion, that evangelical
theologians feared, rather than demonstrated, a pan-
theistic anthropology on Strong
1
s part; they were prone
to share Behrends’ view that, once metaphysical oneness
of substance is granted, the resultant monism "can be
called ethical only by courtesy."'*' But it was the logic
of enthusiasm, rather than of demonstration, which here
2prevailed. One circumstance, however, is clear. Sub-
sequent personalistic thought, which left no doubt about
the separate personality of finite selves as outside of
God, at the same time freed humanity theologically from
guilt, depravity and penalty of sin which traditional theo-
3logy had assigned him, and to which Strong’s view clung.
1. Behrends, Art.(lS94), 370.
2. But Strong had clearly used language which personalistic
idealists would resist. When he wrote of Christ that
"the whole race lives, moves, and has its being in him;
for he is the soul of its soul and the life of its life"
(CCEM, 288 )
?
Strong hardly reflected the emphatic and
thorough-going pluralism which Bowne and Bnghtman com-
bine with qualitative monism. Strong 1 s intentions, how-
ever, were clearly in the pluralistic direction, despite
the occasional use of language in a manner which sug-
gests absolute idealism.
3. The nature of the divine-human encounter is one of the
central issues of contemporary theology. Strong, despite
his firm intention to put selves outside of God, made
some serious concessions to the pantheistic mood of Bosan-
quet
,
Bradley, Pringle-Pattison
,
Royce and Hocking, and
halted short of the radical pluralism of Bowne, Knudson
and
#
Brightman . But the contemporary nersonalists
,
in
their placing of selves outside of God, at the same time
substitute an autonomous ethic for the traditional tbaeono-
rpous ethic, and take a less serious view of sin. The neo-
supernaturalists generally affirm a theonomous morality,
but treat the fall of man as symbolic rather than literal
history.
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But if the case against Strong was not clear-cut in the
area of anthropology, because the pantheizing statements
must be viewed as concessions within a deeper pluralis-
tic intent, the evangelical theologians were confident
that, in^the areas of Christology and soteriology, Strong
had so compromised traditional doctrine as to leave no
doubt of his destruction of the central tenets of Chris-
tianity.
iv. Christology
The central problems with reference to Christology,
on Strong 1 s later assumptions, may be divided into those
concerning the pr e-incarnate Logos and the God-man. It
may be well to treat these in reverse order.
That Strong sought an explanation for the virgin
birth along the lines of parthenogenesis has already been
indicated . ^ Since on the monistic approach the distinc-
tion between the natural and the supernatural was eliminated,
it was necessary that he abandon the view that the virgin
birth is significant because the event is an impossibility
within nature as constituted, apart from special divine
activity; all nature, on the monistic view, involves such
immediate activity. Even more significant was the sug-
gestion that Christ fully manifested all the powers and
1 . Bowne accepted the virgin birth on aesthetic grounds,
but not as a fundamental doctrine, in contrast with his
attitude toward the person of Christ and the incarna-
tion. But "nothing whatever of importance depends on
it," he wrote (Bowne, SIC, 386 ). The controversy has
generally assumed the "undivineness of the natural"
now "ruled out by the doctrine of the divine immanence
in all natural processes," he explained (SIC, 386-387).
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qualities partially embodied in nan and nature, which
indicates a distinction mainly in terms of a higher
degree of a lesser and universal divine manifestation,
and is more compatible with a contrast of the whole and
the part, than with that of Creator and creature.
Christ’s veiled deity has analogies, Strong held, in the
unappropriated resources of human life generally. But
not alone on the side of Christ’s humanity, but on that
of his deity also, Strong tended to narrow the disparity
from ideal mankind. In the incarnation, he affirmed,
nthe Godhead narrows itself down to a point that is next
to absolute extinction ." 1 This was developed by the
affirmation that Christ was not omniscient, neither as a
babe nor later. Yet Strong guarded against the view that
Christ erred. 'Whatever historical and scientific errors
are conceded in the Bible, he stressed, "we can never
admit that there are imperfections in Christ."- At the
same time, he conceded that God had adopted human and
imperfect methods of self-revelation not only in creation
and Scripture, but also in the disclosure in Christ. ^
While formally accepting the Chalcedonian Christology,
Strong leaned actually to a modified kenosis theory.^
1. ST(1907), 703. Strong commented that "omniscience
gives up all knowledge but that of the child, the in-
fant, the embryo, the infinitesimal germ of humanity.
Omnipotence gives up all power but that of the im-
pregnated ovum in tne womb of the Virgin."
2. CCEM, 134. 3. ST (1907
)
,
21?.
4» Bowne too accepted kenosis Christology and spoke of
the "deootentiation" of the Son of God (McConnell, BPB,
183). The Chalcedonian formula, he protested, "goes
beyond both Scripture and reason" (Bowne, SIC, 92).
3ut_R. T. Flewelling has rightly remarked that the
Chri stological interest remained an important part of
Bowne ’s system (Flewelling, PPP, 157)'.
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Some evangelical theologians were quick to see that, in
this circumstance, the monistic presuppositions were
active, especially in Strong’s affirmation that Christ
had but one will, consciousness, and knowledge,'*' as
against the doctrine of two consciousnesses and of two
wills, which Strong designated as an unwarranted addition
to the Chalcedonian doctrine. The younger Hodge asked:
What meaning, then, can attach to the bare
assertion that there were two natures in
Christ? Was the one will omnipotent? If
so what becomes of the reality and com-
pleteness of the human nature? Or was the
one will finite and limited? If so what
becomes of the divine nature?2
There was no question, Hodge added, that for all Strong 1 s
effort to distinguish his view from the kenotic theory,
3Strong had yielded to it nonetheless. With a kenotic
Christology, consistent liberal thinkers were as dis-
satisfied in their own way as the evangelicals; it
seemed to compromise the integrity of Christ’s humanity,
in which they were interested, no less than that of
Christ’s deity, on which the evangelicals placed stress.
That Strong’s position was a temporary^ expedient has been
made plain by subsequent tendencies in Christological
thought, in which the abandonment of Chalcedonian Chris-
1. In this emphasis, curiously, the kenosis theologians
and those who held to a strictly human Jesus linked
hands.
2. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 338-339.
3. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 339.
4. John Stewart Lawton has singled out Strong’s view that
Christ’s consciousness and will are always theanthropi
and never simply either human or divine, as ,fa ready
stop-gap in the face of the new psychology” ( Conflict
in Christology
,
262. London: Society For Promoting
Ohri stian Knowledge
,
1947).
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tology has issued in a humanitarian view of Christ.
For Strong, that transition did not appear necessary
and, indeed, it is evident that, had it appeared to be
so, he would have moved in the direction of the tradi-
tional, rather than of the modern, theology. For in the
preface to his final theology revision, it will be re-
called, he singled out as the test of orthodoxy one’s
reply to the question: "do we pray to Jesus?" For
evangelical theologians, the question seemed to take on
its traditional significance only if, contrary to Strong’s
view of a Godhead narrowed in Jesus to a point bordering
on absolute extinction, one insisting instead that "in
Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."^
If, however, Strong’s treatment of the incarnation
did not satisfy either evangelicals or liberals, his dis-
cussion of the relationship of the pre-incarnate Logos
to humanity seemed to the theological conservatives to
destroy the very foundations of a Biblical view, whether
by implicating the eternal Christ in sin, or by making
the atonement a matter of necessity rather than of grace.
It may be remembered that Strong felt the monistic
doctrine of Christ’s natural union with the race to be
the only satisfactory reply to the criticism that Christ’s
atonement for man’s sin is external, arbitrary and
TT Colossians 2:9* Curiously, in answering the complaint
that Strong’s view makes any "true doctrine of atonement
impossible by regarding Christ as no more divine than,
any other of the sons of men," Strong replied by quoting
this verse and commenting that "Christ is not distinguish-
ed from men in Scripture by being of a different substance
from humanity, but rather by having that substance in its
completeness and perfection" (CCEM7 83).
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mechanical, since it a ssigned him penalty without guilt
of any kind . 1 Imputation involves that which truly and
properly belongs to an individual in view of guilt, Strong
wrote . 2 This principle is applied to the imputation of ra-
cial guilt to Christ, and of Adamic guilt to the race. His
adoption of the view of "realism,” that the race was in Adam
realiter and consequently sinned in him, he
(
regarded as more
satisfactory than the view of Adam’s federal headship, which
made Adam’s sin that of the race by the representative prin-
ciple . 1 Since evangelicals have themselves divided over
the question of natural or federal headship, and the issues
with which this study is concerned are of a broader nature,
this controversy need not be detailed. 1" Spokesmen for the
representative theory replied that, on their view, Adam
was designated the federal head of the race because he was
its natural head, and not arbitrarily. But the more central
1. ’’The atonement of Christ seems foolishness to the so-
called philosopher,’’ Strong wrote, ’’only because he re-
gards it as an external, arbitrary, mechanical transfer of
guilt and penalty. Guilt and penalty, he says, are indi-
vidual and personal, and cannot be thus transferred.
There is no justice, he says, in punishing one for the
sins of another, and especially in punishing the innocent
for the sins of the guilty" (CCEM, 176).
2. ST(1907), 596-621.
3. Evangelicals who held the theory of natural headship dis-
sented from Strong’s formulation. Strong’s reconstruc-
tion of the Augustinian position, Behrends wrote, "is
enough to make even the Bishop of Hippo turn over in his
grave" (Behrends, Art.[l695)> 366).
4. The Princeton theologians replied that "the ’realistic’
view, besides resting on a well-nigh exploded metaphysics
and one that would have a destructive influence on other
Christian doctrines, seeks a ground for the personal re-
sponsibility of each individual, in regard to Adam’s sin,
in an act that was totally unconscious and involuntary
so far as each is concerned. This appears to us far
more arbitrary than the princiole of representative re-
sponsibility" (C. W. Hodge, Rev. [19063/336).
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issue was whether Strong’s assignment of guilt to Christ
did not either involve God in sin or destroy the reality
of sin for man.
Strong denied, it is true, that the pre-incarnate
Christ was involved in personal impurity; the age-long suf-
ferings which he bore are a curse, in his case, just because
he suffered penalty as one personally pure.-*- But Christ is
guilty because he so shared man’s life that he ” justly and
inevitably” was exposed to ’’condemnation on account of human
sin.” Humanity’s rejection of God falls on Christ, who
must suffer because his life is the inmost principle of man’s
being. ^ To this assumption, that Christ must share man’s
guilt and penalty because he gave life to mankind and sus-
tains humanity in being, the evangelical theologians made
prompt reply. On the one hand, to identify the life of hu-
manity so closely with that of Christ would seem to destroy
the very independence of finite persons for which Strong
had argued, in differentiating his view from pantheism.
”It is impossible that he who is the natural life of human-
ity should not be responsible for the sin committed by his
own members,” Strong wrote. ”It is impossible that he should
not suffer, that he should not make reparation, that he
should not atone. To these assertions, Jesse B. Thomas
1. CCEM, 179. 2. ST (1907), 752-754. 3. CCEM, 200.
4. CCEM, 37.
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responded that if Christ’s
’members’ be a part of himself, this
would imply Christ’s personal sharing
in sin, personal obligation to make re-
paration, and why not also., personal re-
pentance on behalf of all?-1-
Hovey was even more direct:
The monistic assumption subordinates all
men so completely to Christ, that it is
impossible to hold them guilty, if He is
holy. This, however, is only a state-
ment of the way it looks to one man.^
On the other hand, the union of Christ with humanity as
Strong stated it, if it did not destroy the reality of sin
on man’s part, seemed at the same time to involve Christ
personally in sin, whatever effort Strong made to avoid
that conclusion. Patton had already warned against the
danger of such an implication in Strong’s system before
the latter’s espousal of ethical monism, when reviewing the
1336 theology. There the union of Christ with the race
which was in view centered in the incarnation, rather than
in a monistic creation, but Strong insisted that guilt was
imparted as well as imputed to Christ, although he was su-
pernaturally preserved from corruption. This was, it will
be recalled, the earlier effort which Strong made to meet
the objection that the innocent mechanically suffers for
the guilty. But by holding that guilt was imparted as well
as imputed to Christ, although he was personally pure, Strong
seemed to raise the same issue which followed from the later
1. Thomas, Art. (1900), 11. 2. Hovey, Art. (1394) 2, 11.
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monistic union which presumably implicated him in the same
way. Patton replied that to make Christ not innocent rais-
es
a far greater and more serious objec-
tion... not relieved by saying that Christ
was free from depravity by reason of his
miraculous conception. 1
Since Christ was obligated to suffer by becoming a member
of Adam’s race, Patton added in protest, this view
makes a sinner the world’s Saviour, des-
troys the voluntary character of Christ’s
atonement, and puts Christ in the position
of the Jewish high-priest, who needed to
atone first for his own sin and then for
that of his people.
^
When Strong later grounded Christ’s guilt and obligation to
suffer in the pre-incarnate creative union with mankind, he
did not discard this insistence that in his incarnation Je-
sus assumed human nature which was in Adam realiter and had
thus been corrupted, but supernatural purification so re-
moved depravity that he bore only guilt, and that not for
any personal sin.^ For now, by this dual reference, Christ
owed the penalty of death twofold on His own account, by
virtue of his pre-incarnate relationship to humanity, and
of subsequent Adamic guilt. And the reference to monism
furnished an undergirding for the insistence that responsi-
1. Patton, Rev. (1667), 367. 2. Patton, Rev. (1&B7), 367.
3. Although Strong called this a combination of the ideas of
"substitution” and of "sharing," C. W. Hodge noted rightly
that "Jesus had, then, by a participation in the ’realis-^
tic’ sense, the guilt of Adam’s sin* which attached to hu-
manity. In a word^ sin was not imputed to Him, but He
had just as much 01 the rage sin as He was not relieved
of" TC. W. Hodge, Rev.[1908J, 339).
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bility can attach only to a sin in the origination of which
one has participated. 1 But the twofold reference seemed to
evangelical theologians to intensify, rather than to re-
lieve, the difficulties, for it seemed to involve Christ
the more securely in personal guilt. The younger Hodge
stated’ the problem clearly:
Here, then, is a dilemma, viz. --if
Christ can be said to have ’had a part’
in the origination of our sins, by rea-
son of his connection with humanity,
then, He would be responsible, accord-
ing to the logic of Dr. Strong’s view,
just in the sense in which He is held
by Dr. Strong to be responsible for
Adam’s sin. Hence, Christ would owe
the penalty of death on His own ac-
count for our sins, and, hence, could
not be our substitute. On the other
hand, if Christ had no part in the
origination of these sins of ours,
then, according to Dr. Strong’s theory
of responsibility, Christ would have
no actual responsibility for our actual
sins, in which case it is, to say the
least, a fair question whether the re-
presentative relationship on the basis
of the Covenant is not a more adequate
basis for the imputation of our sins to
Christ .. .Indeed, the logic of Dr. Strong's
view demands a responsibility of our Lord
on His own account for all human sin, as
Dr. Strong acknowledges ... But if this is
so, how can Christ be said to bear our
sins as our substitute?^
Strong had thus, to the mind of many evangelical theologians,
replaced the Biblical view of a gracious atonement with that
of a necessitated atonement—necessitated indeed not alone
TT3T(1907), 510.
2. C. W. Hodge, Rev. (1908), 340. This was clearly a leading
question. If before Christ can properly bear all race
sin he must be personally involved m race sin, then must
it not be maintained that before he can properly bear all
personal sin he must likewise be personally involved?
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because of a more intimate creative union of Christ and
humanity which seemed to verge toward pantheism, but be-
cause of a supposed guilt on Christ’s part which, it seemed
to them, could not escape compromising the personal purity
of the pre-incarnate Logos.
For later personalistic idealism, which, had broken with
the notion of a primal fall from righteousness in which all
humanity was implicated, and also with any appeal to an
a priori Biblical authority, the tensions existing in
Strong’s formulation were to be met by several modifications
of the traditional theology. For one thing, the identifica-
tion of the immanent Logos with the historical Jesus was now
maintained on the narrower pattern of Sabellianism, and its
exclusiveness was found in a greater intimacy of the union
of divine and human, held to be of such degree as to be the
practical equivalent of a difference in kind. The whole Bib-
lical scheme of imputation and atonement was abandoned; in
view of the emphasis on the dignity and worth of human
personality, it was assumed that the transfer of another’s
penalty or merit is immoral. The historical Jesus was re-
garded as the supreme divine revelation of spiritual and
moral achievement, to wham a relative absoluteness must be
assigned in terms of religious example. But any meta-
physical sonship, as distinguished from the remainder of
humanity, was denied. In him, more than in any other,
the universal disclosure of divine ideals appeared in such
a way that he may be singled out as the supreme revelation
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of God but, insisted subsequent personalism, such metaphy-
sical formulations as the doctrine of the Trinity, or of
Christ’s pre-existence, are to be given only a symbolic
significance. In this spirit Knudson proposed that the
meaning of incarnation be broadened "so as to make it prac-
tically synonymous with the divine immanence," on which in-
terpretation the highest degree of immanence would be as-
signed to Jesus.
^
v. Soteriology
The treatment of Christological tensions in Strong’s
final view touched quite inescapably upon certain phases
of soteriology also. But central considerations in this
sphere remain to be evaluated.
It has already been inquired, in the section on Chris-
tology, whether Christ if guilty could provide atonement
and whether, if obligated to do so, the atonement can be
regarded still as a gracious divine provision. It might
here be added that evangelical theologians insisted that
the distinction between guilt and corruption, on which
pStrong insisted, cannot be maintained. Unless the penalty
were endured by a person not already indebted to justice,
3the concept of atonement is inapplicable, it was held.
The atonement was, on Christ’s part, covenantially and not
l7 Knudson, DOR, 331, 332.
2. Shedd insisted that Christ’s relationship to humanity
involved him neither in personal guilt nor pollution
( Dogmatic Theology , II, 59, 32).
3. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology
, II, 457, 462.
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essentially necessary, in terms of his relationship to hu-
manity. Strong’s reformulation seemed to evangelical scho-
lars to jeopardize an atonement, the divine mercy, the sin-
lessness of Christ, and the seriousness of sin on man’s part.
The tensions were complicated by the fact that, on
Strong’s approach, Christ’s atonement was in a sense self-
justifying. Through the retroactive efficiency to the atone-
ment, Strong held, Christ’s human nature was purged of its
depravity from the moment of incarnation, and was delivered
also from the race guilt in which he was involved.^" To evan-
gelical thinkers this seemed to involve an inescapable cir-
cularity, for they insisted that if Christ were genuinely
guilty in any sense, he could not atone; and if he provided
atonement, he could not have been under guilt.
But at another major point, that of the supposed eter-
nal suffering of Christ, the question of the destruction of
Biblical theology seemed to be involved. Evangelical think-
ers saw in Strong’s affirmation that the historical death
was but a paedagogical manifestation of a supra-historical
suffering, a sacrifice of the doctrine of a once-for-all
2
atonement. They insisted that the divine compassion for
lost man antedates the fall, in terms of the eternal plan
of God, but that the compassion must not be confused with
a vicarious suffering on account of sin. They found in
Scripture no evidence of any divine displeasure with Christ,
1. ST(1696)
,
416. 2. Cf. Hebrews 9:25-2$.
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whether at the fall of primal man or at his incarnation,
with the lone exception of the historical passion. What-
.
ever sufferings were ascribed to Christ, on Strong's ap-
proach, could not be described as vicarious, in the Biblical
sense.
1 The evangelicals insisted further that, while Cal-
vary is a concrete presentation of the eternal fact that
holiness must punish sin, the atonement—in any Biblical
meaning— can hardly be regarded on that account as eternal.
Strong’s readiness to speak of the present suffering of
Christ for sin, so that while the historical suffering is
ended the supra-historical suffering will continue until sin
no longer exists, seemed to evangelical theologians to evac-
uate the historical passion of all final significance.
Two further difficulties would seem to suggest them-
selves here. If what God does at any one. time, as disclo-
sive of his character, must be done always, the question
arises whether an eternal rather than temporal creation need
not be affirmed, on Strong’s approach. Again, if it is of
the essence of the Divine Spirit to manifest himself, must
not the concept of special, historical revelation give way
1. Despite his insistence on substitutionary atonement as
primary, Strong had affirmed that all suggerings are
penal, because due to sin, but that in Christ’s case
the sufferings become a substitutionary atonement be-
cause he was personally pure (CCEM, 179 )• Here Strong
apparently overlooked the customary insistence, that
the substitutionary element results from the fact that
Christ’s sufferings alone propitiate a divine principle
of holiness and justice.
2. CCEM, 80-82.
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entirely to the priority of general, universal revelation?
A second difficulty concerns also this contrast of tem-
porality and eternity, applied in another way. Strong
vacillates in his references to Christ’s sufferings, speak-
ing of them at times as eternal, and again as age-long,
with the suggestion in the latter case that they date from
the creation of or the primal fall of man.^ But if Christ
suffered not eternally, but only from the time of man’s fall,
is not the tension between the historical and the supra-his-
torical merely retained in another manner—for it his suf-
ferings are not eternal, do not all the tensions remain which
Strong had urged, on his approach, against the traditional
view of a merely historical suffering on Calvary?
In striving with these inner difficulties of his view,
Strong appeared not to sense, what was apparent to later ex-
ponents of a monistic theology. ’’The modern doctrine of
the divine immanence
,
!
’ Knudson wrote, ’’does not furnish a
favorable background for the idea of mediation. ,,<c In that
spirit, subsequent personalism cut the ties to the Biblical
view of a once-for-all propitiatory atonement. Strong
1. Strong had replied to the charge that his view "makes
Christ’s atonement compulsory’’ that it ’’only puts Christ’s
original act of free surrender farther back and makes
the sacrifice contemporaneous with creation (CCEM, 79)
but this distinction seemed again to destroy the moral
necessity for atonement on which he also insisted.
2. Knudson, DOR, 376-379* Bowne had shown the way here also,
by coupling his belief in redemption with vigorous cri-
ticism of the doctrine of substitutionary atonement or
penal satisfaction (McConnell, BPB, 196-199). His de-
tailed treatment appeared in SIC, 113-163.
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thought that the emphases on substitution and sharing
could be retained mutually, in his newer statement of the
doctrine, but in subsequent theology influences by monis-
tic immanence, the emphasis on redemption by incorporation
displayed that on redemption by mediation.
vi. Eschatology
Especially at one point in Strong’s eschatology—and
the supremely important one—did ethical monism appear to
have implications other than those which he associated with
his newer views. That is the doctrine of the future des-
tiny of all mankind.
Strong, it will be recalled, insisted unreservedly on
the eternal punishment of the impenitent, and denied the
possibility of a second probation. But there was an element
in his theology, as shaped by ethical monism, which seemed
to demand, instead, a doctrine of universal restoration.
For if Christ, as the life of humanity, was so impli-
cated in human sinfulness that it was necessary for him to
provide atonement, does not the necessity for the applica-
tion of the atonement also follow? If the sinfulness of
man is so rooted in Christ, as humanity’s life, that he sus-
tains a natural race guilt, is not the obligation on his
part, assuming Strong’s systematization, not merely that of
providing a conditional atonement, but rather one of apply-
ing that atonement to all finite creatures, whether angelic
or human, whom Christ sustains? It is true that Strong
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held that no man is finally condemned on account of race
guilt, but that Christ’s sacrifice atoned for racial sin;
it is for their personal rejection of Christ, in which the
will consents to Adamic revolt, and the refusal to appro-
priate the redemption from personal guilt available in
Christ, for which men are punished. But is not Christ the
life of humanity also, in regard to post-Adamic sin, no
less than in regard to Adamic sin? If his union with the
race in the one instance is such that he is obligated to
provide atonement, does this not require at the same time
a universal extension of the principle? ./as it possible
for Strong, on his own premises, to defend eternal punish-
ment of the wicked against the doctrine of universal resto-
ration? Behrends thought not, and, in expressing his views,
furnished at the same time an anticipation of the direction
in which liberal personalism was destined to move once the
new immanence was applied more thoroughly than in Strong’s
approach, by the elimination of any necessity for substitu-
tionary atonement at all, because of a prior elimination of
any principle in the divine nature which requires propitia-
tion. When this step was taken in subsequent personalistic
thought, the new immanence had worked itself around to the
denial of what Strong had insisted upon most vigorously in
his 1907 preface, that the divine holiness is not merely a
form of the divine love. But Strong had introduced tensions
unrelievable within a monistic structure into his defense
r
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of an alternative view. It was with prophetic insight
that Behrends asked, how can
universal restoration be logically
evaded, though Dr. Strong declines to
push his Ghristology to this extreme?
But others will do it even if he does
not.
For subsequent personalism was united in its rejection of
the doctrine of eternal punishment, though it divided over
2the doctrine of a conditional immortality and the notion
of universal restoration.-^ The abandonment of eternal pun-
ishment derived from the assignment of a greater value to
human personality in its present state, assumed to be moral-
ly continuous with God, than that assigned by traditional
theology, which made divine creation and redemption of man
as sinner the joint determinants of value.
1. Behrends, Art. (1895), 369.
2. Knuason seems open to this alternative (DOR, 469), which
Brightman also avows
.
3. Bowne rejected conditional immortality, contending that
personal immortality provides a necessary opportunity for
the expansion of human life (McConnell, BPB, 221) and,
in the same tradition, L. Harold DeVfolf rejects condition-
al immortality, contending, among other arguments, that
every human soul is intrinsically valuable (cf. article
on "immortality, conditional” in An encyclopedia of Re -
ligion [Vergilius Fern, editcq]
,
362-3o3 [Hew York: The
Philosophical Library, 19453)*
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CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation is an attempt to determine the
influence of personalistic idealism upon the theology
of Augustus Hopkins Strong, who became through his teach-
ing, writing and speaking ministries the most influential
theologian of the Northern Baptists.
The dissertation seeks to answer three questions:
(1) to what extent were Strong 1 s convictions colored by
the growing monistic philosophy of intensified divine im-
manence? (2) what were the interactions and processes,
so far as they are discoverable, by which this transition
was encouraged and facilitated? (3) was the final formu-
lation of Strong 1 s theology, which took the form of "ethi-
cal monism", of such a nature by virtue of organic consis-
tency that it afforded a coherent system secure against
the possibility of necessary modification?
The observations which have hitherto been made on
these three points have been of the general, somewhat dis-
connected nature of reviews of Strong’s works, or brief
articles or series of articles inquiring into his theology;
to the author’s knowledge, no detailed, systematic study
has been made of Strong’s views across the years, in an
effort to provide a definitive study pertaining to the
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questions stated above. The more thorough study has been
discouraged in some measure, doubtless, by the unsystem-
atic integration of Strong’s later personalistic views
into his earlier evangelical theology, without a thorough
revision of the earlier system, but rather by way of ab-
sorption, modification, and limited revision. The fact
that Strong's final revised theology continued to be used
for decades, and is used to this day, in some of the conser
vative Baptist divinity schools, with an emphasis on his
evangelical commitments and the elimination of the "monis-
tic concessions" indicates the absence of an actual matu-
ration to the implications of the newer view to which
Strong professed loyalties. The originality of this study,
then, is to be found in its effort to suggest the rather
obscure influences which operated upon him directly; to
specify in a thorough manner the precise element of change
which entered his theological views under personalistic
influences; and to evaluate in an extended manner the in-
ternal self-consistency of the final statement of Strong's
beliefs. The bibliography will indicate the volumes which
were useful in the fulfillment of this endeavor.
The author's conclusions are as follows:
(1) Although Strong tended to state his revisions in
the interest of ethical monism as acceptable modifications
of a basic evangelical framework, he had in fact subscribed
to a new theory of religious knowledge which, by its empha-
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sis on inner rther than external authority, would have in-
volved him, if consistently applied, in theological changes
far beyond his expressed intentions.
(2) Strong’s partial application of this principle was
such that his revised theology was not fully acceptable to
either conservatives or liberals; not to the former, because
of the concessions to the latter; not to the latter, because
of concessions to the former.
(3) The influences which Strong suggests as encourag-
ing his adoption of an intensified divine immanence include
Ezekiel G. Robinson, -is former teacher; Hermann Lotze,
and his leading American interpreter in Strong 1 s day,
Borden P. Bowne. This study casts doubt on any substantial
influence from Robinson in this direction. The precise man-
ner in which Strong effectively came in touch with Lotze’
s
views remains undiscerned; even a son of the Rochester theo-
logian, who studied theology in his father’s classroom,
stated that the father concentrated on the results, rather
than on the processes, of his thinking. There is nothing
to indicate that Strong’s trip to Germany, coming as it
did in his earlier years, was an important factor in this
connection. The evidence points rather to the American
exponents of Lotze who were active in the lS90’s, and from
Strong’s frequent quotation and expressed appreciation of
Bowne ’s writings especially, it would appear that Bowne,
if not the central influence, v.Tas at least one of the major
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contributors, directly or indirectly, to Strong’s adoption
of the philosophy of immanence.
(4) Strong’s ’’ethical monism” had a vital element of
discontinuity, as well as of continuity, with the Lotze-
Bowne tradition. Although Strong’s expressed intentions
mark him as an exponent of qualitative monism and quanti-
tative pluralism, the pluralistic .element in his system is
compromised by expressions which the radical pluralism of
contemporary personalistic idealists, and Bowne before them
would not have tolerated. Strong’s intentions, however,
are clear, both from his express statements, and from the
serious view of sin and the need of divine redemption which
is a central factor in his system. But, contrasted with
the compromise of the pluralistic element in Strong’s theo-
logy, the tradition of personalistic idealism places a su-
perior emphasis on divine transcendence in God’s relation-
ship to human selves. If Strong’s qualitative pluralism
appears at times to have been obscured, the same may be
said of his quantitative monism, in view of his refusal to
break entirely with a substance philosophy.
(5) Although the Biblical and Christological interest
was peculiarly central in Borne, his system involved a more
fundamental shift from revelational theism than did Strong’
and the tendency of contemporary personalistic idealism has
been to move still further than Strong from the traditional
Protestant theology, in the interest of a more consistent
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application of the emphasis on the heightened divine im-
manence to which Strong subscribed.
(6) Strong himself, in view of his insistence on the
doctrine of the Trinity, the deity of Christ, substitution-
ary atonement and supernatural regeneration, as involved in
the very warp and woof of Biblical Christianity, would
probably have chosen evangelical Christianity rather than
contemporary personalism, if he had felt the options were
thus limited.
(7) Strong’s revision of traditional doctrines, in the
interest of metaphysical monism, discloses a halfness and
hesitancy, because of his conviction that the old and the
new could be retained as two phases of a deeper truth,
without the necessity for absorbing one in terms of the
other. This is illustrated by his appropriation of the no-
tions both of substitution and of sharing with regard to
the atonement; again, in his hesitation to break completely
with a substance philosophy; further, the derivation of the
necessity of atonement, but not of its application, from hi
view of Christ’s union with the race.
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The theology of Northern Baptists has been influenced
for two generations by Augustus Hop kins Strong {1336-1921},
not only through his instruction of divinity students at
Rochester Theological Seminary (1372-1921;, but through
his Systematic Theology which, in numerous revisions, was
studied by Baptist teachers and clergymen, and became in
time the more or less standard theology text of the con-
servative Baptist seminaries of the North . In 1S91 Strong
published a series of articles espousing the new philosophy
of immanence, essentially in the lotzean tradition, and
set forth the initial statement of his "ethical monism
,
'
which term he applied to his theology as recast in the
interest of the heightened emphasis on divine immanence.
There has been no adequate exposition nor thorough appraisal
of the factors which encouraged Strong T s acceptance of meta-
physical monism, nor of the detailed changes which this step
involved for his system of theological thought. The purpose
of this dissertation is to help to remove this lacuna in
the story of the influence of personalistic idealism upon
the theological thought of America.
The movement of the dissertation is both historical and
ideological. Its three major areas of study are (1) the
earlier theology of Augustus Hopkins Strong; (2) the later
interaction with personalistic idealism; (3) the evaluation
of Strong' s final position.
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I . The earlier theology of Augustus Hopkins Strong; :
The study begins with Strong T s upbringing in a Christian
home and his conversion, like his father before him, under
the preaching of Charles G. Finney. The transition from
Arminianism to Calvinism was made in his divinity studies
at Rochester Theological Seminary, where his theology in-
structor was Ezekiel G. Robinson. Robinson’s theology was
in the main evangelical and in the Calvinistic tradition,
although Kant’s metaphysical reserve colored the treatment
of the divine attributes and the Trinity, and the new
theology had encouraged a kenotic , Christology and dis-
couraged a forensic soteriology. When Strong began teach-
ing in Rochester, as Robinson’s successor, he took sub-
stantially more traditional ground, although he shared
Robinson’s indecision whether the creation of man was
mediate or immediate. To discourage dependence upon Robin-
* *
son’s lectures, Strong prepared his first lectures de novo
,
although he carried over the same fluctuating appeal to
both revelation and philosophy, without developing clearly
the precise relationship between the two. But there appears
little substantial ground, so far as the study could dis-
cover, for the opinion, which Strong himself encouraged,
that an incentive to his adoption of qualitative monism
could be found in the theology of Robinson before him.
Strong’s espousal of theistic evolution came before his
adoption of monism. As late as lSBS, in fact, Strong wrote
a strongly negative essay on modern idealism, viewing it as
in all its forms a competitor to the Biblical tradition.
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II. The later interaction with personalistic idealism :
In 1694 Strong contributed three articles to The Examiner ,
tentatively adopting "ethical monism"—a metaphysical monism
and psychological dualism of the Lotzean kind, as he called it.
The chief American influence in this direction appears to ha^e
been the writings of Borden P. Bowne, so that Strong became,
in intent, a champion of qualitative monism and quantitative
pluralism. The 1696 revision of Strong’s theology limited
the application of the new immanentism to the doctrines of
preservation and atonement. In numerous essays and public ad-
dresses, however, Strong applied the monistic view to the va-
rious evangelical doctrines and in 1699 issued Christ in Crea-
tion and bthical Monism
,
which contains the 1694 articles and
subsequent addresses and essays pertaining to the theme. The
effect of an intensified immanence upon his theological struc-
ture is best seen in his final theology revision, in 1907
,
in
which his debt to Bowne is apparent, but even here Strong’s
tendency was to incorporate the modifications by way of supple-
mentary comment, rather than by a thorough redaction of his po-
sition. Strong left no doubt, in the 1907 preface, that monism
must not be permitted to interfere with the historic Christian
doctrines of the Trinity, the deity and atonement of Christ,
supernatural regeneration, and other evangelical doctrines.
That he maintained this dual insistence on the newer immanence
and the traditional theological structure, in the context of
theistic evolution and a modified higher criticism, is indi-
cated by his valedictory volume, What Shall I Believe? (1922).
The espousal of ethical monism intensified the twofold appeal
to revelation and philosophy, latent both in Strong’s earlier
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views and in those of his teacher, Robinson, and shifted the
justification of traditional theology more and more to a phi-
losophical base. There was no overt rupture with special re-
velation; indeed, the two appeals were often maintained side
by side and in intent, if not in practise, the appeal to reve-
lation was assigned priority still.
III. The evaluation of Strong’s final position :
Encouraged by the new immanentism, Strong had assigned a more
positive significance to general revelation, and sought to
give the evangelical insistence on external Biblical authori-
ty an inner, spiritual foundation. But his position, which
he offered in the hope of reconciling theological liberals
and conservatives, placated neither. Both felt that monistic
immanence was an unsatisfactory handmaid for traditional theo-
logy; the liberals asked the discard of conservative doctrine,
the conservatives urged abandonment of the post-Lotzean philo-
sophy. Both felt Strong had halted mid-way in the shift of
the basis of authority from external to internal grounds; that
his identification of the immanent Logos with the historical
Jesus was such as to create difficulties with trinitarian doc-
trine; that the vocabulary of creation alone had been retained
that the tendency to find latent anticipation of prophetic
knowledge in universal experience, and the inclination to make
divine purpose or subjective conviction rather than a distinc-
tion between natural and supernatural the criterion of miracle
actually precluded an appeal to special revelation in the
traditional sense; that a heightened immanence negatived view-
ing man as guilty by virtue of racial implication in an Adamic
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fall; that a kenosis Christology could afford but temporary
satisfaction; that any union of deity with the race which ne-
cessitated atonement would also necessitate its application,
so that there could be no antecedent obstacle to the divine
forgiveness of sinners, and the doctrine of eternal punish-
ment must be abandoned; that the view of intensified divine
immanence is not compatible with the traditional doctrinal
emphasis on mediation. In all these affirmations, subsequent
personalistic idealism declared against Strong, and in so do-
ing upheld the insight both of evangelical and of liberal
thinkers of his day, that the ethical monism which he offered
as the reconciliation of competing theological moods in his
day must be dismissed as unsatisfactory, for it lacked the
inner self-consistency and coherence to safeguard against the
possibilities of further modification. The departure from
the traditional Protestant belief in a -scripturally based
revelation involved, in its interactions with metaphysical
monism and psychological dualism, revision far more extensive
than that which Strong was ready to accept. But there was
another significant difficulty in Strong’s ethical monism
which renders it unsatisfactory not only to thinkers outside
the Bowne-Lotze tradition, but also to exponents of persona-
listic idealism. For Strong had not been thorough-going in
his affirmation of qualitative monism, in view of the reten-
tion of a "ghost” substance theory, and he had not uncompro-
misingly affirmed quantitative pluralism, in view of passages
which designate humanity as a finite, graded manifestation of
God. At both points his ethical monism is objectionable to
contemporary personalistic idealists.
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BIOGRAPHY
I was born January 22, 1913, in New York City, the oldest
of eight children of German immigrant parents. At that time
German was the only language spoken in our East Side tenement
house, but the international feelings aroused by World War I
soon occasioned its complete disuse for English. I attended
kindergarten and the initial primary grades in New York City
until 1919, when my parents moved to a Long Island farm.
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I finished grade school and attended the first two years of
high school, the highest offerings there available, in
Central Islip, and completed high school in Islip in 1929,
at the age of 16.
Upon graduation from high school, I went to work as a
weekly newspaper reporter, an activity for which I had ac-
quired a fondness during high school sports reporting days.
From a local reporter for The Islip Press I became an assis-
tant editor, and then relief editor for the Suffolk Consoli-
dated Press Company, Inc., which in 1933 assigned to me the
editorship of The Smithtown Star
,
an appointment which made
me the youngest or second youngest editor of a weekly in
New York State. During those Long Island newspaper years,
in which I was converted to Christianity, I served as subur-
ban reporter for the Standard News Association, New York
Herald Tribune
,
New York Times
,
and Mew York Daily News .
In 1935 I attended Wheaton College, in Illinois, con-
tinuing my newspaper activities as DuPage county reporter
for the Chicago Daily Tribune and the Elgin Courier News .
I received my B.A. degree from Wheaton in 193 3, and three
years later, in 1941, the M.A. degree. Meanwhile, I had
begun studies at Northern Baptist Theological Seminary,
Chicago, from which in 1940 I received the B.D. degree, and
in 1942 the Th.D. degree. Special courses or summer studies
were also taken at Loyola University, Indiana University,
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and Boston University, where I became a candidate for the
Ph.D. degree in 1946.
Upon completion of theological studies, I was named
associate professor of theology and philosophy at Northern
Baptist Theological Seminary, from 1942-43; then professor
of theology and philosophy, 1943-44; then chairman of the
department of theology and philosophy of religion, 1944-47.
With the organization of Fuller Theological Seminary in
Pasadena, California, I became professor of theology and
Christian philosophy in 1947, and served during the school’s
initial year as acting dean. In 1946-47 I was visiting
professor of theology at Wheaton College, and have served as
visiting professor at Gordon Divinity School, in Boston,
Massachusetts, during the summers of 1946-43.
My publications are: (editor) Not By Bread Alone
(Wheaton College chapel addresses) (Zondervan, 1939);
A Doorway to Heaven (Zondervan, 1942); Successful Chur ch
Publicity (Zondervan, 1943); Remaking the Modern Mind
(Eerdmans, 1946)
;
The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamen-
talism (Eerdmans, 1946); Notes on the Doctrine of God
(Wilde, 1943); The Protestant Dilemma (Eerdmans, 1943).
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